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ABSTRACT 
This research exposed some of the factors that affected organisational culture 
and group behaviour in Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) from its 
inception in 2007 through to 2014, when it became a Bespoke Trading Entity.   
The factors that were examined included organisationally legitimised personal, 
social and geographic identity, and linguistic difference and group size.  Metaphor 
was also used by group members to describe the relationship they had with their 
groups. Group size was another factor that affected group behaviour.  Finally, the 
effects of socio-technical induction and socio-cultural integration were seen to be 
additional factors that allowed cultural drag to occur within DE&S.   
The research was an insider ethnographic study that used a qualitative, multi-
factorial approach which encompassed 6 years of observations, 124 interviews, 
and included the analysis of appropriate DE&S policy documents.  This thesis is 
considered to be unique because no research of this nature, or at this level, has 
been carried out in DE&S, the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) and the 
Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO).  In addition, no studies have investigated 
the organisational culture of DE&S, apart from Kirke (2007a unpublished), Kirke 
(2010), which was a published article that was informed by that pilot study. 
The factors that were identified combined to produce both an organisation that 
possessed multiple organisational cultures and one single ethos which was that 
of delivering equipment to troops and supporting the troops, described as ‘front-
line-first’.  There was also an organisational culture that was affected by both the 
socio-technical and socio-cultural interactions of its members and of unconscious 
behaviours.  All of those factors acted together as a system of interactions, with 
different factors taking primacy depending on the organisational context, no 
single factor being consistently more important than any other.  The ethos of 
“front-line-first” was embedded within the DE&S organisational culture as a value 
which may have been used as a metaphor for the primacy of the overarching 
organisational culture of supporting the front-line.   
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 GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Acronyms and Abbreviations Expansion 
ABW Abbeywood 
A&DC. Assessment And Development 
Centre. 
Used by MOD, to assess suitability of staff for 
promotion between broader banded civilian 
grades.  Phased out in 2013. 
DE&S Defence Equipment and Support 
DPA Defence Procurement Agency 
DLO Defence Logistics Organisation 
IPT Integrated Project Team, Isolated Project 
Team 
LFE Learning From Experience.  A required 
method of identifying practice and process 
lessons within project management.  Initially 
developed from a DPA ethos. (Jordan et al., 
1988) Prevalent throughout DE&S. 
MOD Ministry of Defence  
PRG Policy Rules and Guidance 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RN Royal Navy 
SCS  
*to denote hierarchical grade  
Words in italics Words in italics are contested terms or 
vernacular phrases 
‘ ‘ Mark quotations from respondents 
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DEFINITIONS 
Term Meaning 
Contracting for Capability (CfC) Under a Contracting for Capability (CfC) 
contract industry would be required to deliver 
a complete capability, which would include 
operators and maintainers and all of the 
support.1 
Front Line First Concept of supporting Soldiers, Sailors and 
Aircrew, who ever they are and wherever they 
are. 
Banter 
 
The playful and friendly exchange of teasing 
remarks. 
 
Military capability 
 
The ability to achieve a specified wartime 
objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target 
set). It includes four major components: force 
structure, modernization, readiness, and 
sustainability. 
Floor-plate A distinct, functional area within a 
Neighbourhood of Abbeywood, usually, but 
not exclusively, home to a single functional 
group or team. 
Neighbourhood A single building within Abbeywood, home to 
usually, but not exclusively one Operating 
Centre. 
Acquisition Hub The geographical area defined by Bath, Bristol 
and Corsham where DPA and DLO activities 
were collocated to form DE&S. 
Pragmademic Describes the act of bridging the pragmatic, 
work based elements and the academic 
elements of a project.  Used by Patching in the 
context of soft systems analysis (Patching, 
1990) 
Socio-technical Linking the people, the socio, of an 
organisation, with the technical processes, 
rules and constructs of an organisation (Trist, 
1981, Cummings and Srivastva, 1977, Trist, 
1978) 
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Socio-cultural Linking the people, the socio, with the cultural 
norms of their groups.  
Match Fit A phrase to denote a changed DE&S as a 
Bespoke Trading Entity, with world class 
processes and  ‘a One DE&S way of carrying 
out its work 
Managed Service Provider (MSP) The managed service provider (MSP) 
contracts are being brought in to drive the 
DE&S transformation programme by 
providing skilled personnel who have the 
expertise and past experience in 
implementing transformational change in 
organisations as large and complex as DE&S. 
(MOD, 2014c) 
 
 1 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Chapter One introduces the research organisation, Defence Equipment and 
Support (DE&S).  It also introduces the research question and some of the 
reasons that led to the research being carried out.  
This research was a snapshot of the elements of the organizational culture of 
DE&S between 2008 and 2014.  The factors that contributed to the organisational 
cultures were investigated through a “trouble case” lens  as described by Kaufert 
et al. (1984).  This line of enquiry was not a deliberate strategy, rather it developed 
from the data.  The use of this method enabled a narrative to be developed that 
took extreme examples of group, personal and organisational behaviour and 
allowed the explanation of the underlying story to provide reasons for that 
particular behaviour being exhibited.  This approach also allowed comparison to 
be made between the technical rules that DE&S provided and staff behaviour, 
which was seen to be pragmatic custom and practice.   
The aim of this research was to investigate the organisational culture within a 
department of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Defence Equipment and Support 
(DE&S).  It did this by firstly identifying the organisational culture of DE&S and 
then explaining it.   
Accordingly the research question that this research set out to answer was:   
‘What factors affected the organisational culture of DE&S? between 2008 and 
2014’. 
 
The research contributes new knowledge because it describes group behaviours 
and organisational cultures that were generally recognized within DE&S and its 
precursor organisations by those considered to be outsiders, but which had not 
previously been subject to in-depth academic study.   
 2 
 
The researcher had unprecedented access within this closed organisation 
between 2008 and 2014 because he was employed as an established civil 
servant in DE&S.2   
1.1.1  The Research Domain 
The research was carried out in the Ministry of Defence (MOD): Defence 
Equipment and Support (DE&S).  In 2007 the Defence Procurement Agency 
(DPA) and the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) were merged to form a new 
single organisation called Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S).  DE&S was 
created in order to “improve financial planning by ensuring that new equipment 
and its in-service support costs were planned more coherently”.  MOD (2006 
Section 3, para 20).  This overarching aim was defined politically for DE&S at a 
governmental level in 2006 and it differed substantially from the aims that the 
DPA and the DLO held as individual organisations.  The aims were, in DPA, “To 
equip the Armed Forces”, (Office, 2005) and in the DLO, to “Deliver Logistics for 
Operations”. (The National Archive, 2007).  These individual aims could be 
thought to be contradictory because the DPA procured equipment and did not 
have to support it, and the DLO supported it, without having a say in what 
equipment was bought.   
The research was geographically constrained by the location of what was called 
the Acquisition Hub, which comprised: Corsham in Wiltshire, Ensleigh and Foxhill 
in Bath, and Abbeywood in Bristol.   
Within the overall organisation of the MOD, DE&S was a Top Level Budget 
(TLB).3   During the period of the research, DE&S comprised 27,0004 staff in total 
and had a worldwide presence.  The Headquarters were in Abbeywood, Bristol, 
where approximately 6,687 people5 were based.   
                                            
2 Informal observations started in 2005 on the researcher joining the DPA, and subsequently moving into 
DE&S with the merger of the DPA and the DLO. 
3 An organisation construct that was part of MOD, but possessed a high degree of autonomy from MOD.   
4 This figure was valid in 2009 as part of Strategic Defence and Security Review in 2012 the staff 
numbers were reduced to 18,000 approx. 
5 Including consultants and others such as contractors.  
 3 
 
DE&S was, and still is, responsible for the procurement of the UK defence 
equipment capability, and for the support and disposal of that capability.  This 
capability ranged from the provisioning of food to the military, to the procurement 
of major military systems, such as submarines, ships, or aircraft.  It was therefore 
a Programme and Project Management organisation.   
The mission statement of DE&S is: “To equip and support our Armed Forces for 
operations now and in the future.”6  This statement combines elements of the 
DPA and DLO mission statements.  The range of skills and functions within DE&S 
includes engineers, Programme and Project Managers, Commercial negotiators 
and Financial Controllers.  “All of whom are focussed on ensuring the right 
equipment and support is available to our customers and users.”7.   To achieve 
these aims DE&S is structured in the manner shown in Figure 1-1. 
 
                                            
6 DE&S Business plan 2010-2013, page 2. 
7 DE&S Corporate Plan 2015-2016-p 5. 
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Figure 1-1 Simplified Organisational Structure of DE&S 
Source: DE&S Corporate Overview Presentation 
In order to carry out those responsibilities military personnel who worked 
alongside civilian staff, made up approximately 12% of the staff population.8  
During the period of the research, in DE&S, there were varying ratios of military 
personnel to civil servants.  The ratio depended on both the type of work to be 
carried out and the domain within which the Operating Centre was based.  Some 
Operating Centres were fully staffed by Civil servants, while others may have had 
in specific project teams up to 80% military personnel.  At the time of the research, 
DE&S was led by a member of the Senior Civil Service, (SCS) of 4* grade.  A 
star grade (*) is a signifier of a pay band within the Military and also the Civil 
Service where the person holds a rank that is above B1 or military equivalent. 
Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM) and functional groups were led by an SCS 3* 
civil servant, the military equivalent being a 3* military officer. Table 1-1 shows 
how military and civilian ranks are marked and their equivalence within DE&S.  
These functional group leaders were labelled either a Chief of Materiel (Land, Air 
or Maritime), or a civilian Director (Finance, Commercial, Joint Enablers or 
Human Resources).  Chiefs of Materiel (COM), areas were further broken down 
into Operating Centres, which were led by an SCS 2* military or rank equivalent 
civil servant.   
In terms of organisational structures, DE&S comprised a number of 3* Chiefs of 
Materiel, who were served by 2* Operating Centres, Operating Centres which 
were responsible for delivering equipment capability such as Armoured Fighting 
Vehicles, Surface Ships, or Submarines or Combat Air capability.  Operating 
Centres were further divided into Pillars or business Units and Delivery Teams 
whose role was to deliver a specific item of equipment, and also Support Groups, 
who provided services such as commercial, or finance expertise and support to 
Project Teams.  Delivery Teams were divided into Role Teams or Project Teams, 
                                            
8 1106 at 20 Oct 2010, Source DE&S Secretariat.  The organisation of DE&S is described in more detail in 
section 4.2. 
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responsible for delivering a single element of a project.  These groups contained 
a mix of military personnel, Civil Service personnel, contractors and industry staff.  
All of these groups varied in size and function.  Functionally these areas were 
defined by the types of capability that they delivered, or by the function that they 
performed.   
Project Teams were responsible within an equipment domain for the delivery of 
a specific project or capability, for example, a weapon system, or platform, such 
as a ship.  Project and Delivery Teams could comprise varying levels of Civil 
Service and military personnel.  Each Operating Centre, Delivery Team, Role 
Team, or Support Group was found to possess its own physical boundary, 
organisational dialect, identity, and boundary of responsibility and function.  
These organisationally formalised groups within DE&S were essentially the same 
as had existed in the DPA and the DLO.   Some groups that procured and 
supported equipment were merged in order to provide what was termed a through 
life approach to equipment procurement and support, while others remained 
unchanged.  This through life approach was defined in a policy document, JSP 
886.  JSP 886 is a repository for Defence logistics policy, processes and 
guidance.  JSP 886 is intended to be used by Defence Equipment and Support 
(DE&S) and Front Line Command (FLC) logistic staff and, to an increasing 
degree, by Industry (DE&S). It comprises seven volumes and underpinned both 
the methods of acquisition and support of equipment but also the bureaucracy of 
DE&S.   
To help the reader to understand one of the differences between civilian staff and 
military who worked alongside each other the differences in assigned rank labels 
are shown in Table 1-1.   
 
 6 
 
 Civil Service Pay 
Band 
British Army  Royal Navy Royal Air Force 
Serial 
1  
SCS - Senior Civil 
Service Pay Band 
4 
General 4* Admiral 4* Air Chief Marshal 4* 
Serial 
2 
SCS- Senior Civil 
Service Pay Band 
3 
Lieutenant 
General 3* 
Vice Admiral 3* Air Marshal 3* 
Serial 
3 
SCS - Senior Civil 
Service Pay Band 
2 
Major General 2* Rear Admiral 2* Air Vice Marshal 2* 
Serial 
4 
SCS - Senior Civil 
Service Pay Band 
1 
Brigadier 1* Commodore 1* Air Commodore 1* 
Serial 
5 
B1 Colonel Captain Group Captain 
Serial 
6 
B2 Lieutenant 
Colonel 
Commander Wing Commander 
Serial 
7 
C1 Major Lieutenant 
Commander 
Squadron Leader 
Serial 
8 
C2 Captain Lieutenant Flight Lieutenant 
Serial 
9 
D 2nd Lieutenant Sub-Lieutenant Flying Officer 
Serial 
10 
E1  WO19 WO1 WO1 
                                            
9 Warrant Officer 1st  Class. 
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 Civil Service Pay 
Band 
British Army  Royal Navy Royal Air Force 
Serial 
11 
E2 WO210 WO2 Flight Sergeant 
Table 1-1 Grade and Rank Equivalence Table   
Table 1-1 shows the rank equivalence between members of the Civil Service and 
members of the British Armed Forces. Senior leadership grades are serial 
numbers 1-4, leadership grades are serial numbers 5-6, management grades are 
serial numbers 7-8 and administrative grades are serial numbers 9-11. 
The groups in DE&S were observed during the course of the research to have 
many similarities to the groups that comprised the DPA and the DLO, the 
organisations that had preceded DE&S.  Many of those groups were located in 
the same geographical locations where they had always been, until Ensleigh, 
Foxhill and other geographical locations outside Bristol were closed down 
between 2010-2012.11 Some other groups moved into DE&S organisationally 
from Portsmouth, but there was no re-location of staff from Portsmouth to Bristol 
as there was with staff from, for example, Andover.  Some DE&S staff remained 
in the locations where they had worked previously, such as naval bases and other 
depots.   
The functional groups in DE&S used many of the same organisational processes 
that they had always used, whether they had been in the DPA or the DLO, even 
though other processes were implemented by the new DE&S.  They also supplied 
the same customers, ‘The Front Line’,12 with the same equipment, purchased 
from the same suppliers.  It might therefore be asked, ‘what changed when DE&S 
was created?’ And many members of DE&S did indeed ask that question.  This 
research answers that question in Chapters four and five. Within DE&S, as in any 
                                            
10 Warrant Officer 2nd Class. 
11 Some groups from Andover and Wyton were also moved to Abbeywood during this period. 
12 The Armed Services and Front Line Commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force. 
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large organisation, there were many different groups with distinct differences 
between them.   
Each formally legitimised group was observed to possess its own ways of doing 
things, symbols, and subtleties of group language.   
The linguistic subtleties described in this research could be described as 
organisational dialects.  Examples of this were “Jack-speak” (Jolly, 2008b) or 
‘MOD-speak’13 and these could be described as manifestations of in-group 
language.  Each group was also seen to possess their own symbols of social 
identity, for example, the lanyards or badges that signified affiliation with an 
Operating Centre, team or equipment.  Photography was used to capture and 
present these manifestations of personal, group, and geographic identity, as 
shown in Chapter 4.   
Five major formal groups and group identities were recognized within DE&S.  
Those identities were the British Army, Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, the Civil 
Service and also contractors and industry personnel.  These groups existed in 
addition to and quite separately from the formal structure of the Operating 
Centres, in that all the personnel within each Operating Centre were members of 
one of these other groups in addition to being a member of the Operating Centre, 
no matter how transient that membership may have been.   
Within each of these major groups, there were numerous sub-groups.  Each of 
these sub-groups possessed individual, specific, and sometimes overlapping 
manifestations of social and personal identity, some of which may have been 
influenced by their primary service.  In the Army, for example, Thornberrow 
(2001) and Cooke (2008) separately identified that there was a strong 
identification between individuals according to cap badge.  In the RAF, there 
appeared to be a strong distinction between ground-crew and air-crew, squadron, 
and aircraft type.  In the Royal Navy, the groups identified themselves by 
                                            
13 A pejorative term for closed group Civil Service jargon.   
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speciality and service, or the distinction between small ships and large ships and 
surface ships and submarines.   
In 2012, Kirke completed a separate cross-cultural study within the MOD, that 
identified the group characterisations that group members used to create 
boundaries between themselves and other groups (Kirke, 2012).  He found that 
the British Army, Royal Air Force and Royal Navy all exhibited inter-service 
rivalry; the inter-services sports competitions being one of the formal 
manifestation of this rivalry.  Within the Civil Service, distinctions between groups 
were made at a high level by role, profession or function, for example, engineer, 
accountant, commercial or project manager, as well as by Operating Centre or 
Role Team.   
Some of these groups were formally constituted and others were informal self-
forming and self-organising groups.  These self-forming groups formed around 
personal interest, such as the smokers or football team supporters.  These groups 
were multi-faceted and could appear and disappear very quickly.  An example is 
the Abbeywood Field Gun Crew, which formed every year from new and 
consisted of military personnel who were the only people allowed to crew the 
Field Gun, both in practices and in the competition itself (MOD, 2013b) and civil 
servants who were only allowed to act as support crew.   
There has been much work carried out on group identity in organisations and 
communities see for example Smeltzer and Flores (1986), Ellemers (2005), 
Haslam (2003b), (2001 ), Joenson (2008), Livingstone et al. (2011), Mael and 
Ashforth (1995), and Samuels (2009).  It appears, however, that there has been 
no published study of this type and level of academic enquiry carried out in DE&S.  
However there was an unpublished study by Kirke (2007a), which was a small 
pilot for future work which was not funded.  This was later used to support a paper 
on organisational culture and defence acquisition in the MOD (Kirke, 2010).  
However, organisational culture has been a regular topic for MBA (Masters of 
Business Administration) and also Defence Acquisition Management MSc 
dissertations, for example, Bain (2008), discusses the ‘tribes’ and their cultural 
differences within one Operating Centre within the DPA.   
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In relation to organisational culture in the wider MOD, in 2012, the following was 
published in a Ministry of Defence in-house magazine: 
‘Interviewer: “How do you see the link between civilians and military, with all the 
change do you think we might become poor relations?’’’ 
“I guess this is a tribal thing, each of the services compares themselves to 
the other two, and we civilians compare ourselves to them.  That is human 
nature isn't it?”  (MOD, 2011)   
This study provides a unique opportunity to investigate elements of the 
organisational culture of DE&S.   
DE&S was a closed organisation with a consistent turnover of military personnel 
that was itself unique within the United Kingdom and had not been researched 
extensively or in any depth before.  The research is an insider investigation of 
factors that affected the DE&S organisational culture and the behaviours of the 
groups of which the researcher was a both a member, and also an observer, of.   
In terms of identities, the researcher was a substantive civil servant and 
performed a dual role as both a civil servant and as a researcher.  The genesis 
of this research occurred when the researcher took up a post in the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD) at the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA), at Abbeywood in 
2005.  The following extract is from a conversation that the researcher had with 
a military officer.  It shows that the creation of “the other”, as described by for 
example, Goffman (1959:p 18), co-existed alongside other forms of loyalty within 
the DPA:   
‘The respondent approached my team with a question about contracting 
for capability, another Integrated Project Team (IPT) had, the previous 
week, sent the team a report on their work on that subject.  I, [the 
researcher] told him this and gave him the name of the person to contact.  
His reply was surprising, ‘I am not going to talk to them, what do they know, 
they are the RAF, we are the Army’’ (Shaw, 2005). 
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The researcher concluded at that time, that perhaps the inter-group behaviours 
that he observed in the DPA were affecting the organisation's ability to share 
lessons, the facilitation of which was the core functional and professional role of 
the researcher at that time.14   
The desire to investigate to investigate the background to these behaviours lies 
at the heart of this research.  On observing the behaviours shown in the anecdote 
above, the researcher started to ask questions about what might be causing 
those behaviours.   
Was it the fact that the groups were visibly different; for example, through the 
wearing of uniforms, something that appeared to accentuate their differences?  
Difference through dress and its effect on identity was described in a general 
sense by Lurie (1981) in her research on clothing and identity, and also within 
DE&S by Sims (2010 unpublished) and separately (Bain, 2008).15 Reactions to 
clothing in Nursing organisations were also described by, for example, Kluger 
and Rafaeli (1998) and also Rafaeli and Pratt (1993).  Perhaps the behaviours 
were generated by, as Dean (1984) describes, socialisation and team-building 
practices?  Or perhaps the behaviours that were generated were a combination 
of these visible elements and something else that was less obvious?   
It was therefore, as a result of the researcher’s inquisitiveness that the research 
that subsequently developed from questions like these took a “pragmademic” 
form, as described by Patching (1990).  This can be defined as a way of solving 
a business problem through the use of academic research, ethnography and the 
reflective practice of the manager.   
Thus, the manager became a researcher, and in so doing, informed his own 
management practice, by carrying out an insider led, ethnographic study.   
There were many factors that might have warranted consideration during this 
research.   
                                            
14 As team leader of the Learning From Experience team in the DPA.  
15 Sims and Bain remain unpublished. 
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Was there, as Bourdieu (2007) described, something influencing the vernacular 
language of the groups, that turned both the DPA and the DLO and then DE&S 
into self-styled tribal organisations, organisations that would often work for their 
own good, rather than for that of DE&S, or MOD, and that protected themselves 
and their resources? (The Stationery Office, 2012a). 
Was it the Integrated Project Team structure that was the cause of the behaviour?  
After all, in the vernacular, these teams were jokingly called ‘Isolated Project 
Teams’.  These and other questions that underpin this research are contained in 
Appendix A.   
The aim of this research was to answer the research question by reporting the 
results of the research that was carried out between 2008 and 2014 within DE&S.  
The research that supports this research was undertaken by working within the 
boundaries of social science, using techniques from social sciences to study the 
organisational culture of DE&S, its groups, and its members.  The study spans 
the boundaries of the disciplines of social anthropology, sociology, evolutionary 
anthropology, and management theory.  The research applied the theoretical 
frameworks of these disciplines to identify how a series of factors affected the 
organisational culture of DE&S.   
A series of explanations were developed that described the effects that the 
factors under investigation had on group behaviour and organisational culture in 
DE&S.  These explanations are presented, analysed and discussed in Chapters 
4 through to 8.  There appeared to be a multiplicity of factors that affected the 
organisational culture of DE&S.  Therefore, the use of a multi-factorial, multi-
method approach to the research was chosen, an approach that can be likened 
to visiting an optician.   
One’s vision is blurry, one knows something is wrong, but not exactly what the 
problem is.  The optician puts a heavy frame on your face and then puts a lens 
into the frame, you can see a little better, and then another lens is put in, your 
vision gets even better and you get excited as the answer becomes more clear, 
and with the insertion of further lenses you get a better idea of what the answer 
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may be.  The lenses in this case were the various theoretical, analytical, and 
methodological axes which were complementary to each other.  These lenses 
are presented and discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.   
1.1.2  Summary and Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of the thesis is as follows:  Chapter 1 introduces the researcher’s 
chosen subject.  This is achieved through the use of a preamble and background 
information.  Chapter 1 also contains the researcher's reasons for choosing the 
subject and provides background to both the subject and to the organisation that 
was under study.  DE&S as an organisation is described, giving the reader an 
idea of the organisational context that the research was carried out in.   
Chapter 2 contains the critical literature review.  
Chapter 3 describes the methodology and research methods that were used to 
carry out the research.  The methodology includes a description of the 
epistemological, ontological and axiological foundations of the work.  The 
research methods section describes the data gathering and analysis strategy that 
was used to support the research.   
Chapters 4 to 6 report the results of the research.   
Chapter 7 tests the findings and presents the conclusions.   
Chapter 8 discusses the implications for other organisations, organisational 
design and research and also presents an agenda for future research.  
Chapter 9 presents an epilogue and observations of the organisational change 
when DE&S was vested as a Bespoke Government Trading Entity, in April 2014.   
References and a Bibliography are found at the back of this thesis. 
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2. Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 grounds the research question in existing theory.  It achieves this 
grounding by identifying the arguments that are relevant to the thesis, thus 
enabling the researcher to identify gaps in the literature that the research has 
helped to fill.  In addition, this chapter establishes the theoretical, conceptual, and 
disciplinary frameworks that inform the research.  These frameworks make use 
of the sociological concepts of social identity theory, self-categorisation theory, 
socialisation, social and evolutionary anthropology, and organisational 
anthropology.  They inform the conceptual framework of the research, as 
described by Bell (2005: p 102), which was developed through a critical review of 
the relevant ethnographic and sociological literature.  The conceptual framework 
takes the elements of the theoretical framework and seeks to show how they work 
together to affect the organisational culture of DE&S.   
The disciplinary framework takes a broad social science approach, using 
concepts from social anthropology, evolutionary anthropology, management 
theory, life course theory, and social psychology as the basis for the framework.   
The literature review covers an initial survey of what others have written both of 
government organisations and in wider literature.  It critically examines the tools 
and concepts that guide the research process.  There were, however surprises 
that appeared from the data, these areas are discussed in chapter 7.   
 
2.1.1 Navigation 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 examine the field of relevant and similar organisational and 
cultural studies to DE&S.  Sections 2.4 onwards examines overlapping bodies of 
theory that are relevant to this study of DE&S. 
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This research took a broad social sciences approach that is theoretically and 
conceptually pragmatic and multi-stranded, rather than taking a narrower single 
disciplinary approach.  It is from this multi-theoretical point of view that 
organisations, and groups in organisations, were discussed and compared to the 
groups within DE&S.   
2.2 Studies Of and Within United Kingdom Defence, Support 
and Acquisition of Equipment Organisations 
Books have been written by ex-DPA senior staff on defence acquisition, but these 
are not academic texts.  They describe the DPA in a historic and vernacular 
sense: see for example, Kincaid (2008).  There are also very few texts or studies 
that have formally researched the organisational culture of UK Defence 
Acquisition.  Weiss (2005), for example, only touched lightly on the acquisition 
culture within the UK Ministry of Defence. One study within the DPA was carried 
out by Yardley and Neal (2007) who investigated military leadership in the DPA, 
but that study has little relevance to this research, save that the authors identified 
that military personnel view a tour of duty in acquisition as a necessary evil and 
they therefore view a posting in Abbeywood as being transitory.   
There has only been one ethnographic study of DE&S shortly after it was formed.  
This was by Kirke (2007a unpublished)16, in which he describes several things in 
relation to DE&S, the MOD and their intertwined organisational cultures, one of 
which is that of cultural drag which he identifies as a “slowing down of change 
through lack of cooperation by the work force who tend to look back to how things 
were and drag their feet in transition to the new state of affairs desired by their 
management” (Kirke, 2010 p 98).   
Kirke does not identify whether there is an effect from this drag that might be 
caused if organisational processes do not change sufficiently quickly, thereby 
                                            
16 A paper that was developed from this study was published in 2010.  KIRKE, C. 2010. Organisational 
Culture And Defence Acquisition: A Key Internal Factor for MoD. Royal College of Defence Studies. 
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providing the action for socio-technical drag and causing people to be unable to 
change and fulfil any new organisational cultural or behavioural requirements. 
This omission, where Kirke takes a predominantly social view of culture, is not 
surprising given that Kirke is a social anthropologist, not a management theorist.  
Kirke also describes cultural precession, where management implement a set of 
processes to create organisationally positive behaviours, but the group members 
actually behave in different and unexpected ways (Kirke, 2010 p 98), not all of 
which are organisationally positive.  This is not cultural drag, this is an effect of 
the law of unintended consequences, where an organisation implements, in this 
case, a change programme and either does not understand completely what it is 
trying to achieve, or does not understand what ‘unintended consequences’ may 
arise from the implementation.   
What Kirke describes as cultural drag and precession are important aspects of 
organisational change that were considered in detail during the research, as this 
research was undertaken immediately preceding, during and throughout the 
aftermath of major organisational change which was the merger of the DPA and 
the DLO to form DE&S. (Office, 2006)  What Kirke identifies as cultural drag and 
precession also chime with Hofstede (1980 p 27) who says that the history of an 
organisation constrains its options for organisational behaviour, and both history 
and culture may work in tandem to delay organisational change.   
Kirke also carried out a study into cross cultural issues in the four services.  This 
study (2012 p ii), which was carried out across a wide area of the MOD, identified 
that small team cultures tended to reward cohesive behaviour, regardless of the 
(multiple service) cultural composition of the teams.  Kirke also identified that 
stereotypes were developed within Civil Service elements that spoke 
disparagingly, for example, of DE&S civil servants as opposed to those in Head 
Office (Kirke, 2012 p 14).  Kirke identified what he called a site culture, which was 
bounded within a geographical location, such as Abbeywood or Head Office, but 
which also might be as small as a floorplate or side of a building (Kirke, 2012 p 
17), which chimed with his previous finding from DE&S.  Kirke’s work, therefore, 
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indicates that within the parent organisation of DE&S there were cultural, social 
and behavioural structures that were very similar to, and may have influenced 
and been influenced by, those same or similar structures in DE&S.   
Kirke also discusses identity and membership through the use of an “Operating 
Group”, which he defines as: 
“The group of which a person was exercising membership at any one time, 
which takes precedence in those circumstances over all other groups to 
which they belong.  Thus, a member of a team in Abbeywood might have 
as their operating group at work the team itself, a sub-group within the 
team, a cross-team meeting, or a group of old friends with whom they 
normally eat Friday breakfast.  Each group will have slightly different 
conventions of behaviour–different cultures–so how a person behaves will 
be specifically relevant to the group he or she was in at that particular 
moment.”  (2007a p 3)   
Kirke does not give any indication of the size of the groups that he studied, but 
he describes identities that were fluid and changing.  This fluidity of identity 
accords with the work of Watson (2006 p 94).  Kirke develops his view of identity 
further by touching on group identity and associated attitudes to outsiders.  He 
describes these attitudes as being either organisationally positive or negative, 
and based on stereotyping and social categorisation (2010 p 99),  (see also for 
example Bargh. J, 2006, Norander et al., 2011, Billig et al., 1973, Engel, 2010, 
Tajfel, 1979, Tajfel and Turner, 1986).   
Kirke observes social categorisation across all of the major groups that he 
observed for instance, in each arm of the military services and the civil service.  
For example, aircrew differentiated themselves from ground crew, and finance 
civil servants viewed themselves as separate from engineering based civil 
servants (2010 p 99).  This finding was repeated in his Head Office study, (2012 
p iii ).  Kirke also describes how individuals in a purely military environment might 
move very fluidly from one group to another to share knowledge (2007c), chiming 
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with such as Pate et al. (2010), Riketta and Nienaber (2007), Herb and Kaplan 
(1999), Hakenbeck (2007) and separately Ellemers (2005) regarding the 
existence of multiple identities, and also of the ability of group members to 
possess multiple, nested identities.   
Geographical distinctiveness of groups was investigated in DE&S, in particular, 
its relationship with the nature of the architecture of Abbeywood, with its observed 
‘Neighbourhoods and floor-plates’.  Implied within Kirke’s study is the creation of 
identity that was location based: a territorial or geographic identity.  This finding 
is in line with Van Marrewijk, but also falls into the trap identified by Van Marrewijk 
and Yanow (2010 p 3), which is one of taking space for granted when carrying 
out ethnographic research in organisations.   
Linguistic difference is another factor within the concept of group distinctiveness 
see for example Bourhis and Giles (1977), Tong et al. (1999), Wenger (1998).  
Kirke does not explicitly acknowledge this differentiation, noting instead the 
existence of what he describes as banter (2012 p iii ).  Kirke also identifies the 
visible military and civil service cultures, but he does not explicitly describe culture 
as an organisational trait, preferring to describe culture as a social trait.  However, 
implied within his description is a culture that could be called the technical culture 
of the MOD.  This set of rules functions in parallel to his descriptions of military 
service cultures, professional cultures, and the informal social culture of the MOD, 
and, by extension, DE&S.   
Kirke also describes a series of behaviours that were exhibited by groups that at 
best could be called protectionist of their own prestige.  These behaviours 
appeared to be exacerbated by a lack of resources, resulting in the groups 
fighting over resources (Kirke, 2010 p 99 ).   
Kirke’s studies provide the closest theoretical, methodological and organisational 
starting point for this research.  He informs this research by showing how a 
methodology that is similar to the one proposed within this research, and which 
was used both in DE&S, and also in the MOD, can be a valid method of enquiry.   
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While reporting on defence acquisition before DE&S was created, Weiss (2005) 
superficially investigated organisational culture in the MOD, and how that affected 
defence acquisition.  In a few short paragraphs Weiss describes three cultures in 
senior levels of the MOD (pp 54-59), and also some external cultures that affected 
the MOD, but misses the subtleties between the groupings.  He also misses the 
barriers between the MOD Head Office in London, the DPA in Bristol, and the 
other regional or geographic identities that existed within MOD at that time.  
Weiss indicates that group behaviours, which he labelled as tribalism, affected 
the procurement and support of military equipment. Weiss also identifies that 
where-ever UK armed forces were involved in military conflict, all groups of the 
MOD were driven by the overriding need to overcome the current emergency, 
and all “tribal differences”  were waived “at least temporarily” (2005 p 54).  This 
finding chimes with Kirke who described the services’ cultures as coming together 
in the face of a common enemy (2010 p 99).   
A separate area of literature that may have provided background to this research 
is that of grey literature.  This consists of reports and other material of research 
that has been carried out for primarily government organisations but which is not 
openly published.  This research found little material within grey literature on 
organisational culture within defence acquisition, either in tehn UK or more 
widely.  However in terms of research on the organisational culture of the 
constituent parts of DE&S there is one unpublished MSc study by Bain (2008).  
He describes the existence of professional, functional cultures and stereotypes 
within one Operating Centre that were linked to task, military service, and also to 
symbols of dress.  Those cultures were also supported by linguistic difference.  
Bain investigated one Operating Centre17 in DE&S and provides only peripheral 
evidence of group behaviours that are relevant to this research. 
                                            
17 An Operating Centre is a label for a domain specific group within DE&S responsible for the acquisition 
and support of one type of equipment, for example ‘Weapons’. 
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The research outlined in this study appears to be unique, as it investigates group 
behaviours and organisational culture in DE&S, which was a mixed military and 
civilian organisation that had not previously been the subject of this level, or type, 
of study.   
One of the reasons for the lack of academic published work within organisations 
with mixed military and civilian staff appears to be that there have been very few 
researchers who work in, or with, or have unfettered access to those 
organisations.  The difficulties of gaining access to study military groups are 
described by  (Kirke, 2013 p 23).  Higate and Cameron (2006) also indicate the 
issues, while Irwin (2002) describes the problems of access and rejection from a 
first-hand perspective.  Alvesson (2010, 2012)  and others also describe the 
difficulties of remaining objective in organisations other than the military while 
carrying out this type of research (see for example, Collins, 2002, Irwin, 2002). 
The paucity of closely aligned prior work makes this insider research within DE&S 
more valuable.   
2.2.1 Studies of Similar Organisations 
2.2.1.1 Introduction 
This research could be anchored in the fields of military sociology and military 
anthropology, but as we have seen, no substantial academic studies of 
organisations that are directly similar to DE&S were found.  Therefore the 
researcher broadened the search for literature that could be applied to similar, 
military and non-military organisations. Military sociologists and anthropologists 
have largely ignored research into military/civilian organisations and their internal 
boundaries, preferring to concentrate on the military/civilian boundary of military 
operations, or the military/political/civilian boundary such as those covered by, for 
example, Faber et al. (2008), Gusterson (2006), Gusterson (2003), Littlefield 
(2000), Feaver (1996), Westerman (2005 ), Higate and Cameron (2006), Caforio 
(1998), Burk (2002), Yardley and Neal (2007), Cooke (2008) Samuels (2009), 
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Lefeez (2014), Irwin (2002) González (2007), Lucas (2009), Rubinstein et al. 
(2012), Samuels (2009).   
Godfrey indicates that this lack of literature in relation to military/civilian 
organisations is also true of management theory when he discussed masculinity 
and the military (2009 p 1).  In terms of organisational design and context, DE&S 
was, in the period between 2007 and 2014, a large bureaucracy, similar to those 
described by Barnard (1938) and also Merton (1968).  A bureaucracy is, as 
Weber indicates, an organisation that is characterised with division or 
specialisation of labour, i.e., finance or commercial or project managers, a well-
developed hierarchy, such as in the military, a series of procedures, by which, 
rights and duties of employees’ are defined, such as Queen’s Regulations, 
interpersonal relations based on position, rather than personality, promotion 
based on technical competences,(after Weber, in Furnham, 2011 p 73).   
Because DE&S was composed of Military and Civilian staff, and was a 
government department, it was similar in some ways to the United States’ Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA)  as described by Johnston (2005).  Johnston is relevant 
here because of the coincidence of professional identities and socialisation that 
military and civilian staff experienced in order to become group members.  He 
recognises the concept of identity and especially professional identity in this 
context and suggests that:  
“A professional identity was generally a disciplinary norm, and it regularly 
occurs in other domains that were as cognitively demanding as 
intelligence analysis, such as medicine, aeronautics, and jurisprudence..  
These other domains practice a general system of professional 
enculturation that progresses from a basic education program to 
specialized training.  These training programs help to differentiate 
communities of practitioners from the general public, create specific and 
unique professional identities”. (Johnston, 2009 Ch2 p 28). 
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Johnston also recognises several factors that affect group behaviour: group 
distinctiveness, the effects of in-group language, re-socialisation, and the 
creation of a separate in-group identity.  These traits are also identified as 
professional identity discriminators and also as prestige maintenance 
mechanisms, confirming the work of Pratt and others, (see for example Pratt, 
2003, Pratt and Foreman, 2000, Åkesson and Skålén, 2011, Atun, 2003, Bosch 
et al., 2006, Braithwaite, 2006, Carlisle, 2004, Chinn, 2007, El Akremi et al., 2009, 
Norander et al., 2011, Rudvin, 2007, Van De Mieroop, 2007).   
In particular, Johnston says:  
“The adoption of the word ‘tradecraft’ demonstrates the analytic 
community’s need to create a professional identity separate and unique 
from other disciplines but tied directly to the perceived prestige and cachet 
of intelligence operations.  Adopting ‘tradecraft’ as a term of reference for 
explaining work practices and as a professional identity marker may seem 
trivial.  Yet the term, and its effect on the community, had unanticipated 
consequences.  Tradecraft purposefully implies a mysterious process 
learned only by the initiated and acquired only through the elaborate rituals 
of professional indoctrination.”  (Johnston, 2009 Ch2 p 18).   
Johnston thus indicates that socialisation into a profession creates an in-group 
with a separate identity, which appeared to be caused by a need, rather than an 
accident of circumstance.  Johnston’s study of the CIA is the only study of similar 
organisations to DE&S that was discovered, and the factors, such as socialisation 
and professional and function group boundaries that Johnston discovered, may 
be relevant to this research.  But no similar study has been carried out in a British 
military/civilian organisation.   
2.2.2 Implications 
The single pilot study of DE&S by Kirke (2007a) is the only study that has 
investigated in any way the organisational culture of DE&S.  Kirke’s study 
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provides some background for this study, both methodologically and theoretically.  
this research attempts to expand Kirke’s work in many ways.  Kirke was a 
knowledgeable outsider and therefore would have been treated as such by 
informants.  This research was an immersive insider study, and takes a wider 
social sciences based approach to identifying factors that may affect the 
organisational culture, whereas Kirke used a predominantly anthropological 
framework as an outsider through which he tried to gain an understanding of the 
organisational culture of DE&S.   
Section 2.2  has examined work that is directly relevant to DE&S, or that was 
carried out in a military, or military/civilian domain.  Works such as these provide 
one of the foundations for this study:  the existence of and the effect that multiple 
factors, such as culture, identity and language, influencing influence group 
behaviours and organisational culture in military/civilian organisations.   
This then leads this literature review to examine the wider social sciences 
disciplines that are known to examine elements of organisational culture and 
which are therefore likely to be relevant to the organisational culture of DE&S.   
2.3 An Examination of the Relevant Bodies of Literature 
Sections 2.3 onwards examine bodies of theory that are relevant to this study, 
but which do not come from, or directly cover a military/civilian organisational 
type.  The theoretical areas covered are: culture and organisational culture, 
groups and their attributes, metaphor within organisations, evolutionary 
implications for the study of organisations and finally induction and integration of 
group members into new groups. 
2.3.1 Culture and Organisational Culture 
The general concept of culture is contested, both in the general sense of the word 
and also in terms of organisational culture.  In DE&S, the word culture itself was 
observed to be used as shorthand to describe the way that the organisation and 
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its groups behaved.  These behaviour patterns may or may not be replicated in 
the same way in other groups, so there is an implication that in-group members 
may have a common understanding of the social norms of their group, but not 
necessarily of other groups.   
That then can become the basis of a group culture that can be shown to differ 
from any other group culture. The contested nature of culture is deeply rooted 
and has a long history.  Arnold defined the concept  as a term for promoting the 
civilised, enlightened world as was then understood, “the best which has been 
thought and said in the world, and, through this knowledge, turning a stream of 
fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits” (1993 (1869 p  viii)).  
On the other side of the debate, Tylor proposed a much wider definition, by saying 
that  culture was ‘that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, 
morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of society’ (1871 p 1).   
The need to distinguish between these two definitions was repeated by Hofstede 
(1994 pp 4-5).  In organisational terms, Hofstede suggests that cultures differ 
along a collectivism dimension, and that collective cultures tend to value the 
group, because they emphasise interdependence, and that individualistic 
cultures emphasise the uniqueness, responsibility and value of the individual 
(2005 p  32).  Triandis (1994) agrees with Hofstede and further suggests that 
social identity and, as a result, discrimination against out-groups would be most 
evident in collective cultures.  According to this model, the strength of emphasis 
on the group membership dimension should result in strong in-group identification 
and the tendency to favour the in-groups and deprecate out-groups; Feather 
(1993), see for example, Billig et al. (1973), Tajfel (1979), and Tajfel and Turner 
(1986).   
The breadth of contemporary meanings for the word culture across theoretical 
areas  can be seen in the field of anthropology, where Eriksen suggests that 
“Culture refers, in other words, both to basic similarities and to systematic 
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differences between humans” (Eriksen, 2001 p 3).  Rapport and Overing suggest 
that “Culture pertains to that huge proportion of human knowledge and ways of 
doing things that is acquired, learned and constructed – that is, not innate to a 
newborn child” (2007 p 109).  From sociology, Taylor proposes the following, 
definition, [that culture is] “learned shared behaviour of members of society” 
(1995 p 6) and Brake suggests that culture is “learned behaviour emphasising 
the effects of socialisation within the cultural subgroups of a pluralist society” 
(1985 p 2).  Management theory, in turn through the work of Schein, suggests 
that: 
“Organizational Culture is the pattern of basic assumptions that a given 
group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and that have 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to 
new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to 
those problems” (Schein, 1984 p 3). 
These definitions share one common theme, that culture or acquired and does 
not therefore, exist in isolation.  Geertz argues from an ethnographic point of  view 
that culture can be defined as systems of meaning which are the collective 
property of a group (2000 :3), thereby taking what might be described as a socio-
cultural view of culture. Socio-cultural, in this instance is taken to mean the 
interaction of social and cultural elements of a group,  Nasir (2006), Boreham and 
Morgan (2004), Spinuzzi (2003), see for example Kaufert et al. (1984), Penuel 
and Wertsch (1995), and Gregory (2009).  It thus appears that culture is learned 
and that culture is an existing element in human groups that affects all the 
members’ behaviour, whatever form the culture takes.  This definition includes 
behaviours, linguistic frameworks, informal and formal dress codes, and also 
other social norms. The existence of organisational rules and social norms means 
that an organisation must possess a technical culture and also a social culture, 
thus tying together Taylor’s view of the informal and formal organisation (1911).   
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Kirke proposes a useful definition of organisational culture in relation to the 
collective culture of the British Army:  
‘‘Organisational Culture” is a specific term to describe the customs, 
practices and attitudes of the people within an organisation, but only while 
they were exercising membership of it.  An organisation such as large retail 
company, for example has an organisational culture for the work place, but 
its members do not live by that organisational culture when at home at the 
weekends.”  (Kirke, 2004 p 11 ).   
Kirke’s definition of culture is useful to this research because of the intertwined 
nature of the military and civilian cultures within DE&S.  Part of that intertwined 
nature revolves around shared norms.  Norms according to Furnham are the 
unspoken, unwritten rules that guide behaviour in a group and which could be 
either prescriptive or proscriptive (2011 p 489).   
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2.3.2 Social and Technical Cultures 
There are several cultural concepts that have been identified within the literature 
on organisational culture.  One concept that appears to be important and which 
helps to frame this research treats culture as having two complementary axes.  
Those axes are the socio-technical, see for example, Cummings (1978), 
Cummings and Srivastva (1977), Kerr (2002), Pan and Scarbrough (1998), 
Ropohl (1999), Sutcliffe et al. (2012), Trist (1981), (Trist, 1978) and the socio-
cultural,  Boreham and Morgan (2004), and also Nasir (2006), see for example 
Penuel and Wertsch (1995), Shankar and Elliott (1999), Spinuzzi (2003).   
Trist (1978) first described the concept of socio-technical system to describe how 
the socio (people) interact with the technical system of the organisation.    The 
socio-technical approach focusses on integrating the human and technical 
elements of organisations to complement each other at a work group level.   
The socio-technical approach appears to take account some elements of the 
socio-cultural and the other elements that group members bring into groups, and 
that these technical and social requirements must be both optimised in order for 
the organisation and also the employees to be optimally productive (Scott, 2008 
p 112).  As in all systems, there are interactions and feedback loops between 
these systems.  Ropohl suggests that the socio-technical system shapes and 
transfers its power to an individual and thereby changes their interaction with the 
socio-technical system, a process which he calls technical socialisation (1999).   
In all organisations there exists the informal organisation (Taylor, 1911) which 
may be called the socio-cultural system, see for example Blackler (1993), 
Gregory (2009), Nasir (2006), Penuel and Wertsch (1995), Spinuzzi (2003).  The 
socio-cultural system within an organisation may be of use as a complementary 
explanatory framework to the socio-technical within this research.  That 
usefulness arises because the socio-technical can be used to explain the 
organisation as a machine of rational processes and technology, while the socio-
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cultural can be used to explain the human, emotional, and informal elements of 
the organisational interaction, as a series of emotional, symbolic, evolutionary 
and, at times seemingly irrational, sub-cognitive interactions.   
Groups possess culture, and people learn the norms of that culture, therefore it 
is also possible that when a person joins a new group they bring patterns of 
behaviour with them that were pre-learned in similar or even dissimilar groups, 
and that they are likely to repeat in their new group, see for example Furnham 
(2011 pp 116 - 118).  These patterns of behaviour might be technical and process 
based, such as, for example, following an organisational process to the letter, as 
characterised pejoratively as ‘being a jobsworth’ or they might be more social 
behaviours, where a person ‘has always done things this way, and I am not 
changing that for you’. Either of these behaviours might, or might not fit with the 
group’s rules and norms at that particular time.   
Other groups, such as professional groups, also possess rules and norms relating 
to required behaviour. They also possess common values such as: extensive 
training requirements, status differentials, self-regulation, institutional, and 
individual resistance to imposed change.  As Watson describes, professional 
culture exists as a separate dimension to organisational culture (2006 p 260), but 
exists in parallel to the formal socio-technical culture of an organisation.   
Therefore organisational, group and team identities and cultures do not exist in a 
vacuum; organisations consist of technical processes and the people that interact 
with those processes.   
In terms of representing organisational cultures, there are a number of cultural 
models available to researchers, for example those proposed by Denison and 
others Engel (2010), Gladstein (1984), Haski-Leventhal (2008 ), Haslam (2003a), 
Ilgen et al. (2005), Daft (1983), Vallejo (2009), Van Knippenberg and Hogg 
(2003), Vora (2007).   
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Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998 pp 20-27) and also Schein (1990) 
separately view ‘culture’ as constructs with internal and external attributes.  These 
models are compatible with each other because of the way that the internal and 
external attributes are laid out. 
But as Godfrey (2009 p 1) indicates there have been few studies on culture in 
military/civilian organisations, so a search for a prior cultural model that fitted this 
research could only find a best fit, rather than a perfect fit model.  That model 
came from management theory and was the Competing Values Framework as 
proposed by Cameron and Quinn (1999).  Cameron and Quinn (1999) use 
organisational culture dimensions and four dominant culture types: clan, 
adhocracy, market, and hierarchy18 to describe whether an organisation 
possesses a predominant internal, or external focus, and also whether it strives 
for flexibility and individuality, or stability and control.  The competing values 
framework was chosen and adapted for this research primarily because the 
language that was used by Cameron and Quinn (1999 p 54) to describe groups 
and group behaviours, significantly matched the language that was observed 
being used within DE&S to describe what appeared to be the same phenomena.   
Bastien and others suggest that culture within groups and organisations is 
thought to be enduring, Kirke (2007), Bastien (1992), Schein (1984), see for 
example Smircich (1983), McLeod (1994), Morgan and Lowry (1999).  Because, 
as Tylor (1871) states, cultures are group phenomena, it is self-evident that when 
organisations or groups change, the group’s culture should change.  However the 
culture of the group or organisation might not change at an appropriate or right 
speed, Kirke calls this cultural drag (2010 p 98).  This phenomenon can occur 
when organisations merge, for example, when the DPA and the DLO were 
                                            
18 Clan: an organization that concentrates on internal maintenance with flexibility, concern for people, 
and sensitivity for customers. Hierarchy: an organization that focuses on internal maintenance with a 
need for stability and control. Adhocracy: an organization that concentrates on external positioning with 
a high degree of flexibility and individuality. Market: an organisation that focuses on external 
maintenance with a need for stability and control (Cameron & Quinn, 1999).   
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merged to become DE&S, and may explain why as Barton (2011) describes, 
organisational change has a history of failure in MOD.   
2.3.3 Implications 
DE&S as an organisation is a group of people.  This suggests that it must 
therefore possess some form of culture, a set of formal rules that allows it to 
function.  These organisational rules must describe the technical culture of DE&S, 
but because DE&S is composed of people, there can also be social norms that 
those people create and adhere to in order to maintain order in their groups.  
Therefore as Taylor and others have identified in other organisations, there must 
be formal DE&S and an informal DE&S, and it remains for this research to attempt 
to discover it and to identify what might characterise it.  Therefore, a series of 
questions arise from the discussion of culture in DE&S and what might that 
culture be.   
The following questions arise were answered by this research: What are the 
characteristics of the organisational culture of DE&S? Is there evidence of one 
organisational culture in DE&S, or are there multiple organisational cultures that 
are affected by the functional and military organisations within DE&S?  Can any 
difference be made between the formal organisational culture and the informal 
organisational culture? Is there a legitimate distinction to be made between the 
socio-technical and the socio-cultural elements of DE&S?   
Also, are there cultural attributes of the groups within DE&S that can be 
characterised as being different from whatever the over-arching culture DE&S 
may be characterised as?  
These questions can be summarised into the following question that supports the 
research question:  Does DE&S have an organisational culture, and if it does, 
what are the characteristics of that culture?  
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2.4 The Study of Groups and How They are Described 
Research on groups can take any one of several approaches.  One is the 
anthropological, Erickson and Murphy (2013), Harris (2001), Kaplan and 
Manners (1968), see for example Boas and Farrand (1898).   A different approach 
is that of evolutionary psychology, as described by Nicholson (2000) and 
separately Dunbar and Spoors (1995), Hill and Dunbar (2003), there is also the 
concept of neo-tribe as described by Maffesoli (1998), Hilder (2004) and Price 
and Cybulski (2007).  Within each of these different areas groups are described 
differently, even though the groups may appear to possess the same 
characteristics or attributes.   
The anthropological concept of groups will first be described and then the 
descriptions that are used within organisational anthropology and organisational 
psychology will be examined.   
The concept of the neo-tribe that is currently prevalent within management and 
management literature, as discussed by, for example, Cova and Cova (2002) and 
Dionísio et al. (2008), Moutinho et al. (2007) will also be examined.   
The way that anthropologists have described groups has changed as the 
discipline has developed and fractured into sub-disciplines.  Anthropologists 
predominantly study indigenous human group in the field, and indeed immersive 
fieldwork is viewed as being something of a rite of passage.  Levi-Strauss (1963), 
Malinowski (2002), Gluckman (1956) and Mead (1930) all discussed, or studied 
exotic groups in their own surroundings.  These early anthropologists were 
seeking social structure, and in Gluckman’s case, laws (Gluckman, 2012).  They 
came back from the field with tales of the native culture and social structure and 
how the people viewed their world. They all appeared to put a boundary between 
a western ‘civilised world’ and the ‘uncivilised’ world of the native.  
In the industrial west, the study of organisations by anthropologists, and therefore 
the birth of organisational anthropology is acknowledged by Wright (2004 p 5) to 
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be the Hawthorne experiments by Taylor (1911).  These experiments 
investigated a group of workers that was called a team, ‘the team’, comprising six 
females in one room and a separate room of males. As a result of the research 
the company implemented interventions in order to improve the productivity of 
the workers (Wright, 2004 p 9).  The experiments and the research therefore were 
led by a managerialist agenda.  The research was extended and anthropologist 
Lloyd Warner joined the team to use ‘anthropology in ‘modern’ societies’ (Wright, 
2004 p 6).  He had previously carried out fieldwork studying Australian 
Aborigines.  Warner and Taylor were looking at the organisation of work in the 
same terms as they looked at their fieldwork, which was in terms of social 
structures on the shopfloor.  They then treated the shopfloor as a society which 
was interconnected socially, and that the formal organisation and the informal 
organisation and the social culture affected work output feeling that an engaged 
social culture was better for output.   
Taylor’s approach is relevant to this research, because it is seeking to understand 
factors that affect the organisational culture of DE&S, and also what social 
structures there may exist there, although his work was obviously in a different 
organisation and a completely different historical period.  In the UK, and 
subsequent to the shopfloor experiments, Trist (1981) developed different 
approaches to organisation research by incorporating social psychology into the 
work of organisational design through the concept of the socio-technical 
organisation, as opposed to the traditional, hierarchical bureaucracy.   
This way of thinking about organisational design raised the idea that teams could 
be self-organising and still benefit the organisation, rather than be passively 
directed by ‘management’.  This was the socio-technical approach   (Trist, 1981, 
Cummings and Srivastva, 1977, Ropohl, 1999, Cummings, 1978).  The socio-
technical approach is seen to be relevant to this research as DE&S is a technical 
organisation.  It is also the case that the teams that inhabit DE&S appear to have 
a degree of autonomy, and therefore might be called self-organising.  This 
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research sought to identify whether there is an effect on DE&S organisational 
culture that might be called socio-technical.   
Within organisational psychology Furnham suggests that: “Most big and small 
organisations are essentially networks of small workgroups/teams that have to 
coordinate their efforts” Furnham (2011 p 499).  But what is a group or a team?  
Turner provides an insular definition of a group, it being when “two or more 
individuals perceive themselves to be members of the same social category” 
Hogg and Turner (1987 p 15).  Brown (1999 p 3) expands on this definition by 
adding that for a group to be valid, its existence must be known and “recognised 
by at least one other”.   
This definition, as Edwards (1999) suggests, could also include unseen groups, 
or secret societies, such as masonic groups, which exist, are known to exist, but 
which are very difficult to actually recognise, even though they may have levels 
of influence and projected power.  Cohen and Bailey (1997) agree with Brown 
and Furnham, when they say that the organisation was ‘organised’ by the people 
who were responsible for managing the organisation to achieve the 
organisation’s super-ordinate goal.  Brewer and Caporael, quoted in Hatch, 
describe groups as possessing: 
“Four fundamental configurations: dyads–two person relationships, 
teams–small face to face social and working groups, bands of small 
interacting communities and tribes–macro bands characterised by shared 
identity and communication but without continual face to face interaction”. 
(Hatch, 2004 p 68).    
It is interesting to note Brewer and Caporael’s use of the word tribe here.   Deloria 
(1971) and separately, Neuhauser (1988), both use tribe to describe a set of 
behaviours that were negative and that they saw as being legitimised within 
organisations.  These uses of the word ‘tribe’ appears to align in that they all 
express a set of cultural attributes that are predominantly negative in outcome 
and effect.   
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The formation of groups has been widely addressed in the literature, Dunbar and 
others describing this as sociality (Dunbar and Shultz, 2010, Krupp et al., 2008, 
Lieberman et al., 2008).   
In organisations a discrimination can be made;  people come together in groups 
to perform a particular function, not necessarily because they like the other group 
members, but because they are working together to achieve a super-ordinate 
goal.  Gurvitch (1973 p 210) calls this coming together to achieve a goal 
“functional sociality”, this is where a group forms to perform a function within an 
organisational system.  If this discrimination between sociality and functional 
sociality is accepted, a distinction can then be made between a purely socio-
technical culture which exists as a result of functional sociality, that is, fulfilling 
organisational aims by its existence, and a separate, but linked, socio-cultural 
construct that exists within the socio-technical.  The two could be complementary 
or contradictory depending on the overall organisational culture.   
These concepts are considered to be relevant to this research and was 
investigated within DE&S, because DE&S is a large organisation, with both a 
social, informal element as well as a functional element to its groupings.  This 
research sought to identify whether these two elements have an effect on the 
organisational culture of DE&S and if so, what that effect might be.   
Organisations and groups are composed of individuals; therefore, it is relevant to 
consider how they are linked to each other.  Ashforth and Mael provide a way of 
considering the link of the individual to the organisation.  They assert that by 
“crediting a collectivity with a psychological reality beyond its membership, social 
identification enables the individual to conceive of, and feel loyal to an 
organisation or corporate culture” (Ashforth and Mael, 1989 p 85).  Allport also 
recognises that the group could not be removed from the individual or vice versa 
(Allport, 1962a).    
Allport (1962a) and also Ashforth and Mael (1989) indicate that groups can hold 
power over an individual, and that even though an individual might not physically 
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be a member of a group, either at all, or by having left that group, they may still 
belong psychologically to that group.  This link of the person to the group is seen 
for instance, in the vernacular saying, ‘you can take the man out of the army, but 
you can’t take the army out of the man’. The linking of the person to the group 
resonates with Turner and Tajfel’s concept of the classic acceptance of groups in 
social psychology, where a person may identify and belong to that group without 
physically being a member of the group (Tajfel and Turner, 1986).   
Hoegl (2005 p 201), and separately Hackman (1987) suggest that a team is a 
social system of two or more people that exists within an organisational context, 
with an identity that is self and other perceived, and whose members have a 
common task, thus possessing a social identity.  Hoegl and Hackman’s work 
therefore chimes with that of Tajfel (1979), but Hoegl (2005) and Hackman (1987) 
also include group size, of two or above, as a factor of group behaviour in the 
field, rather than in an experimental context.  In addition to the existence of a 
social system, group members have rights and responsibilities as members of 
that specific group.   
As members, they agree to abide by the rules that form part of the group’s 
structure, and they share a common identity.  Therefore, a group exhibits a level 
of social cohesion, structure, and purpose, which make a group more than simply 
a collection of individuals.  It is from this series of factors that groups develop 
shared norms and an observable culture.  Furnham’s (2011 p 478) definition of a 
group is used throughout this research to bound what a group is and does, and 
also to describe the attributes that a group possesses. This definition was chosen 
because it describes the basic characteristics of organisational groups, whether 
they are stable over a long period or whether they are transient, without being 
prescriptive.   
“Essentially, a group is made up of persons (more than two, which is a 
dyad) who communicate regularly, share goals, and interact with each 
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other over time, so building up affective (or emotional bonds)”.  (Furnham, 
2011 p 478).   
But that definition still does not identify explicitly what a team is, as Furnham 
indicates, “All teams are groups,  but not all groups are teams, groups can work 
without one another, teams can’t”, (Furnham, 2011).  In organisations the group 
labelling concept of ‘team’ is widely used.  The difference between groups and 
teams can be characterised as a factor of size, a team in an organisation appears 
to be a single entity within a group, it must therefore be smaller than a group.  
This then presents a paradox; the concept label of team in DE&S as Project 
Team’ may consist of multiple sub-teams.  These other ‘teams’ are Delivery 
Teams’ and ‘Role Teams’, the smallest ‘team’ in that hierarchy.  By using 
Furnham’s definition, the only true team appears to be the Role Team, because 
they cannot function in isolation.  The largest size of ‘team’ in that hierarchy then 
becomes according to Furnham, a ‘group’ because it consists of other ‘teams’ 
working together, and it can function semi independently. But, as with the Role 
Team it would not exist unless it was part of the concept of the ‘Project Team’.  
The Project Team is a group because it can function independently and consists 
of its ‘teams’, but it is called a team by its members and also by management see 
for example (Amason and Sapienza, 1997, Cohen and Bailey, 1997, Haleblian 
and Finkelstein, 1993, Hoegl, 2005, Ilgen et al., 2005, Katzenbach and Smith, 
1992).  So what is it about the label of team and group that makes people want 
to use one label over another?  Team appears to be a label that describes a group 
that comes together for a specific purpose, a football team, or a project team, and 
people naturally want to belong to groups.  Groups form naturally, whereas teams 
do not. Teams have to be built, which may explain why in organisations the 
concept of team-building is widespread, see for example (Anthony and Janet, 
2002, Salas et al., 1999, Tohidi and Tarokh, 2006).  So if people naturally form 
groups, but need help in forming teams, a team appears to be an unnatural type 
of group.  This may also help to explain the perceived importance of team-building 
to organisations, in order to overcome the unnatural nature of teams.  
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These formally legitimised teams perform particular functions and roles that 
support the superordinate goal of the organisation, Anthony and Janet (2002), 
Batt (2004), see for example Belbin (1982), Cohen and Bailey (1997), Denison et 
al. (1996), Hackman (1987), Hoegl (2005), Ilgen et al. (2005), Katzenbach and 
Smith (1992), Pratt (2003), and also Staats et al. (2012), Sundstrom et al. (1990), 
Yeatts and Hyten (1998).  They comprise in DE&S multiple functional roles, 
finance staff, commercial staff and engineers, and also of course, military 
personnel in who perform various roles. Teams are therefore embedded in the 
socio-technical culture of the organisation, but as Taylor  (1911) identified they 
are also affected by the socio-cultural norms of their members.  Those norms 
may, or may not, match exactly the socio-technical rules of the group, thus 
potentially producing a tension between the socio-technical and the socio-
cultural.   
This research sought to identify if there is any tension between the formal rules 
of DE&S and the informal norms of groups within DE&S.  It also attempted to 
identify if there are any effect from potential or actual tensions on the 
organisational culture of DE&S.   
2.4.1 Groups and Teams in Organisations – Form, Function and 
Size 
There is a large library of literature on group and team size in organisations see 
for example Ingham et al. (1974), Gooding and Wagner (1985), Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1993), Calman and Royston (1997), and also Hirshman et al. (2011), 
O'Toole (2002), Cohen and Bailey (1997), Gersick and Hackman (1990), 
Hackman (1987), Kulik et al. (1987), Porter et al. (1975 ), Amason and Sapienza 
(1997), Bradner et al. (2005), Curral et al. (2001), Salas et al. (1999), Pearce and 
Herbik (2004). But there appear to be none relating to teams in mixed 
civilian/military organisations.   
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Organisations formally sub-divide into units and sections, Batt (2004), see for 
example Hackman (1987), Pratt (2003), Denison et al. (1996), Yeatts and Hyten 
(1998), Chen and Klimoski (2003), Anthony and Janet (2002), Hoegl (2005), and 
also Ilgen et al. (2005), Cohen and Bailey (1997), Katzenbach and Smith (1992), 
Sundstrom et al. (1990).  Within the literature on group and team size in 
organisations, a distinction is made between different team types.  Cohen and 
Bailey describe four types of team: work, parallel, project, and management 
teams, each of them carrying out a different function within an organisation Cohen 
and Bailey (1997).  In contrast, Greenberg and Baron (2003) categorise formal 
and informal groups into sub-groups, these being command groups, such as 
standing committees, and task groups of individuals with particular expertise.   
DE&S as a bureaucracy has many types of groups and the research sought to 
identify some of them, their purpose within DE&S and what effect those groups 
have within the organisational culture of DE&S.  Gray and Starke in Furnham 
(2011 p 436, Table 10.2) similarly develop a matrix of attributes of formal and 
informal groups.  They also show how informal groups in organisations often 
evolve naturally, containing people from differing levels and parts of the 
organisation who all share the common interest that brought them together as an 
informal group (in Furnham, 2011 p 484).   
According to Watson (2006 p 95-107), the relationships and understandings of 
identity formed within these groups could be fluid and changing.  This research 
investigated the effect of fluidity of group membership because people in DE&S 
can move from group to group, either as a new job, or on promotion, in order to 
see if there is an effect of that fluidity of membership on the organisational culture 
of DE&S.   
Cohen and Bailey indicate that 82% of companies with more than 100 employees 
consisted of teams and that a team could be defined through interdependence of 
task, shared responsibility, and was an “intact social entity embedded in one or 
more larger social systems” (1997 p 240).  Also that a “group as a social entity 
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has shared psychosocial traits that influence its behaviours, including group 
norms or shared mental models” (1997 p 245), thus sharing part of the definition 
of a group with that proposed by Furnham (2011).  This research has sought to 
define what a team is in DE&S, and whether there is a discernible difference 
between a team and a group, and if there is whether that difference has any effect 
on the organisational culture of DE&S.  
Table 2-1 provides comparative data from the literature on team and group sizes 
in organisations, so none relate to military or mixed military and civilian 
organisations.   
Source Size Range of Groups Average Size 
of Groups 
Team Type 
Hoegl (2005) High performing 3-6 
Low performing 7-9 
4.4 
7.8 
Software 
development 
Campion et al. 
(1993)  
6-30 15 Work teams 
Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1993) 
None given 3.39  Management 
Staats et al. 
(2012) 
 
2- 4 None given Experimental 
Kirkman and 
Rosen (1999) 
11.12-13.8319 
11.4-15.3220 
13 Work teams 
Curral et al. 
(2001) 
2-18 5 Work 
Engel (2010) 5-12 Not given Work 
Cohen and Bailey 
(1997) 
Not given 46 Work 
Gibbs (1994)  3-6 Not Given Work group 
Table 2-1 Team Sizes in Organisations 
                                            
19 Team member data. 
20 Team leader data. 
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Table 2-1 shows that within the literature on group sizes in organisations, there 
appears to be no agreement as to what might be the ideal size for a work-team 
or group.  Hoegl (2005), and Hoegl and Proserpio (2004) suggest that increasing 
team size to more than 15 members negatively affected team performance.   
This then suggests that group size becomes self-limiting internally.  Hoegl also 
suggests that in software development organisations, the average team size was 
4.4 members for the best performing teams, and the teams that performed badly 
were 7-9 people in size, averaging at 7.8 members (2005 p 212). He thus appears 
to create a core team/extended team construct, with the core being essential to 
the project, and the other members acting as consulting or advising and linking 
to other groups in a network spanning role.  This is similar to the boundary 
spanning concept of team members that was described by Prusak (2002) .   
While experimental data indicates that larger groups are better, field work 
suggests that smaller teams are better.  But both field and experimental data all 
converge at 5±2 members being the most effective team sizeHoegl (2005), and 
Hoegl and Proserpio (2004) do not appear to link team size to evolutionary 
factors, but Nicholson (2000 p 207) appears to link group size in organisations to 
evolutionary psychology citing Dunbar’s group size theory (Zhou et al., 2005, Hill 
and Dunbar, 2003), but the team sizes that Hoegl and the literature describe 
appear to fit closely to the evolutionary patterns of stable group sizes that are 
proposed by Dunbar (Zhou et al., 2005, Hill and Dunbar, 2003a).  The literature 
on the design of groups or organisations does not appear to offer any other 
explanation for team sizes falling at 5±2 other than for cognitive, work design 
reasons, see for example Hoegl (2005 p 212).   
Also, Evans and Carson (2005) indicate that there are problems with 
communications, group coherence and meaning,  as group sizes expand, but 
they do not offer any testable answers.   
Hackman (Hackman, 1987) may provide the best answer to the question of what 
size a team should be, when he suggests that a team was the right size when it 
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has enough members to do the work, no more no less.  Hackman then discusses 
how small the team should be, not how large (Hackman, 1987, Kulik et al., 1987).  
In terms of group size, the groups shown in Table 2-1 were all smaller than 46 
members, however,  Batt identified teams that were within organisations of 75 
members and  which were geographically co-located, and linked to a 
geographical area, or turf (Batt, 2004 p 12).   
Cohen and Bailey (1997) show on a model of group effectiveness that size was 
a factor, but do not go into any further detail as to what caused the lack of 
effectiveness. Steiner (1974) also agrees that group size is a factor in team 
effectiveness, but again does not provide data as to the group sizes that he is 
describing, and what the effects might be at any given group size.  The seeming 
lack of discussion of the effect of group size on group behaviour in organisations 
appears to indicate that group size was taken for granted, appearing almost as a 
framework within which the researchers and the researched operated, without 
seeing the framework and investigating group size as a potential causative factor 
on group behaviour.   
There also appears to be a group size factor at play within systems 
psychodynamics.  Miller (1990 p:197)  describes the Leicester model of running 
conferences which places members into small study groups of 9-12 members 
plus a consultant.  At the end of the conference group members are placed into 
smaller homogenous groups of 5-10 people to review the conference and their 
learning.  These group sizes also match closely Dunbar’s group size theory (Zhou 
et al., 2005, Hill and Dunbar, 2003).  Also that within the main conference Faher 
(2004 p 77) states that “it was not uncommon for subgroups to form or split”.  
Furnham (2011 p 485) also states that “groups of more than twelve members find 
mutual interaction difficult and tend to split into separate groups of seven or eight”.   
This splitting of groups indicates that fission/fusion as described by Aureli et al 
(2008) is a primary condition of group behaviour and that systems 
psychodynamics may be subject to cognitive bias in their manipulation of group 
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sizes for effect.  In his investigations, Lewin (1939) cautions that experimental 
contexts for examining group behaviour may miss some of the essential 
interactions within the group, indicating that field research, such as this research, 
though messy and difficult, is able to provide a different level of data about group 
behaviour than experimental work.   
Group size in DE&S, as a hierarchical organisation were investigated in order to 
identify if there are any patterns in the sizes of groups within DE&S and whether 
those group sizes have any effect on the organisational culture of DE&S. 
2.4.2 Implications of Group Size Literature to This  
Research 
DE&S is a large organisation with approximately 8,600 staff located at the single 
geographical location of Abbeywood and as is the case with most large 
organisations it is broken down into functional groups.  The functional groups 
within DE&S comprise a hierarchy of domains that are based on function and 
also size, these are; Operating Centres, groups, Teams and Project Teams.  In 
this respect DE&S is probably no different from any other large organisation.  This 
research is interested in identifying where the concept of the group in DE&S ends, 
and where the concept of the team starts, and if there is a defined boundary, such 
as group size or function.  This is because the words team and group appear to 
be used as shorthand to describe the concept of a group of people, number 
unspecified, who are formally tasked with achieving a defined organisational 
outcome.  
The questions that were answered by this research from the literature on groups 
and teams include asking whether: the academic definition of groups and teams 
fits the vernacular labels that are used within DE&S? What are the defining 
characteristics of groups and teams in DE&S? And, can a discriminatory 
framework be applied within DE&S that allows teams and groups to be 
appropriately categorised?   
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The key question in relation to the research question then becomes: what is the 
effect that the groups and teams of DE&S have on the organisational culture of 
DE&S?   
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2.5 Evolutionary Anthropology and Psychology  
2.5.1 Introduction 
Evolutionary anthropology attempts to discover what it is that makes us ‘human’ 
(Calcagno and Fuentes, 2012). Evolutionary psychology seeks to explain how 
evolution has shaped the human mind and human behaviour, Dunbar et al. 
(2007), see for example Smith et al. (2001 p 128).  Section 2.5.2 discusses the 
literature in these two evolutionary fields that inform this research and then 
considers how to apply those fields to the study of organisations. 
2.5.2 Evolutionary Anthropology 
Cartmill and Brown (2011) suggest that language is a factor in differentiating 
humans from other animals and that we as humans decide what words mean, we 
can therefore make the meaning whatever we want it to be. Campbell  and 
separately Hrdy, in  Calcagno and Fuentes (2012 pp 187-188), argue that it is the 
evolution of the brain for social reasons that is the differentiator,  thus chiming 
with Dunbar and the “social brain hypothesis” (Dunbar, 2007, 2003, 2007).  Stiner 
and Kuhn, in Calcagno and Fuentes (2012 p 191), also argue that language is a 
defining element of being human, with the addition of culture as defining what it 
means to be a human, although they acknowledge that there is disagreement 
between anthropologists as to whether culture is uniquely human, (2012 p 191 ).   
2.5.3 Evolutionary Psychology 
Smith et al. (2001 p 129) indicate that evolutionary psychology is a relatively new 
field, being extended from the study of non-human animals in the 1970s.  This 
late-coming was attributed by Dunbar et al. (2007 p 2) to the combined 
nervousness of biologists “dabbling in things human” and the latent distrust by 
social scientists of evolutionary ideas from the beginning of the 20th century.  
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A key area of the debate within the literature about the evolutionary approach to 
human behaviour is what that approach can, and cannot do.  Dunbar et al. (2007 
p 3) suggest that the evolutionary approach “provides a theoretical framework 
which enables the generation of a set of concise hypotheses on behavioural 
responses and psychological mechanisms and subjects them to rigorous test 
using data from the real world”.  Dunbar’s approach (2007 pp 4 - 5) does not 
appear to support the notion that behaviour is directly genetically determined and 
that biology is our destiny, see also Smith et al. (2001p 130).  One way of 
illustrating the difference between genetic and evolutionary is this, evolution 
provides human beings with hair on their heads, genetics provides that hair with 
different colours.  Smith et al. (2001 p 131) describe genetic evolution as a slow 
process, and as Bowlby (2008) suggests all adaptations are solutions to recurring 
problems in the remote past.  Therefore, we may have as Nicholson (2000), 
(2008)  suggests, stone age brains in the information age. But as Smith et al. 
(2001 p 131) suggest, positive examples of supposed adaptations may be 
spurious, and negative examples may simply mean that the adaptation is no 
longer right for the new environment.  Bowlby and Nicholson can also be 
challenged, because evolutionary psychology suggests that the “flexibility of 
human adaptive systems, and the flexibility of evolved conditional strategies, 
learning biases and social information transfer, will produce adaptive outcomes, 
even in the most novel circumstances” (Smith et al., 2001 p 131).   
The evolutionary as opposed to the genetic approach can therefore be said to 
provide a more strategic, generalisable approach to behaviour and helps to 
explain  “why does the individual behave in that way and what purpose does it 
serve for the individual it simply assumes that an individual’s behaviour is guided 
by evolutionary considerations” (Dunbar et al., 2007 p 6).  Because this approach 
works at a generalizable, rather than at a specific level, Dunbar et al. (2007 p 7) 
suggest that evolutionary explanations are predominantly statistical.  This 
approach, however, then potentially ignores the value that ethnography can 
bring.   
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The ethnographic approach can add to the statistical approach by observing and 
documenting the outcome and effect of the behaviours, how people view the 
exhibition of the behaviour in question, and what people think they are doing 
when they behave in that way.  Therefore, as Dunbar suggests, “it is entirely 
possible and equally evolutionary, for non-genetic inheritance to take place and 
for such non-genetic resources to be selected over time.  Cultural processes can 
therefore have very important evolutionary effects,… in other words, 
understanding human behaviour from an evolutionary perspective may not 
require the involvement of any genes at all” (Dunbar et al., 2007 p 9).   
2.5.4 Evolutionary Approach to Organisations 
Furnham (2011 p 33) suggested evolutionary that psychology had not impinged 
greatly on either organisational psychology, or on organisations, except with the 
work of Nicholson (2000). Nicholson also indicates that tribalism as group 
behaviour in organisations exists because humans are hard-wired to identify with 
groups Nicholson (2000).    
Within the context of groups as units, Nicholson also suggested that because the 
human psychological capacity to manage personal networks and relationships is 
limited, once a business unit gets much beyond 150 members it becomes difficult 
to maintain a single communications community and therefore sub-groupings 
assume greater significance (Nicholson, 2000 p 207).   
Nicholson (2000 pp 227-228) later references this number to the work of  Dunbar, 
who proposes 150 members as the cognitive limit of human group size, (Hill and 
Dunbar, 2003).  Nicholson also considers other attributes relating to group size, 
for example, he indicates that groups of 14 members are too large for genuine 
team-work, and that the 5-9 members of a “family-sized group”  are better 
functioning teams (2000 p 56).  One of the key concepts within evolutionary 
psychology that appears to be applicable to this research is that of group size 
and how size impacts on the behaviour and culture of the group. 
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2.5.5 Evolutionary Approach to Group Size 
Dunbar’s argument proposes that group size follows a consistent series of 
boundaries (Hill and Dunbar, 2003, Zhou et al., 2005).  This might indicate that 
organisational design specialists think they are making a rational, intellectual 
decision on group size based on work requirements and load; Batt (2004), Cohen 
and Bailey (1997), see for example, Hackman (1987), Hoegl (2005), Ilgen et al. 
(2005), Katzenbach and Smith (1992), Staats et al. (2012), Sundstrom et al. 
(1990), Yeatts and Hyten (1998), they might actually be making the decisions 
they do because of evolutionary factors that are hard wired into them.  In effect, 
they may be affected by cognitive bias, thereby predicating them towards 
particular, comfortable to understand group sizes as described by Dunbar 
(1993a), (1995), Zhou et al. (2005).  
Dunbar (1993b) proposes that human communities and egocentric networks 
have a distinct size that is a result of neo-cortex volume and evolution.  This is 
what he calls the social brain hypothesis (2007).  Dunbar (1998), Hill and Dunbar 
(2003 p 63) also suggests that as a result of evolution, groups and human 
networks scale consistently at a factor of between 3 and 4, and are layered, 
hierarchical and geometrically sized 2,3,5,15,45-50, up to maximum cognitive 
boundary of 150.  Dunbar shows that this hierarchy of group sizes is consistent 
across a wide range of groups, for example, archaic groups, hunter gatherer 
groups, religious communities, and also armies (2003 Figure 1), Hill et al. (2008).   
Groups sized between 500 members and up to 2500 members become in 
Dunbar’s terms, “mega-bands” and “tribes”  (Hill and Dunbar, 2003 p 67). 
Dunbar’s research into the group sizes of armies was of particular interest to this 
research because of the proximity of the British army physically, psychologically, 
culturally and organisationally to DE&S, especially as this organisational 
proximity was likely to have an effect on structural criteria, such as the design of 
DE&S organisational structures.  
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Hackman (1987), and also Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) indicate that groups 
numbering 5 members, described as a team by Cohen (1997), appear to relate 
to family sized groups within anthropological literature, see for example  Boas 
and Farrand (1898), Pulliam and Caraco (1984).   
Dunbar also seems to provide an answer for the communications and coherence 
problems in larger organisational groups that were observed by Cohen and Bailey 
(1997), Nicholson (2000). Dunbar et al. (1995) indicate that there are natural 
breakpoints in group sizes that affect communications and information flows.  
This again is due to the fact that as Nicholson (2000 p 207) indicates, the larger 
a team becomes in an organisation, the more difficult it is to communicate with 
all members, leading to communications within the group becoming more formal, 
thus presaging the development of a bureaucracy, but with sub-groupings 
becoming more important.   
2.5.6 Challenging Dunbar  
Dunbar’s conclusions are not, however, universally accepted, in particular de 
Ruiter (2011) and separately Wellman (2012), challenge Dunbar.   
De Ruiter et al attempt to challenge Dunbar by suggesting that external cultural 
factors such as technology enable larger network sizes, this positon agrees with 
Bernard et al. (1987), and also McCarty et al. (2001).  De Ruiter seeks to provide 
an explanation for people having larger networks than Dunbar’s 150 maximum 
group size.  He suggests that the energy that was put into maintaining 
relationships was not put into the whole network, but into maintaining the right 
level of relationship, with the frequency and energy investment adjusted by the 
person depending on the need and the return at the time (2011 p 559).  Therefore, 
while a person’s network, or functional group, could be larger than 150 in totality, 
at any one time the 150 maximum boundary still came into play (2011 p 563).  
Ironically this supposed critique of Dunbar appears actually to support his findings 
by agreeing with Dunbar’s bounded layers, both in their existence and their sizes. 
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De Ruiter (2011 p 560) also acknowledges that larger groups may contain smaller 
groups of people, citing Layton and O'Hara (2010) in that respect.   
Wellman (2012) also challenges Dunbar on network size, but a group is a 
different construct from a network.  A group is a generally stable concept, 
whereas a network is a more fluid entity, and therefore group size is likely to be 
smaller than a person’s network, especially within a technology mediated 
organisation as described by, for example, Bernard et al. (1987), and also 
McCarty et al. (2001).   
Bernard et al. (1987) also expand Dunbar’s group size boundaries by proposing 
that larger groups can form in technology based organisations.   
The work of McCarty et al. (2001) supports the extended technology enhanced 
network sizes that were identified by Bernard (1987).  These extended network 
sizes only contradict Dunbar with their maximum boundaries, so within the 
maxima and up to Dunbar’s boundary there appear to be sufficient similarities to 
indicate a correlation, and in many cases they are network sizes, not stable group 
sizes.  Other authors have attempted to challlenge Dunbar through evolutionary 
anthropology, Layton and O'Hara (2010 p 10), Hamilton et al. (2007 pp 196-197) 
attempt to demonstrate that hunter-gatherer communities of over 1000 members 
existed, but they admit that these larger groups consisted of smaller interlocked 
groups that divided for activities.   
This fracturing of groups also applies to teams in organisations and was 
investigated through this research in order to see whether Dunbar’s concept of 
fission and fusion of groups (Aureli et al., 2008) around particular group sizes 
may be applicable in organisations in respect of both sociality (Dunbar and 
Shultz, 2010) and functional sociality (Gurvitch, 1973 p 210).   
Therefore it could be said that Dunbar’s construct, of boundaried layered groups 
of consistent sizes, that are part of larger personal networks appears to survive 
criticism.   
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2.5.7 Implications of an Evolutionary approach to Group Size in 
Organisations  
Evolutionary theories such as Dunbar’s group size hierarchy inform this research 
because DE&S is a hierarchical organisation.  It is composed of, at the smallest 
group size, Role Teams, these are part of Project Teams, that are themselves 
elements of Pillars or Business Units, which themselves are elements of 
Operating Centres and Domains.  People within these groups are also 
hierarchically ranked by grade, which can be described as a status label.  
Questions then arise and which were answered in relation to organisational 
design and intent, such as why was DE&S designed in this way? Was it truly 
deliberate, or is there a cognitive bias within the organisational design?  Is DE&S 
built on these group sizes, layers and networks because these networks are the 
‘right-size’ for the human brain to work within and manage?  If that is the case, 
what happens if groups in DE&S breach these evolutionary group size criteria? 
Do they fragment? Can they fragment in a formal organisation?  Do they become 
low performing, rather than high performing teams.   
Also, by looking at the work of Hoegl (2005), can predictions be made on what 
might the optimal team size be for a particular situation in DE&S?   
There is a further element of group size that appears to be unique in DE&S. That 
is the proximity and juxtaposition of the military and their group sizes, to the non-
military groups. Dunbar found that there was consistency of group sizes in military 
organisations that significantly matched the evolutionary group size criteria.  The 
group and their labels are the same in the British military now as they were 100 
years ago.  There is still the company, regiment and brigade structure and they 
are formed at approximately the same group sizes. Is the consistency of group 
sizes within these two distinctly different military and civilian organisations 
something that enables them to create hierarchies of groups that are broadly 
similar in size? Is it coincidence? Or deliberate design? Or is it cognitively biased? 
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All of these questions can be distilled into two questions that fit within the research 
question: Does group size have an effect on DE&S organisational culture? And, 
do the group sizes in DE&S match evolutionary group sizes, and thus are a result 
of unconscious bias, or are they deliberately designed to be that size? The 
hierarchy of group size, as proposed by Dunbar may also help to explain the use 
of the family and tribe metaphor in DE&S to describe the groups that they inhabit 
and the groups’ behaviours.  If Nicholson and Dunbar are correct, then these 
group sizes, because they are ‘hard-wired’ into people may have some effect on 
the organisational culture of DE&S.   
2.6 Evolutionary Anthopology and Language 
There exists a second element of evolutionary anthropology and psychology that 
is relevant to this research.  That area is language and its effect on group 
coherence through the concept of gossip.  Gossip appears to be present in most, 
if not all, groupings and there is a long anthropological tradition that encompasses 
the study of gossip, as described by, for example Besnier (1989), Foster (2004), 
Gluckman (1968), Jones (1980), Noon and Delbridge (1993), Haviland (1977), 
(2010), Michelson and Mouly (2004), (1997), Emler (1994), Bergmann (1993), 
(1998), Michelson and Mouly (2000)).  Gossip can be viewed as being positive 
or negative.   
Jaeger (2004 p 203) views gossip as being primarily negative, and only pertaining 
to events and people.  Wert and Salovey (2004b) suggest that gossip is a 
mechanism of social comparison, which allows the reduction of face to face 
confrontation between parties which is also as described by Dunbar (1998 p 78) 
who, by looking at gossip with an evolutionary perspective, views gossip more 
positively by indicating that it can be used for both conflict reduction and also to 
maintain group coherence.  This evolutionary approach suggests that language 
primarily evolved in order to achieve both of these outcomes amongst others.  In 
addition to conflict resolution, Dunbar, in Brown et al. (2004) suggests that the 
purpose of gossip is for the spread of social information or knowledge.    
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In terms of group coherence, Foster (2004), (2006) note that most people are 
actually likely to spend a non-trivial amount of time gossiping and also that not 
gossiping means that a person could be marginalised from the local social fabric.  
Foster’s view chimes with that of Dunbar (1998 p 116) who suggests that modern 
day hunter gatherer tribes spend up to 25% of their day socialising.  . Foster is in 
accord with Bergmann and others to a certain extent, but as a corollary, 
Bergmann suggests that too much gossip could also marginalise the gossiper, 
see for example Gilmore (1975), (1978), Bergmann (1993), (1998), Michelson 
and Mouly (2000), and also Slade (1995).   
Networks are different from groups in that they are centred around a group of 
closely interconnected people, and a larger group, of less densely connected 
people, both to the core and to each other (Hill and Dunbar, 2003 p 12).  In 
organisations Foster (2004 p 85) identified a link between status and gossip, 
which he saw as falling into the core/periphery pattern similar to that identified by 
Dunbar,  “what begins as trusted exchange in private becomes at the group level 
the knowledge, norm and trust boundaries of tribes, clans and cultures”. (Foster, 
2004 p 85)   
Therefore, as Albrecht (2002) and others suggest, in order to maintain a group 
as a group, it appears that the group  members must develop trust and 
communicate with each other, see for example, Atun (2003), Kuwabara (2007), 
Fuchs (1995), Mumby (1988), Putnam and Nicotera (2009), Semin et al. (2003).  
This could be done formally or informally and informal communication is often 
called gossip.  Dunbar (1998 p 121) suggests that gossip is purely social and 
informal in nature, discounting formal conversations because these were bound 
by a set of rules.   
By taking gossip as a purely social information exchange mechanism and 
removing any value statements, Dunbar defines gossip as a conversation about 
personal and social topics.  Gossip could, therefore, be called social knowledge 
exchange.  Gossip crosses all gender boundaries, but its labelling differs.  There 
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is “women talk/girl talk” as described by for example, Brown (1990), Coates 
(1989), and Eckert (1990), and also  men’s “shop talk” as described by Fine 
(1978), and also Rosnow and Fine (1976), or also the signalling to others about 
“having a coffee together”  (Foster, 2004 p 88).  Levin and others describe gossip 
as a sense-making mechanism, where gossip could also be the “truth to counter 
the official line” (in Jaeger, 2004).  Levin chimes with Brown, who uses the label 
of rumour in addition to gossip to  add to the linguistic tools that are available in 
organisational sense-making (Brown et al., 2004).  This sense-making 
mechanism implies that there is a link between gossip and linguistic hierarchies, 
especially within organisations, where the management narrative differs from that 
of the workers.   
Foster (2004 p 87) agrees that gossip aids group coherence through dyadic and 
larger group reiteration of group norms and social structures.  Gossip and 
knowledge exchange of this nature therefore appear to be important mechanisms 
in cultural learning and stability within groups which accords with Chinoy (1961) 
and also Baumeister (1995) and their work on socialisation and group coherence.   
Gossip, or social knowledge transfer, could also be said to act as a mechanism 
of social categorisation (Wert and Salovey, 2004b).  Gossip achieves group 
coherence by forming or reinforcing an in-group, which could become a clique, 
against an out-group, which may be the formal team, thus creating group 
coherence, and fracturing it at the same time, as described by Stirling (1956). and 
separately by Dunbar (2004).  The alignment with Dunbar and others on the 
transmission of culture through gossip, implies that there is a bias towards the 
transmission of social information.  This confirms Mesoudi et al. (2006), that this 
type of learning is predominantly socio-cultural and not socio-technical.     
It appears that no writers have considered gossip in military/civilian organisations, 
so this research sought to investigate whether gossip exists in DE&S, what gossip 
consists of in DE&S, and what effect it has on the organisational life of DE&S.   
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2.6.1 Implications of The Evolutionary Approach To Language 
As all organisations are composed of both the formal and informal (Trist, 1981, 
Trist, 1978, Taylor, 1911), and as Fine and others indicate, (Fine and Rosnow, 
1978), Emler (1994), Foster and Rosnow (2006), Fuchs (1995)) gossip acts as a 
sense-making mechanism within the formal organisation.  It is therefore right to 
ask what patterns there might be in the sense-making of the technical 
organisation of DE&S, and how might Dunbar’s concept of social linguistic 
grooming apply within the technical functional organisation of DE&S.  The work 
of Dunbar is also of interest to this research because of group size criteria and 
the link to the development of language as a tool of group coherence.   
The questions that arise from this approach centre on the concept of gossip as a 
mechanism to maintain group coherence.  The questions are: Are there any 
patterns of language within DE&S that are used in social interaction that also 
appear in formal interaction? Is it possible to identify the amount of time that 
groups and group members spend on group coherence activities?  
And is group coherence enabled or improved by gossip? And is it possible to 
identify any measures of effectiveness of these activities on group coherence?  
These questions can be crystallised into two themes that align with the research 
question: Does the language that is used in group coherence activity, whether it 
is formal or informal, have any effect on the organisational culture of DE&S, and 
is that effect a result of evolutionary factors or something else? 
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2.7 Groups, Tribes and Neo-Tribes 
When describing what a tribe is, earliest anthropologists indicate that a tribe 
refers to a ‘primitive’ society, characterised by proximity and  kinship, acting as 
Giddens (2001) suggests, individual micro groups of a land.  
A different interpretation of a tribe is that of a pre-state organisation, united and 
defined by a political direction and leadership (Fried, 1975). These are definitions 
of old tribes.  Management theorists such as Kaplan (2007), Isaacs (1975), 
Friedman (2001), Price and Cybulski (2007), Emelyanov-Lukyanchikov (2004), 
Van der Weyden (2006), Sowell (1997), Ramakrishna (1994), Fried (1975), 
Prasad and Smith (2001), leadership writers such as, Logan et al. (2008) and 
writers on concepts of national and trans-national groupings, for example, Walzer 
(1992), and Campbell (2006) have all adopted the word tribe to describe 
particular bounded groups, both within organisations and in a wider society.  This 
way of thinking then appears to link to the evolutionary psychological concept as 
proposed by, for example, Nicholson (2000), where the construct of the tribe is 
seen as hard-wired into humans because the concept is so widely documented.  
Maffesoli (1998) moves the discussion on by suggesting that the historic concept 
of the tribe as being predominantly defined by physical proximity and membership 
by kinship could be replaced by definition that encompasses more emotional 
bonding, or of belonging to a collective, unstable and fluid group.  This then 
becomes a key defining characteristic of the neo-tribe and differentiates it from 
an archaic or historic tribe, as members can exercise multiple memberships of 
their chosen tribes, chiming with, for example, Goulding and Shankar (2011), and 
Shankar and Elliott (1999).   
In delving more deeply into what constitutes a tribe, a meta-analysis of 
anthropological literature from 1895 to 2012, using the search term 
‘characteristics of tribes’, showed that old tribes and new tribes appear to 
generally possess the same characteristics of some form of linguistic 
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differentiation, some form of “territory” and forms of membership and symbols. 
Price and Cybulski (2007 p 796) provide a useful indicative table of those 
characteristics.  But because there appears to be no single definition of what a 
tribe is, this then gives rise to the possibility that the word tribe is simply a 
conceptual model of a type of group.  
There is then, a distinction to be made between what anthropologists and 
evolutionary psychologists call tribes, and what marketing and management 
literature calls neo-tribes.  Dionísio et al. (2008), Moutinho et al. (2007) 
distinguish between archaic tribes and the thinking around them, and the fact 
that modern groups can also act like tribes, and can possess some of the 
characteristics of archaic tribes through the concept of identity.  But whereas a 
member of an archaic ‘tribe’ possessed only one exclusive membership, a neo-
tribe member may possess more than one, non-exclusive membership of 
groups.   
Also according to Cutler, 
“Neo-tribes are the somewhat unstable, fleeting, collectives that makeup 
contemporary society, reflecting the need of individuals to find meaning 
by bonding with others. Such self-defined communities often rely on the 
exclusion of the other, which may be marked by overt signals such as 
dress and language. The continuity of the group is dependent upon 
maintaining these boundaries” (Cutler, 2003 p 3). 
Cova (1997 p 22) uses the word tribe to refer to a notion of the re-emergence of 
quasi-archaic values, such as a local sense of identification, religiousness, 
syncretion and group narcissism.  Cova uses the word ‘tribe’ as a metaphor, by 
emphasising the social links and identities that are associated with physical 
artefacts and exchange mechanisms.  These then appear to be attributes of this 
type of group.  These artefacts can be seen to give a group a greater sense of 
communality.  This accords with Pate et al. (2010) and Ellemers (2005), who all 
separately identify in their work on multiple and nested identities, a factor that 
appears to be a key differentiator between archaic tribes and neo-tribes.  That 
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factor is the ability of a neo-tribe member to hold multiple group memberships at 
the same time, as opposed to the archaic tribe’s membership being exclusive.  
Thus Pate and Beaumont and Ellemers, all appear to have unknowingly indicated 
that groups in organisations possess at least one characteristic of  what Maffesoli 
(1998) calls neo-tribes.  
The concept label of the tribe is seen elsewhere within literature, for example to 
describe the social structures and behaviours of football groups, see for example 
Vrcan (2002), Fawbert (2005), Pennings and Pascoe (2012), Bjelajac (2004), or 
racing groups (Fox, 2005).  Dionísio et al. (2008 p 27) describe the characteristics 
of football tribes as including shared cult meeting places, for example, “the 
ground”, thus showing territory and space as an attribute of a football tribe, 
combined with symbolism and symbols, such as club colours (Dionísio et al., 
2008 p 28).  The existence of symbols within the context of football tribes mirrors 
the work of Pratt and Rafaeli and their linking of symbols, symbolism and group 
coherence, (Pratt, 2003), Pratt and Rafaeli (1997), Pratt and Rafaeli (1993), and 
also Rafaeli and Pratt (2013).  Symbols, space and group behaviour was 
investigated in DE&S through the concept of the clothing, lanyards and territory 
marking.   
Hilder, working within the field of technical project management and using 
concepts from both anthropology and evolutionary psychology, indicates that 
“human tribalism drives behaviour which runs counter to the needs of viability” 
(2004 p 632 ), suggesting that there is a sub-cognitive, evolutionary element to 
the behaviour, which chimes with Nicholson (2000 p 207), in that tribalism may 
be a natural group-state for humans.  Hilder suggests that this behaviour within 
organisations could be overcome by studying the tribal groups in organisations 
and inoculating teams against what he calls ‘the disease of tribalism’ (2004 p 
633).  He then portrays tribes and tribalism as being negative group behaviours.  
Hilder also discriminates between management and workers by describing the 
existence of the “above tribe” and the “below tribe” (2004 p 643).   
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Price and Cybulski (2007) also describe organisational tribes as possessing 
characteristics of leadership, territory, resources language, dialect or jargon, and 
identity, see Table 2-2 In line with this conceptualisation, Etter Sr (1998) 
characterises street gangs as tribes, because they possess a common language, 
culture, or territory, exclusive memberships and a psychological bond.   
In terms of the numbers of members that these groups encompass as tribes 
Dunbar (2005) suggests that group size and language are conjoined evolutionary 
traits linking to different sizes of group as family groups, bands, mega-bands and 
tribes (Dunbar, 2003, Hill and Dunbar, 2003, Zhou et al., 2005).  
Those combined size and linguistic boundaries match those found in 
organisations by for example, Gibbs (1994), and also Logan et al. (2011), (2008), 
Hamilton (2007).  They and others, such as Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993), Hill 
et al. (2008), Hoegl (2005), Ilgen et al. (2005), Kirke (2002), Pulliam and Caraco 
(1984), and also Staats et al. (2012) all suggest that team size boundaries are 
organisationally contextualised.   This may indicate that organisations may 
coincidentally create the conditions for groups to be modelled and labelled as a 
form of neo-tribe. 
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Facet  Early (Cro  
Magnon) Tribe 
Contemporary 
Generic Tribe  
Contemporary 
Corporate Tribe 
Uniformity homogeneous heterogeneous  Homogeneous 
incorporate 
affiliation 
 
Heterogeneous in 
sub-tribe 
affiliations 
 
Boundary clearly bounded fluid boundaries fluid 
organisational 
boundaries 
 
Proximity geographic  geographic organisational 
Communication common 
language 
common 
language 
Unification is 
controlled by 
attention 
exchange 
between 
members 
Emphasis on 
shared 
understanding 
Less reliance on 
common national 
language unique 
industry or 
department 
language 
Common 
methods of 
collaboration 
Common 
communication 
channels 
Table 2-2 Characteristics of Old Tribes, Contemporary Tribes and Corporate 
Tribes. Source: Price and Cybulski (2007) 
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Facet  Early (Cro  
Magnon) Tribe 
Contemporary 
Generic Tribe  
Contemporary 
Corporate Tribe 
Common 
Leadership 
common leader common leader A common figure 
of authority who 
typifies the value 
expectations of 
the tribe 
Membership stable dynamic Emotional 
collectiveness 
desires peer 
acceptance 
Membership 
gives value and 
non-members 
deserve sub-
human 
acknowledge 
ment and 
treatment 
Shared Social 
Structure 
Primordial social 
ties blindly 
accept direction 
Social structure 
Blindly accept 
direction 
Organisational 
structure 
Shared Political 
Structure 
parochial political Corporate culture 
 
Table 2-3 Characteristics of Old Tribes, Contemporary Tribes and Corporate 
Tribes. Source: Price and Cybulski (2007) 
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Generic Tribe behaviours Contemporary corporate tribe 
Entitativity or grandiose self-image Individuals are defined by their tribal 
membership 
Tribal shadow based on their history  Tribes record and celebrate success 
to reinforce their identity and value 
Group polarisation Individuals act to reinforce their self-
worth, tribe protects security 
Group think Tribe offers sub-ordinate identity to 
sub-tribes 
Information is filtered based on self-
interest or an existentialist standard 
Tribes communicate in a non-
traditional intuitive and subjective 
manner 
Conflict was based on politics, 
revenge or survival 
Tribes act to secure their self-
preservation if their security is under 
threat 
Table 2-4 Comparison of Generic Tribe Behaviours and Contemporary Corporate 
Tribe Behaviours 
Source: Price and Cybulski (2007) 
It was found that within the prior literature that was reviewed for this research 
there was no clear and unambiguous definition of either tribe or neo-tribe.  
However there appears be a consistent series of characteristics that can be used 
to distinguish between tribes and neo tribes.  These characteristics are shown in 
Table 2-2.  The context that bounds the characteristics that are found in Table 
2-2 is Price and Cybulski’s concept of the Information Systems tribe, a group 
responsible for implementing an information system within an organisation that 
Price and Cybulski call the ‘IS tribe’, a grouping that they indicate comes together 
to complete Information Systems projects in organisations (Price and Cybulski, 
2007).  The final column that they describe as the IS tribe is not included in Table 
2-2 as that grouping was not appropriate for this literature review. So Tables 2-1 
and 2-2 concentrate on what they describe as the ancient generic and corporate 
tribal corporate characteristics.   
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Price and Cybulski provide some useful indicators as to how a tribe may be 
defined, but there are some weaknesses within their characterisations.  This 
review will firstly discuss the weaknesses.  Price and Cybulski indicate that Cro 
Magnon tribes possessed a series of characteristics.  This presented as ‘fact’ can 
immediately be challenged as there is no observed or documented history of 
these tribes, there is also little archaeological evidence data to support their 
assertion, which then becomes a belief. But if for Cro Magnon, the term historic, 
old, primitive or archaic is used, then observed group characteristics can be seen 
within the evidence, see for example Boas and Farrand (1898), Mushinski and 
Pickering (2000), Rink (1891), Fried (1975), and also Zhou et al. (2005), although 
these characteristics appear to be not definite but fluidly represented within these 
groups.  
The characteristics of these old tribes and neo-corporate tribes appear to 
withstand scrutiny from management theorists as being valid and observed 
characteristics of group in organisations, see for example Becher and Trowler 
(2001), Cooke (2008), Edwards (1999), Ferguson (1996), Fried (1975), Gibbs 
(1994), and also Godin (2008), Isaacs (1975), Maffesoli (1998), Pickering and 
Mushinski (2001), Watters (2003), Nicholson (2000), Neuhauser (1988), Deloria 
(1971).  But once again there appears to be no definitive mapping of these 
characteristics from old tribes to either contemporary generic or corporate tribes, 
even though there are some clear similarities.   
Price and Cybulksi also do not address the characteristic of group size within 
tribes and groups and the link to linguistic boundaries as Dunbar (2003), Hill and 
Dunbar (2003), Zhou et al. (2005) do, even though linguistic difference is 
generally seen as characteristic of contemporary and corporate tribes.  Price and 
Cybulski also define a set of behaviours that can be called ‘tribal’.  Once again, 
Cro Magnon behaviours can only be surmised, but also, by substituting the terms 
old, or archaic for Cro Magnon some similarity may be seen with anthropological 
observation, see for example Gluckman (1956), (1968), Gluckman (2012), Fried 
(1975), Mushinski and Pickering (2000), Rink (1891).  These behaviours can then 
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be placed into a recognisable and tested organisational framework such as that 
provided by for example Deloria (1971), Neuhauser (1988), Nicholson (2000), 
(2008)  and found to be applicable in a generalizable form.   
It would then appear that there is a thread of credibility, logic and authenticity that 
enables the archaic tribe to be linked to the neo tribe through a series of attributes 
and behaviours that are exhibited in certain situations when people come 
together as groups.  But that still leaves the question, what is a tribe? 
By linking those characteristics to a set of behaviours, such as those described 
by Price and Cybulski (2007) in Table 2-4 it appears clear that some groups in 
some organisations may be labelled in the vernacular as being tribal in nature.  
 This leaves a quandary for this research, the term tribe is not appropriate, 
because groups in organisations are not in a jungle, or ‘old’ in the anthropological 
sense; groups in organisations are also not perfect neo-tribes as discussed by 
for example, (Becher and Trowler, 2001, Bennett, 1999, Fried, 1975, Watters, 
2003, Price and Cybulski, 2007, Maffesoli, 1998) because they may for example 
have rigid boundaries and may also not blindly accept direction.   
So neo-tribe as a concept label appears to be too deterministic to describe the 
reality of organisational groups, the hierarchies within them and team structures.  
It is from this that a further definition is proposed which will be used throughout 
this thesis, that of the para-tribe and para-tribal behaviour.   
These definitions are concept labels that can be used where in the vernacular, 
groups in organisations are called tribes or tribal, and also where those same 
groups exhibit some or all of the characteristics that are shown in Table 2-2 and 
Table 2-4, either in concert or separately and also to differing degrees. 
The term para-tribe, or para-tribal then becomes a useful way of describing a 
system of observed group characteristics and exhibited behaviours where 
organisational groups are observed to behave as though they were tribes.  This 
then encompasses a set of attributes, such as identity manifest through personal 
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and geographical symbols and artefacts, linguistic distinctiveness through dialect 
or functional language and behaviours that may consist of protecting of their own 
resources or super competitive behaviours.  
2.7.1 Implications of Group Labelling  
If this study was purely anthropological, then the labelling of the concept of groups 
in DE&S would be purely rooted in the language of organisational anthropology, 
where groups are called what the organisation itself calls them, be that groups or 
teams.  This study, however, is based on a combined social anthropology, 
evolutionary anthropology, evolutionary psychology and management theory 
framework and therefore the labelling of groups in DE&S is more nuanced than if 
a single disciplinary approach had been taken.  As we have seen, the literature 
tells this research that there is little agreement across disciplines as to how to 
appropriately or consistently label a gathering of more than one person.   
The labels that are used appear to be contextually appropriate, and that the labels 
employed may be appropriated for reasons of brand, fashion, or novelty.  The 
literature on the labelling of the concept of the group informs this research by 
drawing attention to the questions: How do groups label themselves in DE&S? 
How does DE&S label these groups? Are there any differences in the hierarchy 
of group names within the organisational hierarchy of DE&S? What do these 
names signify to group members and non-group members?  
Are there differences between the functional formal labels and the informal labels, 
and what might that mean? These questions lead to two further core questions: 
What is the most appropriate label for the functional aggregations of people in 
DE&S?  And can the labels that are used in the formal and informal vernacular of 
DE&S be linked to any characteristics of a group that might give rise to that label 
being used?   
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Therefore the key question becomes: Do the labels that are used to describe 
groups and teams in DE&S have any effect on the organisational culture of 
DE&S?   
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2.8 Symbols and Symbolism  
Schein (1992), and others propose that it is culture which provides the context 
that enables the meaning of a symbol to become valid and potent, see for 
example Schein (1992), Trice and Beyer (1984) (Pondy, 1983). Trice and J. (1993 
p 86)  recognizes three types of symbols: objects, settings, and performers.  
Uniforms, for example, are object symbols which contain specific meanings and 
are context specific.  As Trice and J. (1993 p 86) says, their meaning and use 
may differ from organisation to organisation, or from time to time in one 
organisation.  Hatch (1993) describes organisational identity as being embedded 
and assumptive, but which only involves characteristics that enable self-definition 
of the organisation or of the sub-group.  Therefore, clothing says who I am and 
also who are you? thus enabling social categorisation.  There is therefore a 
contradiction between the organisational elements that are consistent, enduring 
and distinct, and those features that are transient, such as professional, or social 
identities.   
There is also an identity change that occurs as a result of organisational change, 
such as happened in DE&S, with the merger of the DPA and the DLO, and also 
the collocation of teams from other sites into Abbeywood.  During those changes 
people and teams had to lose one geographic identity, assume another 
geographic identity and become more integrated into the core DE&S construct.   
This research then provides evidence of that interaction, through the tensions 
between groups around organisational dress as the symbol in this context.   
Culture within groups can be viewed as frames of reference that determine the 
meaning of a symbol or symbolic system and these symbols can be called 
artefacts, Hatch (1993), see for example Lurie (1981), Pratt and Rafaeli (1997), 
(1993), Rafaeli and Pratt (2013), (1997).  One cultural artefact is organisational 
dress, which is defined as comprising of clothing and artefacts, for example, a 
name tag (Pratt and Rafaeli, 1997, Rafaeli and Pratt, 1993).   
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The literature consistently states that dress and uniform are important symbols in 
the definition of role groups and identity and that dress can also symbolise the 
core values of an organisation.  This research considered the effect of 
organisational dress on the organisational culture of DE&S in particular the 
impact of the military uniform being worn in the civilian environment of DE&S.  
The research considered whether this may cause tensions between military and 
civilian staff, or whether it is seen as a positive symbol.  
Both Gaertner (1977), and Lurie (1981) recognize that dress is also a form of 
symbolism.  By the term symbol, this research uses the meaning that Trice and 
J. (1993 p: 86) uses, that organisational symbols are specific cultural forms 
distinct from the organisational language, narratives, and practices.  Pratt and 
Rafaeli (1997) also describe hybrid identities, these are two or more identity types 
that would not be expected to go together.  This research investigated whether 
there were any effects of this on the military and Civil Service identities that exist 
in DE&S.  Hybrid identities may be competing, but are able to exist 
simultaneously within the same overarching cultural construct, perhaps as a 
result of organisational change transition.  This co-existence may apply for 
example, as a result of the DPA/DLO merger, or the collocation of groups into 
Abbeywood and was considered as part of the research.   
Pratt and Rafaeli (2001a), Rafaeli and Pratt (1993), and also Rafaeli and Pratt 
(2013) also suggest that internal contradictions may be made explicit through the 
provision of symbols such as dress and can be managed by such mechanisms 
as logos, letterheads, and badges.   
For example, personal pins or badges offer a non-verbal indicator of multiple, 
potentially subversive identities, which may indicate a tension between the 
person, as an individual, and the person as a group member, and enable them to 
belong to one, or many social groups.  Dress, therefore, as Rafaeli (1997 p 862) 
indicates, becomes malleable and able to present, and also to mediate conflicting 
personal and organisational identity requirements. 
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Pratt and Rafaeli and others indicate that there is a strong link between the 
organisational control of dress codes and group member’s compliance with a 
wide range of organisational rules, Pratt and Foreman (2000), Rafaeli and Pratt 
(1993), see for example Goffman (1959), Trice and J. (1993), (1984), Bain (2008).  
These dress codes may be in harmony across an organisation or could represent 
different fragmented cultures in organisations which may result in fragmented and 
multiple identities see for example, Albert and Whetten (1985), Pratt and 
Foreman (2000), Brewer (1999), Riketta and Nienaber (2007), Van Dick et al. 
(2004), nested identities Pate et al. (2010), Foreman and Whetten (2002), 
Medrano and Gutiérrez (2001), Herb and Kaplan (1999), Hakenbeck (2007); 
multiple axes of identity Kirke (2007d), or contradictory identities Ellemers (2005).   
Rafaeli and Pratt (1993) also suggest that members may react to conflicting 
identities ambivalently, but Swann (2005) suggests that what actually occurs is a 
process of identity negotiation.  Pratt and Rafaeli, and other researchers, view 
dress as a symbolic concept within an organisational culture.  Dress serves, in 
their view, two functions: the assertion of management control, and also the 
conveyance of identity.  Lurie (1981 p 18) Pratt and Rafaeli (1997), Pratt and 
Rafaeli (2001b), Pratt and Rafaeli (1993), (2013, 1997) and others also state that 
in addition to being a method of social control, individuals could identify with a 
group by specific use of clothing.  
They also consider that, on wearing a uniform the individual gives up the right to 
act as an individual, thereby allowing themselves to be controlled by the group.  
Identification with a group could be voluntary or forced on them by organisational 
norms called dress codes.  This research has investigated whether there were 
any dress codes in DE&S, and if there are, what effect they may have on the 
organisational culture of DE&S.   
Davis and Pratt and Dutton (in Hatch, 2004) argue from a slightly different 
perspective when they say dress and other symbols represent different social 
identities such as professional or gender identities.  They also state that both of 
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these identities could apply at the same time.  However, according to Pratt and 
Rafaeli in Hatch (2004 p 278), it  is unclear how multiple identities play out in the 
context of one symbol in one organisational setting.  Solomon (1985) indicates 
that organisations spend a lot of money on maintaining employees’ dress.  The 
MOD spends in excess of £50 million on military working dress, and 
approximately £5 million on ceremonial uniforms annually.21  The MOD 
prescribes military dress through various official dress committees such as Bain 
(2008), MOD (2004), such as those set out by the Royal Royal Navy (2002a), 
Royal Royal Navy (2002b), that are reinforced by organisational socio-technical 
sanctions and by socio-cultural norms.   
Pratt and Rafaeli (1997 p 863) suggest that dress also serves as a convenient 
medium for disclosing conflicting organisational issues that are less easily 
grasped, and that dress is also a convenient medium for representing competing 
conceptions of two, or more, social identities.  Kluger and others indicate that 
clothing triggers specific behaviours in others of differing rank, Kluger and Rafaeli 
(1998), Varda Wasserman et al. (1999), see for example Pratt and Rafaeli (1997).   
In the military, for instance, as described by Jolly (1996 p 88), when people 
encounter each other in specific situations, it may result in the paying of 
compliments such as saluting, or in a specific language being used.  This in – 
group signalling enables those who know, or belong to the groups, to read the 
clothing, and therefore to adjust their interaction with the wearer accordingly.  
Lurie (1981 p 18) indicates that this pragmatic symbolism also means that casual 
observers or out-groupers would not be able to read these signals, thus further 
creating an identity boundary.  In this way, as described by Gaertner (1977), 
visual cues could directly impact on representations of identity and subsequent 
bias towards that identity.  Smircich (1983) goes on to describe how differing 
symbolic systems shape the organisational reality in different ways.  Braithwaite 
                                            
21 Data provided by Defence Clothing PT (Logistics Commodity Services Group). Provided in October 
2014. 
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(2006) also makes reference to such activities in relation to group coherence in 
the Royal Marines, but King was working as an outsider, and only investigating 
one group within a much larger organisation.   
2.8.1 Implications of Symbols in DE&S 
If, as shown, it is a characteristic of organisations that they possess symbols, 
then DE&S should both possess symbols at an organisational level and also 
throughout the organisation.  Just what those symbols are and their meaning was 
investigated during the research.  There are some lines of enquiry on symbols in 
DE&S that are obvious: the military possesses uniform and dress codes while the 
civil service does not, so what might this asymmetry of dress code and symbolism 
mean in terms of the effect that the symbols have on the two groups working 
together?  Also, does the civil service possess its own symbols, and if so what 
might they be? Are equipment and functional outputs categorised and used as 
symbolic representations of a DE&S or a group identity? Is the link to the military 
used as a positive or negative symbol in terms of, for example, Remembrance 
Day services? And how do staff react to that symbolism? Can symbols be defined 
as either positive or divisive within DE&S?   
All of those questions align into one key question that fits within the remit of the 
research question: Can a symbolic system of representation be identified within 
DE&S? And if it can, what is that system and if that symbolic system does exist, 
how does that system affect the organisational culture of DE&S? 
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2.9  Social Identity  
Social identity theory, at its broadest, makes use of the psychological and 
sociological aspects of group behaviour theories.  These describe when and why 
individuals identify with, and behave as part of, social groups  Tajfel (1979 p 122).   
Festinger (1954) states that identity can be expressed as being in relation to 
something else, such as another individual, and that the categories that an 
individual uses, consist of social value judgements.  Tajfel and Turner (1986) 
suggest that there is distinctiveness of the group’s values in relation to those of 
comparable groups.  This distinctiveness provides a level of uniqueness to the 
identity to the group itself, and that the distinctiveness of group values within an 
organization should be judged against the strength of group domains and 
boundaries.  Tajfel and Turner also  identify how categorisation leads to 
psychological distinctiveness, which arises because people want their identity to 
be both distinct from, and positively compared with that of other groups and 
individuals, in, for example Billig et al. (1973), Tajfel (1979), Tajfel and Turner 
(1986).   
The fact that people form groups is described by for example Lieberman et al. 
(2008), Furnham (2011 p 479), Dunbar and Shultz (2010), and alsoKrupp et al. 
(2008).  Maas and Schiller in (in Capozza, 2000 p 46) also show that people show 
in-group and out-group behaviours, suggesting that there is an “initial 
categorisation based in-group bias” that guides subsequent intergroup 
comparisons.  This approach assumes that in-group favouritism is a type of initial 
default mode of behaviour, in line with Sherif (1956), rather than the end product 
of inter-group comparisons.   
This default mode of in-group favouritism indicates a link to human categorisation 
behaviours, of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and suggests that they are sub-cognitive and 
influenced more by evolution than intellect.  It could therefore follow that 
categorisation is, as Krieger (1995) states, a cognitive bias.  
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Similarly evolutionary anthropology and psychology has informed this research 
in relation to social categorisation.  There are conflicting views as to why group 
bias occurs.  Sherif (1956) takes the view that competition drives categorisation, 
while Billig et al. (1973), Tajfel (1979) take the opposing view that collaboration 
drives categorisation.   
In addition to personal identity, Ashforth and others indicate that a central defining 
element within any group is that of collective group identity, Ashforth and Mael 
(1989), Balmer (2008b), Baumeister (1995), Billig et al. (1973), Brickson (2007), 
Brunetto Y (2002), Cunningham (2007), Dick et al. (2006), and also El Akremi et 
al. (2009), Ellemers (2005), see for example Festinger (1954).  These writers 
suggest that definitions of group identity are founded on social comparison 
processes, where a value judgement is made in relation to that characteristic, or 
other characteristics that are displayed by the ‘other’ group.   
Louis and Pondy (1983) also describe two forms of duality of identity, one where 
each unit in the organisation shows both the identities of the organisation, and of 
the group, which they call an holographic organisation.  The other type of 
organisation that they describe is one where each organisation shows only one 
identity, the multiple identities being represented by different units within the 
organisation.  This they term an ideographic organisation.   
This variation in the level of identification fits neatly to the view, previously 
expressed by Watson and others that identity is fluid, changing and negotiated 
over time and context; Ashforth and Mael (1989), Deaux et al. (1995), Desmette 
and Gaillard (2008), see for example Doise (1978), Duffy and Nesdale (2009), 
Dutton et al. (2010), Ellemers (2005), Haslam (2003b), (2001 , 2011), Hatch 
(2004), He and Balmer (2007), Hogg (2003), (2007), Hong-wei He. (2009), 
Jenkins (1999), Watson (2006).   
Identity can also be managed by internally constructed language and meanings 
through specific formal and informal actions (and also Ashforth and Mael in 
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Hatch, 2004 pp 134 -160, see for example Bourhis and Giles, 1977, Tong et al., 
1999).   
Miller, Prentice and Lightdale (1994) indicate that there can be an attachment to 
other group members that is based on common identity, called collective 
identities.  Markus and Kitayama (1998) agree that people perceive themselves 
in terms of the groups that they belong to, be they family, friends or of the same 
geographic location.  People also categorise by a perceived coherence between 
their individual aims and the groups aims, to the extent that they become a 
collective aim (1998).  Bourdieu (2007) and separately Douglas (1970 pp 57-72) 
also describe how in-groups and out-groups form and are supported, and how 
they are re-enforced by ritualised boundary management and differentiation 
activity.  They describe how this activity is designed not simply to differentiate the 
participant from the non-participant, but also to define and reinforce the cultural 
limits of the group and its rule-set for harmonised social activity.  It then appears 
that ritualised and symbolic boundary management can act to keep people in 
certain groups and out of others.   
2.9.1 Implications of Identity For This Research 
Wider research on social identity informs this research because all organisations 
possess an identity, and that identity can be symbolic or pragmatic or both.  
Within organisational identities, the groups that comprise organisations each 
appear to possess their own identities which may be contested or agreed, and 
which may also be marked symbolically or pragmatically: on the person, via 
territory or via architecture.  
DE&S is an organisation, so it can be said to possess an identity.  That identity 
may mean different things to different people, whether they are inside, or outside 
of its organisational boundaries, whether they are military, civilian civil service or 
contractor.  That identity can be seen as having a duality:  is it a civil service 
organisation, or is it a military organisation? Is it a department of state? Or is it a 
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project management organisation that acts as a middleman between the 
politicians, military and industry ‘to equip and support the armed forces’?  
The research has considered what might the effect of these multiple and 
potentially conflicting identities be on DE&S as an organisation? 
Questions then arise and which were answered on the concept of ‘identity’ in 
DE&S are such as: Does DE&S have a single identity? And how is that identity 
marked and maintained? And what identities are extant in DE&S and how are 
these group identities marked both practically, symbolically in groups and on the 
person? Does the existence of differing dress codes between the military and 
civilian staff have an effect on civilian and military interactions?  
And also do staff accept the symbols that DE&S provides to mark its brand 
identity, thus acknowledging that they belong to DE&S or do they prefer to do 
something else and not identify with DE&S, but perhaps with some other 
construct of their work-life, thereby marking multiple identities? 
All of these questions can be distilled into one question that aligns with the 
research question: Does ‘identity’ have any effect on the organisational culture of 
DE&S?   
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2.10 Identity and Organisational Mergers 
If groups, organisations and individuals all possess identities, then at times of 
organisational change, such as within a merger, it might be expected that the 
question of identity could acquire a different level of importance than was usual 
in the group or the organisation, or even for the individual.  There is a large body 
of literature on identity and organisational mergers, Boen et al. (2007), see for 
example Cartwright and Cooper (1992), De Gooijer (2009), Dick et al. (2006), 
Giessner et al. (2011), (2006), Ilka et al. (2009), Kavanagh (2006), Knippenberg 
et al. (2002), Riad (2005 ), Terry et al. (2001), (2001), Vaara (2002), Van Dick et 
al. (2004), Van Knippenberg and Van Leeuwen (2001), Van Leeuwen et al. 
(2000), Hogan and Overmyer-Day (1994).   
This literature indicates that the management of identity or brand within a period 
of organisational change can affect the outcome of the organisational change, 
whether positively or negatively.   
Ashmore et al. (2004), Abrams and Hogg (2002), Tajfel and Turner (1986) all 
separately describe merging groups in an experimental context.  Their 
conclusions show that the identity of the merging groups is often important to their 
members, especially as regards their self-definitional capabilities.  Terry (2003), 
and also Haunschild et al. (1994) suggest that negative reactions to mergers may 
be engendered because group members are forced to lose their pre-merger 
identity and to adopt a new identity.   
The threat that is posed to group distinctiveness through an organisational 
merger could be viewed as a constraint on the success of any merger and any 
subsequent cultural change that may be required.  In the case of the DPA and 
the DLO this factor was investigated through the vernacular of DE&S, and group 
members’ feelings at the time of the merger of the DPA and the DLO.   
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Mergers affect everyone in an organisation differently.  This is often dependent 
on their hierarchical position.  Engel (2010), Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993), 
Van Knippenberg and Van Leeuwen (2001), Van Leeuwen et al. (2000), (2003) 
separately use case study data to show that if the Top Team is dismissed by the 
dominant group after a merger, as described by Cartwright and Cooper (1992), 
then this imposition of the dominant culture and identity on the acquired 
organisation often strengthens resistance to the merger.   
Strength of identity also strengthens resistance to the imposition of the new 
culture and identity from the point of view of the dominated group. Van Leeuwen 
et al. (2003  p 248-249) indicate that in these circumstances, the original top team 
would be expected not to identify with the merged organisation.  One approach 
that could accommodate these tensions would be to legitimise a multi-cultural 
approach to identity in the merged organisation and allow sub-cultures to exist 
within it.  Van Leeuwen et al. (2000) argue against the imposition of a single 
identity in a post-merger organisation.  She suggests that sub-group identities are 
a healthy element of an organisation which help to maintain a sense of continuity 
in both the dominated, and the dominant group after a merger.   
Boen and many others also assume that one group would be dominant and the 
other group would be dominated, and that a single organisation would appear 
after the merger, see for example, Boen et al. (2007), Cartwright and Cooper 
(1992), De Gooijer (2009), Dick et al. (2006), Giessner et al. (2011), Giessner et 
al. (2006), Ilka et al. (2009), Kavanagh (2006), Knippenberg et al. (2002), Riad 
(2005 ), Terry et al. (2001), Terry and O’Brien (2001), Vaara (2002), Van Dick et 
al. (2004), Van Knippenberg and Van Leeuwen (2001), and also Van Leeuwen 
et al. (2000).  They do not say how long it might take for this single organisation 
to emerge. 
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2.10.1 Implications of Organisational Identity and the Merger of the 
DPA and the DLO 
In 2007 the DPA and the DLO were merged to form DE&S.  It is self-evident that 
those precursor organisations possessed their own identities, because they had 
been in existence for some time.  Also the DPA and the DLO were functionally 
different and so possessed different functional identities: the DPA acquired 
equipment while the DLO supported that equipment.  Each organisation was 
likely to have been viewed differently by its customers, politicians, industry 
partners and staff.   
This research was carried out in the aftermath of the merger of the DPA and the 
DLO and therefore provides an opportunity to ask questions about the process of 
identity management at the time of the merger.  It also provides an opportunity to 
ask questions about the effect that identity and its management had on staff 
during and after the merger.   
Questions that might be asked are: What were the organisational team identities 
in the DPA and the DLO prior to 2007, how were they manufactured, marked and 
maintained? How strong were those identities? Was there any understanding of 
organisational identity and its place in organisational change? What measures 
were put in place in order to change the organisational identities of the DPA and 
the DLO to DE&S? Was there a concept of a DE&S identity prior to the merger, 
and if there was, how was that defined, implemented and managed?  Then there 
are questions of the effect and effectiveness of the change of organisational 
identity on employees, customers and industry partners after the merger?   
Did people identify with DPA and DLO, and if so, what did they do on the merger? 
Did they identify immediately with DE&S and stop identifying with their old group? 
Or was there a latency where it took some time for people to get used to the 
DE&S identity?   
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These questions can all be encapsulated into one question: what effect did the 
merger of the DPA and the DLO have on the identity claims of the employees, 
groups and teams.   
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2.11  Geographic Identity, Symbolic and Functional Space.  
“We shape our buildings; thereafter they shape us”. 
Winston Churchill 
There is a further type of identity that is of interest to this research.  This is 
because of the nature of the built environment and its effect on identity as has 
been described by amongst others (Abel, 2010, King, 2004, Nasser, 2005, Seiler, 
1984, Vale, 1992, Wegerhoff, 2008) .   
There is much now written on space, see for example King (2004), Van Marrewijk 
and Yanow (2010), Weir et al. (2010).  This literature review considers the 
concepts of space as flexible, multi-use areas where identity, group size and 
belonging could be legitimised or subverted as they relate to DE&S and considers 
whether the existing literature is relevant to DE&S.  This approach brings the 
conceptualisation and use of space in DE&S into line with a series of theoretical 
and academic lines of enquiry that are well established, and also within the 
central investigative axes of this research.  There are spaces where people come 
together and work, such as on a floor-plate office working area, or break apart, 
or relax, for example in a restaurant.  In addition, spaces may at any one time be 
functionally purposed, for example, as transit spaces or work spaces.  In any 
organisation, this is likely to have consequences, but in the complex and 
hierarchical, multi-cultural organisation of DE&S, it was of interest to identify how 
it is manifested.   
Van Marrewijk and Yanow (2010 p 30) indicate that identity could be manipulated 
through the built space, and also through symbolic artefacts and performances.  
This chimes with Pratt and Foreman (2000), Pratt and Rafaeli (2001a), and also 
Rafaeli and Pratt (2013).   
This manipulation could range from flags at entrances, or the entire look of 
buildings and their relationship to their surroundings.  The legitimisation of team 
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and personal territory marking reinforces the behaviours that were identified by 
Van Marrewijk (2009 p 301), where people arrived early to get the best seats with 
no one ‘owning’ a desk.   
Pratt and Rafaeli, and also Hackman and others, also note that organisations 
could legitimise symbolic and functional use of space, and the development of a 
geographical or territorial identity through teams being allowed to personalise 
their workspace, see for example, Pratt and Rafaeli (2001b), Rafaeli and Pratt 
(2013), Hackman (1987), Kulik et al. (1987), Porter et al. (1975 ).  This is also 
expressed indirectly by Kirke (2012 p 9) who describes a geographical boundary 
to social categorisation behaviour in the MOD.   
Weir et al. (2010 p 118) describe how identity could also be discerned in decision 
making spaces, where the space becomes symbolised with, for example, a desk 
and seating placed specifically to manipulate behaviour and make visible the 
power hierarchy that exists within, and adjacent to that space.  The power 
hierarchy around space, territory and the desk is especially salient in DE&S in 
relation to DE&S policy on the numbers of people working at Abbeywood, and 
how employees might react to being forced to share desks through the corporate 
Abbeywood desk booking system.  (Trist, 1981), Trist (1978) linked space to work 
because work occurs within, and is guided by, the organisational, socio-
technically constructed spaces, through the imposition of the socio-spatial.  
Within this embodiment of space and architecture is the exhibition of power and 
the intent of the organisational leaders with regard to what they want the buildings 
to say.   
Therefore, as Van Marrewijk and Yanow (2010) describe, how architecture and 
space is used and protected must be addressed if organisational research is to 
be truly holistic.   
Therefore, space and the pragmatic and symbolic marking of territory was 
investigated in DE&S through photo-ethnography and the documenting of the 
marking of territorial boundaries and liminal spaces.   
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2.11.1 Implications of Geographic Identity in DE&S 
DE&S possesses a geographical identity that is centred on the site of 
Abbeywood, a site that was also historically the location of the DPA. Within that 
location are different buildings which house offices and various work and leisure 
locations, for example, the gym, cafés and restaurants as well as meeting rooms 
and open plan offices and floorplates.  These areas can be categorised as formal 
and informal areas and they are all permitted by DE&S to exist.  Thus the 
questions that arise in relation to geographic identity are such as: How is office 
space allocated to teams in DE&S? How is that space managed and guarded by 
DE&S? How do teams decide what their geographical boundaries are, and how 
do they manage and mark those boundaries? 
Is it possible to identify different functional and cultural groups by the symbols 
and artefacts that they use to mark their territory? Are there any organisationally 
driven policies that affect the individual at their desks? Or does the organisational 
policy on space only affect teams at a corporate level rather than people at an 
individual level?  
These questions can all be aligned to the single question: does geographical 
identity in DE&S have any effect on the organisational culture of DE&S?   
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2.12 Linguistic Frameworks: Metaphor and Organisational 
Dialects 
“Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the 
world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the 
mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of 
expression for their society.  The fact of the matter is that the ‘real world’ 
is to a large extent unconsciously built upon the language habits of the 
group.  We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do 
because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices 
of interpretation”  (Sapir, 1949).   
Sapir, in that quote, appears to be addressing what Vygotsky (1997) calls the 
sociocultural in that Sapir indicates that language is built on the habits of the 
group, and that may be sub-conscious rather than deliberate.  
Carnap and Schilpp (1963) further suggest that “discussing any entity requires a 
linguistic framework”, (Stafford, 2005).  This indicates, as Sapir does, that 
frameworks are engrained into a person, and also within a culture.  Therefore the 
more common and expedient a sign, or a framework is, the easier it becomes to 
forget that there is a difference between the framework and the entity.  As Sapir 
suggests, people become unseeing of the framework, only seeing the entity 
(Sapir, 1949).  Yablo (1998 p 249) also suggested that metaphor runs in parallel 
to frameworks in that metaphors can be both literal and metaphorical.  It can 
therefore be interpreted that metaphor and language can be used within 
organisations in an unconscious and un-knowing way to describe a lived reality.   
The study of organisations through the use of metaphor is well established, see 
for example Bargh. J (2006), Johnson (1980), Lakoff (2008), see also Morgan 
Morgan (2001), (1999).  Lakoff and Johnson (1980 p 15) categorise metaphors 
as types, for example, orientation, happy is up, sad is down.  Morgan describes 
culture as a metaphor, saying that  “its strengths are that it directs attention to the 
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symbolic significance of almost every aspect of organisational life” (Morgan, 2001 
p 141 ), and also, that “organisation ultimately rests in shared systems of 
meaning” (Morgan, 2001 p 142).  Language can also be used to manage identity, 
both in strength of identity and how people relate to groups, and people use words 
to negotiate meaning between themselves, their peers, and the organisation (see 
for example Czarniawska-Joerges in Hatch, 2004 p  408).   
In the wider military environment metaphors described how people relate to their 
groups.  The first label that is often used is that of family to describe relatedness 
of an individual to a group.  This has been documented by Jolly (Jolly, 1987, Jolly, 
1996) through the construct of the wider services,  and also the Civil Service 
‘family’.   
This research has investigated whether this type of metaphor exists in DE&S, 
whether there is a link to military metaphors and whether there is an effect on the 
organisational culture of DE&S from the existence and use of these types of 
metaphor.  
The existing literature indicates that the metaphor of familial relationships in 
organisations is not wholly positive, and that its value can be determined by other 
cultural factors.  For example, kinship and the metaphor of family can become 
problematic, whereas in eastern philosophy, kinship and the metaphor of family 
are the norm, to quote Furnham: 
“In some cultures kinship is an unqualified criterion of cohesiveness.  
Whereas in the west it may be considered nepotistic to employ relations, 
this was not always the case in the East, where blood relations are the first 
choice, in part to ensure group cohesion and loyalty’  (Furnham, 2011 p 
487).  
The effect of family metaphors on group behaviour was investigated in DE&S 
through the investigation of the language, structures, and roles that were used to 
support people, and the reactions that people had to the use of these structures.  
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The way that people relate to their groups through language is considered to be 
relevant to this research as it concerns the way that group members identify with, 
and relate to groups. This relatedness could be expressed through language as 
metaphor, such as family or tribal language, thus indicating a para-familial 
relationship between individual group member and the group as a whole, and the 
group members.   
Relatedness may also be described through the use of tribal metaphors and 
language to signify a different relationship.  Relatedness through the expression 
of language is hierarchically dependent, as relatedness may also be expressed 
through de-emotionalised task-oriented language as proposed by McDougall 
(1920), and separately Lakoff (2008).   
This de-humanisation occurs where the group member relates less to group 
members and more closely with the group or organisation as a psychological and 
physical construct.  This then appears to link to Weber’s concept of bureaucracy 
de-humanising those that come in contact with it (Weber, 1946).   
2.12.1 Implications of Language and Metaphor 
Organisations comprise groups of people, and people use language to describe 
their surroundings and their lived experiences within their groups.  The language 
that is used may be pragmatic or it may be laden with metaphor.  Therefore, this 
research sought to discover if any linguistic frameworks of this nature exist in 
DE&S.  Once again the existence of the military within civilian groups would be 
expected to influence group language and metaphor within that group. This 
research attempted to identify if there is an effect on, for example, group 
distinctiveness, if the effect can be characterised and also the magnitude of the 
effect and its effect on how the group functions.  Also this research sought to map 
and characterise languages of the functional groups in DE&S in order to 
characterise the extent of linguistic difference and similarity between the groups.   
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In terms of metaphor this research sought to identify some of the key metaphors 
in DE&S.  It attempted to discover why they were used and what they described.  
Therefore the questions that relate to the research questions on the subject of 
language and metaphor are: Does language and metaphor affect the 
organisational culture of DE&S? And if is it does how can that effect be 
characterised?     
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2.13 Integration, Induction and Socialisation 
Socialisation describes the process of learning group norms:   
“On the one hand, it prepares the individual for the roles he was to play, 
providing him with the necessary repertoire of habits, beliefs, and values, 
the appropriate patterns of emotional response and the modes of 
perception, the requisite skills and knowledge.  On the other hand, by 
communicating the contents of culture from one generation to the other, it 
provides for its persistence and continuity”.  Chinoy (1961 p 75)   
Heinz (2001) indicates that socialisation occurs at several points in a person’s 
life, for differing reasons and with differing effects.  These status changes occur 
as a series of status configurations.  Heinz (2001 p 8) suggests that the status 
configurations consist of variable durations of employment episodes, bounded by 
variable practices of induction and integration that range as Heinz indicates, from 
formal to informal, personal, explicit, implicit induction and  also explicit 
socialisation interventions.  In the Civil Service and armed services an employee 
can change role, and often status, on job change or promotion.  The practice of 
socialisation and integration of employees into groups converges into what 
Feldman (1976) calls contingent socialisation, because socialisation occurs when 
it is needed.   
Albert and Whetten, in Hatch (2004 p 90) describe configuration points as 
common life cycle events: birth, growth, maturity, and retrenchment.  Van Gennep 
(2011) and also Mayrhofer (2005) describe these points  as rites of passage.  At 
each stage, ritual is enacted to transition a person from one state to another, and 
to demonstrate this to others, as well as to the individual.  These stages and 
points may be, for example, puberty, graduation, gaining a first job or promotion.   
Thus Albert and Whetten appear to agree with Heinz, in that they identify time 
points in an individual’s and organisation’s life-cycle when identity becomes 
 88 
 
 
important, and is manipulated or changed.  This point may be a merger with 
another organisation, as happened when the DPA and the DLO merged to create 
DE&S.   
In organisations with all of these forms of socialisation there is only one outcome 
that is expected, that is, for a new group member to be able to fit in with their new 
group, and to perform a role effectively, Chao et al. (1994), see for example 
Clausen (1968), Feldman (1976), Fogarty (1992), Korte (2009), Van Maanen 
(1978), Scholarios et al. (2003), Semmer and Schallberger (1996), Van Maanen 
and Schein (1979), Wanous (1992) and also Sprogoe and Elkjaer (2010).  None 
of the organisations that those authors studied were mixed military civilian 
organisations, although some of Van Maanen’s work was carried out within a 
police department, so the findings are likely only to be generalizable to this 
research.  At each of these temporal or stratified points in an employee’s work 
life, differing elements of agency assume different levels of importance, all with 
the caveat of most often occurs in this way.   
Goffman (1959), and Van Maanen (1978) suggest that the new group may also 
reward the assumption of a new identity in a symbolic way.  Pondy (1983) also 
indicates that gaining a new identity is achieved through the management of 
symbols, traditions, myths, stories and rituals of an organisation in order to 
provide the new member with a compelling image of what the group or 
organisation represents for the individual joining the organisation.   
Socialisation processes could therefore include rituals, taking the definition of 
ritual that Trice and J. (1993 p 107) proposes and applying that to the practice of 
socialisation: “Rituals were relatively simple combinations of repetitive 
behaviours, often carried out without much thought, and often brief in duration”.   
Trice and J. (1993 p 138) distinguishes between the investiture process that 
ratifies the newcomer’s incoming identity, and the divestiture process, which 
supplants the incoming identity with a new organisationally situated identity. They 
recognize that divestiture involves the reconstruction of the newcomer’s social 
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identity through the removal of symbols of previous identities.  In divestiture, the 
group that the newcomer wants to join restricts the newcomer from external 
contact, disparages a newcomer’s status, knowledge and ability and imposes 
new identification symbols.  To ensure the rejection of the previous identity, the 
new group may proscribe and also prescribe behaviours that must be exhibited, 
and punish infringements of these behaviours.   
According to Feldman (1976), induction is never a stand-alone practice.  Where 
it occurs, it is always embedded within an organisational context, and 
accompanied by multiple layers and meanings.  Feldman’s view of socialisation 
chimes with that of Sprogoe and Elkjaer (2010), and separately Nicolini et al. 
(2003) who define induction as different sub-practices within an overarching 
notion of a perceived coherent process of induction.  Sprogoe further describes 
induction as a socialisation process in which the newcomer learns both the 
culture of an organisation and also how to function in a new job .  Sprogoe and 
Nicolini echo Chao et al. (1994), and also Van Maanen and Schein (1979), who 
also describe two strands of learning imbued by the newcomer.  Those strands 
can be identified as the socio-cultural and the socio-technical as described earlier 
in section 2.3.2. Sprogoe and Elkjaer also note that induction provides an 
opportunity for the organisation to learn from the newcomer.   
However, if the newcomer is inducted too quickly, then they will become 
enculturated too quickly, and the organisation will have reduced its opportunity to 
learn from the newcomer. The nuanced view of Sprogoe and Elkjaer and also 
Nicolini et al. (2003) enables a flexible approach to induction.  The different 
approaches to socialisation in DE&S was investigated by this research, because 
anecdotally the approaches appear to produce completely different outcomes.  
This research draws a wide boundary around the practice of socialisation in order 
to accommodate the totality of explicit, implicit, and also, formal and informal 
practices.  This view was reached because it was observed that none of the 
socialisation practices were found in isolation from one another.  The literature 
indicates that socialisation can be viewed as linked systems of integrative 
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practice within an organisational system, being therefore characterised as both 
socio-technical induction and socio-cultural integration.  Once again, the literature 
refers to research that was carried out in organisations that were fundamentally 
different from DE&S, so principles from the literature were applied to this research 
in order to identify if the results from the literature are generalizable and 
applicable to DE&S.   
Socialisation also, according to Kirpal (2004 p 199) within the theory of work-
related socialisation, assumes that work identities play a role in the integration of 
workers into different work settings.  This integration is achieved by helping 
individuals to create their own role and professional place in their team and also 
to develop attachment and commitment to their work.  Identity, attachment and 
commitment are reflected within the research as key themes.  They were 
investigated through a social identity theory and social categorisation theory 
approach to the research.  The processes of socialisation and re-socialisation are 
at the centre of developing an individual’s understanding of, and ability to work 
within, the rules and norms of a group as discussed by Billig et al. (1973), and 
Tajfel (1979), (1986).   
As a result of a critical review of the available literature this research uses a 
definition of socialisation that is deliberately broad, and builds on Settersten, 
quoting Inkeles: 
“‘Socialisation’ was used to refer to an ‘exceedingly large range of 
phenomena’.  It simultaneously described a process, or input, external to 
the person, the individuals experience in the process and the end product 
or output”. (Settersten, 2002 p 1).  
Therefore, socialisation is defined by this research and in the context of this 
research, as:  The socio–technical and socio–cultural processes and practices 
that an organisation or group uses to communicate its current or intended future 
socio–technical ways of working and socio–cultural rules and culture to people 
who are joining it, have joined the organisation or who are already members of it.  
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This definition allows socialisation to encompass the plethora of socio-technical 
organisational practices that include: induction, integration, on-boarding, team-
building, and meetings. It also enables the inclusion of the socio-cultural practice 
that takes place in coffee meetings, in conjunction with food, and any other day 
to day social practices.  The investigation of explicit actions within the practice of 
socialisation indicates that there are two axes of socialisation.  These axes are: 
formal, or socio-technical induction into the documented rules of a group or 
organisation, and an informal socio-cultural integration into the norms of a group, 
which may occur as a parallel activity.  Goffman (1959) and Van Maanen (1978) 
separately consider the accepting of new behaviour patterns, and also the 
discarding, either willingly or not, of former behaviour patterns when they describe 
how total and quasi-total institutions, such as the military, integrate new 
members.   
There is a further form of socialisation, anticipatory socialisation, when a person 
rehearses for future positions, occupations, and social relationships, see for 
example Chinoy (1961), Dean (1984), Feldman (1976), Heinz (2006), Korte 
(2009), Scholarios et al. (2003), Wanous (1992), and also Wanous et al. (1992).  
Within a military context, anticipatory socialisation might be exemplified by pre-
deployment training (Braithwaite, 2006).  Anticipatory socialisation may also 
encompass the concept of re-socialisation, which is the discarding of former 
behaviour patterns and the accepting of new ones, in that respect Chinoy (1961), 
and separately, Johnson (1961), recognize that re-socialisation occurs 
throughout the human life cycle, but they treat it as a form of specialized 
education.   
Johnson (1961) describes the importance of inculcating members of the US 
Coastguard with a set of values that enable the concerted response to 
commands, and the acting in unison without question.  King (2006) agrees with 
him, but in the context of the Royal Marines, a corps of the British military.  It is 
also generally agreed that people may be socialised into identifying with a group 
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formally, or informally, when peers tell, and repeat stories, Lauenstein (2009), 
see for example Morgan and Lowry (1999), Braithwaite (2006). 
There are few studies of induction and socialisation into mixed military and civilian 
organisations, but Kirke (2007b), in his study on integrating Territorial Army 
soldiers into regular army units for operations, identifies that both formal and 
informal structures and processes are important in bringing people into groups.  
The existence of both enables the newcomer to become effective and trusted 
more quickly.   
2.13.1 Implications of Induction and Socialisation 
The socialisation of new group members into groups can happen, as Feldman 
(1976) describes, in a manner that is appropriate to the circumstances where it 
is needed.  As DE&S is composed of groups, and people move into and out of 
these groups, then some type of socialisation must occur in order for them to 
function within their new group.   
It is for this thesis to show how that socialisation occurs in terms of the practice, 
the processes that dictate the practice, what the content of the socialisation or 
induction is, and the context that socialisation occurs within and what the effect 
of that socialisation is on groups and group members. It will also be of interest to 
identify if there is a distinction, or a recognition of difference between a technical 
induction into a role, and socialisation into a group culture.  Also in DE&S there 
is the proximity of military personnel, so relevant questions are: are there any 
differences in inducting military staff into DE&S compared to civilians? Do they 
have expectations of a military induction? Or are their induction experiences and 
processes different? And what effect might that have on them fitting into DE&S 
and its teams?   
As DE&S was created from two groups, the DPA and the DLO, it will be of interest 
to attempt to identify the induction and socialisation activities that were 
undertaken, if indeed there were any measures in place, to socialise employees 
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into DE&S on its creation.  It was also useful to identify if there were any positive 
or negative effects of that socialisation, such as a reduction of, or a recognition 
of, cultural drag from the ‘old’ organisations.   
All of these questions can be distilled into: Does induction and socialisation in 
DE&S affect the organisational culture of DE&S, and if so, what is that effect?   
2.14  Conclusion 
The literature review has described the broad theoretical frameworks that support 
this research.   
The literature review has also identified the lacuna that this research fills.  There 
have been no ethnographic studies carried out from an insider point of view within 
DE&S, and no studies have applied these specific theoretical frameworks to study 
group behaviours in a mixed civilian and military defence procurement 
organisation such as DE&S.   
This research is considered to be unique because no research of this nature, or 
at this level, has been carried out in DE&S, the DPA and the DLO.  In addition, 
no studies have investigated the organisational culture of DE&S, apart from which 
was a small pilot study (Kirke, 2007a). 
This research is therefore unique when considered on those factors alone.  A 
further factor in the uniqueness of this research is that DE&S only existed in the 
form that was investigated from 1st April 2007 – 31st March 2015, when it 
underwent an organisational change to become a Bespoke Government Trading 
Entity (BTE).  Therefore the research cannot be directly repeated as the 
underlying organisational structures that were subject to the initial research are 
no longer in place.   
In academic terms, this research is considered to be unique because of the 
theoretical framework that combined a broad social sciences approach with 
evolutionary anthropology and psychology, which have been used to investigate 
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and attempt to understand factors that affected the organisational culture of 
DE&S.  This specific, multi-factorial framework has not been used before within 
any organisation, let alone part of the UK government, such as DE&S.   
The overarching concept that supports this research is that all of these factors 
worked together, in a unique way, in the unusual organisational environment that 
was DE&S.  
This research has addressed the organisation environment gap by carrying out 
an ethnographic study in DE&S.  This research was completed while the 
researcher was a full time employee, thus performing in an identity as a full time 
member of DE&S.  In doing so he filled two gaps; one in the scholarly knowledge 
of organisations and organisational ethnography, and the second within the 
knowledge of DE&S and its understanding of its own organisational culture.    
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3.  Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 describes the research philosophy, research methods and the 
subsequent implementation of the research methods and how, and why, these 
techniques were appropriate for the research.   
3.1.1 Research Philosophy and Methods 
3.1.1.1 Introduction 
Section 3.1. describes the research philosophy and also the methods that were 
used to carry out the research and to validate both the data and results.   
The term method, as described by Bernard (2006 p3) has multiple levels of 
meaning.  At each of these levels, there are principles that must be addressed in 
order to define the direction of the research, and to add to the quality and validity 
of the data gathering and analysis.   
The constraints that are presented in Chapter 3 mean that the ontological 
framework for this research had to be based on gathering data on the attributes 
that were exhibited by groups in DE&S.   
The research was carried out in order to uncover and explain the factors that 
affected the DE&S organisational culture, the reasons that people and groups in 
DE&S behaved in the way that they did and why they self-identified as tribes.  
The epistemological framework used the work of Hay (2007), and also Johnson 
(2001) to aid the development of the research methods.  This enabled the 
determination of the most effective methods to gather and analyse the data that 
were needed to complete the research.  These methods were determined to be 
semi-structured interviews, questionnaires, and observations.   
The correct choice of methods was crucial because by using the most appropriate 
methods the most appropriate data were collected and from this there followed a 
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logical progression to the development of valid conclusions to adequately 
address the research question.   
The researcher also carried his own values and opinions about group behaviours 
in DE&S: this is axiology in practice in the field.  These values originated from the 
researcher’s role identity at the time and also his identity prior to the initiation of 
the research.  The researcher’s values centred on a belief that groups should 
collaborate and share their knowledge for the good of DE&S, that is, to act 
corporately rather than be protective of their own position.  The researcher, of 
necessity, needed to understand and to suspend these biases while observing.  
However, the researcher also needed to be able to reflect and understand how 
these values may have introduced any bias when documenting the results of the 
research in order to understand where those biases might be weakening or 
invalidating the results.  The suspension of bias was achieved by the researcher 
integrating high levels of reflexivity into his fieldwork practice.   
3.1.2 The Research Philosophy 
The research was an ethnographic study that sought to describe and explain 
factors affecting the organisational culture of DE&S.  The techniques that were 
used to elicit information from informants were an appropriate mix of exploratory 
questions, observations and interviews.  The central research approach, 
therefore, was one of social constructivism where, as described by Foddy (1994), 
one looks to see how the perceived truth of group behaviours and the factors that 
affected those behaviours, were constructed within the minds of individuals within 
a cultural boundary.   
The research philosophy of this work is multi–stranded and pragmatic.  This 
approach was deemed to be appropriate because by integrating appropriate 
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies, the researcher gains a 
better understanding of the phenomena that were being studied.   
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Therefore this research embeds triangulation as defined by Bryman (2012 p 379) 
because it weaves “an approach that uses multiple observers, theoretical 
perspectives, sources of data and methodologies” into the warp and weft of the 
practice of the research.   
Hay (2007 p 118) suggests that the research philosophy provides important 
assumptions about the world view of the researcher.  In the same manner, Coffey 
(2000) suggests that the researcher also becomes more aware of their own 
identities throughout the research.  The researcher’s own academic and role 
identities affect the researcher’s ontological view of the informants: the actors 
who perform within their daily work lives, the group behaviours that the research 
is investigating.  In this research the researcher’s own identities became salient 
at different times, sometimes in very explicit ways, at other times much more 
subtly.22  These areas of commonality with at home research are described by 
Ybema and others Ybema (2009), Moeran (2009), Alvesson (2010), see for 
example  Coffey (1999), Kirke (2013) where at home ethnography often has an 
element of auto-ethnography.   
3.1.3 The Research Strategy 
The process of defining the research strategy was initiated by identifying the 
research topic, which was investigating the organisational culture of DE&S.  That 
then led to the research question: What factors affected the organisational culture 
of DE&S?  The next step was to investigate the topic through a broad social 
science framework.  This framework encompassed areas as diverse as 
evolutionary anthropology, management theory, ethnography, social identity 
theory, systems psychodynamics and life course theory.  Complementary to this 
multi-faceted framework, a data gathering methodology was developed that took 
a predominantly narrative ethnographic approach to the research.     
                                            
22 The researcher’s identity changes have been presented as a series of academic papers that are listed 
at Appendix B. 
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This narrative approach employed qualitative participant observation and 
interviews to give a longitudinal view of group behaviours in DE&S.  The formal 
research period was six years from 2008 to 2014.  Prior to that, from 2005 to 
2007, the researcher had worked within the DPA and the DLO, and so was 
immersed in the pre-merger organisational cultures.  Other data were gathered 
through the use of organisation charts that showed formal organisational 
structures and processes, such as group size and reporting structures.  This 
allowed functional group sizes and organisational practices to be determined 
objectively, and as organisationally designed and legitimised, rather than purely 
as subjectively experienced.   
As a precursor to the main study and in order to test the initial research 
methodology a pilot study was carried out in 2008.  The results of, and reflections 
on this study are described in more detail in section 3.4.2. 
The final element of the research strategy identified ways to present the narrative 
data as described by Foddy and others (Foddy, 1994), Bernard (2006), Bell 
(2005), Creswell (1998), and also Crotty. (1998).  Quantitative data were used 
either as validating data and management information or, where group size data 
were used, presented as data tables and graphs.   
The data analysis was influenced by grounded theory as described by Glaser 
(1992).  Grounded theory uses as its starting point the data that has been 
gathered, rather than any pre-defined hypothesis.  This approach allows patterns 
and theoretical elements to emerge from the data, thereby minimising the 
possibility that the researcher’s own biases affect the results.   
A grounded theory approach to this research enabled the identification of themes 
in the data and allowed those themes to be related to appropriate areas of theory.  
The combined use of a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach enabled an 
integrated narrative to be developed that tells the story of how the phenomena 
that were investigated affected the organisational culture of DE&S.   
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The factors that the research centred on were: integration, identity, language, 
group size, and the group behaviours that were practised and experienced within 
DE&S at the time of the study.  These factors were chosen initially because they 
were the most visible factors within DE&S that may have had an effect on the 
organisational culture.   
From these attributes a series of concepts were developed that defined more 
discrete phenomena, such as the group type and function and also differing levels 
of the formality of integration process and practice.  The development of these 
concepts then led to the development of the theoretical elements of the research 
which enabled a broad grounded theory approach to be taken and which was 
developed methodically as the research progressed.   
3.1.4 Ethical considerations 
“Ethics is about moral choices.  It is about the values that lie behind them, 
the reasons that people give for them and the language they use to 
describe the”’ (Thompson, 2007 p 1). 
The ethical framework of this research was enacted through the twin concepts of 
‘informed consent’ and ‘do no harm’, as described in the Association of Social 
Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth Guidelines (Commonwealth, 
2008).   
The most important level of informed consent was at the individual level.  
Informed consent was gained from informants by providing them with a synopsis 
of the research.  Presented with this, respondents were able to decide whether 
to engage with the research at all and, if so, at what level, exercising free choice 
some potential informants declined to take part because they did not have the 
time available to take part.23   
                                            
23 The most common reason for not taking part was that people did not have time.  This was explicitly 
relayed to the researcher. 
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In order to avoid any harm being done to those people who did take part, 
permission was sought and gained from their line management for them to take 
part.  The interrogative framework was provided to the informant before the 
interview, in that way they could prepare themselves to answer the questions.  
This was so that they could know in advance if there were any questions that they 
did not want to answer.  In order to counter respondent’s potential reservations 
over some of the recorded responses, the respondent was given charge of the 
digital voice recorder.  They were instructed how to switch it off, if there was an 
element of the conversation that they did not want to be recorded.   
At an individual level, every participant involved in the surveys and 
questionnaires, was asked to sign a consent form, stating that they agreed to take 
part, and agreeing that the data could be used for specific purposes.  Permission 
to quote specific responses was requested separately.  The consent form 
described why the data were being gathered, what they were to be used for, and 
how they were to be stored and protected.  It was through the completion of and 
adherence to all of these processes that informed consent was achieved.   
The research was legitimised ethically within the MOD, by presenting the 
research proposal to the MOD Research Ethics committee (MOD, 2009).  Within 
DE&S, the research was legitimised by the consent gained from the then DE&S 
main board and the incumbent Director Civilian Personnel in 2009.  Within the 
Operating Centres that were the subject of detailed study, the research was 
known about, through the researcher briefing the Operating Centre Directors, and 
it was understood that the researcher would be observing group behaviour at all 
times.  
3.2 Research Design and Evaluation of Methods 
The research set out to identify factors that affected the organisational culture of 
DE&S and attempted to provide explanations for those effects, how the factor 
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and the effect arose and finally to provide an understanding of how to manage 
those effects and factors within DE&S.   
The research design therefore identified and evaluated data gathering methods 
that were deemed to be appropriate.  Those methods fell into five broad 
categories: formal structured questionnaires, formal semi-structured 
questionnaires, unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews and finally 
observations.  There was a separate method that can be seen as akin to these 
categories and these were serendipitous conversations or meetings that were 
unplanned and were discussed along with the more formal observations.  Each 
of these methods were deployed at different times during the research when the 
researcher identified that the method was contextually appropriate.   
These methods all fell under the broad banner of ethnographic methods, Bernard 
(2006), Cassell (2006b), Creswell (2003), see for example Jick (1979), and also 
Higate and Cameron (2006).  This research was biased towards qualitative 
methods because it was felt that qualitative methods would provide a more 
nuanced result, as opposed to a quantitative approach.   
This can be considered as taking an ethnographic approach to the research.  
Ethnographic research is the study of people in their own environment using 
methods such as participant observation and face-to-face interviewing.  The 
ethnographic style that was used in this research was realist based ethnography 
as described by and also Reed (2005), Lareau et al. (1996).  Marcus and 
Cushman (1982 p 29) suggest that ethnographic research ‘seeks to represent the 
reality of a whole world or form of life’ and that was the intent of this research.   
Therefore, ethnographic methods were considered to be appropriate because the 
researcher sought to document the narrative of work life in which they, the 
researcher, were embedded as an insider.   
Carrying out an insider ethnographic study enabled the researcher to more easily 
document the feelings, as well as the actions, of group members.  It was for this 
reason also that a multi-method approach to the research was chosen.  Gioia 
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suggests that multi-method approaches counter single method approaches that 
‘produce too narrow a view to reflect the multifaceted nature of organisational 
reality’ (1990 p 584).   
Bryman uses his preferred term of mixed-methods research to indicate that ‘the 
quantitative and qualitative data deriving from mixed-methods research should 
be mutually illuminating’ (2012 p 603).  It is therefore from the position of wanting 
to produce the best results that an interpretivist, objective and pragmademic 
research approach was adopted as the basis for the research because of the 
nature of the organisation and the stance of the researcher.  The researcher 
viewed DE&S as a system of systems and therefore a single methodological 
approach could have weakened the validity of the research results.   
Patching (1990) used the term pragmademic to describe work that bridges the 
practical, pragmatic and academic domains.  This term was adopted by the 
researcher in an effort to categorise this research.  This term was used because 
the researcher employed a combined pragmatic and academic approach to the 
research question, and also to the research itself.  The multi-method approach 
employed used both qualitative and quantitative techniques, and as a 
consequence of this, a variety of tools were suitable for data gathering.  The 
creation of the original research strategy involved an examination of the research 
methods and tools that were available to the research, accompanied by a 
discussion of their suitability and place within this research.  That discussion is 
presented in the following sections.   
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3.2.1 A Questionnaire Based Approach - Formal Questionnaires 
A questionnaire based approach to research can take one of several forms, from 
a wholly defined set of questions where there is no allowance for deviation from 
the questions, to one where the questionnaire forms the basis of an interview 
based discussion, with the questions being a framework through which 
phenomena can be explored, if appropriate, in more detail.  
A formal questionnaire can be exposed to respondents via hard-copy, 
electronically via for instance, web-based mechanisms24, or internally via 
company intranets.  Responses from formal questionnaires can be analysed 
statistically with codes and weighting applied to each question and its response.   
The research approach of questionnaires lends itself to studies of large 
populations where average responses and outriders can be seen and analysed 
numerically.  This can also be a strength if used with sufficiently large populations 
because statistical validity is maintained see for example Bracht and Glass 
(1968), and Healy (2000). The formal questionnaire particularly lends itself to 
studies within the domain of social psychology.   
While using a formal questionnaire is valuable for maintaining coherence of the 
responses because of the tightly defined, presented and managed set of 
questions, it also has some weaknesses.  One of those is that it can be difficult 
to gain contextual responses to a question as the response indicator, because 
the nature of the questionnaire may require yes or no answers, or a Likert scale 
based indicator, Brooke (1996), Albaum (1997), see for example Garland (1991), 
and also Mogey (1999), where the respondent is asked to rate their response to 
an event or question on a scale.  The Likert scale is heavily used within DE&S as 
a ‘quick and dirty’ method of finding out how people feel about a particular 
phenomenon or event.  An example is the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude 
Survey, (AFCAS), an annual survey of all military personnel that acts to 
                                            
24 For example, https://www.surveymonkey.com/. (Last accessed 26 March 2015). 
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understand how military personnel feel about being in the military.  There is a 
civilian equivalent to the military AFCAS, that of the Have Your Say Survey, which 
provides the same type of data, but for civilian staff.  
In addition to being delivered electronically this type of questionnaire can also be 
analysed electronically as the responses can be automatically downloaded into 
a suitable software package for analysis, for example Minitab™ or Statistics 
Package for Social Scientists (SPSS)™.  Electronic delivery and analysis of the 
questionnaire minimises the possibility of transcription error and enables the 
researcher to have a higher confidence in the accuracy of the results.   
If the questionnaire is delivered in printed form for the respondent to complete by 
hand, the results must be collated by hand or scanned into a suitable analysis 
package.  It is here that extra effort is required and it is also where the potential 
for error occurs within the process.  Therefore, this type of questionnaire is best 
used within a large population, or, conversely a small population who are highly 
motivated to complete the questionnaire, in order to gain a high response rate or 
at least a sufficiently large response rate rather than an indicative response, 
which would be gained from a low number of responses within a large population.  
This type of questionnaire can also be used directly with respondents, but used 
in this way it can be clumsy and constraining, for both the interviewer and 
respondent in order to obtain consistency and reliability across the results.  
A formal questionnaire was deployed in the pilot study but was not used in the 
main study.  The discussion relating to this takes place in section 3.2, but in 
essence the original questionnaire was too rigid and did not identify some of the 
other themes that were discovered in the pilot study, and which were elaborated 
through observations and through a more narrative approach, which was the 
other technique that was tested during the pilot study.    
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3.2.2 Structured Interview 
A formal questionnaire can also be used in conjunction with an interview.  In this 
instance the number of questions will be fewer than in a remotely delivered 
questionnaire, thus giving the interviewer the ability to ask more probing 
questions and to tease out more detailed responses as appropriate.  This type of 
interview can be recorded for later transcription, or a second interviewer can also 
be used to write notes or immediately transcribe responses.  In addition to 
documenting responses and writing field notes, the second interviewer can also 
ask some of the questions.   
This type of questionnaire then becomes a framework of questions and, with an 
appropriately prepared questioning strategy, the interviewer can steer the 
interview to perhaps gain validation of previous responses, or to find out how 
widely held a particular belief is.  This type of questioning format is widely used 
in organisational ethnography, Cassell (2006b), (2003), Geisler (1999), (see for 
example Jick, 1979), Parkhe (1993), and alsoSaunders (2007).  The results that 
it produces can be statistically analysed by transferring appropriate responses to 
an appropriate data analysis software package, and also thematically by placing 
narrative responses into a format where they can be analysed manually by 
‘learning the data’, or by using a software package such as NVivo™, where 
themes can be identified and marked electronically.   
3.2.3 Unstructured Interviews 
A further gathering technique that was evaluated and used within this research 
was the unstructured interview, Corbin and Morse (2003), and also Cohen and 
Crabtree (2006), see for example Fontana and Frey (1994).  This technique uses 
a general subject area as the basis of the interview.  There may be one or more 
questions that the interviewer sets out to the interviewee, but there is no 
questionnaire as such.  The unstructured interview allows the subject area to be 
explored in a very flexible and fluid manner, exploring pathways that arise out of 
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the questions and answers, rather than being perceived as being pre-defined by 
the interviewer.  To achieve best results the interview should be recorded and the 
data transcribed and coded.   
One of the advantages of this technique is the freedom that it provides to explore 
the research questions in some depth which might be driven by the interviewer 
or by a ‘good’ informant, see for example Seidler (1974), Van Maanen (1979), 
Barriball and While (1994), Chambers (1983), and also Booth and Booth (1996).   
A disadvantage of this technique is that if a respondent is not ‘good’, has nothing 
to say that enlightens the research, or has an obvious agenda of their own, then 
this can render an interview less valuable, with the interviewer feeling that the 
interview is wasted, even though the interviewee may be quite happy as they 
‘have got things off their chest’.  The unstructured interview was used in the 
research and also, some conversations were recorded.  These in effect became 
unstructured interviews and were often with ‘good’ respondents.  A further 
disadvantage of an unstructured interview is that it can be difficult to analyse, or 
even detect, common themes across several interviews.  Semi-structured 
interviews are better in this respect, but can be more constrained in the subject 
matter that they cover.   
3.2.4 Focussed Interviews 
There is one other interviewing technique that is worthy of discussion, that is the 
focused interview technique as described by Merton and Kendall (Merton, 1948, 
Merton, 1987).  This technique has two characteristics that are particularly 
relevant to this research, those characteristics are; the participants have taken 
part in and uncontrolled but observed social situation, hypothetically significant 
patterns and background information have been analysed by the researcher 
enabling them to develop a hypothesis of the meaning of the situation.  On that 
basis an interview guide is developed that includes questions that aim to obtain 
the most pertinent responses and data covering the majoring areas of enquiry.  
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The interview focusses on subjectively lived experiences of people within a 
particular social situation, enabling the researcher to test the validity of both their 
hypothesis and also of prior responses.  This approach also provides a structure 
that enables the researcher to be prepared for any unanticipated responses that 
may allow new hypotheses to be developed. 
Because this research is an insider ethnography it falls squarely within Merton 
and Kendall’s criteria (Merton, 1948 p 541) of the researcher having 
foreknowledge of the situation and many of the situations that informants may 
have experienced and are communicating to the researcher.  The researcher was 
able to devise a set of questions, found at Appendix A, that both formed what 
might be called a meta framework of the ‘big questions’, but which was able to be 
broken down into a series of questions that elicited subjective and real world 
examples of how a person reacted to and was affected by a particular social 
situation in rigorous detail.   
3.2.5 Observations and Fieldwork 
The final research technique that was examined was the field work of 
observations and capturing the mundanity of daily life, as and also Martin (2007), 
Van Maanen (1988) describe it.  The capturing of the phenomena of daily life 
within DE&S was subject to a process of maturation and development that started 
with the pilot study, which is discussed in section 3.4.   
Observation can take many forms, from timed sampling to linear observations 
over a period of time, throughout part or all of an event, such as a meeting.  These 
can be captured in field note books or more detailed note books.   
Field work and observations provide the material for what Geertz (1994) 
describes as ‘thick description’.  These observations all have one aim, which is 
to document the daily life of the people and the groups that are being observed.   
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Observation may also include, as described by Harper (2003), the use of 
photographs, video or audio recordings  to either record for the researcher’s later 
use a situation or symbolic representation, or they may be used to elicit 
responses from respondents about a situation that is historical (Harper, 2002).  
This documenting is carried out through the eyes of the observer and, as 
Podsakoff (2003) suggests, is subject to any, and all, cultural biases that the 
researcher may have.  
Ethnographic field work may be carried out anywhere, from within a business or 
other organisation to a remote village, and so is not limited to a particular place.  
For a small sample of different fields see Fine (2009), Irwin (2002), Jehn (2004), 
Lareau et al. (1996), Nothnagel (1993 ), Sanger (1996), and also Van Maanen 
(1988), Verbeke et al. (1998).  
The field in which this research was carried out was a large organisation.  That 
organisation, called DE&S, can be characterised as being part of the machinery 
of government, and populated by both military personnel and civilians. As 
explained above, the organisation was responsible for the purchase and support 
of equipment to Her Majesty’s Armed Services.   
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3.3 Research Methods Deployed In This Research 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Section 3.2 describes the research methods that were used within this research, 
how they were deployed and examines their suitability.  The order that the 
methods are presented is governed by the perceived importance of the method 
to this research.  Section 3.3 presents how observations and field work were 
deployed during the research as this was the primary data gathering method that 
was used during the research.   
3.3.2 Observation and Field Work 
The research question that this research set out to answer was: What factors 
affect the organisational culture of DE&S?  To achieve this, observational data 
were gathered during the period of 2005 to 2014 through the researcher working 
in the DPA, and then working in DE&S within Operating Centres A, B and D.  This 
research started officially in 2008, prior to which date, the researcher was a civil 
servant who was observing the organisational culture and group behaviours in 
the DPA, DLO and from 2007, DE&S as a matter of personal and professional 
interest.   
Observational data were achieved firstly as an insider and participant observer, 
and subsequently, as the researcher’s own identity as a researcher became more 
mature, they became more of an observant participant, a transition in the style 
that is described by and also Alvesson (2010), Kamsteeg (2008), Ybema (2009), 
Collins (2002).   
The observations were originally captured as short notes, but as part of the 
maturation of the researcher’s field work capabilities these notes developed into 
longer and more detailed field notes, diary entries moving towards thick 
description as described by Geertz (1994 p 6-7).  Initially, the researcher kept two 
diaries, one a work based diary and the other field notes, but this was a clumsy 
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and indiscrete method of writing down observations and was subsequently 
rejected in favour of having a single A4 diary with observations on the left hand 
page and work notes on the right hand page, but once again this was clumsy and 
the researcher ended up with, on some days, lots of blank pages and disjointed 
field notes.   
Eventually, a single, linear observational approach was developed, where field 
observations were captured as ‘in line notes’ in an A4 or A5 size diary that 
performed the function of a work diary and day book, and also a field diary.  This 
meant that the note capture was discrete, as it looked to others as though the 
researcher was just keeping their work day book up to date or writing in work 
notes, which they indeed were, and it locked these into the context of field notes 
to provide a very detailed and contextually balanced record of the research and 
role based identities being performed at that time.   
These notes were typed into MS Word™ and analysed in NVivoTM, where 
meaningful themes and codes were assigned to them.  These themes and codes 
were developed from the data.  
Observing at this level of detail over such long a period of time has advantages 
and disadvantages.  One advantage was that patterns of behaviour, both 
personal and organisational, could be identified in multiple contexts, such as in 
formal and informal meetings, thus enabling the researcher to identify how deeply 
these behaviours were embedded in the organisational culture of DE&S.  Also 
the longitudinal nature of the observations allowed the researcher to identify 
whether there were any latent effects of the merger of the DPA and the DLO, and 
how long they remained visible within the culture of DE&S.   
The primary disadvantage of this length of observation was maintaining both the 
standard of observation, which did improve as the research continued, but also 
became increasingly inter-twined with the researcher carrying out the daily tasks 
and thus losing stranger value as described by Cressey (1983).  The researcher 
is absolutely certain when they look back at the observations and field work as a 
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reflective academic that they have missed seeing some phenomena because 
they were working and not observing.  But the observational data have provided 
the core of the data that provides the evidence for this research and that narrative 
evidence is supported by photographs, both of which illuminate the questionnaire 
based responses.   
3.3.3 Photographs as Ethnographic Tools 
Additional observational data were gathered using photographs to record events 
during the course of the research.  Photo-ethnography was used for example to 
show visually how uniform and dress represented symbolic and pragmatic 
identities.   
Photographs were also thought to be the most effective way of showing how 
territory was marked at different levels of the hierarchy throughout DE&S, as they 
enabled the visual explanation of the concept of a geographical identity.  
Participants could not be identified from these photographs.  DE&S is a restricted 
site within the MOD, and so photography and digital recording are not permitted 
unless specific permission is gained.  Permission was gained to use a personal 
digital camera to take a series of test photographs at specific locations and within 
a tightly bounded time span prior to tasking the official DE&S communications 
photographer to take a series of official photographs specifically for the research.  
These photographs are attributed with their source and MOD Copyright.  
It is interesting to note that even though the researcher had permission to take 
those photographs, and publish them in this thesis taking them was a nerve 
wracking experience, because they knew that they were carrying out an act that 
was in normal circumstances illegal.   
Subsequent to the permission to take photographs specifically for the research, 
permission was gained to use stock photographs of DE&S and also a series of 
photographs to illustrate the vesting of DE&S as a Bespoke Trading Entity in April 
2014.  These official photos are marked as Crown Copyright.   
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Photographs thus provided an effective way of showing symbolic and territorial 
aspects of a closed organisation that would not normally be seen by outsiders to 
that organisation.   
3.3.4  The Interrogative Framework 
The evidence that supported this research was gained through exploration, 
photography and observation, organisational storytelling, individual anecdotes 
and the metaphors that people used to make sense of DE&S.  Because 
observations are, by their nature, subjective and selective, the field observations 
were supported through the use of questionnaires, and informal semi-structured 
interviews.  
The interrogative framework that supported the research was based around a 
series of broad questions that were developed by the researcher through their 
reflective management practice in DE&S.  Those broad questions can be found 
at Appendix A.   
Consistency within the qualitative data gathered was achieved through the use 
of a prepared questioning framework for interviewees.   
Eighteen questions were used as a guide during the interviews, and their use 
provided a structured framework that sought informants’ views on how they felt 
about group behaviour in DE&S.   
The interrogative framework was built with reference to Creswell (1998), (2003), 
Geisler (1999) Foddy (1994), and also Weller (2007).  This was based on open 
ended questions, using phrases such as ‘what does it feel like to   ?’... And ‘how 
you do feel about   ?’  The questions were developed to examine factors that may 
have affected the organisational culture of DE&S as the informants experienced 
it.  They were asked: What was happening?  Why was it happening?  Where was 
it happening?  How was it happening?  When was it happening and who was it 
happening to?  The it being the phenomenon of the organisational culture and 
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group behaviour in DE&S. The resulting themes were identified, extracted and 
cross-referenced against the observational data gathered, the results of which 
are presented in Chapters 4 to 6.    
The interviews were transcribed verbatim by an audio typist into Word 2007 (TM).  
In this format the transcriptions were put into NVivo(TM) where coding and analysis 
was carried out.  
The original research questions were tested during the pilot study and refined 
prior to being used in the main study in order to achieve more accurate, 
meaningful and comparable responses.  The pilot study is discussed in section 
3.4   
3.3.5 Choosing Informants 
A number of Operating Centres were chosen as targets for the detailed research.  
These included firstly Operating Centre A,25 a predominantly cross-cutting 
Operating Centre populated with mainly bureaucratic/technocratic staff, as 
defined by Bain (2008), of whom the majority were civil servants who had MOD-
wide responsibilities.  The further Operating Centres: B to J, were chosen 
because they were vertically integrated delivery Operating Centres, staffed by all 
four services, working in discrete, and predominantly single service, platform and 
capability-based groups.  These yielded 32 sub-groups that functioned as 
legitimised teams within the Operating Centres that were under investigation.   
This combination produced data from both project based and vertically integrated 
groups and also from cross-cutting corporate functional areas, thus giving the 
results a greater level of validity and reliability.  The process for choosing 
informants was one of a deliberately random selection of names from the DE&S 
organisational directory.26  For each of the Operating Centres, potential 
                                            
25 Letters of the alphabet were used instead of titles to conceal the proper identity of the various 
Operating Centre. 
26 Electronic Telephone list.   
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informants were chosen randomly across project teams, grades, and services to 
ensure as wide coverage as possible within each Operating Centre and also to 
achieve the greatest degree of randomness possible within the sample.   
Between 20-25 informants were thus purposefully chosen from each Operating 
Centre, all volunteers.  The choosing of this number of participants was a 
pragmatic decision due to the factors of time available to the researcher, and time 
allowed by the organisation for informants to be available.  Not all of the chosen 
respondents took part in the research.   
The study population encompassed all grades of staff in the target Operating 
Centres, regardless of service and did not preclude commercial contractors or 
Foreign Liaison Officers.  So that each participant knew what they were being 
asked to do each interview was preceded by the participant receiving a list of 
questions that were used to inform the interviews and provide quantitative data.  
This technique introduced validity and reliability at the beginning of the data 
gathering process.  A template was created in order to make the process of 
contacting potential respondents consistent.  This was used to contact each 
potential informant by email.  The template included a standard introductory text 
that informed potential participants of the needs of the research and to request 
their participation.  Replies were received sometimes in a matter of moments, 
others after a day or two.   
If the initial contact engendered a positive response, a mutually convenient date, 
time and location to hold an interview was agreed.  Each participant was allocated 
a unique interview number.  A master list of identities was kept in a separate 
protected archive.  This introduced anonymity at the very start of the research 
process.  Interviews were carried out in closed rooms and recorded, each 
interview being planned for one hour.  Some interviews with highly articulate and 
informed interviewees lasted 2 ½ hours, while interviews with other informants 
who were less articulate, or perhaps less interested, were completed in 
approximately 20 minutes.   
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Operating 
Centre  
No of 
Military 
selected  
Grade  No of 
Civilians 
selected 
Grade Location Total 
A 1 Major 
General 
14 D/E x 2, 
C1/C2 x 10, 
B1/B2 x 2 
Abw x 
14, Fo x 
1 
15  
B 4 Brigadier x 
1, 
Commodore 
x 1, 
Squadron 
leader x 2 
22 D/E x 8, 
C1/C2 x 10 
 B1/B2  x 4 
Abw x 
3, Co x 
18,  Cop 
x 2, Ens 
x 3 
26  
C 4  Major x 2, 
Colonel x 1, 
Warrant 
Officer x 1 
19 C1/C2 x 11, 
D/E x3, 
B1/B2  x3, 
Contractor x 
2 
Abw x 
21 
Ens x 2  
23 
D 2 Major x 2 16 C1/C2 x 8, 
B1/B2 x 2, 
D/E x 6 
Abw x 
17 
Gos x 1 
18 
E 8 Commodore 
x 1, Captain 
x 1, WO x 2, 
Cdr x 2 
Lt Cdr x 2,             
10 C1/C2 x4 
,B1/B2  x2 
D/E x 4 
Abw x 
18 
 18 
F 2 Captain x 1, 
Commander 
x 1 
0 0 Abw x 2 2  
G 0 n/a 14 C1/C2 x 12 
Grade 
B1/B2 x 2 
Abw x 
14 
14  
H 5 Gp Captain 
x1  
Wing 
Commander 
x 1 
Sqdrn 
Leader x 3 
5 C1/C2 x 3 
Grade 
B1/B2 x 1 
D/E x 1 
Abw x 
10 
 
10  
Table 3-1 Table of Respondents by Grade, Location and Operating Centre  
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Table 3-1. shows the breakdown of respondents by grade, location and Operating 
Centre.   
KEY: ABW= Abbeywood, CO= Corsham, FO=Foxhill, Ens=Ensleigh, 
Gos=Gosport, Cop=Copenacre. 
One Interview was carried out at Shrivenham Station due to logistical reasons, 
that interview is coded as Sh. 
Seventy nine interviews were carried out at Abbeywood because Abbeywood 
was the headquarters of DE&S and had the largest staff population. Twenty six 
interviews were carried out at Corsham, Foxhill, Copenacre and Ensleigh prior 
to, and concurrent with, activity to collocate all staff from other locations to 
Abbeywood.  These interviews and the resulting data aided the validation of the 
themes gained from within the Operating Centres that were the core research 
constituencies, thus enabling the researcher to identify whether those themes 
were in turn replicated more widely across DE&S.   
Table 3–2 shows the grade and rank equivalents within DE&S.  Within Chapters 
4 and 5 Civil Service Grade is described as SCS (Senior Civil Service) or Civil 
Service broader band.  Military grades are described as their rank.  
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Civil Service Pay 
Band 
Army  Navy Royal Airforce  
 Senior Civil Service 
(SCS) Pay band 
(PB)4 
General Admiral Air Chief Marshal 
SCS PB3 Lieutenant 
General 
Vice Admiral Air Marshal 
SCS PB2 Major General  Rear Admiral Air Vice Marshal 
SCS PB1 Brigadier  Commodore Air Commodore 
B1 Colonel Captain Group Captain 
B2 Lieutenant 
Colonel 
Commander Wing Commander 
C1 Major Lieutenant 
Commander 
Squadron Leader 
C2 Captain Lieutenant Flight Lieutenant 
D 2nd Lieutenant Sub- Lieutenant Flying Officer 
E1 
E2 
Warrant Officer 
(WO) 1  
WO2 
WO1 
WO2 
WO1 
Flight Sergeant 
Table 3-2 Grade and Rank Equivalence Table 
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3.3.6 Application 
The use of the instruments of observations, semi-structured interviews, combined 
with the multi-factorial approach to the research enabled the collection of data 
and information that described how people felt, what they believed in, and why 
they acted in a particular way in a particular situation.  The methods were applied 
in the style of a sandwich, observations were started in 2005, but interviews were 
only carried out in 2010 and 2011, while observations continued until 2014.  
These observations helped in the definition of firstly the questions for the pilot 
study, described in section 3.4 and then the re-definition and clarification of the 
questions that were used in the main study.  This method allowed findings from 
the observations to be queried with informants, and the veracity of the 
observation to be challenged and tested.   
3.3.7 Data Analysis 
This research used a grounded theory approach and the principles of grounded 
theory to analyse the data that was gathered by observations and questionnaires 
(Glaser, 1992).   A grounded theory approach to data is, as Charmaz (2011 p 
155) states, ‘an emergent method which begins with the empirical world and 
builds an inductive understanding of it as events unfold and knowledge accrues’.  
Therefore data and the discovery of themes within the data drives the application 
of those themes to theory.   
In addition to those data types, the researcher was exposed to and was able to 
analyse DE&S policy documents and other texts that were appropriate to the 
research, such as dress codes (Bain, 2008, Cooke, 2008, Shaw, 2015f, MOD, 
2004). These paper and intranet-based texts comprised the formal organisational 
rules that communicate Policy Rules and Guidance (PRG) of the socio-technical 
organisation.  They perform the function of communicating instructions about how 
people should behave and how they should perform their role-based functions.   
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The analysis of those documents supported and informed the analysis gathered 
from the data and observations, all of which are presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 
6.  The researcher analysed data by firstly learning the data, and capturing 
themes by hand. Those themes were then transferred into NVivo™ as the tool of 
choice.  NVivo is a widely used qualitative analysis tool.  Further textual analysis 
was carried out by text mining the data that was stored in NVivo™  Text mining 
was achieved through, for example, identifying how often a particular theme, or 
word, or word set occurred, and also where that theme occurred within the data 
set.  This technique was particularly useful to this research during the later stages 
of writing up the results, when it was used to check on themes that had previously 
been identified in order to gauge the weight of data supporting them.  It was also 
used when a new theme arose from the data, in order to test the data to see how 
widespread that theme was within the data.   
Data mining was used in this research with the output of a word-tree, which is a 
visual representation of the proximity of the search phrase to other linked phrases 
within the data.   
Data-mining was considered to be faster and more flexible than coding and theme 
development, so it had greater utility during the writing up of this research, and 
became the method that was preferred for the analysis of the data.  Therefore, 
within this research data-mining was a useful analytical technique within an 
overall approach that was based on grounded theory principles as it allowed 
emergent themes to be tested by reference to the data gathered.   
3.3.8 Data Presentation 
From the analysis of the data a narrative structure emerged from the themes that 
were discovered in the data that enabled the data to be presented logically. The 
foundation of that narrative were data elements as quotations that were derived 
from questionnaire responses, observations and photographs.  That foundation 
was formed into a trajectory of factors that appeared to affect the organisational 
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culture of DE&S.  These factors were developed into three strands; Chapter 4 
describes some of the groups that were discovered in DE&S and some of their 
attributes, while Chapter 5 describes induction and socialisation and cultural 
drag; Chapter 6 then discusses how those factors appeared to affect the 
organisational culture of DE&S and also what that culture could be characterised 
as.  There then followed the period of drafting and re-writing where the data was 
sifted and tested.  During this period the qualitative data were represented both 
textually as a narrative summary reporting the results of the research, and 
graphically as figures or photographs where appropriate, to illustrate a particular 
response.   
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3.4 Testing the Research Methods 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Section 3.2 described a series of research methods that were available to this 
research, while section 3.3 described how they were deployed in this research.  
Section 3.4 describes how those methods were tested, and what measures were 
put in place during the research in order to improve the validity and reliability of 
the research.  The research methods were formally tested in a pilot study.   
3.4.2 A Pilot Study 
The pilot study was carried out in the Through Life Project Management group 
(TLPM), a 1* organisation in DE&S. This was a support group in DE&S in 2008.  
In particular this study tested the research strategy of using a web-based 
questionnaire, appropriate qualitative data analysis and observations as 
appropriate methods of gathering data on the socialisation of people into teams, 
people’s feelings of identity in teams and also intergroup behaviours within those 
teams.   
3.4.3 Study Context 
In 2008 the study group consisted of 85 people, across two locations: Bristol 
Abbeywood and Kentigern House, Glasgow.  The pilot study was carried out as 
part of an official off-site team-building event, which is where the observations 
were made.   
This was the first time that a study of this nature had been proposed within this 
or any other group within DE&S and there was some reticence from the study 
group’s management board members, who were worried that the research would 
be critical of their management style or of them personally.   
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That particular hurdle was overcome by showing the board members the 
questions and the methodology before they were deployed, thus giving them the 
ability to question the reasons for using a particular question and giving the 
researcher the opportunity to defend their use.  Once the questions and 
methodology were reviewed by the board members they were approved, apart 
from some minor issues which revolved around Data Protection and the capture 
of possibly sensitive personal data. These questions were removed from the 
questionnaire.   
3.4.4 Practicalities of the Pilot Study 
A questionnaire was given to 60 team members in the week prior to the team 
building event: Forty responded, including one who commented on all of the 
questions with remarks such as ‘I don’t like this question’ and ‘stupid question’.  
Discussion of this, and also the initial analysis of the data gave the researcher a 
real sense that they had misjudged the reactions of some of the group members 
that were the research subjects.  This use of an outlier of the responses was 
taken as a single example of explicit criticism of the study, and enabled to 
researcher to reflect on the practice and validity of the study, which in turn 
informed the researcher’s practice.   
While most people were positive in responding to the questionnaire, the fact that 
one person gave negative comments to the questions enabled a re-assessment 
of how the researcher would attract informants in future.  This change was, that 
in future, research subjects would be made more aware of what the research 
entailed.   
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The research questions asked during this pilot study were:  
What teams or groups do you belong to in Operating Centre A27, how do you 
identify with those groups; how strong is your identification with them and how do 
you view the other teams in terms of sharing knowledge? 
In a general sense, these questions asked and the observations carried out 
during the study considered the group member’s feelings of identity in teams and 
inter-group behaviours within those teams.  The reason for this was very clear.  
At that period during the research, the researcher still considered the research to 
be based around the exploration of identity and its manifestations in DE&S.  It 
was only after the pilot study that there was a realisation that there were other 
factors that were not as visible as ‘identity’ in a mixed military and civilian 
organisation that affected the research.  The questions were chosen for two 
reasons: first, because they summed up the researcher’s early thoughts of the 
nature of the research and secondly, to connect directly with the research 
question itself.  At that stage of the research, the researcher was of the view that 
‘it was all about physically belonging to a group’ and that the important groups for 
people were the physical, visible groups and their manifestations of identity.   
The experience of carrying out the pilot study and the inadequacy of the questions 
at that time demonstrated that the researcher had not spent sufficient time 
developing the questions and the questionnaire prior to carrying out the pilot 
study, a common failing that was pointed out by Foddy (1994).  
With hindsight the questions and application of the pilot methodology show the 
researcher’s naiveté and his low level of understanding at that time of identity 
theory, such as defined by Billig et al. (1973), Tajfel (1979), (1986).   
The study was carried out using two ethnographic techniques.  This was to test 
the researcher’s ability to use these techniques in the field. The techniques used 
were a questionnaire and observations.  An internet based questionnaire was 
                                            
27 Name changed to ensure anonymity. 
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deployed, using Survey Monkey.com (TM) as the technology mechanism.   The 
questionnaire was delivered, via an email link, two weeks before the team 
building event was held.  This enabled a management team and the researcher 
to do some initial analysis of the results prior to the researcher carrying out 
observations at the event.  These included in-depth observations, and field notes 
gathered during the course of the event and also post-hoc observations.  
The pilot study consisted of four parts: the on-line questionnaire,28  which was 
three days before the event, and three participant observation sessions, day 1, 
evening 1 and day 2.  The reason for this sequence was that the main team 
building event was held at a hotel, taking place over two days.  Most of the staff 
attending stayed at the hotel, and the days were broken down into talking 
sessions and workshops and exercises designed to bring people together and 
foster a sense of being in one team.  The event started at midday November 11th 
and finished at midday 12th November 2008.   
The researcher was able to capture observations as they happened.  This was 
the first time during the research that the researcher became aware of the 
potential pitfalls, or benefits of taking this approach.  Those pitfalls became 
apparent during the early evening when the researcher was approached by the 
researcher’s Team Leader, a B1 grade, and criticised for not joining in groups 
enough.   
It was also said very forcefully that ‘people don’t like being watched’ (Shaw, 
2008e).  At the time the researcher was finishing writing up the researcher’s notes 
from earlier in the day.  The researcher was unable to find anywhere out of the 
way to do this, so was in corner of the bar area.  At the Team Leader’s insistence, 
the researcher put their notes down and had to rely on memory for the rest of the 
evening; thus, providing another learning point which was that memory plays a 
part in research but that memory must be supported by field notes so that the 
                                            
28 Using Survey Monkey.com, with output as Excel ™ files. 
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memory remains valid.  The last observations were at 1.49 am as the researcher 
was leaving the bar.   
3.4.5 Reflection on the Pilot Study  
A pilot study is an important element of the research and should be treated as a 
research project in its own right.  This did not occur with this pilot study as it was 
biased towards gathering data to improve the functioning of Operating Centre A 
and away from a purely academic study.  While this did not invalidate either the 
data or the data gathering methods, or even belittle the results, it made the 
interpretation and subsequent write up more difficult because the researcher was 
trying to answer the wrong question with the data.   
The qualitative data gathering during the pilot study was relatively successful, the 
quantitative element less so.  The questionnaire that supported the data gathering 
was designed over the period of three weeks.  The availability of the 
questionnaire was communicated to users via email and also through ‘Face to 
Face’ briefings29.  This took place in the week preceding the Team Building event 
and the response rate was 46%.   
The quantitative data gathered were exported to an Excel ™ spread sheet to 
facilitate its analysis.  Analysis was to take place thematically, with the outcomes 
being expressed as factors of the number of people who respond positively or 
negatively to a particular question.   
It was at this point that the researcher realised that they had made a series of 
mistakes that would make full analysis of the data very difficult.  These mistakes 
were in turn: carrying out the pilot study too early in the research process; not 
being sufficiently confident with, or competent in quantitative data gathering 
techniques; and not being sufficiently competent in question and questionnaire 
                                            
29 Face to Face briefings are a corporately legitimised communications mechanism which as it suggests 
consists of Team leaders briefing teams through a cascade process down the hierarchy by talking to 
people ‘face to face’.   
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development.  The result of making these mistakes was the use of a 
questionnaire that was overly long and complex.  This meant that the data 
gathered were broad and shallow rather than focussed and deep, and thus more 
indicative.   
There was another factor that played into this series of errors; the questionnaire 
itself was not tested before being deployed in the Pilot Study.  This resulted in 
some of the questions being seen by respondents as being naïve, thus reducing 
the credibility of the research and the researcher in the eyes of the research 
group.  The other effect of this lack of competence was that the data gathered 
were not in a state to manipulate easily.  This was because all of the data had to 
be re coded and re-categorised in order to make clear the differing categories 
that were identified.   
Once the data were coded it was then imported into Minitab™ to produce a 
statistically analysed report.   
On analysis of the data, one pattern emerged that appeared to be significant; that 
pattern was of the strength of identity within teams and organisations.  The 
pattern that emerged was not expected by the researcher.   
Because of the pan-MOD and pan-DE&S role of the Operating Centre, the 
researcher had expected the majority of the respondents in the pilot study to 
identify most strongly with MOD and DE&S.   
This was not the case.  The data produced a pattern that indicated a split in 
identification, with respondents below the level of B2 grade identifying most 
strongly with their role teams, and above the level of B2 grade identifying most 
strongly with MOD and DE&S.   
This pattern of the strength of identity that was identified in the pilot study, and 
the factors that produced it was refined and taken into the main study and the 
responses were measured on a Likert scale to provide greater clarity on just how 
strongly a person identifies with each of the groups.   
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A further pattern in the data indicated that people were able to belong to, perform 
in, perform alongside and also identify with multiple groups at once, thus time-
sharing their performativity and belonging in a one-to-many relationship, thus 
opening up a literature field developed by such as Pate et al. (2010), Amiot et al. 
(2007), Ben-Ner et al. (2009), El Akremi et al. (2009), Ellemers (2005), Pratt and 
Foreman (2000), Kirke (2007d).    
The researcher identified three key learning points as a direct result of the pilot 
study.   
These were: 
 The craft of field work. This required a rapid re–evaluation and re–
appraisal of the researcher’s fieldwork technique, because of the 
negative reaction of some informants to the research.  This resulted in 
the researcher being much more discrete when capturing observations.   
 Group sizes and conversational groups. This was a key phenomenon 
observed, although at the time it was not realised just how important this 
was.  This phenomenon was the formation and disintegration of 
conversation groups during the informal event.  The groups formed of 
five to six people but disintegrated to three people, and then reformed to 
five to six people.  This factor of group size and accompanying behaviour 
led to the investigation of the literature surrounding the factors that affect 
group sizes.  This in turn led to the researcher’s identifying the concept of 
the evolutionary group sizes as proposed by Dunbar (1993a) which 
appeared to explain the sizes of the conversational groups observed that 
evening, and proved to be a valuable break-through in the investigative 
axis of the research.   
 The third factor was the identification of a hierarchical split in the strength 
of identity towards role groups, the front line, MOD and DE&S.   
This led to the development of a smaller, more focused questioning strategy that 
produced fewer, but more high quality, data points.   
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3.4.6 Implications of the Pilot Study  
The pilot study informed the research in several ways.  The first way was in the 
use of a research methodology that was appropriate for the research.  The pilot 
study had used a large questionnaire with supporting observations as the data 
gathering technique.  At the end of the pilot study the researcher realised several 
things, first that the questionnaire was too long and that informants would not 
complete it unless they were particularly motivated.  Secondly that the questions 
were asking about what happened to a person, rather than how they felt about a 
particular phenomenon, and thus were not as illustrative as they could have been.  
The third realisation was that the amount of work needed to analyse the questions 
was negatively dis-proportionate to the value of the answers that were received.  
These factors led to the wholesale changing of the research methodology.   
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3.5 Validity and Reliability.   
Bracht and Glass (1968) and also Huberman and Miles (2002) recognized that 
absolute validity cannot be guaranteed in studies of this type. However they do 
accept that a properly constructed interview population reinforced by longitudinal 
observations can increase the validity and reliability of both the conclusion and 
the data from which those conclusions were derived.  
Therefore, in order to achieve the highest levels of validity within this research, 
the multi-method and multi-theoretical approach espoused by such as Gioia 
(1990) was employed.  Validity and reliability were achieved through the use of 
multiple main data points in the research.  Those data points consisted of the 
multiple observations that were achieved during the course of the research.  
Observational data points were achieved formally between 2008 and 2014 on a 
daily, weekly and monthly basis.  Informal data points were also gathered from 
the researcher’s work note book from July 2005 until the formal start of the 
research in 2008.  It was through the multiplicity of different types of data points 
and the triangulation of responses across these data points that the research 
achieved a high level of internal validity and reliability.  The data gained from 
these individual data points enabled themes to be derived that were 
complementary across and between data types and methods.   
The interview sample size of 124 was influenced by two factors, the first being 
the time available of the researcher and the second, the fact that interviews took 
place over a five week period during which the researcher took annual leave to 
carry out the interviews.  That sample benefits the research in two ways, firstly 
the breadth of the interview sample.  Interviews were carried out in 10 Operating 
Centres, concentrating on three completely different types (Operating Centres A, 
C and D), and the second was interviews were carried out across a wide spread 
of civilian and military personnel across all grades who worked in DE&S 
Abbeywood.  
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To further improve the validity reliability and credibility of the research the 
interviews were combined with six years of formal observation and a further two 
years of recollections of the researcher’s experiences within the DPA.  
This increased the reliability of the data though partial triangulation of the 
combination of the two techniques.  This then provides one element of the 
methodological foundation of the research because interview responses can be 
used to challenge, validate or explore observed phenomena and analysis of 
observed phenomena can provide material that can be used to explore and 
expand interview responses.   
Validity was achieved by carrying out a minimum of 7 interviews within each of 
the target Operating Centres, with a target figure of 10 semi-randomly selected 
interviews across grades from Administrative Assistant (AA) grade civil servants 
to SCS 2*  Major General/Rear Admiral/Air Vice Marshal in the military and 
equivalent rank Senior Civil Service.   
Validity was also supported by interviews with randomly selected people who 
were not in the target Operating Centres,30 but who were in the wider DE&S.  This 
enabled the themes uncovered in the target Operating Centres to be traced back 
into the wider organisation as appropriate.  
The data were then further validated by reference back to selected informants in 
DE&S.  If informants recognized the themes that were presented to them, the 
researcher took this to be a form of face validation of the accuracy of the data, 
analysis, and conclusions.   
Thus the data met Sanger’s criteria whereby “analyses of the relationship 
between events and people achieve greater validity if participants who have been 
                                            
30 Operating Centre D was treated differently as on moving there to work after carrying the main 
interviews the researcher was asked to carry out a subsidiary set of interviews and more detailed 
observations. 
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observed in the research, recognize themselves, their motives, their actions and 
their rationale in the researcher’s recordings and reconstructions”.  (1996 p 40).   
The combination of multiple theories, methods and techniques as described by 
Jick (1979) also enabled triangulation, which further strengthened the validity and 
reliability of the results.  The research employed three types of triangulation: data 
triangulation, theory triangulation, and method triangulation.  Data triangulation 
was achieved through the combined use of interviews, observations, and 
questionnaires. The use of these various instruments produced both qualitative 
and quantitative data, which produced a degree of data triangulation.  Theory 
triangulation was achieved through the use of different theoretical viewpoints for 
determining competing hypotheses.  Methodological triangulation was achieved 
through the use of multiple methods to study a single phenomenon as described 
by Niglas (2000  p 2).   
Triangulation was important to this research because of the complexity of DE&S.  
It was because of that complexity that the use of a single method or theory was 
therefore thought to be insufficient to unpick that complexity, leaving the danger 
that the research would have missed key factors that affected the organisational 
culture of DE&S.  The value of a multi-method approach enabled the researcher 
to both develop and improve the initial conceptual model of how people, working 
within DE&S, viewed DE&S and also ‘lead to superior findings’ Bryman (2012 p 
605).  The approach that this research took to triangulation aided the 
establishment of validity through methodological and data triangulation on the 
underlying reasons and truths of group behaviours and the constructs that affect 
the groups being studied, as indicated by Foddy (1994), Jick (1979 p 602), and 
Olsen (2004).   
Validity was affected by the demographic spread of respondents.  Within this 
research, the responding group was predominantly male.  This was because 
DE&S was a predominantly male organisation.  This was reflected within the 
random selection of respondents.  No comparison was made within the results 
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on the effects of group behaviour on a gendered basis.  If this were to be carried 
out subsequently then a larger data sample would probably be required in order 
to provide a solid statistical basis for those findings between the two variables of 
male and female gender.  No respondents identified themselves as Lesbian, 
Bisexual, Gay or Transgender (LBGT) within the research.   
3.5.1 The Effect of ‘Insiderness’ 
Alvesson (2010), Kamsteeg (2008), Collins (2002), and Kirke (2013) discuss 
insider research within organisations in great depth and they identify problems 
such as the acceptance by the organisation of the legitimacy of the researcher to 
carry out their research and also the problems of remaining objectively distant 
from the subjects.  The methods that were employed to maintain objectivity during 
the research are discussed in Section 3.5.1.  
The researcher as previously stated was a fully integrated member of DE&S,   so 
they could only complete this research as an insider carrying out what  Alvesson 
(2010 pp 156-174) describes as  at-home ethnography.  The dangers of 
becoming too close to the subject are discussed by Ybema (2009), who warns 
that distance becomes as important as closeness to the subject especially in 
gaining an understanding of the ‘natives’ Ybema (2009 p 101).   
In respect of distance, the researcher had no choice as to which type of 
ethnography was to be carried out, as they were an established civil servant when 
the research was initiated.  Because of this, the research took place within a 
pragmatic, pre-defined framework, where the researcher had already established 
friendship networks, functional and work-based alliances, and was known to 
many within DE&S.   
There were risks associated with these pre-defined attributes, such as the 
researcher having prior knowledge of conversations, and of what might be termed 
good informants, who are able to articulate a full response to a question, rather 
than just provide a yes or no answer as described by for example, Seidler (1974), 
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Van Maanen (1979), Barriball and While (1994), Chambers (1983), and also 
Booth and Booth (1996).  These informants may have made the results to be 
subject to a degree of confirmation bias if they had been used within the research,   
These issues were recognized at the beginning of the research, and were 
countered by the researcher expanding the detailed research domain, and 
purposefully researching Operating Centres that were different from the ones that 
the researcher had worked in or had a close functional relationship with.  This in 
turn enhanced the stranger value of the research as described by for example, 
Cressey (1983), Rogers (1999) and also Guest et al. (2006) and thus improved 
the validity of the results.   
The investigation of Operating Centres in this way provided a separate series of 
challenges, because during the research period the researcher worked within 
three different Operating Centres31 and was therefore a full insider in those 
Operating Centres.  As an effect of moving from one job-role to another job-role 
the researcher underwent a transition from being a full insider and group member 
in three of the research domains, to eventually becoming, in turn, a partial and 
complete outsider in relation to those same domains.   
The movement across these groups provided complementary viewpoints for the 
research and also enabled more detailed data to be gathered that supported the 
research.  There was a corollary to that level of insiderness in that the researcher 
was an outsider to the other Operating Centres in DE&S.   
This meant that in addition to the negotiation of an emotional identity the 
researcher needed to negotiate and demonstrate a research identity as described 
by Down et al. (2006) that was known, credible and trusted where he was an 
insider to an Operating Centre or team, but that credibility needed to be 
developed in the groups where he was an outsider in his research identity.  This 
development of partial insiderness and research credibility was achieved  through 
                                            
31 Operating Centres A, B and D. 
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the use of a work identity that the researcher was able to use as a bridge into the 
teams, because in that linked identity he had worked with some teams to provide 
‘services’ to them, he was therefore known to them in that other identity.   
It was in this embedded insider role that the first of the reflections on the effects 
and implications of insiderness were discovered. The researcher was 
participating fully in each group’s activities and meetings, with all of the tensions 
and personal and emotional engagement which that entailed.  Nevertheless, the 
researcher, in their academic identity, was able to step across a boundary and 
engage at times in critical reflection within that particular group context.  But being 
a member of these groups and working within them also meant that at times there 
was the danger of the researcher disengaging from the research observations, 
either because they were tired, or because they were engaged in ‘working’, rather 
than ‘researching’.   
The phenomena of engagement, disengagement and going native have been 
discussed by Alvesson who suggests that the researcher is not an ethnographer 
in the sense of being a professional stranger, but is an ‘observing participant’ 
(2010 p 159 ).  The researcher, therefore, needed to be aware at all times of the 
particular identity that they were in.   
This challenge was countered by, for example, the researcher writing in their field 
notes that they had stopped observing, or that it was becoming difficult to 
concentrate on the observations, or that they had missed part of the work 
conversation because they were observing and not participating.   
The challenges that the researcher faced, including the difficulties of remaining 
objective and of maintaining an academic approach, during his work, have been 
described by for example, Alvesson (2010), Kamsteeg (2008p 101), Moeran 
(2009p 140), Collins (2002), and also Kirke (2013).  Being an insider meant that 
there was an element of auto-ethnography in the ethnography and data gathering 
(Coffey, 2000p 1), as the researcher/civil servant was an active member of the 
groups that he was studying.  As a consequence of this, the researcher had to 
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deliberately concentrate on staying on the boundary, between a participant 
observing group behaviour, and being an observant participant, fully immersed in 
the group, who was fully fledged in the group’s rules and who was observing the 
group.   
The legitimisation and maintenance of the researcher’s professional networks 
while carrying out the research provided a separate set of issues.  These included 
the researcher being seen, and viewed by group members as an outsider, simply 
through the act of carrying out research and observing the groups within that 
organisation.   
A great deal of care was taken therefore, within particular groups to minimise the 
visibility of the research, and thus the tension between the researcher, the 
researched, and management.  There was a further effect of insiderness that 
became more apparent when completing the writing up of the research.  It 
became apparent that in linking the literature that was reviewed in Chapter 2 to 
the field of DE&S the researcher was informing the literature with examples of 
data and not taking a more hypothetical approach to the application of data to the 
field.   
This was, for the researcher, a difficult thing to change, because of the depth to 
which the researcher was embedded physically, psychologically and emotionally 
in the organisation of DE&S and its organisational culture.  This example of 
insiderness affecting the research was countered by the creation of a series of 
implications statements that are set out in the literature review. A series of 
questions were posed that allowed the application of the literature to DE&S which 
enabled the researcher’s experiences as a civil servant embedded in DE&S to 
occur without ‘giving the game away’ by using data and experience as examples 
to illustrate the link of the applicability of the literature to the field.   
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3.5.2 Reactivity and Reflexivity  
The phenomenon of reactivity refers to when individuals change their behaviour 
because they know they were being observed, see for example and also Heppner 
(2008), Higate and Cameron (2006), Johnson (2003).  Reactivity can be triggered 
when individuals alter their behaviour to conform to the expectations of the 
observer, such as giving confirmatory answers when leading questions are asked 
by an inexperienced interviewer.  The change that is engendered may be positive 
or negative, and is likely to be situationally dependent.  Reactivity can also be a 
significant threat to a research study's internal validity.   
The researcher minimised the threat from this phenomenon by the appropriate 
use of open and non-leading questions and also by avoiding responding to 
requests for advice and recommendations on group behaviour within the context 
of this thesis.  But as this thesis was an at-home ethnographic study of the 
researcher’s culture, groups and behaviours, it was inevitable that a degree of 
reactivity occurred.  Several respondents contacted the researcher post-interview 
to discuss their own reflections on the work.  This included occasions where 
respondents had noticed different group’s behaviours and had themselves 
become aware of changing their own behaviour in particular group situations.   
This level of reactivity and reflexivity enabled the researcher to add these external 
reflections on the research as notes to the original data, which in turn informed 
and strengthened the resulting conclusions.   
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3.5.3 The Researcher’s Identity32 
The research was carried out in parallel, and intertwined with, the researcher’s 
formal duties.  This level of embeddedness was both positive, in that it enabled a 
direct link between function and research to be made, and also negative in that 
the boundary between researcher and worker was at times very easy to blur.  As 
a consequence, the researcher either became engrossed in the research, thus 
not carrying out their functional duties, or they became engrossed in their 
functional duties and therefore missed, or did not realise the importance of 
observations or interactions that were happening around them.  It was because 
of these issues that the researcher had to remain consciously competent of which 
task they were carrying out and also of their reflective needs.   
During the course of this work, the researcher became aware that through their 
burgeoning academic identity, the researcher, as both a researcher and worker, 
had become much more of an outsider to the organisation that the researcher 
was working in, belonged to and was studying.  This was a transition point and 
this becoming of their academic identity came about at the expense of a 
weakening role identity as an employee, both in relation to their Role Team and 
to DE&S.   
The researcher realised that he was much more comfortable in his academic 
identity due to the dissonance between their role identity and his academic 
identity.  It was at this point that they became aware that research carries an 
emotional loading and that to be a committed researcher one must engage with 
one’s research on many levels and that an emotional identity was salient (Coffey, 
2000 p 158).  Each time the researcher moved from one group to another, their 
identity salience changed, because not only does a personal identity balance 
change but identities have salience, transience, and value during a research 
                                            
32 This section has been presented in an expanded form as an academic paper and is also the subject of 
a book chapter in preparations at October 2015.  The book is  provisionally titled “Encountering 
Ethnographies”, Palgrave Macmillan.  
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project (Coffey, 2000).  Each of these attributes can become salient at any time 
during the research.  The performance of research as an insider at home can 
therefore cause emotional dissonance, as described by Down et al. (2006 p 6), 
between the researcher’s different identities.   
Closeness and familiarity with both the researched and the research domain also 
provided their own challenges to the researcher within their application of insider 
ethnography.  When one becomes familiar with the group, it can be very difficult 
to see the mundane, because one is immersed in it, thus reducing the stranger 
value (Guest et al., 2006, Cressey, 1983).   
The researcher needed to be constantly aware of the mundane, and constantly 
and consistently question what was happening, why it was happening, who was 
carrying it out, where it was happening and would this phenomenon happen 
anywhere else.  In order to remain separate from the research the researcher did 
not take on a second persona as in the style of Collins (2002).  Rather, because 
he, in his identity as civil servant, already possessed multiple other functional 
nested identities as a librarian, manager, and information manager.  He simply 
entered one new identity to an existing suite of identities.  In doing so, he created 
and maintained a cognitive and intellectual boundary between the research and 
their functional work.   
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3.6 Conclusion  
Chapter 3 has described the research methodology and the methods that were 
used to investigate group behaviours as lived at DE&S.  The philosophy and the 
research methods have described a multi-stranded, social sciences based 
research framework.  The research strategy and methods supported this 
approach by using a broader social sciences, ethnographic approach in 
conjunction with quantitative methods where appropriate.  This was achieved 
while working within the ‘field’ of DE&S.  The research was carried out using an 
interpretivist and constructivist ontology, using observations combined with 
qualitative and quantitative data to explain organisational culture of DE&S 
through a narrative epistemology.  An essentially qualitative approach was 
because the researcher believed that people did not describe their world in terms 
of hard data but as stories.  This was why, in order to reflect and respect that 
reality, the research employed a predominantly narrative approach to gather and 
analyse the data and to present the results and conclusions.   
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 now report the output and outcomes of the methods that 
were described in Chapter 3.  They achieve that by presenting data that illustrate 
factors affecting the organisational culture of DE&S during the research period.   
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4.  Attributes of Groups 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapters 1 through to 3 have framed the research domain and critically reviewed 
and synthesised the theoretical and methodological frameworks that underpinned 
this research.  Chapters 4, 5 and 6 report the findings as a series of case studies 
that answer the research question: What factors affect the organisational culture 
in DE&S? The data were gathered in detail in three Operating Centres, and also 
more generally across the remaining 18 Operating Centres.  
4.1.1 Navigation 
Section 4 introduces the chapter.  Section 4.2 reprises the group context within 
DE&S that was set out in Chapter 1.  Section 4.3 reports the manifestations of 
identity that were observed in DE&S in the form of personal, social and group 
identity and also geographical identity. Section 4.5 presents findings on the 
strength of identity that was expressed by members of DE&S in regard to various 
groups. Section 4.6 presents the formal and informal group sizes that were found 
in DE&S from two perspectives, that of the group member and also of DE&S.  
Section 4.7 describes the linguistic frameworks that existed within the groups in 
DE&S.   
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4.2 Group Context 
‘I suppose in a rawer concept, village life under a smaller population, such 
as the manorial system of medieval times, meant that everyone knew 
everyone else and there was a structure for skills (i.e. butcher, baker and 
candle-stick maker–literally).  Everyone fitted into their niche within that 
society and provided a service for the other person.  In the MOD, our skills 
rarely reflect in our day to day work.  We are expected to be Jacks of all 
Trades yet really masters of none.  And who can really grow excited about 
new innovations, such as MOSS33?  Therefore, because we don’t have solid 
trades, we are seen where: ‘they protect their own resources, don’t share 
resources’, as people who were trying to grasp at vapour to solidify it into 
something tangible’ (Shaw, 2010o). 
As with any organisation, DE&S comprised formal functional groups and informal 
social groups.  DE&S was led at the highest level by the DE&S Top Team, 
consisting of seven people (Shaw, 2014m).  The Top-Team consisted of Chiefs 
of Materiel and Directors General.  The Chief of Materiel areas were led by a 
Senior Civil Service pay band 3, or a 3* Military Officer, labelled either a Chief of 
Materiel (COM) Land, Air or Maritime, or a civilian director, Joint Enablers.  Each 
Chief of Materiel (COM) had his or her own top team of five members, and each 
COM was organised into Operating Centres, which were led by a Senior Civil 
Service pay band 2, or  2* rank military equivalent.  These areas were defined by 
the function that they performed, for example, one of the COM Land Operating 
Centres was the Weapons Operating Centre, which although in Chief of Materiel 
Lands domain, provided munitions and explosive support for all Front Line 
Commands.   
Figure 4-1 reminds the reader of the simplified organisation of DE&S.  It shows 
the structure of DE&S at that time with the relevant Chiefs of Material and 
                                            
33 Microsoft Office SharePoint. An information management system used in DE&S. 
 143 
 
 
Operating Centres, with the crosscutting functions of, for example finance shown 
as horizontal dashed lines.  
 
Figure 4-1 Simplified DE&S Top Level Structure 
Source: DE&S Corporate Overview Presentation 
Operating Centres, shown as blocks under each COM on Figure 4-1 had formally 
issued mission statements that provided the framework that legitimised the 
functional cultures that existed within their component groups. The Weapons 
Operating Centre mission was:  
‘To deliver and support cross domain, end to end weapons system 
solutions, grounded in UK Supply Chain but with access to global markets’ 
(Operating Centre D, 2012). 
Operating Centres were further broken down into areas that possessed their own 
functional and cultural identity through their functional role and also their links to 
the military domain that they solely, or predominantly supported.  The 
organisational nomenclature of each area was unique to that Operating Centre. 
In Operating Centre D, for example, these were called Pillars, (Operating Centre 
D, 2012) in Operating Centre A, these same areas were called Business 
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Units,(Operating Centre A, 2012) and in Operating Centre E, they were called 
Capability or Equipment Domains (Operating Centre E, 2011). .  This research 
has named Operating Centres alphabetically to avoid using their real names.   
Pillars or Business Units were generally led by a SCS 1* or military equivalent 
and were broken down further into Delivery Teams and Project Teams led by a 
B1 grade civil servant or military equivalent.  Below this level existed Functional 
Teams, which were led by a B2 grade civil servant, or military equivalent rank.  
Below this existed Role Teams, that were led by C1 grade civil servants or their 
equivalent military rank. One way that Role Teams and Project Teams 
differentiated themselves was through a mission statement, or the shortened use 
of the equipment name or function that the group was responsible for.  This was 
visible in, for example, the labels that teams used to mark their position on 
floorplates.   
In addition to a mission statement, a more detailed level of functional legitimacy 
was assigned to these groups as a result of the tasks that they were required to 
perform.   
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4.3 Attributes, Characteristics and Group Distinctiveness: 
Identity 
4.3.1 Introduction 
One of the most visible attributes of groups and group members in DE&S was 
their collective and individual identities and identifiers. 
This thesis discusses identity in terms of personal, group, cultural and 
geographical identities, and the various manifestations of the salient identities 
that existed in DE&S during the research period.  Section 4.3 presents examples 
of a sub-set of those identities.  A caveat must be observed here: the identities 
observed were by no means all of the identities that were present in DE&S.  As 
with all of the data presented, the identities presented are necessarily a snapshot 
of the phenomena that were temporally and contextually bound.  It will be 
demonstrated that these identity manifestations in DE&S were legitimised 
elements of group distinctiveness and were therefore elements of the symbolic 
and pragmatic cultural framework of DE&S.   
At the beginning of the research the researcher believed that the various 
manifestations of social and group identity within DE&S were solely responsible 
for the creation of exclusive boundaries around those groups, and that these 
boundaries were responsible for the negative attitudes between groups that the 
researcher had observed.   
The researcher therefore felt that identity and its representations were important 
to the group members, the groups that they were performed within, and also to 
DE&S as an organisation, and thus an important avenue for investigation.  Whilst 
true, Chapters 4 and 5 will show that although this was the researcher’s position 
at the start of the research, as the data emerged and concepts were detected, 
what was observed was much more complex and nuanced than was first thought.   
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These identities and their manifestations, rather than being a sole causative 
factor, were actually contributory factors in the system that affected group 
behaviour in DE&S.  The examples of identities in DE&S were observed to be 
nested and complementary.  This is as described by Pate et al. (2010), or through 
the multiple axes of identity as described by Kirke (2007d).  In addition, depending 
on which group context the group member was performing in at the time, these 
identities did not need to be exclusive, as described by Ellemers (2005) but could 
be complementary, as described by Kirke (2007d).   
4.3.2 A Trajectory of Identity Development in DE&S 
Finding: There was a trajectory to the manifestation of identities in DE&S 
that started prior to the creation of DE&S on the 1st of April  2007, when the 
DPA and the DLO merged (MOD, 2006).   
The creation of DE&S was, for this thesis, the most recent point where personal, 
organisational, and group identities merged and changed. 34  This merger was 
not a direct transition from two organisations into one DE&S.  There was a period 
of transition that started in 2004/2005.35  
The transition involved the creation of a team to manage the merger and 
integration of the DPA and the DLO: the DPA/DLO Merger and Integration Team 
(DDMIT) (Shaw, 2006a).   
One aspect of the merger was the collocation of the DLO and DPA management 
teams in Abbeywood (Shaw, 2006b).  Prior to the merger, the DLO had been 
headquartered in Bath, with the DPA being headquartered in Bristol.   
                                            
34 At the time of writing, in April 2014, DE&S has undergone a further identity change to a Bespoke 
Trading Entity. 
35 The recommendation to combine the two organisations was put forward by MOD senior official Tom 
McKane, who was commissioned to review acquisition arrangements. His report, Enabling Acquisition 
Change, followed the publication of the Defence Industrial Strategy in December 2005 which outlined 
what defence technologies the government intended to buy in the next 10 years, and in the longer 
term. 
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The collocation of what the MOD, and also Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993), call 
the ‘Top–Teams’, sent out several signals that appeared to be interpreted 
differently by the staff within the DPA and the DLO.  The message was interpreted 
by the DLO as though the DPA were taking over the DLO because the DLO Top 
-Team was moving, and not the DPA team; secondly, it signalled that the DLO 
location in Bath was not important, because if it was, then the DLO Top-Team 
would have remained there (Shaw, 2007-2010a).   
Neither of these were actually true in an organisational sense, even though they 
were perceived to be so by group members, because both groups thought they 
were being taken over by the other group. (Shaw, 2007-2010b)  This dissonance 
occurred during, and after the merger, and was still in the vernacular of DE&S 
until 2014.  These factors had some effect on the way that DE&S staff viewed 
themselves during and after the merger, and also whether they willingly accepted 
the merger in terms of changed identities.   
A further factor in the transition of identity from the DPA and the DLO was the 
development of a transitional organisation called Technical Enabling Services 
(TES) (Shaw, 2006c)  This organisation was specifically created from within the 
DPA, to signal that organisational behaviour was to change from the DPA single 
organisational ethos, to one in which services were provided to both the DPA and 
the DLO prior to the creation of DE&S.  TES did not deliver equipment, it delivered 
services such as consultancy, and advice (Shaw, 2006d).   In terms of the 
transition of identity, TES had a specific symbol on its business card to denote 
the jointness of that organisation(Shaw, 2006e) which appeared to be a 
deliberate move in preparation for DE&S, and to prepare people for the 
organisational change into one, rather than two organisations.   
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Figure 4-2 Transition of Identity From the DPA: DLO: TES Business Cards 
Source: Derek Shaw   
Figure 4-2 shows A – DPA business card logo that existed prior to the 1st of April 
2007, B – DLO business card logo that existed prior to the 1st of April 2007 and 
C shows the TES business card logo that combined the DPA and the DLO logo 
and which existed from the 1st of April 2006 until the 31st of March 2007, when a 
formal DE&S logo was introduced.   
TES only existed for a year, as part of the DLO and DPA Merger and Integration 
Team structure (DDMIT),(2007b) because it was an interstitial organisation that 
was created only to symbolically represent the fact that the DPA and DLO 
organisational processes and their socio-technical culture would have to change 
when the two organisations merged. TES business cards were replaced by either 
none, or by a DE&S branded card.   
TES was seen by DDMIT as an opportunity to signal that change, and also to 
make some socio-technical and socio-cultural changes in advance of the actual 
merger and vesting day, which occurred on the 1st of April 2007. 36  But on vesting 
                                            
36 The first day of the formal existence of DE&S.   
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day, the only change that was apparent to staff was a new flag, new letterheads, 
and the DE&S lanyards.  Their jobs did not change, unless of course they had 
been in the merger team.  Therefore, the merger became viewed by many staff 
as yet another change programme where nothing actually changes,(Shaw, 2007-
2010c)  and staff appeared to become cynical about the merger.   
Some of this cynicism may have come about because of the corporate nature of 
the change of identity.   
4.3.3 DE&S Corporate Branding 
Finding: At the merger a new corporate identity was conceived that resulted 
in tension between the old identities of the DPA and the DLO when they 
were removed.   
When DE&S was created it was intended to be ‘One DE&S’ in terms of 
organisation structure, ideology and identity:  
‘   the brief was to come up with a new identity [for DE&S] which would 
come up with like a sort of top level identity and then a sort of sub-identity 
which would allow for all the Operating Centres and Project Teams to 
follow one stable identity, but have an opportunity to still be recognized as 
their Project Team name or Operating Centre name.... we were one 
organisation, we need to reflect this internally as a sense of belonging, 
[that] everything comes from the same stable…’ (Shaw, 2011t). 
DE&S identity and branding was formally promulgated through Policy, Rules and 
Guidance (PRG).  These mandated that all of the previous symbols and identities 
were to be replaced by a new corporate DE&S branding (DE&S, 2012).  Some of 
these identities are shown in Photograph 4-1  to Photograph 4-8 .  Within that 
one identity a series of groups were allowed to exist with their own identities that 
reinforced their historical identities within DE&S, rather than those identities being 
removed. Context to the construction of the DE&S identity was provided by the 
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C1 grade civil servant who was responsible for developing the symbols of DE&S 
identity on its inception.  These symbols therefore initiated the outward 
perceptions and manifestations of the DE&S identity.   
The creation of a new identity involved the removal of all old symbols, such as 
lanyards: 
‘…my new head of Second Comms [communications] feels that everyone 
should wear these [DE&S Lanyards].  We shouldn’t have any variation.  
His biggest hang up was you get people, who might wear their own football 
lanyard or their favourite beer or something!  I know a lot of people wear 
Help The Heroes and that’s a good cause. So we can’t go around policing 
people telling them not to wear it, but I think what we can do is make sure 
that senior people set a good example that others can then follow..’ (Shaw, 
2011t).  
The removal of the old DPA and DLO branding was specifically designed to 
enable DE&S to control physically and psychologically the way in which DE&S 
was represented internally to staff and also externally to other organisations.  
There therefore appeared to be a formal effort to impose a single identity on 
DE&S and its staff, but there was also a recognition that staff may not all wear 
the DE&S lanyard, for example, but would wear their own one as an act of 
variation, such variation from the ‘One DE&S’ identity was deemed by DE&S 
management to be a negative attribute.   
There appeared to be a recognition that this would happen anyway.  The following 
example also indicates the complexity of the task to reduce the old identities at 
that time in order to become ‘One DE&S’.  This points to the recognition that 
people and Project Teams exerted a degree of resistance to the new identity by 
trying to retain their ‘old’ identities.  As the civil servant responsible for the creation 
and implementation of the DE&S identity said:   
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‘…As you can imagine there were over 200 disparate identities across the 
two organisations and a lot of those logos were executed in-house and 
were very sort of unprofessional, and whilst many people bought into the 
benefit of rationalising those and having a single umbrella identity with sub-
identity underneath, there were a few teams who were resistant to change 
because they said that their identity was well established in the markets 
recognized within the Defence industry…look, we were one organisation 
we need to reflect this internally as a sense of belonging, everything comes 
from the same stable, .the only hesitance/resistance we [the corporate 
identity team] had was probably within Project Teams, at that level.  And 
they were the people who were keen to hold onto their team identity…’ 
(Shaw, 2011t). 
DE&S therefore appeared to reluctantly allow social categorisation and the 
facilitation of multiple identities at the Operating Centre and Project Team level 
because it created a single DE&S identity with sub-identities underneath and 
accepted that certain groups and individuals needed to identify themselves 
differently.   
This therefore allowed multiple smaller groups to create and maintain their own 
para-corporate identities, even though all other formal former organisation logos 
were forcibly removed and replaced with new DE&S logos.  This incomplete 
removal of, and in fact acceptance of, sub-identities at the team and Operating 
Centre level appeared to be one of the factors that allowed multiple organisational 
cultures to survive and thrive in DE&S.   
One example of the removal of old corporate branding is shown in Photograph 
4-1.    
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Photograph 4-1 LFE Mints Box Logo  
Source  Derek Shaw 
In this example, the Learning from Experience (LFE) brand was established 
within primarily the DPA (Jordan et al., 1988).  It was also known within the DLO 
as a result of activity through Technical Enabling Services (TES).  The LFE logo 
was developed in the DPA, but was known and recognized in both the DPA and 
the DLO.  The logo that is shown in  was replaced by a corporate logo that was 
part of the DE&S branding and identity (DE&S, 2012).   
The LFE logo that is shown in photograph 4-1was replaced by a corporate logo 
that subsumed the LFE brand, along with many others under the overarching 
Acquisition Operating Framework (AOF), see Photograph 4-2.  The AOF contain 
the DE&S processes that governed the acquisition and support of equipment 
within the MOD.  
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Photograph 4-2 DE&S Logo That Replaced the LFE Logo 
Source: Defence Intranet, Copyright MOD 
This new logo was hidden within a new larger corporate DE&S identity that was 
opaque for many people within DE&S, possibly because of the lack of 
communication about the organisational changes that had occurred (Shaw, 
2007a).  This opacity resulted in people who wanted to access the service, being 
unable to find it through formal channels.  They therefore had to find other ways 
to directly contact the LFE team members, either personally, or through back-
channels to access the LFE service.  This change to a seemingly unimportant 
element of a group’s functional identity showed how organisational functionality 
and effectiveness could be undermined by not understanding how identities 
interacted with each other.   
The introduction of the AOF appeared to create division, as some teams from the 
old DLO would not use the AOF, as it was the acquisition operating framework, 
and therefore seen as biased to the DPA, and not relevant to the ex DLO team 
members who were then in DE&S (Shaw, 2007-2010e).   
It appears then that the creation of the new DE&S identity could be seen as not 
universally popular: 
‘One of the less popular things about the formation of the DE&S was the 
removal of all of the local branding.  The fact that everybody had to use 
the same colour schemes, the same logo, all the local badges and things 
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were stripped out, in an attempt I’m sure to actually brand the DE&S as 
the DE&S as a whole, and I understand that and I did see that going on.  
But that, for all its good intentions, had a slightly negative effect within 
teams because it left them slightly in limbo as to what their loyalties were 
when the DE&S formed’ (Shaw, 2011t).   
It appears that the intent to create one identity for DE&S, and therefore ‘One 
DE&S’, was hampered by factors such as group size, with DE&S being too large 
a group for people to be loyal to at that time, especially as Operating Centres and 
teams had their own identities, and were trying to maintain and re-establish those 
identities. 
‘I know the intent was to forge loyalties to the DE&S, but that’s slightly too 
big an organisation and what we’ve seen since is sub-groups, largely 
functional groups within the DE&S, trying to re-establish their own 
identities.  So logos and things and slight variations to the branding and 
particular selections of the colour schemes form the palette being used in 
individual areas to just cement those identities’ (Shaw, 2011t). 
The fact that DE&S allowed these multiple identities, suggests that DE&S was 
thought to be at that stage a fractured and multi-organisational cultural 
organisation.  In addition to there being local logos, the following example from a 
C2 grade civil servant illustrates the existence of technical groups within DE&S 
that had their own identities that they thought of as brands:  
‘…we’ve got a few different brands within the team that people [and] 
external customers, identified with before the formation [of DE&S] because 
they were around. Some of them have been around for about ten years or 
so, either carried over from the DLO or from other groups within DE&S 
when DE&S had been reorganised because it used to be TES [Technical 
Enabling Services]’ (Shaw, 2011t).  
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The existence of these brands indicates that group distinctiveness may be 
developed over a long period of time, a period which was often characterised by 
several organisational changes, each of which encompassed a change of name 
for the group in question.  It also indicates that these brands had strength, 
because they had survived multiple organisational changes.   
4.3.4 Corporate Branding was Within a Hierarchy that Extended to 
the Team Level 
Finding: Corporate branding and identity extended to labels that indicated 
the function and location of teams. 
The corporate identity guideline extended into the realm of geographical place 
markers and labels that teams used to identify where they were.  These labels 
were written in the organisational dialect of the team to which they belonged, 
which was often expressed as an acronym.  The labelling followed the hierarchy 
of teams and groups, from Operating Centre down to functional sub teams. For 
example, the following response is from a B2 grade civil servant from Operating 
Centre A:   
‘….Where you work has a corporate identity as regarding labels or sort of 
signs that stick down from the ceiling, magnetic ones, so you know 
wherever you are, [ for example] downstairs on the second floor or upstairs 
on the third floor, so you have that corporate identity and that label…  I 
mean there’s distinct teams as well because there’s obviously distinct sub-
team leaders with their own particular responsibilities’. (Shaw, 2011p). 
The respondent here identifies a split in the groups in his areas between 
corporate identities and team identities.   
It also appears that the corporate identity acted as an umbrella over the team 
identities, but did not replace them.  The idea of labels as being combined identity 
and navigation aids is echoed by a C1 civil servant from Operating Centre G: 
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‘We all have these little signs that hang down from the ceiling which says 
Policy Secretariat and that sort of thing, you know, Corporate Performance 
and Risk, Business Management, you know, things that I don’t 
understand.  And Press Office as well and Public Relations.  So yes, I think 
they are identified.  Whether they identify themselves, whether they have 
their own sort of serious identity or not I don’t know, I suspect not’ (Shaw, 
2011j).   
There appeared to be a consistency in the application and understanding of the 
corporate labels that hung down from the ceiling.  The examples shown indicate 
that the implementation of the corporate branding and identity guideline had a 
positive purpose, as navigation aids for group members and to describe a more 
corporate identity at the Operating Centre level.   
But this application of labels also made the distinction between the corporate and 
Project Team output more visible, thus highlighting difference, rather than 
similarity and the ‘One DE&S’.  It also served to highlight the different reasons 
that people worked there: 
‘I think because we [DE&S] were such a big organisation there were 
various sub-groups if you like, and you’ll get a one group who you could 
say will follow everything we do, were very keen on any updates, on the 
future of DE&S because they might be in the fast stream set, or because 
they toe the line and they don’t want to go away from that whereas you get 
other groups who you might say they come here because it’s a job.  
They’re not interested that it’s the MOD, or DE&S it just pays their bill’. 
(Shaw, 2011t).  
An additional effect of these labels on group behaviour appeared to be that 
because, as will be shown later in section 4.7.2, groups were linguistically 
differentiated, geographical labels also acted as signifiers of in-groups and also 
of out-groups.  Therefore it could be said that the imposition of the DE&S identity 
standards actually exacerbated the visible fracturing of DE&S, rather than 
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signifying unity.  The fracturing of identity and the multi-cultural nature of the 
organisation appeared to be an enduring trait within DE&S.   The fractured culture 
may then be linked to behaviour in that some people and groups may follow the 
organisational dictats, but some may not, as shown in the previous responses, 
as will be shown later in more specific circumstances relating to attitudes that 
were displayed in relation to adopting new lanyards. 
4.3.5 Summary 
The removal of old local brands in favour of the imposed DE&S branding was felt 
throughout DE&S, and the replacement of those old brands with new local DE&S 
brands may have been a factor in forcing people to indicate their loyalty to a 
particular group. The actions by DE&S may, unintentionally or not, have had the 
effect of reinforcing the fracturing of identities through the legitimised use of 
branded clothing, labelling and different lanyards confirming that an implied multi-
cultural approach to DE&S as an organisation was taken. This was then a 
paradox of DE&S policy, where DE&S wanted both a coherent ‘One DE&S’, but 
also allowed groups to possess and manifest their own identities below the 
corporate level.   
4.3.6 Lanyards 
Finding: Lanyards were a flexible symbol of identity in the new DES but the 
new DE&S lanyards were not universally accepted, and so lanyards could 
become a divisive rather than a unifying factor. 
A very personal and visible element of the transition of identities from the DPA 
and the DLO to the DE&S identity was the lanyard that civilian and many military 
staff wore and on which their security passes were hung.  On the creation of 
DE&S a single corporate lanyard was imposed on staff.   
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The following example of old identities was provided by a C1 civil servant in 
Operating Centre D.  Beside this person’s desk, there was a loop of lanyards 
hanging on the wall.37   
 
Photograph 4-3 Referential Identities Manifest Through Lanyards 
Source  Derek Shaw 
When asked, the informant indicated that the lanyards represented all of the 
groups that they had worked in while in the Ministry of Defence.  They used them 
as a reminder of the good things that they had achieved (Shaw, 2012b).  This 
was as contrasted by how they felt about DE&S: they stated that they did not feel 
positively about DE&S and the merger, indicating instead that they felt that they 
did not fit in the new organisation.   
Lanyards were a pragmatic and symbolic method of marking identity and 
affiliation.  They could also be used as a symbolic representation of cultural drag 
because they also acted as mechanisms through which a group member could 
access, and also show to other group members, an identity where in the past, 
things were different, or, we did things better then, as was indicated by this 
informant.  
Within the DE&S corporate branding scheme, each Operating Centre and, if they 
wanted to, each team was allowed to retain, develop, maintain, and manifest its 
                                            
37 Only six are shown as the others were duplicates. 
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own functional, cultural, geographical, and historical identity/ies.  Some of the 
group identities that were present in DE&S were so fragmented that the groups 
were unable, and occasionally unwilling, to be joined together as the new 
construct of DE&S.   
Group members in Project Teams, in general, appeared to prefer wearing a 
lanyard that showed affiliation to a Role Team or Project Team, and then their 
next choice would be to wear a lanyard that showed their Operating Centre, rather 
than a DE&S lanyard.  This indicates that there was a collective resistance 
against DE&S’ original intent to behave as a single organisation.  As a result, and 
in spite of senior management’s intent, allowances were made that enabled 
Operating Centres and Project Teams to possess their own identities while in 
some way adhering to the DE&S corporate branding guidelines.  
 
Photograph 4-4 Example of Hierarchy of Lanyards Within DE&S 
Source: Derek Shaw  
Photograph 4-4 shows an indicative example of the potential hierarchy of 
lanyards within one Operating Centre.   
 At the top: the DE&S corporate lanyard, Defence Equipment and 
Support, with the ratified pennant logo. 
 The centre lanyard: an Operating Centre lanyard, Weapons  
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 The lower lanyard: a Project Team level lanyard, Defence Munitions 
‘Safety First’. 
In Operating Centre D, during the research period there were also at least six 
other team brands, including military lanyards.  Military staff could wear either 
their military lanyard or both, thus again indicating multiple group memberships. 
This was in addition to other DLO, DPA, precursor organisations, or other 
lanyards that were worn, occasionally as acts of defiance against the corporate 
identity that was being imposed on people.   
It appears then that although the legitimised lanyards ‘all come from the same 
stable (Shaw, 2011t) in terms of colours and corporate logo, the act of allowing 
these different variations of the corporate symbolic system to exist, contributed 
to the existence of one of the factors in the fracturing of the DE&S identity, that 
of group distinctiveness.  Fragmentation of identity through the use of lanyards in 
DE&S was explicitly allowed because there were Operating Centres and Project 
Teams as groups that viewed themselves as being separate from DE&S. The 
hierarchy of lanyards was at the highest level, DE&S branding, followed by 
Operating Centre branding, and then each project team could have their own 
branding or co-branding with industry partners.  
Examples of defiance in terms of wearing lanyards were observed at all levels 
throughout DE&S.  
Even though the corporate guidance expected senior staff to adhere to the 
branding guideline and wear a DE&S lanyard, it appears that this was not always 
the case:    
‘….  I don’t wear a purple38 [pointing to their lanyard], one of these.  I 
actually refused to at the beginning because I couldn’t take all the branding 
that was going on with it.  … I really got very distressed at the boundaries 
                                            
38 The colour attributed to MOD, and DE&S, as opposed to the Green of the Army, Light Blue of the RAF 
or Dark Blue of the RN. 
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and the barriers between the [MOD] Head Office and the DPA and then 
the merger came along with a very strong branding for DE&S and I just 
couldn’t buy into it at all.  And so I’ve never worn a purple lanyard, I’ve 
always stuck to my blue one [a standard colour available at all sites where 
people have misplaced their lanyard].  I’m probably mellowing on it a bit 
now, but it got to the point interestingly where I think I was in a meeting 
that CDM39 must have been chairing and he was having a go about people 
wearing different team lanyards and DPA lanyards and trying to get this 
sense that we were all one organisation.  And I think the head of the 
internal communications team was in this meeting as well and a day or so 
later I was talking to someone behind me, heard somebody drop 
something on my desk, turned around and a DE&S lanyard had been 
dropped on my desk.  I just found that a step way too far’. (Shaw, 2011h). 
The above is from a civilian SCS 1*, and it could be viewed as subversion of the 
corporate aim, and going against group norms.  Their response described the 
group boundaries that they encountered and the imposition of the DE&S identity 
that they encountered on their return from working at Head Office.40   
Because of their hierarchical position and also the role and the function that they 
performed, they were pressured to conform and to be part of the ‘One DE&S’ and 
to show that conformity by wearing the corporate lanyard.  They objected to this, 
as they saw their work-based identity as being firstly a MOD civil servant and 
secondly part of DE&S, and not the other way around.   
This response illustrates several things: the nested identities as described by 
Pate et al. (2010), Kirke’s transferrable axes of identity (2007d), and also 
Ellemers’ multiple identities (Ellemers, 2005), the possible existence of neo-tribal 
characteristics of multiple group memberships and identity symbols as described 
by Maffesoli (1998), Price and Cybulski (2007), Hilder (2004)  as described in 
                                            
39 Chief of Defence Materiel. 
40 Main Building, Whitehall. 
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section 2.7 and also a hierarchy of identities brought about by the meaningfulness 
of the group to the group member (Evans and Carson, 2005) all existed in DE&S.  
The response also shows that the imposition of DE&S and its identity were not 
universally accepted, and that staff did not all immediately identify with DE&S.  
This can be seen in the way that many staff responded on vesting day.   
In Operating Centre A on vesting day, 1st April 2007, the new DE&S lanyards 
were being handed out to staff by Business Managers, with the instruction to get 
rid of the old lanyards (Shaw, 2007b).41   
The old lanyards had the Support Group, PDG (Procurement Development 
Group),42 branding on them as shown in Photograph 4-5.   
 
Photograph 4-5 Pre-DE&S Lanyards in Operating Centre A 
Source: Derek Shaw 
The strength of the psychological bond, and the corresponding emotional 
investment that people had invested in the DPA were clear.  For example, the 
researcher witnessed a woman coming down the floor-plate in tears: ‘I’m not 
wearing one of those new lanyards, I joined DPA, I didn’t join DE&S, I’m a DPA 
girl’ (Shaw, 2007b).  This type and strength of identity is discussed by, for 
example, Hogg and others, and indicates the importance and consequences of 
organisations not recognising that employee’s constructions of identity are 
                                            
41 Vesting day of the merger of the DPA and the DLO. 
42 DPA organisational structures were Integrated Project Teams and Support Groups. 
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important to the person and to their commitment and identification with the 
organisational goals.  It also indicates that the psychological bond and contract 
is something that is too important to be overlooked during a period of 
organisational change and merger (Hogg, 2003, Ilka et al., 2009, Knippenberg et 
al., 2002, Paulsen, 2003, Seidl, 2005, Van Knippenberg and Van Leeuwen, 
2001).  But this bond, with the old team, and the consequences of not managing 
how it was broken, appeared to be overlooked at the time of the merger of the 
DPA and the DLO.   
The lack of a positive identification by staff with DE&S, combined with the 
existence of active dis-identification with other specific groups, was also seen to 
be enacted against industry partners who tried to imposed a single identity onto 
a group:   
‘…I could tell you the honest story about why I’m wearing a poppy lanyard, 
I thought actually how close am I to DE&S, probably not that close and 
what gives me my energy and why I actually work in this area was to 
ensure that the guys at the front line get the best kit, so actually my 
allegiance was to the front line, Hence the poppies’. (Shaw, 2011h). 
This respondent, a B1 grade civil servant team leader in Operating Centre D, 
encapsulated both sides of that situation and appears to agree that identification 
with groups followed a hierarchy within DE&S and also that the hierarchy 
appeared to match the ideologies of the DPA and the DLO that were latent within 
DE&S.  The creation of hierarchically contextualised identities in DE&S appeared 
to be linked to the way that group members identified with their Role Team and 
front line first, rather than with DE&S, or even their Operating Centre.  Why might 
this be?  Could it be due to the higher levels of interaction between group 
members within smaller groups as opposed to a larger one?  Perhaps this 
enabled a greater number of stronger bonds to be developed between group 
members in small groups as opposed to fewer weaker bonds within larger groups.  
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This then appeared to permit the disassociation of group members with DE&S 
and the replacement of that association with, and by, their Role Team.  
Military uniforms were also worn by military personnel while in DE&S, these were 
a further symbol within the multi-layered symbolic system that indicated affiliation 
to groups, and differentiation between groups.  Nested and non-contradictory 
identities were also illustrated by responses that appear to reinforce the view that 
DE&S group identities were fractured, but this fracturing was not necessarily a 
negative trait.  Within those functional, fractured identities, personal identities 
could also be nested within a hierarchy, within which there might be a strong 
reliance on historical referential identities that could be linked to loyalty to team, 
service, cloth, family and the lads and lasses on the front line.  The existence of 
hierarchies, multiplicities of identities, and nested identities can also be seen in 
the following interview:   
‘…I think in some ways it depends on the context.  If I’m speaking to 
someone at Ensleigh then I’d probably tell them that I worked for Safety 
and Engineering, because there’s a mix of different operators, operation 
teams centres on site, if I was chatting to friends who weren’t in the Civil 
Service I’d say that I worked for the MOD, and identify most strongly with 
the MOD, I’d identify myself as working as that, so in some ways it would 
depend on the context.  I don’t know, DE&S I feel as a sort of entity to 
identity with was probably easier to identify with DE&S than with the MOD, 
because the MOD, was so big’ (Shaw, 2011t).  
The respondent was a graduate engineer who also confirmed the existence of a 
group size component in the meaningfulness of identification of the individual with 
groups that they were a member of.  Once again group size appeared to be a 
criterion that affected the strength of identification of a group member to a group, 
with the MOD, the larger organisation, and much more nebulous than DE&S, 
being more difficult to identify which is itself a large organisation.   
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However, even if staff in DE&S did not identify with DE&S, they still worked and 
were committed to achieving the superordinate goal of DE&S, which was 
supporting the front-line:   
‘Well I don’t particularly want to be associated with DE&S full stop as an 
organisation.  The reason why...one of the reasons actually I work for the 
MOD, is for the work that we do for the guys who are on the front 
line’(Shaw, 2011h). 
This response from a C1 grade civil servant in Operating Centre B introduces a 
dichotomy of not identifying with DE&S but of being committed to the ‘front line’, 
thus indicating the paradox of ethos versus culture by working for DE&S, but 
identifying with the ‘front-line’.  This dichotomy will be explored in more detail later 
in this thesis.   
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4.3.7 Badges  
Finding: In addition to lanyards, badges were used as symbol of identity 
and these symbols could also symbols of division among groups. 
In addition to lanyards and labels, there were other legitimised identity markers. 
Photograph 4-6 and Photograph 4-7 show how team and personal Identity was 
marked in two Operating Centres.   
43 
Photograph 4-6 Role Team Badge 
Source  Derek Shaw 
Photograph 4-6 shows the symbol of affiliation for members of Scout SV team 
(MOD, 2014b). Badges were only given to team members and were not given to 
non-members.   Social categorisation in this group appeared to be binary, a group 
member either had a badge and was visibly in the team, or they did not.   
 
 
 
                                            
43 Copyright Derek Shaw. 
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44 
Photograph 4-7 Operating Centre Affiliation Badge 
Source  Derek Shaw 
The social categorisation shown in Photograph 4-7 was more nuanced because 
there were different coloured badges that signified different levels of internal 
reward and affiliation.  The blue badge pictured belonged to the researcher who 
was associated with the Operating Centre, but who was not a member of it.   
A bronze badge denoted a new entrant or being in the Operating Centre 1-5 
years, a silver badge denoted 5-10 years’ service, and a gold badge 10 years or 
more service.  Thus this Operating Centre categorised in great detail and 
provided symbols that visibly showed those categorisation boundaries both 
externally to other Operating Centres and non-members, and also internally 
within the Operating Centre.   
It appears then that the DE&S identity guidelines, and the implementation of 
those guidelines in teams and Operating Centres in the form of badges and 
lanyards, allowed teams to be distinct within the boundaries of the ‘One DE&S’.   
Social categorisation was therefore legitimised by DE&S within its subsidiary 
Operating Centres, thus making it more difficult for there to be “One DE&S”, and 
consequently a single DE&S organisational culture: 
                                            
44 Copyright Derek Shaw. 
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…People were seeing themselves as being associated with a Project 
Team, they were not seeing themselves as either part of the Operating 
Centre, or of DE&S’ (Shaw, 2013a). 
Thus, the identity and implied culture of DE&S was observed to be binary in 
nature, with the core characterisations being a bureaucratic identity and Project 
Team/Delivery Team identity.  For example, the 2* in Operating Centre D 
organised his Operating Centre such that the floor-plate that he sat on was 
occupied by leadership and bureaucratic staff.  All of these groups were primarily 
bureaucratic, performing reporting and management functions and supporting 
different levels of leadership.  The Project Teams were on different floorplates 
and carried out the engineering and project tasks that directly, as opposed to 
indirectly, produced equipment and supported the frontline. (Shaw, 2010-2014)  
This separation was deliberate, but the effects of the separation, the development 
of the in-group and out-group of the project teams and their effort against the 
bureaucratic effort of the ‘Operating Centre’ were unintended consequences of 
the separation.   
While this boundary between the projects and the bureaucracy of DE&S can be 
shown to be true, it is a simplification of the complexity of identity and also of the 
multiplicity of organisational and social cultures in DE&S.  That complexity and 
multiplicity will be revealed throughout chapter 4.   
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4.3.8 Tensions and Asymmetric Dress Codes 
Finding: the existence of asymmetric dress codes led to tension between 
groups. 
In DE&S affiliation to groups was, in addition to the wearing of lanyards shown 
through the legitimised distinctiveness of dress, through the wearing of a uniform 
by military personnel: 
‘…I think it is differentiation actually.  I think when I’m, as an individual, 
going off to see a frontline Commander, I always put on the combats rather 
than another form of working dress, which was sort of more office dress, 
deliberately wanting to be focussed, this is  about supporting operations.  
I think when visitors come the same thing applies and I notice that the 
military staff will always put their combats on when they’ve got a visitor 
coming.  But I think if it’s a positive discrimination in terms of ‘look we’re in 
this team, we’re all in it together, and we’re doing this job because it’s 
what’s best for the customer” then that’s great.  If it’s “we’re in it together, 
nobody else understands you, they’re all bastards and they all keep 
picking at us’ then that’s bad.  So I’d only promote the positive aspects 
which were conducive to the outputs that we want to deliver to 
defence…’(Shaw, 2011s).  
This respondent Identified with the British Army, of which he was a member, and 
the ‘front-line’.   
Distinctiveness of identity in DE&S through the use of clothing could be 
characterised as being binary, the two forms being that military personnel wore 
military uniforms (Bain, 2008, Cooke, 2008, MOD, 2004, Royal Navy, 2002a, 
Royal Navy, 2002b) and that civilians wore business wear.  This simple 
characterisation, however, hid many nuances and codes, thus chiming with the 
work of Lurie (1981), Pratt and Rafaeli (1993), Pratt and Rafaeli (1997), Pratt 
(1997), and also Rafaeli (1997) on the multi-layered nature of symbolism as 
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expressed through clothes, but in an obviously different organisational context, 
that of DE&S.   
While military personnel could very obviously dress within a formal set of rules, 
there appeared to be a different level of legitimisation of the differing dress codes 
in DE&S, which led to tensions between military personnel and civilian staff.  The 
differences in the perception of, and the performance of, a uniformed identity 
produced several consequences.  One consequence was the existence of the 
stereotype which was portrayed within DE&S and also the wider MOD as, you 
can tell the difference between the military and the civil service, just look at their 
shoes.   
This stereotype broke down, as stereotypes tend to, when the detail was 
observed, as many civil servants obviously knew how to polish their shoes.   
But this stereotype may have arisen because the civil service did not have a 
formally prescribed dress code or uniform, and they were therefore perceived, by 
predominantly military personnel, to have a greater freedom to supposedly 
express the civil servant’s personal identity through the use of clothing.   
This led to the view that was often expressed by military personnel, that civil 
servants could be somehow less professional in their work than the military who 
wore a uniform at work, and who took pride in wearing that uniform, and who had 
been taught how to wear it, something that Bourdieu (1977) described as their 
habitus and bodily hexis, as a British Army Lieutenant Colonel said during his 
interview: 
‘…There’s other cultural issues here as well, you know Fridays, [which are 
designated as ‘dress down days’] this place looks like a holding zone for 
the Jeremy Kyle show.  I mean I’ve never seen anything like it.  Here, some 
of these lot look like they’re going on a fight down the pub, some of them, 
look a sack of crap.  And if you’ve got contractors come around, sorry?  I 
mean it’s rugby shirts, t-shirts, shorts, flip flops, it’s the whole gamut, it just 
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doesn’t give the ethos of a professional organisation dedicated to providing 
effect out to [operational] theatre…’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
Within this characterisation, the groups that dressed smartly looked down on 
groups that dressed less formally.  They appeared to believe that being scruffy 
was a symbol that described the person’s lack of professionalism.  This view was 
most often expressed in the vernacular language of DE&S, as scuttle, which was 
rumour and disgruntlement expressed unofficially.   
On occasion, the tension was formalised and raised through official channels, 
such as the ‘Talk to the Board’(DE&S, 2015) question and response in the 
following example: 
‘…Whilst in the CS [Civil Service] I have also worked for a Line-Manager 
who cautioned me that, when visiting a military unit, people would probably 
speak to me first, assuming I was more senior to him.  When I asked him 
why he thought this, he replied: 'Because you wear a suit to work and I 
wear jeans and a ‘T’ shirt'.  He was right!..... Can you confirm whether it is, 
or was not, the intention of the (Management) Board to bring in a dress 
code for civilian staff working in DE&S?...’  (Shaw, 2011c).  
The tension expressed in this way appeared to centre on the manifestation of the 
difference in the legitimisation of dress codes.  As the question shows, subjective 
judgements could be made subconsciously as to the professionalism of those 
who did not follow a military dress code, in this case, civil servants who wore 
jeans.   
And as this Talk To The Board question asks: 
‘…I really feel that the chance to ‘express yourself’ should be left outside 
the ‘front office’ of a large government department. ….. I realise that as a 
serviceman I will probably be viewed as somewhat of a dinosaur, but we 
wear uniform for a myriad of reasons, one of the first being corporate 
image/team association, another being that being dressed appropriately 
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engenders a sense of discipline.  Frankly, some of the clothing worn within 
the bounds of Abbeywood would be suitable for a downmarket sixth-form 
college, or perhaps downtown Bristol on a sunny day, but should not be 
acceptable in a government office.  As servicemen we were often told not 
to allow an ‘us and them’ attitude to develop between [Armed] forces 
personnel and civil servants [CS]–the lax policy on CS clothing was no 
help to that aim, and threatens to devalue the image of the group to the 
detriment of those who were not only high calibre individuals but can also 
be bothered to try to look the part of serious government employees…’. 
(DE&S, 2015). 
The responses that were given to these questions indicate how social 
categorisation, which was legitimised by DE&S and also the MOD through military 
dress regulations (Bain, 2008, Cooke, 2008, Shaw, 2015f, MOD, 2004), could 
produce negative boundaries between different cultural groups, in this case 
between the military and civilians.  The stereotype of civil servants being less 
professional, portrayed within these questions, appeared to be validated by the 
response given by a 3* British Army General and DE&S board member:   
‘…To answer your question directly, it was not the intention of the Board 
to introduce a Dress Code for civilian staff at the DE&S.  You have 
expressed a personal view about dress, indeed every day (not just Friday) 
you do, by what you wear, you have that choice.  I also expressed a 
personal view that I felt that some would benefit from other influences in 
making up their own minds about dress...’ (DE&S, 2015). 
This response may indicate several factors, the board respondent was a member 
of the same military group, the Army, and therefore he may have been supporting 
the person who asked the questions because they were of the same group.   
He may also have been expressing his own discontent about dress codes and 
scruffy civilians, which chimes with the work of Bain and his findings on cultural 
differences in Defence Acquisition (Bain, 2008).  Implied within this response is 
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a trait that was carried over from the military culture in that a group member 
expected to be told how to do everything.  The respondent also appeared to be 
distancing himself from the Board by putting forward a personal view, implying 
that he personally believed that a dress code would be useful, but that the board 
did not actually think this.   
While not actually wearing military uniforms, some civil servants in specific teams 
did dress differently from others through the purchase of ‘team clothing’ such as 
sweatshirts. This made them visually fit in more with the uniformed organisations.  
This uniform provided civil servants with an identity that was both symbolic and 
pragmatic.  Uniforms and clothing appeared to signal the creation of both a more 
corporate identity at a team level and also a visible group boundary.   
This boundary was hierarchically visible at an SCS 2*/1* or Project Team level.45  
The provision of a work based uniform was not limited to military personnel. 
Photograph 4-8 shows a C1 grade civil servant in DSG, the Disposal Services 
Group.   
                                            
45  For example In Operating Centre D each depot had its own sweatshirts emblazoned with the name of 
the depot. 
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Photograph 4-8 Example of Civilian Identity Through Corporate clothing 
Source  Derek Shaw 
This group had been given their own, non-DE&S, corporate identity through the 
use of clothing, in preparation for being privatised (Shaw, 2013d). The employee 
pictured here had been supplied with a tie of the appropriate colour, texture and 
material, a lanyard to match and a branded shirt.   
The action of DE&S in providing civilians in this instance, with a uniform was a 
deliberate attempt to create a total visual identity for this group that differed from 
the rest of DE&S.  This separation appeared to be intended to support a different 
work psychology, that of being private sector and different to the civil service 
because this group were being prepared to be sold off to the private sector in 
order to improve services and also to save the MOD money (MOD, 2015d). 
Thus social categorisation could be used, as it appeared to be in this instance, to 
enforce difference between a DE&S group and the rest of DE&S and to make the 
target group more similar to, and to behave as though they were a private sector 
organisation. This thesis gathered no data on the effectiveness of that 
organisational change and so cannot comment on its success or otherwise.   
This thesis discusses identity through, amongst other methods, the use of 
clothing as a cultural delimiter that allowed the combined expression of identity, 
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power and behaviour differences and also social categorisation between the 
military, and civilian employees to be made more explicit.  Cultural differences 
between the military and civilian staff over uniforms appeared to amplify tensions 
between the military and civil service culture:  
 ‘…a Major who shared a workspace with us, when he came back in 
wearing uniform, I asked him ‘are you glad to be back in uniform?’ and he 
said to me ‘yes’, and I said ‘does it make any difference at meetings?’ and 
he said ‘yes it allows the civilians to know who they’re working for’ (Shaw, 
2010p). 
The existence of cultural tension shown in the above example, from a Senior 
Executive Officer (SEO) civil servant working in Operating Centre C.  The view 
expressed here, of the civil servants serving the military rather than everyone 
working together as one team, indicates the existence of several themes that 
appeared within DE&S where the use of uniform and dress to achieve and/or 
manipulate outcome or feeling was felt to be legitimate.  It also reinforces the 
concept of commitment to the lads and lasses on the front line, but the 
reinforcement here comes from the military, because the military individual 
believes that that they are in charge.   
The following respondent, a 1* Naval Officer, provides a contrasting view of the 
usefulness of the difference between the civil service and the military, in this case 
the Royal Navy.   
  ‘And therefore the fact that I happen to be in uniform, in some respects, 
helps me to do DE&S’s job a bit better.  In a couple of instances, possibly 
less so…’ (Shaw, 2011h).    
They showed how the uniform could be used to achieve a purpose when meeting 
with people who did not wear the same uniform, by creating a visible difference 
that appeared to enable power to be shown and also to enable, for example, civil 
servants to be reminded of the ‘front-line’.   
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4.3.9  Dress and Uniform: Expressing Underlying Discontent 
Finding: Dress and uniform were used as a proxy to express discontent 
about changes in terms and conditions in the British Army, with the blame 
for those changes being attributed to civil servants. 
In relation to the context of forced identity changes, the uniform changes that 
occurred within the British Army during the research period were also pertinent.  
The researcher had observed that British Army personnel, who were permanently 
based in Abbeywood, changed their style of uniforms.   
‘They came back into the neighbourhood as a group, they had obviously 
been to a meeting, but they were all smart, wearing a uniform that the 
researcher had not seen before: smart trousers, a jumper, and stable belt.  
They were not in MTP46 or C95. They were all the same except for one 
male, who instead of shoes, was wearing open-toed sandals and no socks’ 
(Shaw, 2013n). 
Prior to this date, in summer 2013 the majority of the British Army staff at 
Abbeywood normally wore Combat 95 (C95) uniform, normal day wear for Army 
personnel, or No 2 uniform, or on special occasions, their Dress Uniform.  C 95 
was known by those who wore it, and some that did not, as pyjamas, and, if not 
in the British army, the people that wore them were likely to be called cabbages.  
At this point in time, it appeared that the British Army personnel who were 
stationed at Abbeywood changed to a new form of dress, wearing khaki barrack 
dress trousers, and the khaki shirt from No. 2 dress with a coloured pullover of 
an authorised regimental pattern and a stable belt.   
A Lieutenant Colonel in Operating Centre D provided the first answer to the 
question, ‘Why had the Army changed uniform in Abbeywood?’  His response 
was enlightening, starting with, ‘it (the old uniform) was more comfortable’ and 
                                            
46  MTP = Multi Terrain Pattern. 
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was a ‘cost saving’ even though ‘you need to iron it more’, he then added that ‘it 
was because of a civil servant in the Have Your Say Survey,47 or asking a board 
question, saying they didn’t like the military wearing uniforms in the office, 
because it was intimidating’ (Shaw, 2013q).  These statements appeared to be 
contradictory, because the justification for wearing C95 was that it was more 
comfortable for the Army, but the civilians did not like to see a uniform being worn 
in the office.  This conflation of pragmatism and negative social categorisation 
required investigation.  A civil servant who worked in a British Army Project Team, 
and so was more embedded in the DE&S British Army sub-culture than was the 
researcher,  provided comments that supported the first response but from a 
different perspective, from the civil service, and with the one addition ‘they [the 
military] always blame the Civil Servants’ (Shaw, 2013o).   
The comments made by the Lt Colonel appear to show a construction of 
otherness in relation to dress between military group members, in this case the 
British Army and civil servants who worked alongside the military.   
The British Army appear to view themselves in a positive light, and civil servants 
as a negative one.  According to the Lt Colonel, the Civil Service as a whole, 
rather than simply a specific person, did not like the use of a particular identity 
signifier, the uniform.  That statement was then used as justification of the reason 
that the whole Army dress had to change, surely this was not right?  
Pragmatically, in a process-based hierarchical organisation such as the MOD, 
the change must have been mandated from the Defence Board. (MOD, 2015e).   
The changes that were observed to the uniform were made as a result of the 
Future Army Dress Programme.  In this instance, the discontent associated with 
a change in uniform had been used as a proxy for the expression of discontent 
about changes to terms and conditions and redundancies throughout the Army 
structure (Shaw, 2013p).  This adds to the weight of evidence, that in DE&S 
                                            
47 The Annual employee engagement and satisfaction survey. 
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uniform and identity could reinforce groups and their boundaries and also cause 
division between the groups that may have acted against the central ethos of 
DE&S.   
Section 4.3. has presented a traditional, pragmatic and symbolic view of identity 
within DE&S.  It has shown that these manifestations of identity enabled the 
legitimisation of social categorisation within groups and by DE&S and that 
embedded categorisation, therefore, formed an element of legitimised group 
distinctiveness which affected group behaviour in DE&S during the research 
period.   
Section 4.4 reports the geographical identity and the symbolic and pragmatic 
marking of territory in DE&S.   
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4.4 Geographical Identity – Marking Territory  
Finding: Territorial identity marking follows the group size hierarchy in 
DE&S, from organisational space to personal space via a series of symbolic 
and pragmatic markers and behaviours. 
Within DE&S, it was observed that group identity could be geographically defined.  
There was a hierarchy to this stratification which mirrored the group sizes and 
groups within DE&S.  Because of the nature of geographic identity in DE&S, 
photo-ethnography was a useful tool to capture and show some of the 
manifestations of geographic identity and group distinctiveness.   
Section 4.4 presents examples of the formal and informal geographic identity 
marking mechanisms within DE&S, from outside the physical architecture of 
Abbeywood, across two Operating Centres, Operating Centre D and Operating 
Centre E and finishing at a person’s personal space, their desk.  
Photograph 4-9 shows the entrance at Abbeywood, which was at the front of the 
site and was approached from a road which is an open transitory space.   
 
Photograph 4-9 DE&S Abbeywood 
Source: MOD (2015b) 
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On approaching the site, the external boundaries were visually apparent: the 
decorative white painted low fence, not visible in this photograph, and the lake.  
This makes it more discrete, creating a softer manifestation of the other, which 
was reinforced visually by the apparatus and personnel of security, observing and 
managing the boundary.   
The buildings are distinctive, as was the lake, called in the vernacular, ‘the 
moat’.48  These symbols represent identity boundaries between those inside the 
boundary and those who remain outside.  The existence of the lake, or the ‘moat’ 
enabled some DE&S staff, who were not located at Abbeywood, to call 
Abbeywood ‘Fantasy Island’ (Shaw, 2013b) or ‘Tracey Island’ (Shaw, 2015d) thus 
expressing a negative stereotype group identity, and also confirming the concept 
of architecture creating and affecting group identity, see for example the findings 
of Abel and others, Abel (2010), Vellinga (2007), Wegerhoff (2008), Van 
Marrewijk and Yanow (2010), Van Marrewijk (2009).   
The ‘moat’ thus appears to perform as a physical, psychological, and potentially 
pejorative boundary.  The lake performs several functions: some decorative, 
some ecological, some security based, but all are boundary functions.  The lake 
drains water from the site, provides habitat for wild birds and also provides a 
setting for staff to relax in when they are not being desk jockeys.49  It also acts as 
a frame to set off the architecture of the site, and as a security feature for this 
very publicly visible side of the site.   
Looking like a castle, the architecture of the buildings appears defensive and 
shows how modern architecture can be used to create the idea that the occupants 
need to protect themselves from attack.  It also acts as a mechanism of 
categorisation, as anyone not in the castle is, by necessity, an outsider.  It 
projects a sense of aloofness and, by extension, insiders are cut off from the 
                                            
48 Not visible in this photo are the DE&S flag and the Union Flag and there is also a separate flag pole on 
which other flags are flown to mark special occasions. 
49 A pejorative term, often associated with the RAF, given to people who ‘fly’ a desk, rather than aircraft  
(where they might be called ‘desk jockeys’). 
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outside world, thus symbolising the boundary between the MOD and everyone 
else.  The buildings might also be viewed as a symbol of pride, confidence and 
arrogance, harking back to a time of historic conflict and signifying a pride in 
Britain’s historic past.  This, then, is a visible and multi-sensory boundary between 
those who are permitted to cross it, and those who are not.     
As with many symbolic boundaries, the lake has many myths and in-jokes that 
are associated with it.  The following was attributed to a new member of the DPA50 
when they were receiving their initial tour of the site:  ‘Is that where you keep the 
submarines then?’  This was then assimilated and embellished within the folklore 
of the site.  It is still used as a boundary maintenance mechanism between old 
and new members of the site, being used to wind up new members: ‘That’s where 
we keep the submarines, there is a tunnel to the Bristol Channel’.   
In order to legitimately breach this physical boundary between the outside and 
the inside, certain conditions must be met.  The person must be invited or already 
be a member of ‘Team Defence’ to pass through.  This is a physical boundary 
that controls access which is stratified depending on the person’s security 
clearance.   
These levels of security clearance may be called by this thesis, access or 
permissive identities, depending on the person’s position in that security 
hierarchy, because they would be subject to pragmatic boundaries: for example, 
they would be unable to access certain areas.  These security boundaries are 
also marked by physical and pragmatic symbols, such as personnel being given 
different coloured passes or lanyards depending on their hierarchical place.  A 
visitor would also cross linguistic boundaries as they entered the site where open 
and free-flowing language changes to the guarded, indoctrinated and closed 
language that is used within secure groups.  
                                            
50 Defence Procurement Agency. 
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The concept of geographic identity was also expressed similarly in non-
Abbeywood locations, as shown in the following example from a B1 grade 
Commercial Officer: 
‘…You know that typical depot type mentality that generations were there 
for 30, 40 years and they felt safe and they felt actually quite wedded to, 
not to the organisation, but to the depot, it’s funny it was a local thing, you 
felt very wedded to the depot’ (Shaw, 2011t). 
Geographic identity appeared to have a link to both stability of being in one place 
for a length of time and also group size, because the depot is smaller than the 
organisation.  This indicates that geographic identity appears to have similarities 
to other forms of identity in that it appeared to be expressed more strongly 
towards smaller groups that may be called teams, rather than larger groups that 
may be called organisations.   
Moving inside the physical boundary of DE&S into the Operating Centre 
hierarchy, there were located models of equipment such as that seen in 
Operating Centre D, where an inert model of a Stormshadow™ Missile was 
located, see Photograph 4-10 Stormshadow™.   
 
Photograph 4-10 Stormshadow™  
Source: Andrew Linnet, Crown Copyright. 
This artefact was temporally current, in that it was a weapon that was in service 
with the RAF at the time that the photograph was taken.  The location of this 
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artefact was within the neighbourhood of this Operating Centre in the main 
walkway from a car park onto the main site.  This may, therefore, be interpreted 
as being a gate guardian as it marked part of that Operating Centre, in a space 
that was both transitional and boundary.   
It may also be interpreted pragmatically as being placed there because it was too 
large to go elsewhere (Shaw, 2014r). The placement of this artefact signalled to 
other group members that they were entering an area which was owned by that 
Operating Centre.   
Boundary changes could also signify linguistic changes.  Past this particular 
boundary the language was a specific functional dialect, that of Weapons.  This 
weapons dialect was coloured by the main language of civil service 
bureaucratese, with flavourings of each of the military and functional languages 
depending on the project team, but it remained distinct from the language of other 
areas, such as Ships, or Submarines.  These dialect differences produced 
boundaries within this Operating Centre and also produced boundaries that 
people outside may have had difficulty negotiating, because they used a different 
dialect.  Language is discussed in section 4.7 
It was not only current identities that were considered to be important.  Historical 
identities, aligned with pride and loyalty ran very deep within DE&S, its members 
and those of the precursor organisations.  In Operating Centre D, at its entrance, 
was a wall display of historical swords and flint and match lock pistols and 
carbines. Photograph 4-11, shows these artefacts that were not contemporary, 
but which were historically symbolic.   
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Photograph 4-11 Swords Pistols and Cutlasses Mark Territory  
Source: Andrew Linnet, Crown Copyright 
These artefacts signalled to visitors that the group has been involved in 
successful warfare for a long time, because they were historical and symbolic, 
rather than temporally current.   
They were not located in full view of any member of DE&S, but were only in view 
of those who had reason to either visit or pass through that floor area, which in 
this case was an open area on level 1 of the neighbourhood.  This shows how 
symbolic marking of territory occurred on many levels, some of which were not 
immediately visible to any visitor, or indeed staff member. This was again a 
transitional, boundary space, but at a lower organisational level, that of the 
Project Team, rather than the Operating Centre, where Stormshadow™ resides.   
Regular visitors that passed through this area could also include members of 
Operating Centre E who worked in an adjoining neighbourhood, but the symbols 
marked the entrance to the Operating Centre D floorplate, thus reinforcing a 
different layer of group geographical identity, that of the Project Team.   
So far the artefacts shown that have been located in public areas within the 
geographical boundary of Operating D in Abbeywood.  Territory was also marked 
within closed areas of DE&S.  For example, in one meeting room that was located 
in Operating Centre D had on one wall a board that bore all the coats of arms of 
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the individual services that historically comprised the Masters of Ordnance.  This 
can be seen in Photograph 4-12 History Marking Meeting Rooms as Territory.   
 
 
Photograph 4-12 History Marking Meeting Rooms as Territory 
Source: Andrew Linnet, Crown Copyright 
The Ordnance Board has a long history, being extant in some form since the time 
of Henry V, taking on the name of ‘The Ordnance Board’ after the Boer War.  On 
being subsumed into the MOD, it became the Defence Ordnance Safety Group.   
The artefact displays the symbols of the combined services ordnance 
organisations that comprised the Ordnance Board and which had been moved 
from other sites to Abbeywood.  This artefact, like many others had been 
preserved and moved from site to site on the many geographical moves that have 
accompanied organisational changes, in what can broadly be called defence 
acquisition.  The meeting room that this artefact was displayed in was called the 
OB, or Ordnance Board Room.  Also in this room was a daguerreotype etching 
of Lord Wellesley (The Duke of Wellington) with a piece of card attached to it that 
had his signature on it (Shaw, 2014j).   
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There were also, next to the OB room, the CINO room, named for the Chief 
Inspector of Naval Ordnance, and nearby, the Australia room, named because of 
the formal secondments that took place with the Australian Defence Force within 
this group (Shaw, 2007-2010).   
Historical artefacts thus served to give group territorial legitimacy, both physically 
and symbolically, they also provided more examples of the symbolic, linguistic, 
and cultural boundaries that existed between groups.  These artefacts being 
historically significant were likely to colour the attachment of group members to, 
and also their strength of identity with, their function and their purpose to support 
‘the lads and lasses on the front line’.  While these items appeared to issue a 
symbolic challenge to visitors, they also acted as re-assurance to in-group 
members by demonstrating that they were part of a historically and functionally 
significant, and culturally bonded group.  The Defence Ordnance Safety Group 
(DOSG) also possessed its own language, both functionally and historically.  The 
DOSG dialect was informed by the MOD language, the language of each of the 
military services, by history, and also by the socio-technical language of 
explosives, ordnance, chemistry, and ballistics.   
These characteristics, combined with the nature of the work that this group 
performed, provided a barrier to other groups interacting with this group except 
at specific, managed interactions.  Group members, however, did not appear to 
consciously notice the links between the historical and the temporally current 
because they were apparently inured to them.  It was part of their everyday life, 
they were living within the framework of symbols, and so not actually seeing it.   
A further example of territory marking was observed in Operating Centre E which 
was a maritime Operating Centre.  On the wall and at the entrance to this 
Operating Centre was a series of ships insignia.   
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Photograph 4-13 Ships Insignia Marking Territory In A Public/Private Space  
Source: Andrew Linnet, Crown Copyright 
These marked both vessels that had been built but also those that were 
supported by this group.  The insignia were located on a wall in a semi-public 
area of the neighbourhood where Operating Centre E was located, in the same 
way as the artefacts that were displayed in Photograph 4-11.  Both collections of 
artefacts marked the territory of ‘their’ group, and both appear to show how group 
distinctiveness was manifested in DE&S.   
Role and Delivery Team identity and boundaries were manifest in Operating 
Centre E through the use of other physical artefacts and show how, in a private 
Role Team space, specific examples of some of the role functions of that group 
can be used to mark territory.  Further examples of how territory was marked are 
the copper diving helmet, (see Photograph 4-14) and also the modern SCUBA 
(Self Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus) diving equipment shown in 
Photograph 4-15. 
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Photograph 4-14 and Photograph  4-15 Floor-plate Geographical Identity in 
Operating Centre E  
Source: Andrew Linnet, Crown Copyright 
Group members not only referred back to these historical identities nostalgically, 
for example, things were better/worse then, but also they were supporting 
equipment that appeared to be constructed through that historical identity.  This 
level of identification with the equipment also occurred even if they themselves 
were not part of that original group.   
It appears then, that at Operating Centre level and below, each group would have 
their own gate guardians of equipment that marked the boundary to that 
Operating Centre, Neighbourhood, or floor-plate.  Thus, geographic identity 
manifested as territory marking appeared to be a significant contributory factor to 
group distinctiveness and the production of group identities and boundaries.   
The formal geographical identities that were identified were highly visible and 
were protected by formal and informal territory-marking within DE&S.  Their visual 
presentation was legitimised and protected through the DE&S corporate branding 
policy (DE&S, 2012).   
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Geographic identity was also legitimised through the use of symbols and 
artefacts, such as ship’s insignia, as seen in Photograph 4-13.   
Context and function specific posters that related specifically to the role that was 
carried out by the team in that particular location(Shaw, 2013b), were also seen.  
These artefacts were often formally legitimised and could also possess 
organisational and personal historical significance.   
‘These were my desks, this was our area.  And we have the signs up and 
we have little colour coded desks so that if you’re going to do a job for 
somebody else you go and sit on a blue desk or a yellow desk or a green 
desk and we’re yellow, so you look round if you haven’t got a desk in the 
morning because you know you can go and sit on a yellow desk, because 
that’s your team, so I think the big differentiation at the moment, for us, 
was the territory’ (Shaw, 2011l).   
The existence of these physical, symbolic, and linguistic boundaries therefore 
suggests that it could be difficult to negotiate the visible coded boundaries unless 
one was in possession of and understood the code.   
The pattern of boundary marking shown so far was continued within other 
Operating Centres, for example, the display of Flags and Aircraft models in 
Operating Centre I, suggesting that territory and boundary marking was part of 
the overall culture of DE&S.   
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4.4.1  Desk booking – ‘Get Orf Moi Land…!’ 
Finding: Geographic identity extended to the personal desk level in addition 
to being an organisational or team behaviour. 
At DE&S Abbeywood, in order to make more efficient use of the desk resources 
that were available, DE&S operated a flexi-desk, desk booking policy which 
operated in parallel with a clear desk policy.  The flexi-desk system, however, 
meant that all desks were labelled as a corporate resource and did not ‘belong’ 
to any one person, unless there were reasons of disability for a member having, 
for example, a raised desk (Shaw, 2013b).  The personal territory of the desk was 
the last, and the most local, element of a group member’s work life that they felt 
they had any power over.  This led to a greater use of defence mechanisms of 
territory protection rather than engendering a more corporate, desk sharing 
attitude.   
In terms of geographic identity, there were a series of behaviours that surrounded 
the booking of desks and the ensuing territory maintenance.   
At a group level, the allocation of desks was delegated from the corporate DE&S 
to the Operating Centre via the provision and use of a corporate desk booking 
system (MOD, 2014a).  Further delegation was made to the level of the SCS 1*, 
who were responsible for the tactical operation of the system and the allocation 
of desks to staff within their area.  A yet further level of delegation was achieved 
through the Team Leaders (B1 grade civil servants or their military equivalent) 
having the power to allocate desks locally and manage the system to suit their 
needs, and to create local identities, as one of them said:   
‘   although it’s flexible workspace and you’ve got to book your desk, again, 
and I suspect most people have done it, I’ve allocated areas which were 
primarily team areas and so the team have to manage the fact that they’ve 
got less desks than people but it’s team space.  It doesn’t mean other 
people can’t book the desks, but broadly speaking if I want to find a 
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Commercial Officer they’re all sitting in the same place.  So you know, 
creating those identities I think was important for the team, it’s also 
important for people to know where to go to find people and it’s quite 
interesting just walking into the new building,51 the signage was not 
particularly good and that’ll be one of our biggest challenges.  So it’ll be 
interesting to see how that evolves’ (Shaw, 2011r). 
In addition Project Team Leaders were able to exercise a degree of local control 
over the resource of desks and territory by, for example, putting a percentage of 
the desks that fell within their geographical area into ‘maintenance’.  This meant 
that those desks were not available on the corporate system to be booked by 
other people.   
This action reduced the number of desks available for flexible booking, reducing 
the territory available for corporate use, and producing a more defined territorial 
boundary and team space.  This behaviour became obvious (Shaw, 2013b) when 
there was an attempt in Operating Centre D to make better use of the floor space, 
and also to reduce the numbers of ‘spare’ desks that teams appeared to have.  
During this work Team Leaders would make representations via their 1* leader in 
order to circumvent the process, and to make sure they got more seats than other 
Team Leaders:   
‘   You’ve got the hierarchy.  The 1*s want their team around them and I 
will give you an example at the moment.  We have a 1* who wanted a 
corner desk, so he was given a corner desk, but because of the way the 
floor-plate was designed, his team was sitting the other side of the corridor.  
We moved up here exactly a month ago, exactly four weeks ago, he had 
decided in the last week he doesn’t like to be apart from his team, so they 
were taking two desks over the other side of the corridor so he can sit with 
his team.  Now we’re not even talking about people working from home 
                                            
51 Corsham. 
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here, we’re talking about the other side of a corridor.  So you have the 
hierarchy that our 1*s were still in the mind-set ‘this was my team’, I have 
to have them around us and then you have the need for teams to be 
together, you get the little huddles happening together and therefore, 
….We’re all security cleared, we all work for the common aim of being the 
outer office, but there’s almost the need to keep a stamp on the area so I 
think the problems originate from the senior management and a need to 
keep their teams together, but it’s perpetuated at team level’ (Shaw, 
2011l). 
The above response is from a C2 grade civil servant in Operating Centre B and 
indicates a concept of management by line of Sight.  Management by line of sight 
is a term that is used in DE&S to indicate that managers may only feel that they 
can manage effectively employees that they can see. If they cannot see them 
then the manager may feel that the employee is not working, and also that they 
are unable to manage them.   
The deviation by staff members from the accepted use of the official desk-booking 
system produced several effects. For example, some staff felt as though they 
were not valued or wanted by DE&S or their team, or people were more difficult 
to find by staff walking onto a floor-plate, because they usually sit there, but they 
aren’t there today (Shaw, 2014p).  Because people might not be in their usual 
place this dislocation appeared to produce frictional costs through time wasted 
looking for people.52  
There also appeared to be an emotional cost associated with this dislocation, 
because people were tired of constantly searching for people, so instead of face 
to face conversations, they resorted to email conversations or booking time with 
other people, thereby formalising what would be informal conversation and using 
more time to do it (Shaw, 2014j). DE&S did not appear to recognise these costs, 
                                            
52 Talk to the board question 1405-003. 
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which appeared to increase the tension between the staff who had to hunt for 
desks, and those senior managers who did not.  Thus, the socio-cultural and 
informal was being overwhelmed by the socio-technical, making what should 
have been a quick and easy interaction, difficult and long winded. 
An additional effect was that instead of flexible working across the floor-plate 
producing more serendipitous conversations, it actually had the opposite effect, 
because when a stranger sat in a different group area, the conversations 
appeared to become more closed, with language being more guarded. (Shaw, 
2013b).  
‘    When there was somebody who doesn’t work in your team in the area 
the conversations drop an octave and they’ll happen at the desk.  If 
somebody’s [from outside] sitting in desk A, they’ll huddle around desk G, 
so that there’s that little gap between them’. (Shaw, 2011l).   
This change in language occurred because ‘the visitor’ might not be supposed to 
hear those conversations, because although they might be in the same Operating 
Centre, or a close Project Team, they were in a different group. Although this 
different group might not be competitors, they were still different and it appeared 
that they feared that the information that may have been overheard might be used 
to strengthen or weaken the home group’s position.   
This change in conversation appears to indicate that people wanted to be in 
groups that they trusted and were familiar with.  The groups therefore appeared 
to close ranks, to anyone who they did not know, even if the person in that seat 
might be from the same Operating Centre.  
Therefore, the implementation of flexible-desking appeared to affect employees 
more negatively than positively, even though it was deemed to be a success for 
the corporate DE&S, because it meant that more people could be squeezed onto 
the floorplates, gaining greater efficiency.    
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There was another downside to the greater number of people on site, as the 
carparks were not sufficiently large to accommodate all of the staff.  A car parking 
pass system was introduced that was based on how far away from Abbeywood 
the person lived, with people within a certain distance not being able to bring cars 
onto site unless there was a special reason:  
‘The parking issues and all those sorts of things, the poor guys who live 
within three miles who have to cycle to work, in this weather?  But  you 
know, the two ladies who are our clerks they wouldn’t dream of walking or 
cycling three miles to work, but yet they can’t have a car pass’ (Shaw, 
2011w).  
This response, from an RAF Squadron Leader, indicates that the military were 
well aware of the pressures on the civil servants on the site, even though they 
were not affected.  It seems that military personnel may have been sympathetic 
to the civil servants who had to put up with these decisions on reducing desks 
and car parking spaces, and who did not get special privileges.  Also that DE&S, 
was, with the introduction of car-park passes that discriminated by distance from 
the site, creating more boundaries between staff.   
The trajectory of geographical identity, or territory marking, continued to the 
personal desk level, where identity could be marked either formally or informally.  
This was exacerbated by the DE&S policy of not allocating a permanent desk to 
a person unless they had a formal reason, or they were above 1* rank.   
The following response from a Naval Warrant Officer, while blunt, encapsulates 
both the intent and also the effect of exercising geographic identity:   
 ‘…it’s not quite pissing on your territory like a cat, but it serves the same 
purpose’ (Shaw, 2011h).   
Informal territory marking was achieved by staff leaving their frou frous, sports 
clothing or personal effects on their desks this behaviour appeared to be 
predominantly exclusionary in nature.  The following example makes explicit the 
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unsaid reason for marking territory in DE&S which was that it was for the 
protection of personal space. This example occurred in Operating Centre D and 
is shown in Photograph 4-16   demonstrating how furry toys, trolls, or other items 
were used to mark personal territory.   
   
Photograph 4-16 Desks and Frou Frous  
Source Derek Shaw 
Also shown in the top left hand corner of  is how the Director, an SCS 2*, marked 
their territory, with an engineering cut-away missile, soft seats and book cases, 
chiming with Weir and the concept of the Diwan, Weir et al. (2010).  This whole 
issue was captured by one informant who said: 
 ‘…When [ this person] was on leave or otherwise away from their desk on 
a longer term basis, these ‘frou frous were put away in a cupboard, but 
when they were there, the message was clear, ‘Bugger off, this is my 
space, leave it alone…’(Shaw, 2013r). 
It was also apparent at this point that there appeared to be a gender divide in 
personal territory marking.  Female territory was more often marked by cuddly 
toys or cats, whereas male territory was more often marked by engineering 
models, or by sportswear being draped over the back of a seat (Shaw, 2013u).   
There was also the more unpleasant ‘dirty keyboard’ method of territory marking, 
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where a computer keyboard would be left un-cleaned, so that other people would 
not want to use it (Shaw, 2013u).  
This personal territory marking behaviour appears to indicate that there was a 
tension between the socio-technical organisational rules of the DE&S corporate 
desk-booking and clear desk policy that staff were supposed to follow, and the 
socio-cultural norms of group behaviour and the human need for territory, which 
resulted in some staff circumventing those rules.  The marking of personal 
territory may have become a cultural norm within those groups.53  The fact that 
this socio-cultural behaviour was allowed to override the following of corporate 
processes is indicative of several things.  Firstly, that the leaders of this group, 
could, if they wanted to, enforce the organisational rules, but in reality, they did 
not.  They allowed the socio-cultural norm to prevail. Secondly, it shows the 
strength of the socio-cultural and how that can over-ride and subvert the socio-
technical, leading to potential frictions between groups and group members.  This 
tension was exacerbated by the implementation of a ‘flexible-desk’ policy.   
4.4.2 Protection of Territory  
Finding: lack of desk space and inequitable treatment of staff could lead to 
super-competitive behaviours between staff over desks and also to a level 
of staff dis-engagement over not having a desk. 
It was observed that in three Operating Centres; C, D and F, the desk booking 
system, as a representation of geographic identity, had led to super competitive 
behaviours, also even occasionally to physical violence between people (Shaw, 
2013l).  These behaviours appeared to be caused by a socio-technical process 
conflicting with the socio-cultural and emotional needs of stability and territory.  
                                            
53 It was noted in October 2014 that in the Directors ‘State of the Nation presentation, that one slide 
concentrated on vox pops of staff member’s view of the desk booking system and the behaviours that 
were associated with it.  Those comments corroborated the findings of this research within that 
Operating Centre. 
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In Operating Centre C, civil service staff were expected to give up their desks to 
contractors.  The following incidents were provided by a C1 grade civil servant in 
Operating Centre C: 
‘No desk with my team in NH1 [Neighbourhood] so have a desk in NH2              
[Neighbourhood] with what remains of [another Delivery Team]. [I am] 
thoroughly pissed off with the lack of desks and IT in our team………so 
spent a really lovely day in the sunshine on the beach’ (Shaw, 2013l). 
‘… Nearly saw evidence of violence on the floor-plate today!!  I [the 
conversation initiator] swore and was going to belt a consultant for using 
two desks when one of our guys had no desk.  Turned out to be one of our 
own military burks, (sic) a Major, who had moved onto our floor-plate and 
believes that his desks were sacrosanct!’ (Shaw, 2013l). 
 ‘Ah the luxury of a regular desk. I have been told that I am too often absent 
from the floor-plate but no-one gives a [….] about civvies having desks as 
we have to give them up for the consultants!  Working in a team had  gone 
by the board as everyone had  the consultancy attitude of ‘looking after 
number one’ even to the extent of unbooking a desk and not telling fellow 
team members that they were available…’. (Shaw, 2013l). 
The prioritisation of desks for contractors and consultants occurred because this 
particular team had explicitly stated as policy that it was easier for civil servants 
to find a desk on another floor-plate and that it was generally not acceptable to 
have contractors and consultants sitting amongst other teams.   
As a result of this, and after some incidents in which staff left the building (Shaw, 
2013l) when there was no desk available, staff in Operating Centre C were 
reminded that it was not acceptable for anyone to decide to take a day’s leave or 
to refuse to work if no desk was available (Shaw, 2013l).  This example from 
Operating Centre C was the third example of these super competitive behaviours 
that were witnessed by the researcher.   
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Super competitive behaviours were also observed in Operating Centre F.  In one 
instance two civil servants appeared to have been able to book the same desk 
and an argument ensued, until one of the two was offered another desk (Shaw, 
2014q).  In Operating Centre D another incident was observed that was similar 
to that in Operating Centre F, where two people said that they had booked the 
same desk.  In this instance while one person had occupied the desk, because 
they had arrived early and had started to work, but was temporarily away from it, 
the second person came in and switched off the computer, and had started to 
move the other person’s possessions away from the desk when the first person 
came back (Shaw, 2014q)   
If these behaviours were observed to have been happening in three Operating 
Centres in DE&S at that time, there may have been other, un-reported instances 
in other Operating Centres.  In any case, conflicts like these over desks following 
the introduction of flexi-desking indicates an underlying tension between the 
socio-technical rules of DE&S, the needing to book a desk, and the socio-cultural.  
This tension appeared naturally to lead to understandable conflict.   
In Operating Centre E, a Squadron Leader encapsulated the human effect of 
flexible desking from a military point of view:   
‘   It’s the desk sharing.  The fact that I’m quite happy with desk sharing, it 
makes sense to me the system works, if everybody had to use it, but when 
you come in and the majority of the civil servants have all got their pictures 
up and their frou frous on their desk and they’ve booked their desk for eight 
weeks solid and then they don’t come in for two or three days without 
thinking to ring up and say ‘oh my desk was free’ or unbooking it before 
they go.  Also there was one individual who it doesn’t matter who has 
booked his desk will come in early and sit at his desk and refuse to move 
and that’s allowed, the team leader was not gripping it.  No you’re actually 
affecting people’s daily lives and why am I going to bother coming to work 
if I’m going to have the aggravation?’ (Shaw, 2011w). 
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4.4.3 Summary  
Section 4.4 has shown some of the ways that personal, social and geographic 
identity are manifested in DE&S.  These manifestations support the framework of 
group distinctiveness and the existence of hidden cultural and behavioural 
boundaries between groups.  This in turn led to the retention of group cultures 
which appeared to work against the socio-technical cultural rules of DE&S.   
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4.5 Strength of Identity 
4.5.1 Identity Axes in DE&S 
Finding: identity was expressed along two axes in DE&S, that of identifying 
with DE&S and also identifying with the concept of the Role Team and the 
front-line.  Also even though there was no clear view of one identity being 
stronger than another across all grades, it appeared that the strength of 
identity with the front-line was stronger than was identification with DE&S.   
Identity, its strength and manifestation, was one of the original themes of this 
thesis.  Identity was investigated as a concept through the manifestation of 
personal, social, and geographic identity.  Strength of identity was tested along 
two axes that were apparent in the vernacular speech of members of DE&S, one 
axis being the relationship between the group member and their Role Team and 
the ‘front-line’, and the other, the strength with which group members identified 
with DE&S.   
Graph 4-1 shows the strength of identity as reported by respondents in relation 
to their commitment to their Role Team and the front line.  Academically and 
pragmatically the Role Team and the front line are obviously separate constructs, 
but respondents in fact appear to view them as the same construct, but one that 
exists as two ends of a continuum, in other words the front –line appeared to be 
an extension of their identity in DE&S.   
Therefore, the research measured the strength of identity of respondents to that 
joint concept.  The grades are labelled as shown in Graph 4-1.  Responses were 
ranked on a Likert scale of 1-6 (Bernard, 2006).  On the scale that is used within 
these graphs, 1 indicates that the respondent identified very strongly, with the 
target concept and 6 indicates that they identified very weakly with the target 
concept. 
 201 
 
 
There were 87 responses to this question from a total research population of 124. 
Numbers of each grade that took part were shown in Table 3-1. 
54 
Graph 4-1 Strength of Identification by Grade with the Role Team and the Front 
Line 
Source  Derek Shaw 
Legend : Horizontal Axis denotes broader banded grade respondents. 
SCS=Senior Civil Service, B=Grade 6 and 7 staff (B1 and B2), C=HEO and SEO 
grade staff (C1 and C2), AA=D and E grade staff.  All bands include military 
equivalent grades.  
Vertical axis denotes % response against Likert scale score 
The light blue areas in Graph 4-1 correspond to ‘strongly identify with’ and are 
seen at the top of the bars.  The strength of identity is represented on the scale 
with 1 being strongly identify with, and 6 being weakly identify with the target 
group, shown at the bottom of the bars.   
 
                                            
54 Statistical advice provided by Guy Robinson BSc, Maths, First Class Honours 2014. 
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Explanation of Graph 4-1 
Graph 4-1 appears to show that there is broadly a strong agreement in the 
professed strength of identification of broader banded SCS and senior military 
staff with their role team and the front line.  It also shows that B2 and B1 grade 
civil servants and military equivalents appeared to be ambivalent in their strength 
of identity in their responses.  Whilst many at this grade identified very strongly 
with their role and the front line, more respondents were either neutral or 
negatively identified with their Role Team and or the front line.  On the other hand 
it shows that C1 and C2 grade civil servants and their military equivalents 
appeared to be more likely to identify very strongly with their Role Team and/or 
the ‘front line’.   
This differentiation is even more clearly seen in the responses given by D and E 
grades, where there is little ambiguity.  Of those that responded, the strongest 
identification to the Role Team and to the front line, corresponded to the civil 
service grades D and E,55 and also to substantive 1* to 2*.  Taking account of nil 
responses, these grades identified very strongly and consistently with their Role 
Teams and to the front line.   
When asked the same question, but in relation to DE&S, the picture changes.   
                                            
55 Administrative to Senior Executive Officer. 
 203 
 
 
 
Graph  4-2 Strength of Identification with DE&S 
Source: Derek Shaw 
Legend : Horizontal Axis denotes broader banded grade respondents. 
SCS=Senior Civil Service, B=Grade 6 and 7 staff (B1 and B2), C=HEO and 
SEO grade staff (C1 and C2), AA=D and E grade staff.  All bands include 
military equivalent grades.  
Vertical axis denotes % response against Likert scale score. The light blue 
areas in Graph 4-2 correspond to ‘strongly identify with’ and are seen at the top 
of the bars.  The strength of identity is represented on the scale with 1 being 
strongly identify with, and 6 being weakly identify with the target group, shown at 
the bottom of the bars.   
There were 87 responses to this question from a total research population of 124. 
Numbers of each grade that took part were shown in Table 3-1. 
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Explanation of Graph 4-2 
Graph 4-2 shows that the SCS and B2 and B1 grade respondents and military 
equivalents appeared to be more neutral or negative in their strength of 
identification with DE&S; C1 and C2 grade civil servants and military equivalents 
appeared to be strongly negative towards DE&S.   
Grade D and E grade civil servants and military equivalents appeared to be 
evenly split between those who identified strongly with DE&S, those who were 
neutral and those who identified weakly, or negatively with DE&S.  This finding, 
when placed alongside the findings of the high levels of identification with the 
Role Team, and the low levels of identification with DE&S, indicated that there 
was a hierarchy of identification that appeared aligned to group size.  It appears 
that employees below B2 grade appeared to not identify as strongly with DE&S, 
which was the larger group, as they did with their Role Team, which was the 
smaller group.  Also B2 and B1 grades and up to novice SCS 1* staff appeared 
to be more ambivalent in their identification with DE&S and also with their Role 
Team.  Some of the reasons for this split in the strength of identity appear to be 
illustrated through the following responses, firstly, a C1 civil servant: 
‘Front line every time,  MOD churns too regularly in my opinion for any 
person to identify with anything more than either the top table which 
doesn’t tend to churn very much, or the front line.  But the intermediate, 
the individual teams within DLO, DPA, DE&S they’re changing all the time 
I don’t identify with that very strongly at all’.  (Shaw, 2011h). 
This delamination of identity between employees, stakeholders and DE&S might 
have occurred as a result of the pressures that were placed on staff at those 
grades.  It might also have occurred because the employee was not comfortable 
moving into a stakeholder, functionally oriented role, and away from a task based 
role, for example: ‘selling your soul as a C1 to PPM (Programme and Project 
Management),(Shaw, 2007-2010) which appeared to be seen as negative, 
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whereas identifying primarily with ‘the front line’ was seen to be very powerful and 
positive.   
This was shown in the following example, where a higher degree of 
understanding and commitment to the front line was demonstrated than may have 
been otherwise expected:  
‘…But I very much still view my desktop as an extension of the battlefield.  
You know, I can’t be there in person, but I can influence and may be 
provide that bit of kit that helps them out’ . (Shaw, 2011g). 
The reasoning behind this response appears to be quite clear, the respondent 
was a C1 civil servant, but was ex-British Army.  At the time of the interview he 
was working in the team that supported the weapon that he had used when he 
was a serving soldier.  He had been in Iraq, serving as a fires controller, and 
therefore he understood the question that he was being asked as a project 
manager of the equipment, and also he could put himself in the place and the 
mind-set of the frontline personnel who were asking for help.  Identification with 
the front line for him was a given.   
This respondent gives an insight into what is discussed in section 6.2 as the ethos 
within DE&S.   
This ethos was also indicated within the nested identities that people possessed 
within DE&S and which appeared to be complementary, as opposed to being 
contradictory:   
‘…do I distinguish between DE&S and MOD?  I don’t.  I don’t know if that’s 
because my job occasionally takes me to main building, but also we are 
the cross-cutting part of the programme environment.  I can’t tell you that 
I identify with being a part of the DE&S; I’m a MOD, civil servant who 
happens to work within the DE&S and my identification with that [MOD] 
was actually very strong…’ (Shaw, 2011l).  
 206 
 
 
In terms of identification with a particular group in DE&S there appeared to be a 
hierarchy of identity and belonging to groups within a cultural framework that 
corresponds to Kirke’s concept of the ‘transferrable we’ (Kirke, 2007d).  This 
occurred even if some military personnel only grudgingly acknowledged their 
belonging to civilian based groups in DE&S.  It seems that they could also accept 
both identities as being pragmatic and non-contradictory.  The following 
respondent was a young Royal Naval Lieutenant:  
‘…That’s difficult for civilian colleagues to understand as well, a friend and 
colleague was heavily criticised for being too loyal to the Royal Navy above 
DE&S which was always going to be the case.  You’re never going to get 
us away from that.  In my mind, the two were not in conflict.  If I’m here 
doing a job for DE&S which was of benefit to the Royal Navy there’s no 
conflict in my mind of my loyalty lying with the Royal Navy’ (Shaw, 2011l). 
This linkage may be age, position, or personal-psychology related, because it 
appeared that within DE&S there was a more collaborative and less antagonistic 
view of group life among younger staff members than among old ones.  These 
were predominantly in their mid-twenties to mid-thirties, and had not been in the 
DPA or the DLO for any length of time, or if military had been in at least one 
posting in a joint environment, such as PJHQ.56  It appears then that belonging 
to a single culture, or of having multiple cultural identities, might not preclude 
group members from possessing nested identities that were non-contradictory.   
Belonging to different groups appeared to be no obstacle to bridging the different 
cultures within DE&S, in that it appeared to be possible for military personnel to 
identify with civilian groups and vice versa.  Military or ex-military personnel were 
the only ones to identify strongly or very strongly with the front line.  Civil servants 
could also identify strongly with it as well.  They could also identify with MOD, as 
                                            
56 Permanent Joint Headquarters, Northwood. 
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opposed to DE&S or their Role Team, because they saw themselves as civil 
servants being there to serve whoever asked them.   
‘For MOD, I would identify myself as very strongly.  For DE&S, I’m probably 
in the middle, because I’ve been with it from the start, and the role team, I 
identify less with’  (Shaw, 2011h).   
The fact that some C1 grades and below appeared to explicitly identify more 
strongly with DE&S or MOD, may be related to the respondent’s functional role. 
For example, if a respondent, such as the above C2 civil servant performed a 
corporate role, that was an indication that they may have been more likely to 
identify both with their Role Team and DE&S or MOD, with that identification not 
acting as an exclusive or contradictory factor.  But if a person, either military or 
civil service, did not have a DE&S corporate role they might identify less strongly 
with DE&S.   
The existence of nested identities in relation to the front line and also to Role 
Teams within DE&S was confirmed by a Royal Navy Lieutenant.  He identified 
with the Royal Navy and also with DE&S, and while in DE&S, had taken on the 
DE&S identity as a primary identity:  
‘…when I’m ever down in Portsmouth I’m...I don’t consider myself any part 
of Fleet, although I’m still Royal Navy, but I’m very much DE&S, so yes, 
reasonable.  Not the strongest, but yes, quite high, but in the right 
environment, I don’t think of myself as DE&S sitting here doing my normal 
day job.  Unless I’m on the phone actually, I mean I could be on the phone 
and it’ll switch.  I mean I was having discussions yesterday with FOST 
[Flag Officer Sea Training] about an issue I wanted to sort out and I was 
very much, not defending, but taking the part of DE&S’  (Shaw, 2011o). 
But this switching of identity appeared to only occur when speaking to the other 
group, and therefore the change in identity appeared occur in relation to that other 
group that he was also a member of: 
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‘.. In terms of tribal behaviours within the department it comes down to who 
was one’s allegiance to?  You see, because we’re not homogenous there 
can always be a doubt in one’s mind that if you were dealing with an Army 
officer or a civil servant or an RAF or Navy officer, and I guess those were 
the four tribes really that describe the department, we all like to think we’re 
joint.  But there’s always a suspicion that one’s loyalty was not to one’s 
line manager or to one’s jointness but to one’s service’  (Shaw, 2012h). 
Also, as was shown in the following example, the Team Leader was a Royal 
Naval Reserve Captain: 
‘The team leader presented me [the researcher] with two business cards, 
one had Royal Navy insignia and his rank on it, and history, super nominal 
and decorations, the other was his civil service business card, and I asked 
him why two?  He replied, ‘Literally so that sometimes it gets you a place 
at the table.  You’ll often see that you’ll be placed in various places 
depending upon what your perceived industry rank is’  (Shaw, 2010a). 
So here we see that identity and loyalty could vary during the day, and that identity 
and loyalty may not necessarily be the same thing.  So who does one’s loyalty 
belong to: the Service? Or to DE&S?  It appears that it could actually be both, 
and the identities could be used as was contextually appropriate. The ability to 
possess this multiplicity of identities, and to preference them as appropriate was 
a theme which transcended grade, service, and Operating Centre.  This then 
appears to make one group more important than another at a particular point in 
time, or situation. Loyalty then appeared to co-exist with the fracturing of identities 
and flowed along organisational boundaries, between the civilian and the military 
cultures.  It appears also that identity, as well as having a link to loyalty, also has 
a link to power, perceived power and influence.  The difference in the strength of 
identification with Naval groups across grades is further illustrated by the 
following example from a Naval 1* Officer:   
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‘I am DE&S, but who do I serve?  Well actually I serve my customer, but I 
belong to DE&S.  And I think you can have both’ (Shaw, 2011q).   
This respondent described dual identities and what they meant to him.  It shows 
that he, at his grade, was able to identify equally easily with both DE&S and the 
Royal Navy, that there was no contradiction in his identification with the groups, 
DE&S and the Royal Navy.   
It also appeared to be recognized within DE&S, that within any military domain, 
civil servants could be brought into the broader military grouping.  This was 
because ‘if you work with us in any way you become one of us’.   
This attitude appeared to be consistent across services, and this factor of 
identification and assimilation was also identified by Kirke (2012) in the wider 
MOD, in relation to the RAF and civil servants who worked in the RAF domain.  
This sentiment was confirmed by a Naval 1*, from Operating Centre B: 
‘   Naval service was civil servants and serving, and there’s an interesting 
debate to be had about what constitutes a Naval service person as 
opposed to a civil servant.  When was he a Naval service civil servant, 
when was he not?’ (Shaw, 2011o). 
Therefore it appears that civil servants were thought to be service agnostic, 
implying a separateness from the military.  The following is from a Royal Naval 
1*:   
‘Do I see the Civil Service as a fourth service?  No, I see it as Land, Sea 
and Air and if you’re a civil servant in a team you’ll be one of those.  I 
personally don’t see the civil service as the fourth service.  I see the Civil 
Service as serving all.  And you align with whoever you’re working with for 
at that time’ (Shaw, 2011q). 
This adds weight to the view that appeared to be held by many, especially military 
personnel, that there was no Civil Service identity or that it was nebulous, being 
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‘the semi-amorphous mass in the middle of the supporting groups’ (Shaw, 
2011q).  As described previously, strength of identity appeared to also be linked 
to group size, a Role Team was smaller than an Operating Centre.   
The research shows that group members could maintain multiple and non-
contradictory identities, apparently, because of the difference in the strength of 
identity that was shown towards each of the memberships.  The respondents 
appeared to be broadly consistent, in that if below B2 grade, they might not 
recognize their Operating Centre (2* organisation) as strongly as either the front-
line, their customer, or their Role Team.   
Role Teams and ‘the front-line’ were small groups, because people worked in 
small teams and supplied equipment directly to a small group of people, even 
though that small group of people were part of a larger organisational construct, 
and DE&S was a large bureaucracy that people were part of, and of which they 
could see themselves as being a small part.   
There was also a split in identification between grades which may have produced 
tensions within groups.  This also indicates that it would lead to tensions between 
groups, as well as within them, particularly for a large group. For example if large 
groups, such as DE&S, asked a smaller group, such as a Project Team to do 
something that they did not want to do, such as reduce the number of desks that 
they used, or to use the corporate system rather than a local system to book 
desks.  This might result in the smaller group resisting the demands of the larger 
group, thus going against corporate behaviour.  
This thesis has used the concept of identity as one of the lenses through which 
organisational culture has been investigated.  It may be the case that the concept 
of identity is confused and concatenated with the construct of a person’s 
commitment to a group or an idea.  Identity and ‘identification with’ differ from 
‘commitment to’, in that, as was shown in Graphs 4-1 and 4-2 indicated that B 
grade staff and some SCS appeared to show a degree of ambivalence in their 
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identification with either DE&S, their role teams, to the front-line and also to the 
management of the bureaucracy of DE&S.   
As Kirke (2012) identified in MOD, staff at that level were likely to be looking up 
to the corporate, rather than the project levels of DE&S for their next promotion  
This commitment could be shown as creating a tension between the bureaucracy 
and the project effort.  This tension may manifest itself as preferencing corporate 
behaviour over project team behaviour, through the para-social relationship, 
when that behaviour may be inappropriate, such as  is shown in the following 
response from a 1* the British Army:  
‘DHR (Director, Human Resources) came over to bollock the 1* in the 
team.  The reason?  They were late responding to one of his corporate 
returns, and the reason for that was that they were dealing with an incident 
in Afghanistan on the front-line’ (Shaw, 2011f). 
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4.5.2 Identity Acceptance and Rejection at the Merger. 
Finding: At the inception of DE&S many people openly rejected the 
imposition of the DE&S identity, but were still committed to servicing ‘the 
front line’.   
One of the consequences of the imposition, rather than the negotiated agreement 
of the change of identity from the DPA or the DLO to DE&S, was that many people 
initially and openly rejected that forced change of identity.  This was a recurring 
theme throughout the research, both within the interviews but also within the 
vernacular existing in DE&S at that time.   
For several years after the merger of the DPA and the DLO, a common theme 
that was articulated by interviewees was: ‘DE&S joined me, I didn’t join it’. (Shaw, 
2011q).  
The following illustrations give other examples of this theme, spanning grades 
from C2 to SCS 1*.  The first example was provided by an SCS 1* in operating 
Centre B: 
‘…What did I know about DE&S before I joined it?  Well it didn’t exist before 
I joined it because I was part of the merger.  What did I know about the 
merger ahead of the merger?  I’d say I didn’t pay it too much interest to be 
perfectly honest with you.  So completely devoid of all the politics and all 
the rumour’ (Shaw, 2011r). 
And a Royal Naval Captain in Operating Centre G: 
‘I didn’t join, DE&S joined me.  They took me over.  Because we started 
off, if you go back prior to DLO there was WSA (Warship Support Agency), 
prior to WSA there was NBSA (Naval Base Support Agency), prior to that 
we belonged to another section and we’ve outlasted all of these various 
entities that have tried to control us.’ (Shaw, 2011v).  
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A civilian C2 in Operating Centre E: 
‘…Things that had been briefed but you know, the square root of nothing 
really…It was a fit for purpose thing wasn’t it?  [DE&S was the] same as 
the DPA really, I didn’t join the DPA [at that time], it joined me’. (Shaw, 
2011m). 
One of the effects of the imposition by DE&S of a single DE&S identity and the 
partial rejection of that identity by Operating Centres and Project Team members 
was the enhanced fragmentation of identity, both of individuals and also of groups 
in DE&S.   
At the time of the merger this rejection appeared to occur because of a 
combination of group members’ and also team leaders’ resistance to the new 
identity and also to the change itself.   
The resistance to the change of identity appeared also to be linked to the team 
leader’s perceived loss of power and prestige at that time, because of the 
imposition of Operating Centres and the removal of the Integrated Project Team.   
The Integrated Project Team (IPT) was a construct from the DPA.  These teams 
were responsible for the delivery and management of a project, which might be, 
for instance, a tank, a ship, or food supplies.  IPTs comprised Role Teams that 
were responsible for one specific element of the overall project.  As a result of 
the merger of the DPA and DLO it was decided that the team structures were to 
be changed, to move away from the IPT structures to Operating Centres and 
domains in an effort to remove the boundaries between teams, and to introduce 
a more collaborative and ‘through life’ approach to equipment acquisition and 
maintenance.   
Many of the IPT leaders who had been in the DPA did not like this change 
because they felt that they had lost power and prestige.  This resulted in cynicism 
and resistance to change which acted to inhibit the ability of DE&S to create a 
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single corporate DE&S, because group members did not like being forced to take 
on a new identity that they did not wholly agree with. (Shaw, 2010-2014).   
One of the outcomes of this disassociation and cynicism was that some staff 
apparently appeared actively to dis-identify with DE&S, preferring to carry on with 
their day job while at the same time, accessing one or more referential identities, 
thus allowing the organisational changes to happen around them, rather than to 
them:  
‘He had been in that chair for over ten years, doing the same job, with the 
same phone number, talking to the same people.  He had seen four 
changes of logo and stationery and lanyard, but his job had not changed, 
he just got on with it’ (Shaw, 2013e).  
There then appears to be a common theme, which was that the new DE&S 
identity was viewed as being imposed and not chosen.  This feeling was also 
reflected in the perceived lack of communication that came with the imposition of 
the new identity and the implementation of the merger.  The feeling of the 
imposition of, rather than agreement with the new DE&S identity was also 
observed in terms of symbols of identity, as described in section 4.3.   
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4.5.3 Summary 
Section 4.5 has shown that identity in DE&S was expressed as a factor of 
meaningfulness in relation to among other things: identity group, group-size, and 
place within the hierarchy and also of role function.   
Identity, therefore, formed one element of group distinctiveness in DE&S, 
enabling group members to create in-groups and out-groups, as a result of 
naturally occurring and organisationally legitimised social categorisation.  In 
terms of who, or what, different people identified with, it was apparent in DE&S 
that when group members were asked which team, or who they identified with, 
that identity was expressed along two axes in DE&S, that of identifying with DE&S 
and identifying with their Role Team and jointly with the front-line.   
Also even though there was apparently no clear view of one identity being 
stronger than another across all grades, it appeared that the strength of identity 
with the front-line was stronger than was identification with DE&S. This indicates 
that at that time, the concept of the One DE&S identity may have not been 
accepted by all group members, and that there appeared to be an ethos in DE&S 
whereby employees were there to support the ‘front line’ with the existence of 
DE&S appearing to be a necessary evil.  Additionally, group members were 
apparently able to identify with different groups concurrently and with differing 
strengths of attachment.  This finding indicates that these group members 
possessed multiple identities, as described in another context by (Kirke, 2004). 
The research indicates that the identities that were found in DE&S were not 
necessarily contradictory, but could be complementary.   
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4.6 Group size 
4.6.1 Introduction 
This thesis has so far presented data on group attributes that were found in 
DE&S.  One of those factors is group size.  Section 4.6 will show that the 
functional and social group sizes that were found in DE&S were consistent in size 
throughout the hierarchy and followed a consistent pattern within that hierarchy.   
Socio-cultural attitudes and the relationship of group members to their groups 
were illustrated through narrative responses that were given by informants about 
the sizes of the groups that they inhabited.   
Group size in DE&S and its effect on group behaviours was addressed through 
the socio-technical, organisationally legitimised and designed teams.  This 
discovery was assisted by organisationally available and validated data on group 
and team design.   
Section 4.6 reports the data as two strands in order to show the effect of group 
size on group behaviour in DE&S.   
Strand one presents data on group size in DE&S from a subjective, respondent 
based point of view.   
Strand two presents group sizes that were legitimised as teams through the 
DE&S organisational design process.  It achieves this by using DE&S corporately 
validated data to provide indicative results on group size and the hierarchical 
nature of DE&S.   
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4.6.2 Strand One - Group Members Narrative of Group Size 
4.6.2.1 Teams and Groups Differ in Size 
Finding: Team members were able to recognize the size at which a team 
stopped being a team and became a group. 
There was observed to be a boundary at which a team became too large to be a 
team, as the first comment from a Royal Naval Reserve Captain in Operating 
Centre F, illustrates: 
‘...  The team can only get so big, to the point at which it becomes disparate 
and it’s no longer a team and you get sub-teams and I suspect in your 
detailed studies you’ll determine the optimum size for a team before it 
becomes meaningless because it’s too disjointed…’ (Shaw, 2011v). 
The following from an SCS 2* serves to introduce how language described group 
size in DE&S, and also how group members related to their groups.   
‘’…That’s one of 13,000 [Naval Constructors]  but that’s an incredibly weak 
tribe, an incredibly weak tribe, we think there’s about 13,000 members,’ 
(Shaw, 2012h).  
Teams become groups when they become too large, they are then likely to 
comprise sub-groups, which had a specific purpose and were called ‘Role 
Teams’: 
‘…There’s a team within a team issue as well, which kind of had to work 
sometimes and then how you meld the team within the team into the bigger 
working team.  I’ve never really seen the best way of doing that for a big 
team where you’ve got about 30 to 40 people.  You get people bleating 
about the fact were we one team or four teams and back comes the cry, 
who cares?!  Let’s work out what the whole big team vision was, we are 
working towards a unified goal in whatever groups that we’re in’ (Shaw, 
2011o). 
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The previous example from a B2 grade civil servant in Operating Centre A 
indicates a group size, and also the fact that at that size of group any 
tensions between the teams must be managed to ensure that all of the 
teams, or sub-groups are working towards the superordinate goal of the 
group.  A team also appears to possess a characteristic of identity, which, 
as described by a B2 grade civil servant in Operating Centre A is not 
gained by being within a large group: 
‘What is a team?  A team isn’t a 30,000 strong organisation; you can’t 
possibly be a team.  You have to have a team around you which you 
identify with and go forward’ (Shaw, 2011p). 
Informants appear to consider that there is an optimum group size for effective 
team working.  This appears to chime with the work of Bradner and others who 
have previously identified that the optimum size for a team is dependent on the 
function and work that the team is being asked to carry out, see Bradner et al. 
(2005), Cohen and Bailey (1997), Curral et al. (2001), Fried (1991), Hackman 
(1987), Hoegl (2005), and Pendharkar and Rodger (2009).  It also a further 
indication of a boundary between what are called teams, and groups, because 
groups appeared to be larger than teams.   
Whilst in DE&S there appeared to be no explicit optimal team size. Respondents 
indicated that Role Team sizes in DE&S appeared to be consistently composed 
of around 7 people, but within the overall concept of the ‘team’ in DE&S, these 
organisationally legitimated groups, that were called teams, could range in size 
from five in number to approximately 120 people:   
‘…There were 5 left…’ (Shaw, 2011j). 
‘…The team was 17 it’s now 7…’ (Shaw, 2011j).  
 ‘…We had the whole team sat down, that’s about 30 people…’ (Shaw, 
2011j).  
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‘... we were a team of 25 people of which we have a 1*, 8, B1s, (B1 grade) 
the rest were B2s (B2 grade, apart from 3 possibly 4 Cs (C2/C1) and the 
EA (Executive Assistant)…’ (Shaw, 2011l). 
The concept of a team in DE&S therefore covered a large range, from five people 
to the larger Project Teams that consisted of sub-groups, called Role Teams.  
The sizes of some of these sub-groups are presented in section 4.6.3.  The larger 
Project Teams could be up to 120 people in size, which was caveated by at least 
one respondent as being the maximum group size that was manageable before 
the group fractured.   
‘…I worked in a UOR [Urgent Operational Requirements]  IPT (Integrated 
Project Team), it was about 120 people, when it got over that number, it 
kind of broke up and became unmanageable’ (Shaw, 2012i).  
This last comment, which was both unguarded and un-solicited indicates that 
there may be a link to a group size factor that makes group more difficult to 
manage the larger they become.  That link is discussed in section 4.6.7.   
The group sizes that were indicated by respondents’ examples were consistent 
across a range of Operating Centres and are presented in section 4.6.4.   
Sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.2.1 have presented examples of formal and informal group 
sizes and characteristics as described by respondents.  Strand two now presents 
examples of organisationally legitimised group sizes that were observed within 
DE&S.   
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4.6.3  Strand Two - Organisationally Designed and Legitimised 
Groups 
4.6.4  Introduction 
DE&S was a hierarchical organisation which comprised at the highest level: 4*, 
then down through 3*, 2* then 1* level groups at the SCS, or star grades, in 
military terms Rank.57   
DE&S corporate data was derived from MOD open source statistics(MOD, 2011)  
also provides a breakdown of group sizes at SCS 1* level and 2* level across 
DE&S.   
Detailed group size data were gathered from a 1* led policy group that at the time 
of the research was in Operating Centre B; the sizes of groups and the 2* 
Operating Centre, E, and a 2 * group that was Operating Centre D.   
Functional group sizes were measured from the smallest size of group, the Role 
Team, which was characterised as a minimum of three members and which was 
led at a C1 level, up to the largest group size, the Operating Centre, which 
comprised up to 2500 members.  Pairs or single workers were deemed not to be 
teams in the traditional sense.58   
 
 
 
 
                                            
57 Senior Civil Service or Military Star grades. 
58 Statistical and presentation advice for the data that are presented in this section was provided by Guy 
Robinson. BSc, first class, Mathematics, UCL 2014. 
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4.6.5 Team and Group Sizes 
Organisationally Designed Group Sizes Were Consistent at each Level of 
the DE&S Hierarchy.  
Finding:  2* organisationally designed stable group sizes (Operating 
Centres) were consistent within the hierarchy of DE&S, being between 500 
and 2500 members.  
 
Graph  4-3, 2* Operating Centre Sizes in DE&S 
Source: The Stationery Office (2012b). 
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Legend: Vertical axis shows group size. 
Horizontal axis shows group by research reference number 
Graph 4-3 shows that the predominant pattern of stable, established Operating 
Centre sizes in DE&S was between 500 and 2500 members, with the majority 
falling between 500 and 1500 members.  The group size range of Operating 
Centres appears to be very variable, from 3 to approximately 2500 members, 
there were no groups that had more than 2500 members.  2* led groups that fell 
below 500 were either small specialist groups, or were new groups that were 
forming and at their full operating capability.  These outliers to the pattern of 
groups can be explained as being new groups or special groups that were not 
sized as Operating Centres, but were sized as special Project Teams and led by 
a civilian SCS 2* or military equivalent.   They were labelled Operating Centres 
as they were led by an SCS 2* director or military equivalent grade.  It appears 
then, that there was a level of consistency in the design and implementation of 
an Operating Centre, because most of the Operating Centres in DE&S were 
between 500 and 2500 members strong.   
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Finding:  1* organisationally designed group sizes were consistent within 
the hierarchy of DE&S. 
 
Graph  4-4 DE&S SCS 1* Organisational size  
Source: The Stationery Office (2012b). 
Legend:  
Vertical axis shows group size 
Horizontal axis shows group by research reference number 
Graph  4-4 shows the sizes of the 1* organisations in DE&S.  It shows that there 
was a significant clustering pattern of 1* group sizes in DE&S: 28% of 1* groups 
had 50-80 members, 11% had 120-180 members,  10% had 200-280 members, 
with outliers at above 550 members.  The median group size was 128 members, 
with the average at 171 members.  Groups that differed from this number of 
150±30, if they were larger,  were either distributed groups with members not 
based at Abbeywood, or if smaller they were specialist project teams with a 
specific, often lifed remit, or teams that were being built and were not at a stable 
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size.  The prevalence of 1* group sizes below 120 members is highly suggestive 
of a maximum manageable group size of 120 members.   
This group size may also have been influenced by latency of organisational 
design because of the size of an Integrated Project Team in the DPA had been 
approximately 150 members.  There then again appears to be a degree of 
consistency in the organisationally designed 1* size groups, although the 
consistency was less clear than was apparent in the sizes of Operating Centres.   
Graph  4-5 and Graph 4-6 will now show the patterning of group sizes in detail in 
Operating Centre D.59 This was the only Operating Centre where the researcher 
was allowed full access to all organisational group size data.  These data show 
all members of groups within the Operating Centre.   
  
                                            
59 Data gained from Operating Centre D Organisational Charts 2012 
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Finding: B1 grade organisationally designed group sizes were consistent 
within the hierarchy of Operating Centre D in DE&S. 
Source: Derek Shaw 
  
Graph  4-5 Project Team Sizes in Operating Centre D 
Legend: Vertical axis shows group size 
Horizontal axis shows group by assigned reference number 
Graph  4-5 shows the patterning and clustering of Project Teams60, in Operating 
Centre D.  This pattern shows a predominant linear distribution up to 40 group 
members. That progression appears to be based on a group size of 5 members. 
There appear to be two groups with between 65 and 85 members and there were 
no groups with 100 members.  A significant pattern is the six groups that comprise 
120 to 140 members.  That number falls well within the 150±30 boundary, and 
                                            
60 Led by a Project Team Leader of B1 grade or military equivalent. 
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also corresponds to the narrative data that indicated that groups that have more 
than 120 members become more difficult to manage, the number of 120 members 
thus appears to be a self-limiting boundary.  Within Operating Centre D, there 
were no groups that had more than 150 members.   
What is not clear is why there are so many teams that had fewer than 40 
members.  It was during this period of the research that the Operating Centre was 
under resourced and so that may have affected the group sizes, as these teams 
may have been smaller than they needed to be.   
Finding: B2 grade organisationally designed group sizes were consistent 
within the hierarchy of DE&S. 
 
Graph 4-6 Delivery Team Sizes in Operating Centre D 
Source: Derek Shaw 
Graph 4-6 shows the pattern of Delivery Teams that were led by B2 grade 
members of staff in Operating Centre D.  The number shows that there is 
significant clustering at group sizes of between 5-15 members and a separate 
pattern between 20-35 member teams.  The key pattern in Graph 4-6 appears to 
be the linear distribution of five members, as also appeared in the data shown in 
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Graph  4-5.  Outliers to the patterns, if below five members, can again be 
explained as being either special project teams, or singleton posts that were 
grouped together to account for the management of waifs and strays,(Shaw, 
2013i) or new teams that were not staffed up to full strength.  Graph 4-6 also 
appears to show a pattern of groups whose size ranges between 5-11 members.   
Finding: C1 grade organisationally designed group sizes were consistent 
within one Operating Centre in DE&S. 
 
Graph 4-7 C1 (Role Team) Sizes in Operating Centre D 
Source: Derek Shaw 
Graph 4-7 shows the pattern of Role Teams in Operating Centre D.  With the 
caveat that a team starts at a group size minimum of 3 members, the predominant 
role team size range is between 3 and 15 members, with the majority of teams at 
this being in the range of 5-8 members.   
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Source Size Range61 Team Type 
Operating Centre B, 
group A 
5-762 Work Team 
Operating Centre D 
Pillar A 1*  
Role Team 5-9 
 
Work Teams  
 
Operating Centre D 
Pillar B 1*  
Role Team 5-8 
 
Work Teams  
 
Operating Centre E 
1* group 
Role Team 5-16 
 
Work Teams  
 
Table 4-1 Comparison between Role Teams in Operating Centres B, D & E.   
Source: Derek Shaw 
By comparing the available data from other Operating Centres it appears that 
there is a level of consistency in the design and implementation of Role Team 
sizes across a sample of DE&S Operating Centres.  Role Teams within the 
available data all appear to fall between a five and 16 member boundary.   
The smallest group size of 5±2 was also prevalent across DE&S for Top Teams.  
Chief of Materiel Land held a monthly meeting with the people who reported 
directly to him, four in number, all of whom were SCS 2* Directors or rank 
equivalents, (Shaw, 2012k) thus giving a Top Team of 5 members.   
This Top Team structure was replicated in Operating Centre D, with the 2* 
Director having four, 1* directors who reported directly to him, and further down 
the hierarchy of this Operating Centre B1 grade team leaders having five 
members of staff who reported directly to them (Shaw, 2013-2014). These sizes 
of Top Teams are consistent with other literature, such as Amason and Sapienza 
(1997), Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993).  This then raises the question ‘is the 
consistency of Top Team size across organisations a function of conscious 
                                            
 
62 Does not include Team Leader 
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organisational design, subject to unconscious bias’?  Section 4.6.7 attempts to 
shed light on that question.   
4.6.6 Discussion of Group Size Data 
Section 4.6 has presented data that shows consistent patterns of formal group 
sizes within DE&S.  Section 4.6.6 now presents a discussion of that data and 
asks two questions: one, how similar are the group sizes that were found in DE&S 
to groups and teams in other hierarchical or project based organisations, and two, 
what might be the underlying explanations for the consistency in group and team 
sizes that were found?  
Consistency of organisational group sizes in literature 
The consistency of patterns that appeared to be within the team and group sizes 
in DE&S warrants an initial discussion.  That discussion covers two areas, firstly 
the similarity of team and groups sizes in DE&S in comparison with team and 
group sizes that have been found in other organisations, and secondly possible 
explanations of what appears to be a consistency of team and group sizes 
throughout documented and also DE&S team and group sizes.  In relating this 
thesis to that literature, the formal group sizes that were identified within DE&S 
as we have seen, fell into a broadly consistent pattern of 5±2, 15±3, 45±9, 150±30 
or as the data has shown 135±15 as discrete teams, and between 500 and 2500 
as Operating Centres.   
By looking at literature it appears that Hoegl (2005), discovered teams comprised 
between 3-6 people, a number that closely matches the number of 5±2, provided 
in DE&S for a role team.  Also Staats et al. (2012), presented in Table 2-1 of this 
thesis, identified that teams in their research were sized at between 2-4 members, 
once again matching closely the number of 5±2 of a role team in DE&S, 
separately Curral et al. (2001) identified that teams had an average of 5 
members.   
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Campion et al. (1993) presented in Table 2-1 of this thesis, indicate team sizes 
that average 15 members, that number closely matches a group size that was 
found in DE&S of 15±3 members.  Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) found that 
teams had an average of 13.39 members, once again similar to the 15±3 team 
size that was found in DE&S.  Kirkman and Rosen (1999) data aligns with that of 
Haleblian and Finkelstein, providing a range of team sizes between 11.4 and 15.3 
members, once again matching the data from within DE&S of 15±3 members 
within a B2 led team.   
It thus appears that the concept label of a team is a rather flexible label  that can 
be used to bound a group size of between 3 and 50 members. This broad range 
makes the definiton of an ideal team size difficult to define.  But it also appears 
that a team in DE&S is certainly no larger than 120-150 members, and probably 
a lot smaller, even if organistional jargon and team-building would have us think 
that a large organisation is ‘one big family’ or ‘team-defence’. 
Hackman (1987) suggests that team size in organisations is task driven, while 
Hoegl (2005 p 211) differs slightly and suggests that team size relates to both the 
size  and complexity of the task and the skills that are required to complete the 
task.  Whilst completely logical, that explanation of work design still leaves a 
question, which is why do the team and group sizes appear to be so consistent 
across different types of organisations?  This thesis now looks to answer that 
question through the use of evolutionary anthropology and evolutionary 
psychology and their findings on evolved group sizes.   
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4.6.7 Potential Explanations for Consistent Group Sizes in DE&S.   
The application of evolutionary psychology to this thesis was discussed in 
Chapter 2.  To recap, the element of evolutionary psychology that appears 
relevant to the explanation of the consistency of formal group sizes in DE&S is 
the theory proposed by Dunbar, who finds that human communities and 
egocentric networks have a distinct size that is a result of neo-cortex volume and 
evolution (1993b).  This what Dunbar calls the social brain hypothesis  (2007).   
Dunbar also proposes that as a result of evolution, groups and human networks 
scale consistently at a factor of between 3 and 4, and are layered and hierarchical 
and geometrically sized 2,3,5,15,45-50, up to maximum cognitive boundary of 
150, see Dunbar (1998), Hill and Dunbar (2003 p 63). Dunbar shows that this 
group size hierarchy is consistent across a wide range of archaic groups, hunter 
gatherer groups, religious communities, and also armies from history to modern 
times, see Dunbar (2003 Figure 1), Hill et al. (2008), and Zhou et al. (2005).   
The data that were gathered in DE&S indicate that the patterns within the group 
sizes that were found in DE&S appear to closely match those proposed by 
Dunbar.  For example, in Operating Centre D, the group size shown in Graph  4-5 
Project Team Sizes in Operating Centre D, indicates a linear pattern up to group 
sizes of 40, with the break points being at groups of 5 members, with the key 
pattern appearing between 120 and 140 members, thus matching Dunbar’s 
cognitive maximum for a group and also the base pattern of five members.  
Team size coupled with team effectiveness have provided fertile ground for 
researchers, but within the literature there is no consistency as to what size of 
team is the most effective, for example, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) and also 
Hoegl (2005) indicate that smaller teams are more effective than are larger ones, 
but that size as a factor of effectiveness is itself dependent on the task that the 
team are carrying out.   
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As we have seen, the larger groups in DE&S tended to be between 500 to 2500 
group members.   
It is especially interesting to note that anecdotally, when groups grew to larger 
than 120 members they became unmanageable, and these group sizes appeared 
to be comparable with Dunbar’s concept of the clan (Dunbar, 1993a p 685), and 
also close to the cognitive maximum group size of 150 members that Dunbar 
describes Dunbar (1993a p 686).    
Because of the similarity and also the consistency of the team sizes in DE&S 
compared to other organisations, it may perhaps be the case that organisational 
design was an explicit factor in DE&S group sizes, but one that was also 
influenced by evolutionary factors and therefore subject to cognitive bias.  This 
indicates that evolutionary factors may have influenced the organisational culture 
of DE&S, through in this case group size.   
Sections 4.5 - 4.6 have described the contributory factors of identity and group 
size that were identified as affecting group behaviour within DE&S.  Section 4.7 
will show that multiple linguistic frameworks and organisational dialects existed 
in DE&S.   
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4.7 Linguistic Frameworks, Organisational Dialects and 
Metaphors  
4.7.1 Introduction 
Section 4.5 reports the findings on the linguistic frameworks that were discovered 
in DE&S.   
4.7.2 Linguistic Difference  
Finding: Operating Centres and Project Teams in DE&S possessed their 
own language, as dialects which could act as a barrier between the group 
and the outsider, but which also could reinforce in groups. 
 
Cartoon 4-1 Jargon as Group Distinctiveness 
Source: MOD Crown Copyright 
Cartoon 4-1 shows how linguistic difference, as jargon, was viewed in the 
vernacular humour.  In this case the difference was between technical language 
and plain English.  This shows that the linguistic divide was recognised within the 
wider MOD as something that could be the subject to humour.   
There were other linguistic boundaries that also appeared to have the effect of 
creating in-groups and out-groups.   
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Each functional group developed and possessed its own lexicon which over time 
became a dialect within the hierarchy of DE&S languages.  These linguistic 
factors appeared to combine to amplify the group distinctiveness quotient that 
existed between groups, but language could also serve to reinforce group 
cohesion within the linguistic boundaries of the group.  Linguistic differentiation 
between functional groups could take many forms, from functional language, 
through to slang, thus returning the discussion to a socio-technical and socio-
cultural axis.   
Technical dialects were partly prescribed through the Acquisition Operating 
Framework (AOF),63 which was a mechanism that described socio-technical, 
formal rules as processes within DE&S (MOD, 2015c).  Examples of these 
technical dialects were included in, for example, the written finance lexicon, when 
describing Official Hospitality (MOD, 2013a), while the functional language of 
Programme and Project Management (PPM) contained MDALS (Master Data 
Assumptions Lists) and Earned Value Management (EVM).   
The dialect of Programme and Project Management (PPM) in DE&S was very 
similar to the language of PPM that was used outside DE&S, but the language of 
Finance and Commercial differed significantly from non-DE&S finance and 
commercial language. (Shaw, 2010-2014)   
Other functional language existed through a combination of factors, for example, 
the naming of the equipment that was the project, and the armed service that it 
was designed for, such as the Army, Navy or Air Force.   
Also, embedded within that functional linguistic matrix were commercial, finance 
or project management lexicons that could operate at the same time but which 
took precedence at different periods of the ‘Concept, Assess, Develop, 
Manufacture, In Service, Dispose’ (CADMID) project cycle.   
                                            
63 A mechanism to communicate the organisational processes that DE&S created, and which were used 
top manage the business of DE&S. 
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The functional and organisational linguistic frameworks appeared to function at 
times as group differentiators.  Language and dialects also appeared to reinforce 
an in-group mentality through the use of closed language, and negatively 
identified the out-group because the out-group were less likely to understand 
either the language, or the subtleties of meaning that were encoded within the in-
group’s language.   
These dialects were all variations of English, but all coloured with MOD speak.  
The result of this linguistic difference was twofold: it increased the realisation of 
anyone who was not in that group that they really were an outsider because they 
could not understand the technical language completely, and it also protected the 
in-group who had a degree of superiority and prestige through having to explain 
to outsiders what terms meant (Shaw, 2014j).  The fact that these boundaries 
were represented in the vernacular humour of MOD, is shown by the cartoons 
that appeared in MOD publications and are reproduced here.  Cartoon 4-2  
 shows how deeply they were rooted in the socio-technical and socio-culture 
cultures of MOD, and of DE&S.   
In addition to the multiplicity of internal functional dialects, there were also the 
various argots of the military.   
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Cartoon 4-2 Vernacular Representation of Jargon in a MOD Magazine 
Source: MOD, Crown Copyright 
Even within the language of the military there were dialects.  The language of the 
British Army differed from that of the Royal Navy (Jolly, 2008b, Jolly, 2008a), 
which differed again from the language of the Royal Air Force.  Within these it 
was observed that there could exist an ambivalence towards the language of 
other military groups, for example, a civil servant, ex-British Army, was 
comfortable with using a Royal Navy term  ‘Runs ashore’ in conjunction with the 
British Army equivalent, ‘pie and pint night’ (Shaw, 2011g).  While, when on an 
Army base the researcher overheard someone asking: ‘where were the heads?’ 
and the response from a uniformed member of the Army: ‘we don’t call them that 
round there, that’s the Navy, we call them the bogs’ (Shaw, 2010j).  That 
response was taken by the researcher as an indication that potential offence or 
embarrassment had been caused by the person asking for a facility by using the 
name that a different and competing group used for that facility.  Linguistic 
difference through dialect or jargon might act both as a factor of group 
distinctiveness and also a barrier to cross-team working, thus creating an in-
group/out-group dynamic.   
The linguistic barrier between teams in DE&S was organisationally recognised 
and legitimised and was mediated through the use of team names and a ‘jargon 
buster’, (MOD, 2012) which was a database of common terms that were in use 
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in the MOD.  The existence of the jargon buster was an element of the socio-
technical organisation that group members used to help to understand other 
technical dialects of groups that were different to their own.  Group difference was 
reinforced through the identity labelling that was combined with functional dialect 
to identify where differing functional groups sat on floor-plates as shown in section 
4.3.3 on DE&S Corporate Branding.    
To an outsider these labels were opaque, thus reinforcing the ‘outsiderness’.  
Geographical labels also show the acronymysation of group identity, which made 
group identities opaque to the outsider.  This then created a visible and cognitive 
linguistic boundary between the in-group and everyone else who did not 
understand the functional dialect of that group.   
4.7.3 Language and Hierarchy 
Finding: Language changed depending on hierarchical place within DE&S. 
The difference in language of the ‘Management Boards’ and the senior 
grades from that of employees was legitimised by DE&S.  
It was a rite of passage when attempting to gain promotion, that a person would 
be given drafting tasks to learn the language of the new grade (Shaw, 2010h).  
Also groups of potential candidates for the Assessment and Development Centre 
(A&DC)64 would need to be coached to succeed at the B2 level examinations and 
also to understand the language adjustments that were required:  
‘We walked into the room and there, laid out on the table, were sheets of 
paper, as a process diagram on how to answer each question, and the 
words that the examiners were looking for in each question were 
highlighted.  During the course of the session it was made clear to us that 
we had a better chance of passing if we put the buzzwords into the 
answers’  (Shaw, 2009c) 
                                            
64 The A&DC was a mechanism where if one wanted to be promoted out of ones broader banded grade, 
one was assessed as being suitable for promotion. 
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Also, from a different assessment centre: 
‘The tutor who was running it knew the right answers and we went through 
each one and some of us might have got it wrong, a lot got it right as well.  
And the tutor told us how to write the right answer, there’s a technique’ 
(Shaw, 2011q). 
The learning of an in-group language indicated that a new group identity 
appeared to be achieved through a form of ‘buzzword bingo’, 1690 where all of 
the key words and phrases that the assessors were looking for in a response 
were learned and regurgitated parrot fashion.   
In addition to learning to write and express themselves as managers or leaders, 
candidates were being conditioned.  They were also separated by task and peer 
group from their old work teams because they started to lead teams rather than 
working within them and were given ‘developmental tasks’ and other information 
which separated them from their old roles and teams (Shaw, 2014i).  These 
exercises often occurred in ‘learning sets’, groups of 5 - 7 members (Shaw, 
2009c), which could then become longer lived self-help groups and peer support 
groups as their members moved through DE&S, and also further across MOD.   
One of the effects of the placement of people into these groups was the 
development of a separate in-group mentality that separated them from their ex-
peers.  This separation also appeared to occur because this group were treated 
differently from others, they were the leadership group, and as such they received 
extra training and more information, and also opportunities to influence DE&S 
and also MOD, in a more corporate way. In addition, MOD and also DE&S, 
treated the two groups differently and labelled them as different, the group that 
were B2 grade and above became leadership material, or ‘stakeholders’, while 
the groups below were ‘employees’.   
This is shown in the following, which was taken from the instructions that 
accompanied a security survey in December 2013: 
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“Employee survey – to be completed by C1 grades, military equivalents and 
below. This survey will assess staff attitudes, feelings and perceptions towards 
security. How they think security is currently managed, perceive the attitudes of 
senior leaders and how mechanisms for embedding a strong security culture are 
working.  
Senior Stakeholder Survey – to be completed by band B2, their equivalents and 
above and will assess the DE&S senior stakeholders’ views on current and 
desired security culture” (MOD, 2015a). 
It was as though people magically became different once they had passed their 
examination (Shaw, 2013g) and became B2 grade staff.  This may have been 
one of the reasons behind the perceived communications problems in DE&S that 
the type of language that was used by these senior stakeholder staff did not 
match that used by employees.  This difference in language frequently caused 
tension because below the stakeholder group, the employee group members 
wanted to hear a different language - a straight message.  This meant that there 
was immediate dissonance between the messages that were being given and 
those which were being received, for example: ‘This is just political spin by SoS 
(Secretary of State), and will be aimed at the SCS and not the cogs that turn the 
wheel!’ (Shaw, 2012m).   
The change of language also appeared to affect the way that people identified 
with, and related to, their groups, teams and also to DE&S.  On moving up into 
the B2 and B1 grade and also the SCS 1* area of the DE&S hierarchy, the 
language of relatedness changed, perhaps deliberately, as a result of some of 
the tasks that a potential B2 grade had been given to socialise them for their new 
position, for example, drafting tasks for the Operating Centre management board 
(Shaw, 2009c).   
At that level the language changed to structural, objective, and bureaucratic 
language.  The outcome of this was that not only did a group member’s functional 
language change when they moved from one functional group to another, or from 
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the employee to the stakeholder group, it appears also that their language of 
identity also changed.   
This change of language and role appeared to also engender a change in their 
relationship with DE&S.  Stakeholders may therefore have been more likely to 
develop a stronger relationship with DE&S as an entity, rather than have strong 
relationships with the people that worked for them.  Other people at the same 
grade, rather than becoming peers, became competitors for prestige and 
promotion, and therefore competitors for resources.   
Perhaps because of the paradox, where even though employees professed not 
to identify with certain parts of the organisation, predominantly negatively 
identifying with DE&S, they were still committed to the superordinate goal of 
DE&S, supporting the front line, and to their functional work and teams.  
Therefore it appears that the ethos of ‘front-line-first’ was visible through identity, 
and that at this level, identification with a group in DE&S may be aligned with 
commitment to that group.   
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4.7.4 Language and Emotional Intelligence 
Finding: Language indicated the existence of emotional intelligence at 
particular points within the hierarchy of DE&S. 
In DE&S, the bureaucracy was described as being ‘an emotional desert once you 
get to the B level’,(Shaw, 2011aa) also, as the following B2 grade respondent 
indicates: 
‘The organisation is squeezing it out of them. If you’re in for long enough 
and you progress up through the ranks to a certain level or even above 
that.  You’re being shaped and moulded as you go through it and part of 
that shaping and moulding is the withdrawal of your emotional being if you 
like’ (Shaw, 2011h).  
The apparent effects of emotional intelligence and language are shown in the 
following excerpt from a conversation with a B1 grade civil servant who was an 
assessor at the Assessment and Development Centre (A&DC), they describe the 
extent of the behavioural issues that they had identified within the applicants for 
the A&DC: 
‘The other thing is quite interesting about behaviours in terms of emotional 
intelligence. The levels of emotional intelligence were zero, It’s all very 
transactional, very  little emotional intelligence, very negative behaviours, 
very laddish culture, even the Abbeywood domestic culture, so all very 
negative type stuff’ (Shaw, 2011j).  
It appeared that at C1 grade level and below leadership was valued, whereas 
process and bureaucratic management were valued at B2 grade levels and 
above.  This then supports the view that emotional intelligence was a 
differentiating factor between an empathetic leader and a bureaucratic manager 
appeared to be confirmed from within the business independently:   
‘…I guess that’s part of being in a bureaucracy which was a very rule 
based organisation and some of those softer skills, like socialisation skills 
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that I once knew tend to be, I think are less and less now.  Do we breed 
leaders or do we breed managers I think was an issue.  Often the 
empathetic leader might consider some of those softer issues where the 
bureaucratic manager won’t.  The bureaucratic manager is here to deliver 
a job and that’s how they deliver it’ (Shaw, 2011j).  
The behaviour that was reported in the example appears to be credited with a 
lack of emotional intelligence, and may perhaps be associated with both the 
change of language at those grade levels, that is bureaucratic, de-emotionalised 
language, and also the change of relationship with peers and DE&S that 
appeared within staff at those levels.   
The reasons for this implied lack of emotional intelligence are not wholly clear.  
One reason may be that the language of the organisational dialect of the 
leadership group, grade B2 staff and above, was structural, formal and devoid of 
emotion and references to people.  The new language at the new level was 
defined by being objective, non-emotional, and evasive, rather than being straight 
forward and direct, and was pejoratively called ‘OF565 bullshit’,(Shaw, 2010f) 
being characterised by the person, for example, not directly answering a direct 
question, but simply quoting ‘party line’.   
As an employee moved up the hierarchy and into stakeholder’s domain of the B2 
and B1 staff, they stopped being employees, and became responsible for 
delivering a range of outputs and outcomes.  At this leadership level a person 
was also responsible for both managing outcomes and outputs, and also 
employees.  At this level, they were also providing the first level of 
organisationally legitimised formal leadership.  This was differentiated from the 
management of staff that was carried out at the C1/C2 grade level and military 
equivalents.   
                                            
65 OF 5 is a NATO Rank classification that equates to B2 grade Civil servant or Military equivalent. 
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There then appears to be a distinction between B2 and B1 grade staff, B1 grade 
staff delivering a range of tasks through their team, with little management of staff 
except their direct report B2 grade staffs, and counter-signing officer duties and 
in exceptional circumstances, some C1 grades.   
The linguistic difference that appeared between grades could be characterised 
as thus: below B2 grade and above established 1* level, the relationship of the 
group member to the group was likely to be expressed in terms of a social 
relationship and in social language.   
For example, from an established and long serving B2 Grade Civil servant: 
‘I think of MOD as an extended family, but I wouldn’t say that there’s the 
deep fondness and the deep affection that you get with either friends or 
family, but I do think that if you’ve got a good team together and esprit de 
corps you do enjoy one another’s company’ (Shaw, 2011u). 
This changed at the B1 grade and B2 grade level and up to established 1* where 
the relationship between the group member and the group was more likely to be 
described in functional and non-emotional language.  For example, people 
became resources, or assets (Shaw, 2013k).  
The transition that occurred through the use of language, function and also 
through preparation for the Assessment and Development Centre (A&DC), 
appeared to cause  some dissonance, hence the phrase ‘selling your soul to PPM 
[Programme and Project Management]’ (Shaw, 2010e).   
The change of language appeared also to coincide with the change from working 
in small groups to leading small groups.  It may also have resulted from the need 
to put social, functional, and emotional distance between the stakeholder grades, 
at B2 level and above, and their employees who were below them.   
The existence of a linguistic boundary between the functional family groups and 
the management groups was also identified in Operating Centre K, where the 
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differing, and often competing, objectives from each of the groups within that 
team construct were exposed through language and also expectations in the 
context of team-building activities:   
‘…My line manager,… the head of the section, very much wanted it about 
business objectives and outcomes, vision, mission, strategy and all that 
stuff,…’ (Shaw, 2011j). 
The respondent identifies that the head of the section, or Role Team wanted the 
outcomes of the event to be business focussed. 
Whereas: 
‘...the team were totally against that and so we went with what the team 
wanted to do which was really more about having fun, getting to know each 
other and therefore building more effective relationships in the team  
leading to you know greater output, that was the logic behind it …’ (Shaw, 
2011j). 
But despite the difference in language between the management group and the 
employees, they both wanted to achieve the same outcome: 
‘…We let the team do it and it went off really very well…’ (Shaw, 2011j).   
This difference in language and expectation may have been one of the factors 
that led to formal team-building activities being thought of as ineffective.  Team-
building is discussed in section 5.4.   
The change from direct pragmatic language to the abstract and conceptual, 
appeared to engender within those group members a reaction.  When this 
structural language was used, members of the employee group, those below B2 
grade, as opposed to the stakeholder group (those at B2 grade or equivalent and 
above), did not relate to it, calling it ‘guff’ (Shaw, 2010d).  
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Different levels of emotional intelligence appeared to be expressed through the 
use of language.  It appeared that in DE&S language that was associated with 
low levels of emotional intelligence was devoid of emotion, and formed the basis 
of MOD speak, one example of which is provided here: 
‘Defence Forums – SAT planned for mid-June 
Meridio Reporting – Rollout tbc.l DIST dry run planned for 1st week of 
May 
DATS on XP – SAT now likely wec 27th April. UAT dates tbc 
Import/Export to TNA (National Archives) – SAT complete and went well 
OCS – if any users want to change back from Std Plus please ensure 
that the DIST PM is informed 
K2 – UAT is scheduled to start on 27th April’ (Shaw, 2015e) 
This chimes with the Weberian concept that bureaucracy dehumanises people 
(Weber, 1946), and could be demonstrated in DE&S through the use of the 
metaphor of the emotional desert at the B grades and SCS and military 
equivalent levels of DE&S.  For example, using words such as resources or 
assets instead of people, or lapsing into MOD.  Language that appeared to be 
associated with high levels of emotional intelligence was more family oriented 
and contained metaphors that were associated with positive emotions. These 
were observed below the B grade level staff, the following comment was from a 
C2 grade civil servant.  ‘My team was too small to be a team it was more like a 
family’ (Shaw, 2012e). 
It is therefore quite possible that emotional intelligence was indeed strongly 
associated with the language that was used to describe their relationship with 
their team.    
By looking at data from section 4.5.1, where respondents indicated how strongly 
they identified with DE&S, it appears that some B grade staff started to identify 
more ambivalently not only their new work group, but also with DE&S and or 
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MOD, as a corporate entity, sometimes even identifying to a greater extent with 
their new grade, or peer group even before they had been to the A&DC.  The 
effect of identification with a new group, and potentially contradicting identities 
were indicated in the following example:   
‘…And I think there was […] occasionally torn loyalty between one’s 
broader team downwards that you’re responsible for delivering and the 
output and those in a broader organisation you’re working in.  That’s about 
putting the service need before yourself and there was that sort of 
challenge sometimes’ (Shaw, 2011s). 
There was a very high failure rate for applicants on the promotion schemes and 
some people took three or more attempts to succeed at the A&DC (Shaw, 2009b).  
The first attempt was to learn how to do it, the second was get it right and to pass 
and the third attempt was only if the first two had failed (Shaw, 2010k).  
Candidates were judged by a group of assessors who were their potential peers 
and seniors within the group that they were seeking to join.  From the responses 
given, it appears that the B grades were the first level that real power and 
authority were shown, with the B1 grade level actually being the first level of 
leadership, as opposed to the B2 grade as espoused by DE&S.  In attempting to 
explain this change of relationship and also the emotional state it appears that at 
B2 and B1 grades and military equivalents a person was expected by DE&S, to 
be developing a corporate view of DE&S.  But new B2 and B1 grades and their 
military equivalents were likely also to hold a strong, familial relationship with the 
teams that they had managed, especially if they were promoted from within that 
team.  This relationship dynamic was often unbalanced, causing the person to 
struggle to understand when to behave corporately and when to preference their 
Role Team above the needs of DE&S.   
An unsuccessful manager at this level might suffer from tension, as they would 
be unable to balance those demands. Field notes April 2012 Nh1, conversation 
with a C2 grade Civil Servant, discussing how their 1* was reacting to leading 
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their team.  How that identity transition was managed by group members was not 
clear, but it did appear that one element in the successful transition was the need 
for a clear understanding of what was required in order to succeed at that new 
level in the organisation.  The person needed to understand the contradiction 
between corporate and team requirements, and where to exhibit them 
appropriately and to be emotionally intelligent.  They also needed to understand 
the language that they needed to use in order to assuage other people’s fears 
about change, and not be subsumed into the low emotional intelligence 
relationship that could be the dominant relationship at that new level.   
However, if a person could make the transition to a balanced relationship then 
they could go on to become an SCS/military star grade.  This was observed at 2* 
level and above where the tension disappeared as they appeared to be able to 
understand which relationship with either DE&S or their teams that they led 
should be enacted at any one time, and which language they should use to show 
that relationship and engender action from their teams.   
The reason for the newly promoted person identifying with their new group more 
than their old group appeared to be, firstly, because they wanted the promotion 
and also they understood how difficult it was to become a member of the 
leadership group.  Thus the leadership group appeared to have a greater value 
to the member than did their previous group.   
The concept of emotional intelligence was not captured within the initial research 
question.  This was a discovery that came from the data.  The following 
discussion makes some attempt to explain why emotional intelligence and 
language at the change from employee to stakeholder in DE&S affects 
organisational behaviour.   
Boyatzis (2014), Boyatzis et al. (2014) describes how two brain systems, the 
Default mode Network (DMN) and the Task Positive Network (TPN) are 
contradictory, when one network is engaged the other is less able to function.  
The implication of this for this thesis is that as group members pass through the 
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A&DC they are socialised more into the Task Positive and non-emotional 
elements of DE&S and are therefore more likely to remain in the non-emotional, 
logical mode, rather than reverting back to the more emotional Default Mode 
Network, that according to Boyatzis et al. (2014), more competent leaders are 
able to support.   
4.7.5 Language, Gossip and Group Coherence.  
Finding: There was a pattern of language and a trajectory of linguistic 
change that was apparent in meetings.   
Noted from a meeting in Conference Room 2, Spur 4 Ensleigh. 
10 minutes before the meeting starts, most people of the Operating Centre 
representatives are sitting on the side of the room next to the corridor, and the 
door. There are two sets of seats, those directly around the table, and those next 
to the wall.  (The ones nearest to the wall are known colloquially as ‘the cheap 
seats)’. Conversations at this point are light and mainly social, two people are 
talking about football, and two are talking about their children at school.  The other 
attendees at this point appear to be either listening to those other conversations, 
looking at their phones, or preparing their papers for the meeting.  When the Chair 
arrives and everyone has settled themselves down, the room goes quiet and chair 
now moves to the agenda introductions.  The formal introductions round the table 
start with Name, organisation and role. The chair goes back to the agenda but is 
reminded that people in the cheap seats had not introduced themselves. The 
introduction here in the cheap seats is different to those around the table, it is just 
name and organisation. There is at least one military person at the meeting, but 
they are not wearing uniform, but a business suit.  There is one visitor, who hands 
out an A4 sheet that introduces him, his group and their work (Shaw, 2011ac). 
This observation identified two types of conversation, one type that was 
concerned with DE&S functions, and one that was more personal and non-work 
related.  
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Dunbar proposes that in social situations, in order to improve group coherence 
there occurs “social linguistic grooming”, or gossip (Dunbar, 1998).  Dunbar 
excludes formal situations when he uses his definition, but when the same 
evolutionary criteria of group coherence were applied by this research to formal 
work based conversations it appears that a pattern emerged.  It appears that in 
a formal meeting, the trajectory of information content was firstly informal moving 
to formal and then most likely back to be informal again when the formal part of 
the meeting has been completed.  This type of meeting was not a meeting to 
introduce new members to a group, but was a formal meeting which was task 
based.  The socialisation activity that took place was more akin to a group 
coherence activity, with firstly social information being passed, moving on as 
appropriate to functional information.  When the group progressed further into the 
meeting, everyone appeared to be aligned and working together.  This may have 
been because there was a super ordinate goal, or because everyone at the table 
was in some sense, an information professional, or just because most people 
were from one functional so in many ways are aligned to a single functional area 
and perhaps form one psychological group.   
Because the language used in these interactions was not purely social but was 
also functionally and contextually specific, a new term, functional linguistic 
grooming could be applied.  This new term enabled the researcher to account for 
the use of language in this specific context of improving group coherence within 
an organisational and socio-cultural bent.  The finding of this trajectory and its 
information content further reinforced the proposition of this thesis that expands 
Dunbar’s concept of social linguistic grooming, see Dunbar (1998), Dunbar 
(1991), Lehmann et al. (2007).   
It then follows that it may be the case that ‘gossip’ can be categorised into two 
types, that of the social, such as sport talk, or family talk, that promotes social 
coherence, thus falling into what Dunbar calls Social Linguistic Grooming, and 
also a separate type, where the content of the gossip is more task oriented and 
functional, and is designed to promote functional and technical coherence within 
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a work group, and may therefore be, what this thesis calls, ‘functional linguistic 
grooming’.   
This characterisation then expands the suggestion by Foster (2004), (2006), 
Levin and Arluke (1987), Luna et al. (2013), Michelson and Mouly (2000), Noon 
and Delbridge (1993), Rosnow and Fine (1976) who all indicate that, in 
organisations, gossip plays a role in group coherence.  Further, the use of the 
word ‘gossip’ by Foster and others chimes with the work of Dunbar (1998), 
Dunbar (2004), on social linguistic grooming and gossip, one use of which is to 
promote group coherence.   
4.7.6 Informal Language Existed Within Both Formal and Informal 
Activities 
Finding: Informal language as gossip was observed to exist within informal 
and formal group coherence activities. 
The commonality of social, as well as functional group size, was also observed 
in the restaurants and coffee areas:   
‘   But you’ve only got to stand above one of the coffee shops in 
Abbeywood and you can see it.  How many times do you see a table with 
dissimilar shirts?  The bloody idiots in the camouflage gear, the RAF guys 
in their shirts and the Navy in their shirts.  Very occasionally you’ll see 
them.  The chances of you seeing one of each sat down together having 
a coffee were virtually non-existent, judged on my own experience.  I’m 
not across in Abbeywood very often, but you see groups of people and 
that’s just the way they are’ (Shaw, 2011v).   
The group sizes observed in these social situations were predominantly and 
consistently triadic and dyadic.  Occasionally these groups would be more than 
five strong, but close observation of these groups suggested that there would be 
more than one conversation going on at any one time (Shaw, 2010-2014).  This 
implies that when these social groups became larger than five to eight members 
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they broke down into groups of two to three where meaningful conversations were 
enacted.   
Occasionally the drive for company, i.e., a common interest, doing a crossword, 
overcame differences.  It was observed within Operating Centre D, for example, 
that there was a group of three military personnel who went to the restaurant 
every day to do the crossword at lunchtime, the members of this group were 
British Royal Air Force, Australian Army, and British Army,(Shaw, 2010c) partially 
contradicting the view that was observed by the Captain in the Royal Naval 
Reserve quoted above, in relation to group mixing in DE&S.  These informal, 
social groups linked the socio-technical organisation with the socio-cultural.   
These interstitial groups could be characterised as being on a continuum that ran 
between those groups that were fully legitimised and supported by DE&S, such 
as faith groups which had padres, chaplains, and prayer rooms (Shaw, 2010-
2014)  And those that were not, such as the model train group that met monthly 
(Shaw, 2008c).  
Faith groups were seen to be positive; whereas the smokers, who were also 
supported and legitimised by the imposition of smoking shelters and a series of 
rules (DE&S, 2009d, DE&S, 2009c, DE&S, 2009b, DE&S, 2009a, Dumont and 
Louw, 2009, Ilka et al., 2009, Kumar and Matsusaka, 2009, Platek and Kemp, 
2009, Vallejo, 2009) that prescribed where they could smoke, were only tolerated 
(Shaw, 2010-2014).  
In fact, smokers’ groups were heavily managed and could be viewed negatively 
by other team members, both because of the health implications of smoking, but 
also because of the number of smoking breaks that they took during a working 
day, thus being perceived to be away from their desk and not working (Shaw, 
2011b).  But what the smokers were often doing during their breaks was linking 
into the socio-cultural gossip and information exchange networks that existed 
informally in DE&S.  This appeared to be recognised by some senior staff who, 
during times of organisational change might go to the smoking areas to listen to 
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what people were ‘really saying’ (Shaw, 2011y).  By engaging in this form of 
exchange participants again linked the socio-cultural to the socio-technical via 
the concept that is proposed in this thesis, that of functional linguistic grooming.  
Functional linguistic grooming as introduced by this thesis provides group 
coherence as functionally directed gossip.  Both of these language types may be 
used together or separately, and at times each will take precedence.   
The following was an observed, informal coffee meeting that took place in one of 
the Abbeywood Neighbourhood coffee areas.  The cafés or restaurants in 
Abbeywood were all centrally placed, one in each Neighbourhood. In that way, 
an employee could easily pick up a coffee either on their way to their desk, or to 
a meeting, and they could also pop down to get a snack or meal.  Within 
Abbeywood, coffee meetings were socially and functionally accepted.   
A typical meeting goes thus: two or three people will get together, either by email, 
or physically on the floorplate and say something such as ‘fancy a catch up’?  
This meant ‘let’s have a break for moment’.   
The reply was often ‘yes, why not’.  Purses or wallets will be retrieved from desks, 
or perhaps one person would pay for the drinks this time, thus sharing the burden 
and ensuing that the gift is reciprocated. The group would go down to the café 
and buy coffee, tea and perhaps a snack to go with it, chatting all the while.  When 
they get to a table the conversations start in earnest.  Often the conversation 
would start with such as ‘did you watch telly last night?’ or football or sport, 
occasionally it might start with ‘did you hear about x?’ the content would be 
primarily socially based.   
Sometimes, however, the start of the conversation will be as in this example, ‘how 
are you getting on with what you have been asked to deliver?’, thus moving 
immediately into a conversation that is functionally, rather than socially based.  
More often, however, the meeting starts socially, perhaps for the briefest of time 
and then moved onto functional content.  If the functional subject matter was 
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particularly intense, then social matters may be interjected back into the formal 
conversation, the comments often associated with black humour.  
The outcome of these conversations appeared to be that they allowed 
participants to ‘let off steam’, to reassure people if they felt that things were going 
badly, if had done something wrong and had been criticised. 
They therefore acted as mechanisms to promote group coherence through the 
combined use of social and functional linguistic grooming. (Shaw, 2008b). 
4.7.7 Metaphor and the Reality of Language: Families and Tribes 
Finding: Metaphors in DE&S were used to describe groups and how people 
related to those groups. 
Metaphors were used by group members to describe how they related to their 
groups.  The metaphor of family was noted as being used by 40 informants and 
was also noted throughout the research as being used across grades to describe 
a relationship with a group:   
‘….I think of MOD as an extended family….and I suppose I think of my 
team as an extended part of family, so for me it’s a sort of family substitute’ 
(Shaw, 2011u).   
The group that this respondent was in was part of the corporate DE&S, but for 
this respondent, the concept of team and family were linked, thus showing some 
dissonance between the concepts of the para-familial and the para-social,66 in 
that expressed in this way the concept of family is a positive concept, as opposed 
to the other descriptions of tribes that are normalised as negative ways to 
describe groups in DE&S. Throughout the research, the language that group 
members used to describe their relationship with their groups included implicit 
references to group size, for example: 
                                            
66 Para meaning as though it were true but it is not really ‘true’. 
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‘… But it was a small team though; we’re more like a family than a team’ 
(Shaw, 2012e). 
The responses made by interviewees indicated that the metaphor of family was 
associated with a group size which was ‘small’ and also that the small group sizes 
concerned were like many families, and thus were comfortable concepts for 
people to be within.   
The data also suggest that historically pre-DE&S teams and organisations may 
have been viewed by members as being more family-like than DE&S teams were.   
‘…See I don’t feel like a family now, but I did.  I did 20 years ago when I 
knew lots and lots of people and in fact, I knew their families.  Again, going 
back to that sort of small organisation, although it was part of a much 
bigger organisation’ (Shaw, 2011j). 
The respondent, a B1 grade civil servant in Operating Centre H had lost a lot of 
friends to other groups, and was now working in a larger, more impersonal formal 
organisation, as opposed to a smaller, more tightly and socially bonded group 
that had possessed a strong local geographic identity. This may have affected 
the way that he felt about DE&S, potentially making him feel negatively, or 
ambivalent, towards it.   
There may have been several reasons for the prevalence of the family metaphor 
in DE&S, one of which may have been the size of the group to which the metaphor 
was applied, which were usually small groups.  It may also have been used to 
describe how the person felt about the social, rather than the functional nature of 
the relationship that they had with their group, and also their levels of comfort 
within that group.  This may then link the metaphor to the informal, socio-cultural, 
rather than the formal, socio-technical organisation of DE&S, forming a further 
link to emotional intelligence that has been identified previously.  There may also 
be a further reason for the prevalence of this metaphor.  It may have been the 
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case that people who worked with family members may have joined or 
encouraged family members to join because of the job prospects.   
There were in DE&S at the time of the study, for example, in Operating Centre D, 
three true familial partnerships, where both partners worked within the same 
Operating Centre.67  There were also known to be two other families where 
partners worked in different Operating Centres or other parts of the MOD.  There 
was also known to be at that time, one family grouping where children worked in 
different Operating Centres to parents (Shaw, 2010-2014).   
One respondent related how she met her husband walking along the corridor 
(Shaw, 2011e), while another said:  ‘…My mum and dad actually met whilst they 
were working both in the MOD, in one of the outstations’ (Shaw, 2011q).   
The existence of these relationships may have blurred the boundary between 
metaphor and reality, because not only were some groups in DE&S like a family 
but they could also genuinely comprise family members, meaning that people 
may feel more closely bonded with their teams if they have some imagined or 
real, familial relationship within them.   
The use of the combined reality and metaphor of family was also seen within the 
‘wider military service family’.  This concept of the wider family existed in DE&S 
because of the proximity of the military to the civil service there, and also because 
of the stability of the civil service as an employer.  It was not unusual to see 
people being given long service awards for 40 years of service and, on one 
occasion at a retirement, the retiree brought in their apprentice indenture papers 
and was accompanied on their retirement by two of the three people that they 
had joined the MOD with as apprentices, (Shaw, 2011z) who were still working in 
the MOD.   
                                            
67 There may, of course, have been others that the researcher was not aware of, because of the 
implications to the research of gathering this type of personal, sensitive data. 
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A further example of the use of family based metaphors was used in conjunction 
with language such as brotherhood, kinship, and the ‘Band of Brothers’.  This 
metaphor was then transferred into DE&S with, and within, the military personnel 
that were posted into DE&S.   
‘… a good friend of mine...he had nephews of soldiers he’s commanded, 
under his command still, so in other words there’s such a family orientation 
many join and re-join and so there was a very strong family connection, 
they took great pride in what their predecessors had done almost as if what 
their family had done because it’s an extension of the family.  The ethos, 
as a sort of kinship business, a friend of mine, does talk about the broader 
family of the corps and in doing so he had people in his headquarters who 
were responsible for recruiting all the way through giving out benevolence 
to veterans.   I mean, brothers and sisters were close because they share 
the experience of their family.  There is something about a shared 
experience with those that have done things together and the more 
demanding and challenging it was the greater the feeling of brotherhood 
amongst them…’ (Shaw, 2011s). 
The respondent quoted here, a 1* Officer in the British Army, describes some of 
the complexity and factors within relationships in the British Army and how they 
was managed and perpetuated. This appeared to produce a view of shared 
experience that was linked to exclusivity, that there was a para-kinship 
relationship that existed within the military that might discriminate negatively and 
prevent those group members having a more positive relationship with the 
civilians that they worked with and with whom they had a shared experience and 
ethos, as opposed to just a shared culture.   
The direct use of the family metaphor to describe small groups, and also the 
relationship that group members had with their groups, was displayed by the 
actions of group members and also the other metaphors that they used such as 
support: a shoulder to cry on, and parental terms, such as:  ‘now, now, children’ 
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by team-leaders or others to indicate that either emergency banter (Shaw, 2013j) 
had got out of hand or that the group needed to get back to work after having a 
light-hearted moment.   
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4.7.8 Tribe and Tribal Were Vernacularized and Possessed Particular 
Meanings in DE&S. 
Finding: The second metaphor that was in evidence was the use of the word 
tribe and tribal to describe groups and group behaviours.  While group 
members used the word family to describe their teams in a positive manner, 
the words: tribe and tribal had a more negative connotation.   
Some of ‘tribal’ behaviours were reported by respondents, the following response 
was from a C1 grade civil servant in 2010:  
‘…I think there’s a power dynamic going on there and there’s tribalism’ 
(Shaw, 2011k). 
Terms relating to tribe and tribalism were used in relation to group and personal 
position within the DE&S hierarchy.   
This implies that it was perceived that there was a link between identity, 
relatedness to groups, group size, and the groups place in the DE&S hierarchy, 
although this perception may have been sub-conscious:  
‘I think some of the tribalism is driven by the team leaders, that’s my 
opinion’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
The following response confirms the nature of group difference in the MOD, and 
the fact that many respondents saw ‘tribalism’ as being widespread in MOD:   
‘There were particular branches, you could describe the same for the 
Army, or the Air Force, or the Civil Service, you’ve got all sorts of tribes 
within the MOD. So within the workforce of the Ministry of Defence, you 
see all these different, some of them were visible tribal things because 
you’re wearing a different uniform’ (Shaw, 2012h). 
Within the interviews initially there was no direct question about tribes and 
tribalism, because this was construed as being a leading question.  However, it 
became apparent through the unprompted use of these words by respondents 
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that the concept of tribe and tribalism appeared to be important to respondents, 
was prevalent in the vernacular and was explicitly associated with groups and 
group behaviours.   
The use of the words tribe, tribal and tribalism appeared to be more predominant 
than the use of the word family to describe the relationship with, and behaviour 
of a group.  One context in which the metaphor of tribe was used in relation to 
group behaviours in DE&S and appeared to be used to indicate protectionist, 
territorial empire building and non-corporate behaviours:   
‘I guess this was a tribal thing, each of the services compares themselves 
to the other two, and we civilians compare ourselves to them.  That is 
human nature isn't it?’ (MOD, 2011).   
The view quoted above was given in an interview given by a 2* civil servant to an 
internal MOD magazine.  But these behaviours were also seen as being part of 
human nature, and appeared to be driven by social comparison and social 
categorisation:  
‘That’s human nature though and I don’t think that will change. ….  And 
tribal, because we still, although we try not to be adversarial, the nature of 
our business makes us adversarial’ (Shaw, 2011j). 
The importance of the phrase ‘human nature’ and the concept of these 
behaviours being hard-wired into people because they were endemic in DE&S 
chimes Nicholson (2000 p 207).  It suggests that many of the factors that 
appeared to affect group behaviours in DE&S that were unconsciously exhibited.  
The link to those behaviours being hard wired into people, or a sub-conscious 
response, appears to place the use of metaphor to describe behaviour through a 
group and group size characteristic within the field of evolutionary psychology 
and anthropology as a generalizable behaviour, because as Nicholson (2000) 
describes, people are naturally tribal.  In addition, the belief that those factors 
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were hard-wired into people indicates that people were experiencing and/or 
observing those behaviours on a regular basis. 
4.7.9 The Creation of DE&S Did not End the Use of the Tribe 
Metaphor. 
Finding: The creation of DE&S did not appear to change the way the people 
used the metaphor of tribe to describe their group.   
‘I think the bringing together of DE&S might actually make it [tribalism] 
worse.  I saw it more in DLO, although I saw it in DPA I think simply 
because DPA was so stripped down, but you could see it beginning to 
happen in DPA with sort of setting targets in what they used to call cluster 
groups and things like that for performance where you would start to get 
maybe teams trying to complete with teams, other teams to do the best 
and then the clusters trying to compete with clusters rather than everybody 
trying to do’ (Shaw, 2011o). 
This example from an informant in Operating Centre A illustrates the 
organisational factors that had been prevalent in the DPA, and how those factors 
exacerbated the competition between teams.  The same was also related by an 
informant in Operating Centre B:   
‘…I mean, there was a tribal, almost adversarial sometimes, approach in 
DE&S.  Two tribes came together, not because they wanted to, I’m talking 
about the DLO and the DPA.  So that was interesting enough, you still...I 
mean they came together about five years ago, something like that, and 
for a good two to three years people were still ‘oh that’s the old DPA site.’ 
(Shaw, 2011j).   
The organisational legitimisation of making teams compete for resources 
appeared to make people and groups behave in ways that were contrary to the 
ascribed collaborative ways of working that DE&S and also the MOD wanted.   
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This may be as a result of competing for resources being an archaic behaviour 
that Price and Cybulski described as a characteristic of archaic tribes (Price and 
Cybulski, 2007), thus the existence of this type of behaviour may have sub-
cognitively reinforced the feeling that DE&S was a tribal organisation, because 
the tribes had to compete for resources.  
It was also apparent that the terms tribe and tribalism had a heritage in DE&S 
and were in use within the DPA and DLO before DE&S existed.   
‘We have to have, you know, six aircraft carriers because that’s the only 
way, even though the Navy probably think, actually we could probably get 
by with one or two, but if I don’t ask for six I won’t get the two that I want, 
and who cares what the Air Force or the Army want that’s what I need.  
Whereas if they’d broken those tribal barriers down here’s the joint picture 
that’s what we reckon we’d need’ (Shaw, 2011q). 
It also appears that geographic identity was felt by many to have had some 
connection to the existence of the ‘tribe’, as the ability to identify the ‘tribe’ was 
couched in site terms, in addition to functional and behavioural terms.  
Throughout DE&S the predominant theme was that the civil servants thought that 
the military were the tribes, but perhaps that was only because the military were, 
at the time, more visible and cohesive as a group than were civil servants.  
‘… I think when I used it [tribe], It was probably because you’d put the 
service context into my head. I think I’m using it in a context where it’s a 
group of people who’ve taken a conscious decision that they were part of 
this group and being part of the group was one of the principal things that 
defines them.  So if you’re in the RAF you’re a member of the RAF first 
and you work in DE&S second in all likelihood.  And in the same way that 
I might be a civil servant first and work in MOD second or wherever it is.  
So I think that’s the sense in which I was using it and it was principally your 
introduction of the services that set me off on that path’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
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The response was given after the respondent, an SCS 1* had, un-prompted, used 
the word ‘tribe’, and the interviewer then sought to find out exactly what they 
meant by the use of the word, (Shaw, 2011q) and if the respondent could identify 
who were the tribes.  The example reinforces the commonly held civilian view 
that the military were the real tribes in DE&S.   
It also suggests that there was a hierarchy of identity, from DE&S, to Operating 
Centre, to Project Team, to Role Team, that combined with military service and 
professional identities and contributed to a hierarchy of  groups, or in the 
vernacular ‘tribes’ in DE&S that a person could belong to or identify with.  This 
then appears not to fit with the construct of the archaic tribe, where a member 
could only possess membership of one tribe, bringing the definition of the 
vernacular ‘tribe’  that was self-described in DE&S closer to the characteristics of 
a neo-tribe, where a member can possess multiple memberships as proposed by 
for example, Maffesoli (1998) or Price and Cybulski (2007).  The hierarchy of 
identification with a group size that was called tribalism is also shown in the 
following response: 
‘…the people I worked with 20 years ago didn’t see themselves as the big 
organisation, their allegiance was to the depot, that small depot.  Here the 
way we’re...you know if you’re in...you do get allegiances in much 
smaller......if people want to call it tribalism that’s up to them.  I think that’s 
one of the key challenges and it’s the leadership challenge of an 
organisation was to make sure we’re all pulling in that same direction...’ 
(Shaw, 2011u). 
This respondent had oversight of all of DE&S’ activities and had experienced all 
of the other Operating Centres’ behaviours by observation and once again 
makes the distinction between rivalry and tribalism: one being positive, the other 
negative.  From a civilian point of view it appeared that the worst tribalism was 
seen between the military services, because it happened at all times and could 
be politically driven, and only went away when there was a superordinate goal 
 263 
 
 
or mutual benefit to be gained by working together.  The complexity of identities 
and nested groups also appears to indicate that the groups and members may 
have had, depending on function, size and place, different loyalties and 
affiliations that may have all been coherent with the organisational ethos.   
The need to belong to groups, and also the reduction in meaningfulness to 
members as a group becomes larger, is shown by the following response from 
a B2 grade civil servant in Operating Centre C.  They found that the metaphor 
of tribe to be helpful in describing the reality of belonging to a number of groups:   
‘…You need to create tribes, people...we’re pack animals, you know we 
generally work better in teams, there are the few odd individuals that like 
to work on their own, but they still work for getting recognition or 
whatever, they still like to come back to some place and sort of put their 
ideas and suggestions in.  DE&S is quite a big beast to get your head 
around.  You can get your head around, say, the strategic objectives of 
the DE&S, people scoff at the thing of understanding how what you do 
contributes to the achievement of the objectives of the organisation, they 
could be very useful in terms of managing those interfaces between the 
tribes, because you could have individual tribes or whatever, providing 
they were all at some point working to the same goal and the chief of that 
tribe understands that’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
This response appears to once again link the fact that people need to belong to 
groups to being in a ‘tribe’, and that there is an additional concept of ‘home’, the 
coming back to a settled place, indicating that there may be a geographical link 
within the metaphor of the tribe.   
The previous extracts have indicated how metaphor interacted with identity, 
culture, and group size to allow the vernacular concept of tribalism to exist within 
DE&S and that description appeared to apply particularly to military personnel.   
 264 
 
 
The military view of the civil service group behaviour appeared to be completely 
different in that they saw the Civil Service as being more nebulous: 
‘Of course there’s the semi-amorphous mass in the middle of the 
supporting groups, they’re not aligned to Land, Sea or Air they’re aligned 
to the general greater good so in a sense my answer is very output team 
focussed’ (Shaw, 2011q). 
The use of this label by the military may indicate that the military cultures were 
considered to be hard and visible, and having a different identity which was 
manifest through uniforms and formal rules, whereas there appeared to be no 
civil service culture that could be articulated.   
However, civilian groups could also be included in the conceptual label of a tribe.  
A B2 grade civil servant in Operating Centre C showed what appears to be a 
typical view of how the tribes were viewed and also how they fractured, in an 
organisational context:    
‘You could probably say, from a top level the tribes were the RAF, the 
Army and the Navy.  But if you broke it down into like Land area, I’d say it 
even breaks down to teams.  Teams were very tribal, we all like to look 
after ourselves and we all recognize the fact that you feed upwards but it’s 
definitely a ‘this was my team and I’m looking after us’ and tribalism was 
the culture I suspect that goes on within the team’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
The metaphorical and real behaviours that were identified by respondents were 
all linked in some way to the concept of individual identity and identification with 
a group, and how people defined themselves in relation to that group and to other 
groups.  The following respondent was a C1 civil servant in Operating Centre G:  
‘To me there were elements of identity of a group, people belong to you 
know, civilian or military and that type of stuff.  What it means to me was 
people’s careers tend to operate in specific circles which tend to be either 
in environments like the Sea environment, Air environment or maybe the 
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Weapons environment.  There is a competitive friction between the 
services at all times.  Some of that was because of the political mandate 
to keep funding flowing to get different projects going, to keep each one of 
the services in a position of strength.  Although those different tribes can 
work together for what works for them the best, to give them that position 
of strength, they’re not also adverse from [sic]  saying that ‘my project’s 
more important than yours because’.  And they’ll carry on...they’ll be quite 
competitive about that and there’s an element of indoctrination in that’ 
(Shaw, 2011q). 
It was therefore not surprising to hear: ‘Yes because I still see there was still a 
DPA tribe in evidence and a DLO tribe in evidence’ (Shaw, 2011h).  This phrase 
was heard in multiple locations across DE&S between 2008 and 2014 and it 
appeared to be one indicator of the stickiness of the DPA and DLO socio-
technical and socio-cultural cultures and also the longevity of the metaphors that 
were used to describe those cultures and also the concepts of the groups as 
tribes.   
4.7.10 Tribal Cultures or Group Behaviours? 
Finding: Characteristics of the teams as vernacular tribes appeared as a 
specific cultural trait within those groups. 
By using the characterisation of para-tribal characteristics and behaviours as 
described in section 2.7 a series of characteristics and group behaviours 
manifested itself in the day to day workings of DE&S:   
‘…There’s the tribal boundaries if you like, that were purely organisational, 
so you get a ‘well we’re DOSG [Defence Ordnance Safety Group] and our 
mission and goal is...’, whilst at the high level DE&S was the high level 
mission and goals, ours was a subset of that, slightly different to the 
mission and goal that your PT [Project Team] tribe have got.  We’ve got 
different sets and we’re being measured on different things sort of thing, 
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so suddenly if we’re working together on something whilst there’s a 
common goal in the end there’s a bit of a friction there.  If you take it to the 
extreme where it’s actually not a good thing, it’s where people were 
starting to act to the loyalties of their tribe even though they might suspect 
that actually we shouldn’t be doing this because to support that team and 
the broader goal we ought to be doing this and the classic one was when 
you see the tribal fighting if you like in the media or whatever, between the 
three services talking about budget sort of things and so on’ (Shaw, 
2011h). 
This example of the vernacular use of the word tribe to describe a particular set 
of group characteristics and behaviours chimes with previous examples in that it 
shows awareness of the political and financial costs of tribalism to DE&S, and 
also to the wider MOD. The phenomenon of tribalism in DE&S, its precursor 
organisations and also the costs that it incurred were alluded to by the House of 
Commons Defence Select Committee:   
‘……. to prevent the incidence of any disagreements between disparate 
Profit Centres as to which part of the Technical Solution falls within their 
workshare and which does not – thereby promoting better working 
relations between groups of people otherwise divided by tribal loyalties’ 
(Office, 2012).   
In addition to military and Civil Service cultures, groups and their members in 
DE&S could also possess professional cultures based around the function that 
they performed or which they identified with.  These might also come under the 
conceptual category of the tribe.  These group distinctiveness factors have been 
described throughout this thesis and they were also supported by the vernacular 
language, which described these groups and cultures as ‘tribes’, or ‘families’.  The 
use of this language enabled the creation of boundaries between groups, 
highlighting their differences.   
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The following example from a C2 civil servant encapsulates a range of groups 
and culture labels that were found within DE&S:   
‘   Certainly amongst the three services, there’s intense tribalism.  They 
were very parochial.  There’s also to a...what’s the word?...I would say 
lesser extent, various specialisms within the civilian’s side, Contracts 
people stick together because of the commercial nature of their job, all 
people tend to be a very close group.  I worked in Quality Assurance for a 
while which was also very friendly family focussed group, went across IPT 
boundaries because we were functionally reporting to the head of Quality.  
So there’s definitely tribalism in groups’ (Shaw, 2011h).   
It then appears that tribal behaviour appeared to be a cultural norm in DE&S, both 
from socio-technical point of view, but also socio-culturally:  
‘again there’s the whole thing about some people who were very much a 
part of a tribe and never ever come out of it, their whole career was in a 
stovepipe of being commercial or being a project management engineer 
and others who have a looser affiliation and swap badge’ (Shaw, 2012h). 
But not everyone stayed in their function, especially if they were seeking 
promotion where they would both may leave their team and also their peer group 
to move up the organisational hierarchy of DE&S.  In DE&S, the tribe appeared 
to be enacted particularly at an Operating Centre level or 1* level. Tribalism was 
not limited to DE&S, it was also seen as negatively affecting the whole of 
Defence.  Cartoon 4-3 shows how this is portrayed in an in-house magazine.   
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Cartoon 4-3 Tribal Rivalries Portrayed in Vernacular Humour 
Source: MOD, Crown Copyright 
The cartoon illustrates the in-fighting between the military services at the highest 
levels, and by the leaders of each service.  The use of a cartoon in an in-house 
magazine to satirize these behaviours suggests that the behaviours were viewed 
as an integral element within the organisational culture of MOD.  By extension, it 
can be assumed, DE&S must have been affected by them in some way.   
Humour is often subversive and frequently pokes fun at those in authority in an 
acceptable manner, while allowing a serious point to be made.   
Another theme that appeared throughout the responses in connection with the 
metaphor of the tribe and tribalism, was that tribal behaviour could also be used 
to protect the group:   
‘When I worked in IPTs  [ Integrated Project Teams] in the DPA there was 
a strong tribal message about protecting ourselves and our own 
information in particular, [ there were] issues with bending the rules about 
the way business was done.  I would suggest that’s one of the reasons 
why we’re in such a pickle now and it’s become custom and practice just 
to ignore, flout the rules and regulation…’ (Shaw, 2011k). 
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This behaviour might be thought to be somewhat anachronistic within a 
supposedly collaborative organisation that possessed one super-ordinate goal of 
supplying the military.  But reality said otherwise, where people form groups or 
are formed into groups then these groups take on the persona of a tribe as 
defined in section 2.7, but what happens is that they become members of a para-
tribe.   
The response from a B1 grade civil servant below shows how the socio-cultural 
norms within DE&S could work against the socio-technical rules of DE&S, to 
produce unintended effects, in this case by the manipulation and sharing of 
information.   
It may also indicate the underlying behaviours that are presented in Cartoon 4-3  
existed in DE&S.   
‘….  Going back to the power struggle and the fiefdoms, we have tribes.  
We belong to a service and you know the jokes about the fact that those 
in the grey uniform and those who drive a desk etc., we have those sort of 
tribes.  I see a bigger issue with cliques where people were forming these 
little teams, these little fiefdoms and it’s almost like the playground, you 
know, you’re not coming in.  For me, the tribalism was a much more 
culturally steeped environment.   We on this floor-plate could work really 
well as a tribal organisation supporting the big chief and working together 
to the common aim.  These, for me, were positive elements of tribalism, 
it’s when that splits into cliques that you start to get the negative 
influences…’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
The description of groups in DE&S as tribes and their behaviour being seen as 
tribal therefore appears to have been a predominant theme in DE&S.  These 
descriptions were predominantly negative:  
‘…There were groups, Individual tribes, I think, my understanding of it is, 
they have their own ethos, culture, ways of working, language, and you 
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can see that certainly from a military perspective and also the sub military, 
if you go Navy, Air Force and Land. And also within that there’s the various 
military groups, for instance in Land if you’ve got the […], the Royal 
Engineers, the Artillery, they all have their own different cultures as well.  
You know, there’s different features.  From the civilian side I think, .about 
the grades and roles and management levels or tribes let’s say, but the 
competitiveness and the bestiality ….But in terms of tribes, yes, you have 
different cultural groups.  They’re all their own little tribes in their own way.  
It’s a network, a community’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
It also appears as indicated by this informant, a B2 grade civil servant in 
Operating Centre A, that that these groups possessed a series of characteristics 
that included language, culture, and also an ethos which could be consistently 
displayed and which could be used to positively or negatively to enhance the 
reputation of the group. This suggests that the concept of the tribe that was 
recognised by group members may also be associated with group size and 
language.  It also suggests that the concept of the tribe in DE&S may be 
synonymous with both a network and community, rather than just being a label 
for a stable group.   
Functional groups were also, because of their geographical spread, networks of 
members who had worked together and who had known each other socially and 
functionally, even though they may not be closely located in the same office.  This 
concept of the group as a network might also apply to military personnel who 
were posted to different areas on a regular basis, thus splitting up the 
geographically collated tribe, but creating in its stead a more fluid network of 
members.   
Even though some respondents felt that the tribe and tribalism were natural 
states, echoing Nicholson (2000), several responses suggested that these 
concepts were forced on group members through a combination of the DE&S 
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organisational structure and the socio-technical culture, for example this view is 
from a Royal Naval 1*:   
‘…In a way I don’t see DE&S as being tribal, although I think in some 
respects it had been forced to go tribal and you don’t see it directly, but 
you do see it indirectly.  I think, at the moment, there’s possibly not a lot of 
doubt that the MOD sector in headquarters was tribal and you sort of go 
tribal when you’re threatened.  And there’s an Army, Navy, Air Force 
tribalism going on at the moment, of course there is.  But I think in a sort 
of an indirect way it [DE&S] is tribal because there’s the Afghanistan tribe, 
there’s the in a way the Nuclear Safety tribe and there’s the rest.   So I 
think there’s a sort of enforced tribalism and I don’t think that each of those 
areas was openly exercising it’ (Shaw, 2011q). 
It appears therefore, that the DE&S socio-technical culture produced several 
effects that were related to the development of a para-tribal culture, such as 
legitimised social categorisation through the imposition of personal and 
geographic identity and also particular legitimised team sizes.  As these teams 
had to compete for funds it appears that competition for resources may have 
forced teams to behave in ‘tribal’ ways that were not necessarily compatible with 
the DE&S corporate good.   
The drive for group success and economic need appeared to be behind the 
development of tribal behaviours in DE&S, and prior to that the DPA and the DLO.  
It appears that those factors all added to the distinctiveness of groups.  Also, the 
combination of these factors appeared to force teams, who were already in 
evolutionary stable group sizes with defined and identifiable identities and 
boundaries, to exhibit evolutionary, rather than intellectual behaviours, such as 
competing for resources.   
This group size boundary in DE&S also appeared to be coincidental with a 
linguistic boundary that was observed in Operating Centres.  This pattern is found 
in anthropological literature, and described by Dunbar (1993a p 684) Hill and 
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Dunbar (2003 p 67) who indicates that it corresponds with the mega-band or tribe, 
where a linguistic difference is seen to be identified in archaic indigenous groups.  
Therefore there appears to be both consistency in organisational design of group 
sizes in DE&S and also a consistency with a pattern of group sizes that appear 
to be evolutionarily led, that of the group of five members which corresponds to 
Dunbar’s concept of the support clique (Hill and Dunbar, 2003 p 67 ).   
The group size of 500-2500 as tribes and mega-bands also corresponds with the 
primary point at which functional and linguistic differentiation occurred between 
Naval, Army, RAF, or primarily civilian groups.  This appeared to be function or 
domain led because at this level the groups were functionally different, and had 
predominantly a different customer, for example, Maritime, or Land Army outputs 
(DE&S, 2010c).  The language differences that existed at this group size in DE&S 
may be explained by the language of the Army, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air 
Force acting as a differentiator between Operating Centres and Chief of Materiel 
areas.  It is therefore plausible that these factors of group size and language are 
combined at this boundary of the Operating Centre in DE&S.  Dunbar (1993a p 
686) also found those same evolutionary stable group sizes in armies which was 
of particular interest to this thesis because of the proximity of the army physically, 
psychologically, culturally and organisationally to DE&S.   
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4.7.11 Legitimised Tribes 
Finding: The concept of the tribe was legitimised in parts of DE&S, but the 
use of that label was contentious. 
In addition to metaphorical tribes, there were legitimised military tribal networks 
which originally had the remit to maintain a single service ethos in a Joint Service 
Environment:   
‘It’s interesting, we used to have a Tribal Chief.  It used to be an expression 
that we used to apply to a senior naval officer within the organisation who 
used to look after the naval tribe, so sort of actually recognising us as 
different because of our parent service.  But was perhaps a slightly 
unfortunate nomenclature because it did perhaps then provide some sort 
of a framework that cut across the organisational boundaries and the 
delivery boundaries.  But I recognize tribalism going on within the 
organisation now.  And I don’t know, my perception was that it’s more 
marked in other areas, I’m sure that’s a biased position, and I would say 
that probably the bits of the organisation that support the RAF were the 
most tribal, the Army bits coming somewhere behind and the dark blue bits 
perhaps the most broad.  But I’m sure that’s a biased position and I’m sure 
if you asked people of different areas you’d get a different view of that, but 
that just goes to show that there was demarcation and there was a lack of 
understanding.   And the bits of culture which still exist as we’ve mentioned 
from the DPA and the DLO previously were quite strong and these cultural 
identities were very difficult to break down’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
This response is from the Royal Navy Tribal Chief in Operating Centre B.  The 
genesis of the tribal networks scheme belonged to the armed services; the 
scheme was originally created in order to 'maintain a single service ethos in a 
joint service environment’.  The most senior military person in each service in 
Operating Centre B was called the Tribal Chief.  It was then realised that the Civil 
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Service were not covered by this, and so the Civil Service tribal network was 
created.   
The use of the word tribal was thought by group members and also senior 
members of these groups to reinforce group boundaries through a sense of 
difference and otherness.  In 2010 it was realised that the word 'tribal' carried a 
certain amount of ‘baggage’, this mirrors the finding of Cameron and Quinn 
(1999) with their use of the word 'clan', that they synonymised for 'tribe'.   
'The worst connotations, instantly.  I refused to be called the Army Tribal 
Chief when I got here because I said I’m not chief of any tribalism, I don’t 
do tribalism.  We do stuff for the common good not for the good of an 
individual battalion or company or service it’s done for defence.  Tribalism 
for me had connotations to me of those only doing for what’s right for in 
the tribe and not what’s right for the common good.  And I have heard that 
in DE&S you get the tribe together.  And I disagree entirely, we should stop 
it.  That suggests that there were hidden groupings and a hidden society 
that was doing things for their benefit and not for the benefit of everybody 
else.  I’m not the head of any tribalism.  I’ll be a Senior Army Mentor if you 
want, if that’s what it means, but I’m not going to be their only tribal chief…’ 
(Shaw, 2011s). 
The worst connotations of the term ‘tribal leader’ were made clear in this response 
from the formally recognised tribal chief of the Army, although he preferred to be 
called the senior mentor. The Brigadier was thinking corporately by looking at the 
common good, rather than thinking in either a single service way.   
The corporate versus the tribal view was also articulated by the Senior Mentor for 
the Royal Navy: 
‘We’re not formally tribal chiefs; the term tribe and tribal have been 
overtaken by events.  So we call ourselves, I think, Senior Service Mentors 
was the currently agreed term to describe the role that certainly the three 
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service people in that setup prefer.  And I think there’s a tacit 
understanding that the Civil Service have adopted a similar model as the 
three services’ (Shaw, 2011o).   
The term 'Senior Mentor' was used and the tribal network was rebranded in 2010 
to become a mentoring network (DE&S, 2010b).  But the existence of this 
formalised tribal network indicates how tribal behaviour of the military was 
reinforced in this part of DE&S and also in its precursor organisation, the DCSA.68  
It was recognised formally because they worked to negate it.  Over time, these 
mentoring groups became more subtle in their reinforcement of the military and 
civilian groupings.  The Civil Service ‘tribal’ scheme was, from an organisational 
point of view, intended to develop the mentee, implicitly socio-culturally, to make 
them a better civil servant in their current position, and also to prepare them for 
different, often more senior roles. The informant is the Civil Service senior mentor:  
‘So shall we start with Civil Service tribe bit?  I think you’re probably getting 
the same message from, or you will if you haven’t already, but I’m sure 
you have from the Army, that none of us like the Tribal or the Chief.   We 
view it as counterproductive.  The tribe, because it’s...there’s that sense of 
being a group that’s exclusive to others where we want to be inclusive.  
And the Chief was too hierarchical and it’s not inclusive and embracive or 
a community sense.  The Brigadier’s [who is the Senior Army Mentor/Tribal 
Chief] sense was that the Army and the RAF and the Navy have got a 
sense of identity, but the Civil Service had less so and I’d like you to look 
at trying to create this greater sense of community ….because it’s not 
intuitive to me that there’s a tribal...there’s a tribe here, because there’s 
lots of groups here and compared to the services, if you’ve talked to the 
Brigadier…., there’s a very powerful reason for why they have the tribe 
and I wouldn’t want to express what he would say but the way that we 
looked at it in the past was the military tribal chiefs, their role had  been to 
                                            
68 Defence Communications Services Agency. 
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help people either on detachment to ISS (Information Systems and 
Services), away from their main group, the Army or the Navy, because 
they’ve often felt a bit left out, undervalued, not kept in contact with what’s 
going on in main service and needing someone to represent them with the 
manning authorities…’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
This interview with the first Civil Service Tribal Leader was conducted just before 
his retirement from the Civil Service.  The existence of the Civil Service tribal 
scheme appeared that there were hard and recognisable identities for each of 
the military services, but that the Civil Service did not have that same sense of 
identity.  The existence of the Civil Service tribal scheme may provide part of the 
answer as to how Civil Service identity was developed in this part of MOD.  This 
response echoes the responses from the other senior mentors, that the labels of 
tribe and tribalism were negative.  Historically, the tribal networks had been used 
to ‘maintain a single service ethos in a joint service environment’, thus reinforcing 
groups boundaries and distinctiveness, primarily of the military and between the 
military and the civil servants.   
As we have seen, this had, over time, been perceived as ‘wrong’, and since the 
inception of DE&S the tribal leader identity label and role had been changed to 
promote a more corporate world-view.   
These negative aspects appear to have led to the labelling, and also the ethos, 
of the tribal networks changing to becoming mentoring organisations, with the 
aim of supporting the equality of treatment of military staff, rather than purely 
preserving a military ethos in a civilian environment.   
There were many other changes that occurred in DE&S, but the tribes still 
appeared to exist as a result of cultural drag form the DPA and the DLO and also 
from the military (Shaw, 2014e). 
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4.8 Conclusions That Arise From Chapter Four 
Section 4.8 draws some conclusions from the findings that were reported in in 
Chapter Four.  The concept of identity in DE&S was expressed on the person 
through clothing, lanyards and badges, geographically and also through the 
corporate use of space as an adjunct to personal and team space as shown in 
sections 4.3 and 4.4. It was also expressed though group dialects and distinct 
functional languages that each group possessed as shown in section 4.7  
This multi-level and nuanced approach to identity appeared to lead to multiple 
boundaries being created between Operating Centres, Project Teams, and Role 
Teams and between members, especially between the uniformed military 
personnel and the non-uniformed civil servants.   
The asymmetric implementation of dress codes between military personnel and 
civil servants appeared to create tension between the different groups, and 
between the military culture, of being uniform, and the Civil Service where no 
uniform was mandated. 
This then showed that dress was used to create a negative out-group, which in 
turn appeared to lead to dress and uniform being used as a proxy to express 
discontent about changes in terms and conditions in the British Army, with the 
blame for those changes being put onto civil servants as shown in section 4.3.8.  
There appeared to be a trajectory to the manifestation of identities in DE&S that 
started prior to the creation of DE&S on the 1st of April  2007 when the DPA and 
the DLO merged (MOD, 2006). This trajectory involved the creation of a ‘One 
DE&S’ identity that resulted in tension when the old identities of the DPA and the 
DLO were removed.  At this time, employees appeared not to want or recognise 
that new identity as shown in sections 4.3.8 and also 4.3.2.   
Lanyards were a flexible symbol of identity in the new DE&S but they were not 
universally accepted, and so lanyards could become a divisive rather a unifying 
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factor. In addition to lanyards, badges and brooches were used as symbol of 
identity and these symbols could also be divisive among groups.  This division of 
identity between groups appeared to be exacerbated by the DE&S corporate 
branding team allowing Operating Centres to develop and retain their own 
identities.  This fragmentation of identity may have been one of the factors that 
allowed DE&S to be a multi-organisational cultural organisation as shown in 
sections 4.3.6 and 4.3.7.    
The ‘One DE&S’ identity that was developed at the time of the merger extended 
through the implementation of corporate branding guidelines.  That branding 
identity extended to labels that indicated the function and location of teams. While 
these labels were of the same graphical pattern, the language that was used on 
them was idiosyncratic to the team.  This indicated a further split in the corporate 
identity, as the acronyms that were used on the labels may not have been 
understood by people outside those groups, thus creating a further group 
boundary and adding to the group divisions, as opposed to enabling the single 
identity that was envisaged as shown in section 4.3.3. 
Where identity was expressed in relation to group size, it appeared to be a 
consistent factor during the research that group members identified more strongly 
with smaller groups, such as their Role Team, than they did with larger ones.  
They therefore had difficulty in identifying positively with DE&S as it was such a 
large organisation and many people appeared to be unclear as to its purpose, 
leading to people delaminating from DE&S.  On the other hand team-members 
could identify positively with their role team or the front line as they were more 
clear as to the function of those groups; also, within their role team they had 
formed social relationships and knew more people in that group than they did 
across DE&S, which may have coloured a member’s view of the organisation. 
This was shown in section 4.5   
In addition to the existence of group labels, there was a hierarchy of territorial 
identity marking that followed the group size hierarchy in DE&S, from corporate, 
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down to the personal desk level, marking personal space via a series of symbolic 
and pragmatic artefacts.  This was shown in section 4.4.   
This marking of territory appeared to act to delineate between groups, both in a 
pragmatic way, so that by looking at the artefacts and architecture a group 
member would know where there were, but also in a symbolic way, where a team 
might use some of their equipment to mark territory.  Territory marking thus 
became another way of creating an in-group and out group was allowed at a 
corporate and team level. However, at a desk level territory marking was explicitly 
against DE&S corporate rules, yet it went on.  This was shown in section 4.4.1.  
The existence of territory marking in this way appears to indicate that the socio-
cultural organisation was capable of ignoring and subverting the aims of the 
socio-technical organisation. That is if people did not want to follow the socio-
technical rules, there were ways to avoid them. Their management did not 
manage the person or the rules effectively or provide appropriate sanctions for 
not following organisational policy. This was shown in section 4.4.1.   
Therefore, the socio-cultural appears to have been more powerful than the socio-
technical.   
In terms of personal, as opposed to corporate or team level, or geographical 
identity, the lack of desk space and inequitable treatment of staff could also lead 
to both super-competitive behaviours between staff over desks and also to a level 
of staff dis-engagement over not having a desk. This was shown in section 4.4.2.   
This appeared to be because people define themselves, and may also be defined 
by others by where they sit, either in physical terms, or by how close they may sit 
to other people such as leaders. Position and visibility both, therefore appeared 
to be culturally significant, reflecting ideas of both power distance.   
The flexi-desking policy also appeared to lead to frictions within teams over who 
is sitting in a particular place, or by who is allowed to use ‘that desk’. It appears 
then that the perceived benefits to the user of flexi-desking such as being able to 
 280 
 
 
have more flexible conversation and build networks with other people, are more 
difficult to create.  Indeed the main benefit of this way of working is apparently 
biased towards DE&S, the organisation, as opposed to an individual because it 
can get more people onto the floorplates without having to buy more office space, 
without realising that the frictional costs are borne by the user.  Activities such as 
spending time finding a desk, or finding the person who ‘usually sits there, but 
isn’t there today’, wasted in non-productivity (Shaw, 2013s).  This was shown in 
section 4.4.2.   
It was apparent in DE&S that when group members were asked with whom they 
identified with that identity was expressed in two directions in DE&S, that of the 
organisation as a whole and the Role Team and the front-line.   
Also even though there was no clear view of one identity being stronger than 
another across all grades, it appeared that the strength of identity with the front-
line was stronger than was identification with DE&S, as shown in section 4.5.   
This indicates that at that time, the concept of the ‘One DE&S’ identity was not 
accepted by all group members and it also indicates that there was an ethos in 
place whereby employees were there to support the ‘front line’ and that the 
existence of DE&S appeared to be a necessary evil.  
Identity, therefore, formed one element of group distinctiveness in DE&S, 
enabling group members to create in-groups and out-groups, as a result of 
naturally occurring and organisationally legitimised social categorisation and 
fragmentation of the groups.   
DE&S was a Project Team organisation and was broken down functionally into a 
hierarchy of groups.  The group sizes that were found in DE&S appeared to 
closely match those proposed by the evolutionary anthropologist Dunbar (2003 
Figure 1), and Hill et al. (2008).  Project Teams appeared to follow a linear pattern 
up to group sizes of 40, with the break points being at groups of 5 members, with 
the maximum group size of a team falling at between 120 and 140 members, thus 
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matching closely Dunbar’s cognitive maximum for a group and also the base 
pattern of five members. This was shown throughout section 4.6. 
The larger groups in DE&S were observed to be between 500 to 2500 group 
members.  Dunbar labels these group sizes as mega-band (500 members) or 
tribe (at 1500-2500 members), Dunbar (1993a p 684) (Hill and Dunbar, 2003 p 
67). These numbers coincide with group sizes where linguistic difference is 
identified in archaic tribes (Dunbar, 1993a p 684) (Hill and Dunbar, 2003 p 67) 
And, indeed, in DE&S, linguistic boundaries were observed at  the similar sized 
Operating Centre level, where the Operating Centre is Ships, or Land Equipment 
based.   
There was an additional group size boundary at which language changed. That 
was within the 1* level groups of between 150 and 500 which corresponds to 
Dunbar’s label of a clan and mega-band (1993a p 685).  Groups of above 160 
members were not recognized as teams, being called groups, or when larger, 
Operating Centres.  
 Also, it appears that anecdotally, when groups grew to larger than 120 members 
they became unmanageable, and these group sizes appeared to be comparable 
with Dunbar’s concept of the clan (1993a p 685).  It thus appears that evolutionary 
factors that are associated with the natural formation of groups may have affected 
the organisational culture of DE&S.   
The organisational proximity of the military to the civilians may have influenced 
structural criteria, such as the design of DE&S organisational structures, and may 
in turn have had some effect on group behaviour and the organisational culture 
of DE&S.   But on the other hand, because of the similarity and also the 
consistency of the group sizes in DE&S compared to other organisations, the 
organisational design process that was used across DE&S and the similarity in 
the functional group sizes that were identified across DE&S, it may perhaps be 
the case that organisational design may have been at least influenced by 
evolutionary factors.   
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Therefore, with regard to group size in DE&S, through organisational design, 
DE&S management allowed and legitimised functional group sizes that mirrored 
the size of groups that people create naturally as social groups.  These group 
sizes appear to have been evolutionarily predicated, and it therefore appears it 
was unconsciously driven, leading to a cognitive bias towards these group sizes 
appearing within the organisational design.   
Also, the way group members described their groups, and how they related to 
their group changed depending on the size of the group to which a group member 
was referring.   
This may then have affected the culture and behaviour of the group, and led 
group members to believe that they were in vernacular tribes because of the 
conjunction of the factors of the identity of the legitimate group sizes, symbols, 
language and evolutionary factors of the groups that they inhabited.  But because 
these groups possessed those characteristics, they were in fact in para-tribes as 
described in section 2.7. 
Chapter 4 has presented some of the attributes of the groups that were 
discovered in DE&S.  Chapter 5 now presents some observations on the 
integration of group members into those groups and how that might have affected 
the organisational culture of DE&S.   
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5 Integration, Dis-integration and Organisational 
Culture 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 has presented findings, data and analysis on some of the attributes of 
the groups that were found in DE&S.   
Chapter 5 reports the research findings, data and analysis on integration of 
members as formal induction, informal socialisation, and team-building.  It also 
presents the research findings on cultural drag as defined in section 2.3.   
5.1.1 Navigation  
Section 5.2 describes Strand 1:  Formal socialisation into groups via ‘induction’ 
that was described through DE&S policy.  This was primarily a socio-technical 
integrative practice.   
Section 5.3 describes Strand 2:  Informal socialisation which appeared to be 
primarily peer driven.  
Section 5.4 describes Strand 3:  These were activities that were labelled and 
characterised throughout DE&S as ‘team-building activities’.   
Section 5.5 describes some elements of the organisational culture of DE&S.  It 
also describes some of the cultural drag that was observed in DE&S because of 
a lack of organisational induction into DE&S when it was created.   
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5.2 Strand 1: Induction 
5.2.1 Introduction  
Section 5.2 is structured to show examples of, and discussion of, inductions that 
were experienced by respondents or observed during the research and also the 
policy and organisational instruments that formalised induction in DE&S.   
5.2.2 Induction into DE&S on its Formation in 2007 
Finding: When DE&S was created, insufficient effort was put into 
establishing the new DE&S organisational culture, leading to the new 
culture not breaking away from the old cultures to become distinct from the 
DLO and DPA organisational cultures.   
The following respondent, a C1 grade civil servant was a member of the group 
that was responsible for managing the formation of DE&S:   
‘now I originally said none, but of course thinking about that there was a 
lot of...with the formation of DE&S there was a lot of briefings and other 
events and stuff like that, not formally called induction, but if you want to 
look at it in the broadest possible sense, that was what it was attempting 
to do’ (Shaw, 2011p). 
This response showed that there appeared to be only an implied, as opposed to 
an explicit formal induction for the general population of the DPA and the DLO 
into DE&S on its inception.  A Royal Navy Captain, a Team Leader in Operating 
Centre E elaborates on what he witnessed at the time of the merger:   
‘And I also did obviously the standard stuff that we all had to do on the 
formation of the DE&S.  Which I have to say was limited and that was 
something I, certainly, was aware of and felt that they’d done insufficient 
to establish a new regime within the DE&S… I remember when the DPA 
formed, and we formed up IPTs [integrated Project Teams] the break-
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through process was quite a considerable process.  It disrupted our 
business very considerably over a quite a lot of weeks.  We spent probably 
half of our time out of the office over those periods and did actually really 
make a significant effort and put a significant amount of resource into 
establishing that new culture which probably led to the success of IPTs 
because it was a different culture.  Whereas when we formed the DE&S, 
there was a sort of self-help system to monitor your progress, but there 
wasn’t very much ability to do anything positive. There wasn’t the resource 
either in time or money or external assistance provided to do anything 
other really than change the badges on the day’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
The Captain also provided thumbnail sketches of the cultural types, and the 
manifestations of a lack of organisational change that he had observed while 
working within the precursor organisations to DE&S.  During the interview, he 
accessed both his old identities and also indicated the existence of a slowness of 
staff to adjust to the new organisation to explain the process, practice, and 
shortcomings of staff induction into the new culture of DE&S.   
The paucity of induction at the time of the merger of the DPA and the DLO was 
compared negatively by him to the socio-technical induction, called ‘break-
through’ that they had experienced at the creation of the DPA.69   
The experience of this period supports the view of Littlefield (2000), who 
described the practicalities of the ‘break-through’70 processes, and also their 
effect on groups within the DPA.   
A common theme that was expressed by informants suggests that induction into 
DE&S, at the time of the merger appeared to be inconsistently experienced and 
practised, it was also often not recognized as induction either technically or 
                                            
69 1 April 1999. 
70 Break-through was the jargon word for inducting teams in to the construct of the DPA.  It was used to 
develop an ethos and socio-technical culture for the DPA that enabled group members to be distinct 
from the DLO and other organisations because it brought group members into the concept of the 
Integrated Project Team, the IPT.   
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socially.  For example, a C2 civil servant in Operating Centre G: ‘DE&S held some 
induction interviews, sorry, presentations’ (Shaw, 2011m)  reinforces the view that 
induction into DE&S at that time was implied rather than explicit. 
These perspectives of the experience of the socialisation of group members into 
DE&S when it was created in 2007 are all consistent and encapsulate themes 
that were found throughout the responses.  They also show that, throughout 
DE&S, induction into DE&S from the DPA and the DLO at the time of the merger 
was inconsistent.  It appears then that the inconsistent experience of the induction 
of group members who were in the DPA and the DLO, and were merged into 
DE&S on its creation, may have also have been a reason for the slow pace of 
change from the old to the new in DE&S.  In terms of practice, induction into 
DE&S at the time of the merger was directed predominantly at 1* level and above, 
where DE&S was designed to that level, and described in organisational 
diagrams.  Below 1* level, it was left to the discretion of the 1* leaders to describe, 
build and induct their own organisations as they saw fit.  In Operating centre A, 
for example, there was no work carried out below the 1* level to induct people 
into DE&S as at that time it was thought that ‘everyone was too busy to take part’ 
(Shaw, 2007-2010). 
The organisational culture of DE&S at that time appeared to be viewed by 
respondents as a monolithic construct, because there existed the expressed 
concept of ‘One DE&S’.  The political ethos that had been given to DE&S prior to 
its inception was only one indicator of this new culture.  Political and functional 
elements formed the socio-technical axis of the DE&S organisational culture.   
But neither of the required culture changes occurred in the way that was 
expected.  What happened was that through DE&S allowing multiple 
organisational cultures to persist from the DPA and the DLO and also where 
Operating Centres were allowed their own identities, a fractured, multi-
organisational cultural DE&S appeared to arise, instead of the ‘One DE&S’.  The 
primary cultures of the DLO and the DPA became subsumed within a weak 
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overarching DE&S organisational culture.  One of the reasons for this occurring 
appeared to be because of the lack of induction into DE&S at the time of the 
merger.   
It should be noted here that, in the DPA, all induction activity that occurred at 
levels above the Role Team level was stopped in 2006 (Shaw, 2006) as a result 
of the preparations for the merger with the DLO to form DE&S.  At that time it was 
thought that induction would not be useful into an organisation that would only be 
in existence for 12 months (Shaw, 2007b).   
It was therefore the case that on vesting day 2007 when DE&S officially came 
into being, there was no formal induction into DE&S, and therefore the only 
changes that were apparent to staff was symbolic, rather than pragmatic.  These 
were, for example, a new flag, letterheads and lanyards, all of which were as a 
result of the imposition of a DE&S branding policy DE&S (2012).  The imposition 
of symbolic identities did not necessarily mean that there would be a change of 
behaviour within the organisation.  In fact, it appears that a negative effect 
resulted from the imposition of new identities onto group members.  It also 
appears that there was very little immediate change in personal or group 
behaviours in DE&S, as a result of people not being socialised into the new 
culture of DE&S.   
It was not until 2009, two years after the creation of DE&S that a corporate DE&S 
PowerPoint™ presentation induction (DE&S, 2009c) was created as a result of 
DE&S policy (DE&S, 2009d), it was a further two years before induction policy 
was refreshed in 2011 (DE&S, 2011b).71   
                                            
71 Until 2013 there was no other induction at a DE&S level.  This new level of induction was created in 
response to the hiring of approximately 1500 new staff as part of the ‘interim structures’ programme for 
DE&S.  The research does not discuss the utility of this induction. 
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It is because of this lack of general policy that sections 5.23 and 5.2.4 describe 
induction o specific groups and situations, and not through the eyes of a general 
member of staff.  
5.2.3 Formal Induction Policy In DE&S 
Finding: DE&S had an organisational policy on induction into teams and 
other groups, and expected people to be inducted into those groups and 
into their role.  
Formal induction in DE&S was set out through policy rules and guidance (DE&S, 
2009d, DE&S, 2009c, DE&S, 2011b).  The induction policy described a series of 
outcomes, one of which was that DE&S expected induction of new group 
members to be completed within 6 weeks of them joining DE&S: 
“Departmental: MOD Induction – All new entrants to MOD to complete within 2 
weeks of joining.   
Organisational: DE&S – to be completed by all new entrants to DE&S within 6 
weeks of joining. 
Team Level: (includes local site briefings) – to be completed on taking up 
appointment. 
Line Management: – on taking up appointment,”.  
This policy indicates that DE&S required group members to achieve role 
competence and technical and professional proficiency within a comparatively 
short time (DE&S, 2009d Section 3, DE&S, 2011b).  Thus it would appear that 
one meaning of the value of induction to DE&S was of the new group member 
becoming functionally competent as quickly as possible.  This outcome appears 
to confirm the socio-technical nature of induction in DE&S.   
There was no evidence of how this role competence was measured.  For 
example, it would have been useful to know, as a manager, how much the 
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newcomer understood about their new role and how effectively they were able to 
perform it after, for example, one month and then six months into a new post.   
Instead of this, induction at all levels in DE&S included evaluation purely as a 
process adherence measure.  This was also carried out by the inductee’s 
manager in a Role Team using checklists to ensure that the mandated induction 
activities had been carried out, for example, ‘a check list of activities to undertake 
e.g. shared area, processes, fire alarm etc, and groups/ individual introductions’ 
(Shaw, 2011ad).   
Throughout formal induction practice in DE&S, the measurement of induction was 
achieved through a discussion between the new group member and their line 
manager of the process of new group member’s induction and progress in the 
group. It was therefore a subjective measurement.  If induction policy was 
adhered to, the new group member would answer the questions that were 
contained within the induction presentation (DE&S, 2009c), but it was observed 
that the cultural norm in many Operating Centres in relation to induction was that 
the asking of questions and the gathering of feedback was often ignored (Shaw, 
2012j)  This then appeared to lead to feelings that formal induction was not valued 
as an organisational process in DE&S.   
5.2.4 Levels of Induction into DE&S  
Finding: There were different levels of induction that coincided with the 
hierarchical position of the group. 
There were inductions into DE&S as staff, induction into DE&S as graduates and 
apprentices, and there was a separate process for military personnel.  Examples 
of these are now presented, starting with the induction into DE&S.  Induction 
practice varied from group to group in DE&S, and also by the hierarchical position 
of the induction, whether it was at an Operating Centre Level, a Project team, or 
a Role Team induction.   
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The induction into DE&S as an organisation was a PowerPoint™ presentation 
that was expected to be read by the group member at their desk.  
In contrast, the induction into the Abbeywood site was a formal presentation given 
by subject matter experts (Shaw, 2010l). Induction practice into Role Teams was 
diverse.  For example, even within one Operating Centre, the following responses 
show differences in approach: 
‘Induction pack, introduction to team, familiarisation walk of the site and a 
buddy, from what I can recall all very helpful.  Also a check list of all 
mandatory training and induction events that I needed to complete which 
was reviewed after a month’ (Shaw, 2011ad). 
‘Introduction to team members, H&S,72 tour of area, using computer.  I was 
given a welcome pack and introduced to the team on my first day. My line 
manager also took me through various site information’ (Shaw, 2011ad). 
‘A check list of activities to undertake e.g. shared area,73 processes, fire 
alarms etc. and groups/ individual introductions’ (Shaw, 2011ad). 
‘E-pack describing all the parts of the organisation, where I fitted in and 
detailing email addresses, phone numbers etc’ (Shaw, 2011ad). 
‘Shown around floorplate, introduced to team and shown around 
compound and shown fire escapes and assembly points, introduced to the 
team’ (Shaw, 2011ad). 
‘Mandatory training, fire procedures team member introductions, shown 
the weapon I support and given a detailed description of how it functions 
through videos and shown videos of weapon in use’ (Shaw, 2011ad). 
It appears, therefore, that even within a single Operating Centre there were 
multiple interpretations of DE&S policy.  It appears also that Role Team induction 
                                            
72 Health and Safety. 
73 Electronic Information storage area.  
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in that Operating Centre appeared to be congruent with technical policy, had 
utility, and was meaningful to those who experienced it, even though the 
individual teams carried out the process and practice differently.  In terms of 
timescales, induction and integration in Role Teams appeared to be carried out 
within the first week of a new member joining the group.   
Role Team induction in DE&S might therefore be characterised as providing the 
following benefits: basic technical knowledge of the organisational rules at that 
level, of the team, the development of close, working level relationships that 
sustain good team work.  Role Team induction also appeared to provide 
knowledge to the job–holder of how they should perform their role, and for the 
Line Manager, knowledge that the new group member could perform their role, 
and for the team, trust that the new group member would fit in technically with the 
team. There appears to be no information about how, or the effort made, to 
integrate a new group member into their new team socially.   
5.2.5 Graduate and Cohort Based Entry Schemes 
Finding: Graduate entry schemes were viewed by scheme members as 
being inconsistent in their approach to induction into DE&S, in doing so 
they appeared to engender expectations mis-match. 
In total, five randomised interviews were carried out with members or recent ex-
members of graduate or apprentice entry schemes to DE&S.   
‘All of my pre–conceptions were completely wrong. I was fairly convinced 
that the MOD.  I knew exactly what they wanted out of their graduate 
trainees.    And then when I joined it took me approximately two months to 
realise that all of my preconceptions about how things were run were 
completely wrong and in fact nobody really knew what they were doing.  
Here I am, I’ve jumped through all these hoops, I’ve just joined up and now 
they don’t necessarily know what to do with me and indeed I don’t know 
what I’m meant to be doing either’  (Shaw, 2011h). 
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We see in the response from this graduate that an expectations mis–match was 
realised between the new entrant and their expectation of DE&S, and recognized 
within two months of crossing the boundary and joining DE&S.  This negative 
experience of the induction of graduates was not unique:   
‘…It was a graduate induction; we spent one week in a conference centre 
in Bath and another sort of team-building week, so that was very good.  
But it   wasn’t delivered by DE&S, so it wasn’t a DE&S induction.  It was a 
MOD [graduate scheme74] induction’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
Also,  
‘When I first joined DE&S I’m sure that there was a health and safety, do 
this course, fill in this form to register for this, but not particularly about 
what DE&S was as an organisation.  Because it was assumed that had 
been covered on the graduate induction’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
But this was also an induction into MOD, not into DE&S, which appeared to differ 
from the expectations of this informant.  Further confirmation of the inconsistency 
of induction practice on graduate schemes was provided by the following 
graduate informant, in Operating Centre G:  
‘…We were met at the reception by one of the people that we’d dealt with 
in the past.  We’d been here for a [MOD] pre-induction, so we’d signed the 
Official Secrets Act so we knew...we recognized faces, you don’t really 
remember names, it was a bit of a foul up really because of people not 
turning up and there were guys there on day one and, you know, where’s 
my boss, so a lot of running around and sorting that out, so that kind of...I 
thought it’d be a bit more organised than that…’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
This interviewee related the same themes as the previous graduate entrants, but 
they were a member of the commercial graduate scheme, rather than the 
                                            
74 Scheme anonymised. 
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engineering graduates’ scheme.  This indicates that there was a consistency 
across graduate schemes that induction was inconsistent and not as good as it 
was expected to be.  Once again, there was a MOD induction, but no DE&S 
induction.  This indicates that there was a consistency in the lack of induction into 
DE&S across the different graduate entry schemes.  It also appears that, for the 
first informant, there was no direction as a new group member as to what ‘they’, 
meaning that he, and his Line Manager, were supposed to be doing in terms of 
integrating him into the team, either socio-culturally or socio-technically:   
‘The first placement, I don’t know if you’re familiar with the way [the 
scheme] runs or the placement structure, you’re brought in to do a series 
of six placements over a period of two years.  Though in practice you can 
extend some of them to about six months and therefore maybe do a 
minimum of four placements.  They pick the first one for you based on an 
engineering systems anchor, or ESA, and mine was [an area].  And they 
put me into the [team name].  Immediately I got on very well with the team 
itself, very friendly chaps, but I think the real problem I had was I didn’t 
really know what I was meant to be doing.  I wasn’t given very good 
direction as to what my intended sort of outcomes, my roles and 
responsibilities were meant to be.  I couldn’t look to the [the scheme] 
training office for help on this; they didn’t know.  I couldn’t really look to the 
people I was working with for help on this because they too weren’t 
necessarily sure what to do with me.  So for three months I picked up work 
here and there, but felt very adrift I think in the organisation’ (Shaw, 2011j). 
This respondent was expecting a trajectory of placements, but because the 
people managing him into the team did not know what to do with him, he did not 
receive the integration that he was expecting.  Expectations mis-match between 
graduates and DE&S also appeared to occur where MOD used actors in the 
graduate assessment exercises instead of real civil servants:   
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‘The assessment centre was set up in such a way that you got a very 
professional image of the employees of DE&S and the MOD, but of course 
I was later told that was because the people they employ to do the 
employment assessment centre were actors working off a script’ (Shaw, 
2011j). 
It therefore appears that the expectation that this graduate had developed from 
the initial contact with the Graduate Entry Scheme on pre–socialisation was that 
it would result in MOD knowing ‘exactly what they wanted people to do’. (Shaw, 
2011j). This statement was engendered by both the reputation of MOD and 
through the quality of the pre-socialisation material, because the Graduate Entry 
Scheme was in the top 10 for Engineering Employers and also ‘got a very 
professional image of the employer, MOD’ (Shaw, 2011j).  But the employees at 
the assessment centre were not real employees, they were actors (Shaw, 2013t). 
MOD might therefore be said to be creating a false impression in order to attract 
applicants.   
Two of the graduate informants were members of the Engineering Graduates 
Scheme, but who worked in different Operating Centres.  Their experiences 
appear to corroborate the existence of several things: a specific graduate 
induction, a temporal boundary and inconsistency in the application and 
experience of the technical induction, and the fact that it was only an induction 
into the MOD, there was no induction into DE&S.   
It therefore appears then that graduate induction schemes could be inconsistent 
in their induction of graduates into DE&S, because of what appears to be a lack 
of consistent application of DE&S policy by DE&S staff, whereas induction into 
the MOD which was part of the graduate schemes appears to be successful.  
It could be said that graduate induction was consistent in its inconsistency, each 
group carried out induction consistently in their own way, but the different systems 
were not harmonised.   
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Finding: In addition to graduate entry schemes, there were also apprentice 
entry schemes and these schemes appeared to be inconsistent in their 
approach to induction.  
‘I don’t think it was quite substantial enough because there was a steep 
learning curve, learning things like how to do travel bookings and holidays.  
There’s a lot to learn just about how to work here… but we had a week 
spent having health and safety briefs, getting to know other apprentices’ 
(Shaw, 2011h). 
The example provides a differing view of induction, and appears to chime with 
the general theme that was expressed by the graduate entrants.  It was provided 
by an apprentice entrant to DE&S, working in Operating Centre D.  Apprentice 
inductions involved a longer period of socio-technical formal induction than 
graduate schemes, but it still appeared to be insufficient for new group members 
to understand the functional rules within DE&S, such as, for example, booking 
leave.   
Apprentices also spent time getting to know other apprentices, thus building 
relationships within the group, which helped to build a cadre of apprentices that 
possessed a degree of coherence and identity as a group that was separate to 
their Operating Centres and Role Teams.  But even then, this respondent said 
later that he did not think that this induction was quite ‘substantial enough’. (Shaw, 
2011h). This response adds weight to the conclusion that technical induction for 
graduates and also apprentices was inconsistent across all schemes, breaking 
down when they left their graduate entry scheme induction to join DE&S.  
The elapsed time of a week for a formal induction mentioned by this respondent 
chimes with many other responses about the length of time that new group 
members were given to be formally inducted into groups. This time of a week 
provides further evidence of a boundary between formal induction finishing and 
informal socialisation and integration practice within DE&S taking precedence.   
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The boundary differs to DE&S policy, because DE&S induction was expected to 
take a month to complete.  This shows further inconsistency in the practice and 
experience of formal socio-technical induction in DE&S.   
There was also at this time up to a 50% attrition rate from graduates leaving those 
schemes (Shaw, 2012c).  This attrition rate seems form the interview material to 
be related to the expectations mis-match between the individual graduate and the 
corporate DE&S (Shaw, 2012c).  These responses correspond to the findings of  
(Garavan and Morley, 1997, Scholarios et al., 2003) and others, where 
expectations of graduate entrant to organisations have not been met, .   
It then appears from the data provided, that the formal induction of civilians and 
graduates into DE&S and its teams was inconsistently practised and 
experienced.  If it was good, it was very good and was meaningful to those that 
experienced it, however, if it was not good it was likely to be negatively received 
by inductees.  The result of this may have been that new group members may 
not have felt welcome in their new teams, and they also may have felt that they 
could not perform their new role as well as their manager, or their peers would 
have liked them to perform it.   
  
 297 
 
 
5.2.6 Induction and Integration of Military Personnel into DE&S 
Military personnel formed approximately 10% of DE&S staff and when they joined 
DE&S from military establishments as part of the posting cycle they were also 
subject to a form of induction and socialisation into DE&S which was specific to 
them.   
Finding: The entry of military personnel in DE&S differed from the entry of 
civilians. 
The entry of military personnel into DE&S differed from the entry of civilians, in 
that military personnel expected, and normally received, a multi-day handover 
from the previous incumbent of the post that they were taking up.   
The following example shows the experience of a Foreign Liaison Officer, in 
Operating Centre D:  
‘There was no internal [DE&S] induction programme once I’d turned up 
either. So what I had was a three or four day handover takeover from the 
previous guy, so he ran me through a few presentations specific to the job 
I was going into’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
Whilst this expectation of a formal handover was not always met, the temporal 
boundary that existed between formal induction as socio-technical practice and 
the informal socialisation as socio-cultural practice across DE&S was consistent 
within the data.  This boundary appeared at approximately five working days from 
when the new group member arrived in their new group.  Induction of military 
personnel into DE&S was likely to come from within the Operating Centre or role 
team that they were joining, and, because it was ad-hoc, this induction could be 
seen as being inconsistent because of the process and practice that was applied: 
‘I mean I did and I didn’t [receive an induction].  I had a three or four day 
handover; we spent a day at the IPT (Integrated Project Team), I did a 
manager’s technical course, but I wouldn’t...depends what you mean by 
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induction, there was an arrival procedure [the JSAU process]’ (Shaw, 
2011h). 
‘….I [the new group member]… was given an ad hoc induction by team 
members.  It consisted of: 3 x A4 pages of key points from a subordinate, 
an A4 lever arch with 'useful' reading material, [Operating Centre] Plan, 
copies of old [PowerPoint] briefs, introduction by key personalities, 
admin..’ (Shaw, 2011ad). 
These examples of the induction of military personnel show the consistency of a 
temporal boundary, the length of time that the induction took place over, and also 
the practice within military-to-military post handovers.   
The experience shown here was similar to that experienced by the following 
respondent.  They also experienced a ‘three or four day handover with [their] 
predecessor’ (Shaw, 2011h).   This respondent was relatively senior, an RAF 
Group Captain, leading a team in Operating Centre F.   
It might be presumed that at this level of seniority the respondent would be 
expected to, as expressed in the vernacular of DE&S, ‘be thrown in at the deep 
end’, which means not having any induction.  But that was not what he expected.  
He expected a ‘proper induction’, but it appears that all military personnel who 
were new to DE&S were ‘just get on with the job,’ as they were military.   
This lack of induction may have led to military personnel feeling as though they 
were not really part of DE&S and welcome there and as will be shown in section 
5.5  it may have been a factor in enabling some elements of military culture being 
carried over into the civilian environment of DE&S.   
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Finding: Expectations development and mis-match was present in Military 
personnel who joined DE&S. 
Interviewer-‘Did you have any expectations of DE&S or your team before you 
arrived here?’ 
‘…I expected to find an organisation or a bunch of people that I worked 
with that did the bare minimum, work to rule, were led by the unions, were 
under the cosh of the unions and weren’t really interested about output, 
weren’t really interested about what was going on, it was very much a 
career to get the pension and off they would go at the end of it.  That’s 
what I expected to find from a very naive point of view’  (Shaw, 2011n). 
The response from a Major in the British Army, in his first tour of duty in DE&S at 
Abbeywood, shows that where there were negative expectations of DE&S that 
had developed prior to the person joining DE&S, then those pre-conceptions 
might not be challenged immediately on their arrival.  In extremis, the person 
could leave DE&S having not been formally integrated into the culture of 
Abbeywood.  
It could take many months to change these expectations, or as shown by Yardley 
and Neal (2007) in their study of military leadership in Defence acquisition, as 
much as a whole tour of duty.   
The Major indicates that he was expecting to find a stereotype of both a civilian 
civil servant and also of the unions.  In his response, we see the formation of 'us' 
and 'them', an example of social categorisation in action (Tajfel, 1979, Tajfel and 
Turner, 1986).  The Major also espoused in the above interview, the implied 
positive and negative stereotype, where 'we’, (the military), ‘were the only ones 
interested in output' (Shaw, 2011n) whereas 'they' (civil servants), were only 
interested in the pension.  In an element of self-reflection, he recognized that this 
was a 'naïve view' (Shaw, 2011n) with the implication at this early stage of his 
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posting in DE&S that this reaction was incorrect and also embedded in a 
somewhat negative view of the civil service.  
 His response was an expression of his expectations.  He was expecting to 
encounter a culture which included a set of behaviours that were linked to output 
and reward, described in the response as 'the pension'.   
The Major’s expectations had not been met, but in a positive rather than a 
negative sense.  He described two factors that explicitly led to the development 
of his view of DE&S and the civil servants there, the organisation, and also the 
people, referring to both the socio-technical and the socio-cultural elements of 
DE&S.  In order to refine his response a subsequent question was asked.   
‘Interviewer’, ‘so what have you found?’: 
'I’ve found an organisation [DE&S], and the people I work with are 
incredibly professional, hardworking individuals who genuinely see the 
need of what they’re doing and would go that extra mile where others 
perhaps wouldn’t.  I think they’re really a genuinely good bunch of people 
that I work with here.  It comes from our background in the Army. You see, 
you only ever hear bad stories and the only thing that ever comes out from 
somewhere like this was how badly they’ve performed and how they 
haven’t provided equipment and so you automatically... [see them in a 
negative way] ’(Shaw, 2011n). 
His response identified the reality that he had found, and also identified the locus 
of the creation of ‘the other’ which was developed as a result of him being from a 
different culture, that of the British Field Army.   
The response appeared to indicate that he had been affected by something which 
had not been challenged immediately on his entry to DE&S, because he had not 
received a formal induction into DE&S, or to his team.  That something was the 
effect of his old culture on moving into the new culture of DE&S.  This is confirmed 
by his next response:  'you’re a product of your experience aren’t you?  So you 
 301 
 
 
automatically base your thought processes and what you’re going to find, on your 
experience’(Shaw, 2011n).   
The Major acknowledges that his world view had been shaped by his experience 
in the British Army, and by what he had been told and heard.  Therefore his 
response appears to indicate that he had been affected by pre-socialisation 
through peer agency, before he came to DE&S, rather than him receiving any 
formal, organisationally legitimised pre-socialisation.  He admitted that his 
experience was no different to that of anyone else within his previous group, his 
regiment in the British Army.   
The un-met expectations of military personnel were further shown by a Squadron 
Leader: 
'…My expectations of DE&S? I didn’t really know because I have no 
experience in DE&S in the 12 years I’ve been in the [Royal] Air Force.  I’ve 
never worked in this environment [DE&S]. My expectations were I had a 
lot to learn, which was true, but I also expected to be trained, which had 
not happened.  You feel completely unwanted and it’s not just the lack of 
training, induction’ (Shaw, 2011w). 
The fact that military respondents had un-met expectations resembles the 
responses from graduate and apprentice scheme entrants that were discussed 
earlier.  This shows that the expectations of military personnel joining a group in 
DE&S were no different to those of civilians.  A consequence of the lack of 
induction, desk sharing and other territorial behaviours, and also of un-met 
expectations, may have been that military personnel were unlikely to be fully 
integrated emotionally or culturally into their new group, even though they might 
try to self-integrate into their new group.   
This could lead to new group members feeling excluded from groups and not 
fitting in, and as a result, actively dis-identifying with the group of which they were 
a new member.  This apparent lack of cultural integration appeared to affect both 
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civil servants and military personnel, with the likelihood that people were not 
integrating well into their teams:   
‘We’re made to feel like a nuisance because we move around every 18 
months to 24, which I understand is difficult for somebody who’s working 
on a team and they’ve been here for five years and they understand it and 
when I get replaced they then have to bring my replacement up to speed, 
but the reason they come in is that they have the up to date knowledge of 
operations and how this aircraft is going to be used.  So there’s a reason 
for it, but I feel that’s kind of glossed over and actually we’re just a 
nuisance.  Unless you’re going to stay for three or four years’ (Shaw, 
2011w). 
This tension and inappropriate behaviour appears to be a low-level form of 
cultural drag. Even though military personnel expected and received a Role Team 
induction which was socio-technical in nature, they often received no formal 
induction into Abbeywood, or DE&S.  They did, however, experience a military 
personnel specific arrivals process. 
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Finding: Military personnel received a specific welcome into DE&S 
Abbeywood that was not an induction.  This was designed to maintain their 
military privileges.  
On arrival at Abbeywood, military personnel were directed to go to the Joint 
Services Administration Unit (JSAU) DE&S (2010a) to be booked into the site. 
‘…Abbeywood Admin doc produced by the JSAU, [Joint Services 
Administration Unit]’ a formal 'welcome' & 'overarching' interview with 
superior Reporting Officer, Site orientation’ (Shaw, 2011ad). 
The JSAU arrivals process was a geographically specific practice for military 
personnel who were posted to DE&S, and specifically into Abbeywood.  It was a 
purely life support function for military personnel.  Military personnel received 
information about military specific training and the medical centre.  These were 
facilities that were available to military personnel only, showing a further degree 
of differentiation between military and civilian staff.   
The JSAU was not an induction into DE&S because it only enabled military 
personnel to understand how they could access their military privileges and life 
support culture when in the civilian environment of Abbeywood.  They did not 
receive a socio-cultural induction into Abbeywood at the point in time of joining 
DE&S.  The JSAU arrivals process provided detailed information about what 
military personnel would meet and need when they joined DE&S, thus meeting 
some specific military socio-cultural needs.   
It provided some socio–technical, but primarily, socio-cultural continuity for 
military personnel in Abbeywood, allowing them to access and maintain their 
service ethos while at Abbeywood.  It did not, however, fully integrate them into 
the socio-cultural life of Abbeywood.  Therefore the JSAU appeared to reinforce 
the ‘us’ of the Armed Services through military personnel being treated differently 
to civilian personnel.  The existence of the JSAU and this promotion of difference 
between the military and civilian staff was formalised by DE&S and the MOD 
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(DE&S, 2010a), and became a contributing factor that perpetuated the 
persistence  military cultural traits in DE&S.  It was thus a further indication that 
the organisational culture of DE&S was multi-cultural, with a single ethos, but with 
potentially conflicting loyalties of members within those cultures.   
The legitimised and required experience of the JSAU arrivals process reinforced 
the military identity as opposed to developing or reinforcing a pan-DE&S identity 
or culture, thus indicating once again the multi-cultural nature of DE&S.   
5.2.7 Summary 
The research has shown that induction within DE&S into the technical, role based 
organisation, and also into DE&S on its creation, was inconsistently practised and 
experienced.  This led to high levels of cynicism amongst group members, and 
contributed to them identifying negatively towards DE&S.  Where, however, 
socio-technical induction was positively experienced, the group member was 
more likely to identify positively with their role team and with DE&S.   
The practice of organisationally legitimised socio-technical induction was 
completed within 4-6 weeks of a new member joining their team, therefore 
producing a temporal boundary, at which point DE&S deemed the group member 
to be fully inducted and able to perform their role duties, even though the new 
group member may not have felt totally competent.   
This thesis will now discuss informal socialisation as socio-cultural integration.   
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5.3 Strand 2: Informal Socialisation 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Section 5.3 describes the informal or socio-cultural integration that took place 
after the socio-technical induction was deemed to have been completed   
The narrative of the socialisation of new group members into groups in DE&S has 
thus far been relatively linear, because formal induction into groups occurred as 
a direct result of DE&S policy within a specified time.  The discussion of informal 
socialisation is much more nuanced, because there was no over-arching 
organisational drive, resources, or goal that could be shown to formally legitimise 
its practice.   
While formal socio-technical induction in DE&S may have encompassed social 
and cultural learning, it did so implicitly.  The new group member was expected 
to have assimilated the socio-cultural learning, rather than having what might be 
termed a formal curriculum with learning outcomes, such as the case with the 
socio-technical induction of DE&S.   
However, informal socialisation occurred within teams, and it was therefore 
implicitly legitimised by DE&S.  Analysis of the ethnographic and interview data 
led to the identification of two boundaries within the practice and experience of 
socialisation in DE&S.   
The first boundary was a boundary between technical induction and socio-cultural 
integration, the second was a temporal boundary that existed between socio–
technical induction and socio–cultural integration, which this research describes 
as personal cultural adjustments.   
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5.3.2 Meet the Team 
Finding: Socio-cultural integration could occur in a group setting in 
conjunction with formal business.  
In DE&S, informal socialisation integrated a new group member into the unwritten 
rules and social norms of the group.  It also introduced the new group member to 
the personalities and foibles of the other group members: the socio-cultural 
elements of the group (Shaw, 2007b).  This was in contrast to the practice of 
formal induction of new group members which, as previously shown in section 
5.2, was explicitly designed to enable a new group member to perform their work 
role effectively.   
In terms of successful socialisation practice, in order to become integrated into a 
new team, as described by Chao et al. (1994), and also Chen and Klimoski (2003) 
information had to be exchanged between the team and the new group member, 
and vice versa.  This exchange often occurred during formally arranged meetings 
(Shaw, 2010i), and there was a particular trajectory of information content that 
was present within this type of socialisation meeting.   
The trajectory was often as follows, while the information exchanged was 
contextually and situationally dependent.  In informal socialisation, the 
information was initially predominantly social, that is, information about the 
personalities within the new group and about a group’s social identity.   
This example describes a typical first meeting of the new group member with their 
new team who would often be arranged specially for the purpose.  The 
information flow during this interchange was, as described by Dean (1984), bi-
directional, that is between the team and the team member and vice versa.   
The format of the meeting often followed a pattern.  The Team Leader (or meeting 
leader if the Team Leader was not present), would firstly welcome everyone and 
also the new group member or members (Shaw, 2010-2014).  They would say a 
little about the role of the team.  Following this, the meeting leader would then do 
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what was called in the vernacular, death by introduction, where they would then 
ask everyone present to introduce themselves with a little personal information, 
and to introduce their role in the team.   This may have been carried out 
completely formally or it may have included humorous allusions to what people 
really do in the team, such as ‘general cook and bottle washer’.  The new group 
member, when it was their turn, would then be asked to say a little about 
themselves.   
When the round-table activity had been completed, any other group members 
were likely to be introduced in absentia by the team leader, or perhaps by the 
absentee team member’s line-manager.  The information content of the meeting 
now changed because at this point the meeting became more socially focussed, 
with the discussion moving towards a more relaxed conversation between group 
members.  The effect of this was that the new group member received information 
about the formal group and also implicitly received information about the group 
members’ personalities and behaviours, such as whether the group was 
generally happy or not through the level and type of banter that was exchanged.   
The new group member would also start to learn the dialect and linguistic 
characteristics of the new group.  As the discussion in the meeting moved on, the 
information that was exchanged then changed again from being social 
information to being functional information describing the tasks and roles that 
group members had within that group and the wider organisation. (Shaw, 2007-
2010).  
The information exchanged in these meetings appeared to also function as a 
group coherence mechanism in a similar way to that described by for example  
Foster and Rosnow (2006), Levin and Arluke (1987), Luna et al. (2013), 
Michelson and Mouly (2000), Paine (1967), Slade (1995), and Wert and Salovey 
(2004b).  This pattern of social and functional conversation switching was 
observed to occur within many formal group interactions and meetings.  
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In addition to the outcome-based differences, it was observed that in DE&S 
informal socialisation was practised and experienced more frequently than formal 
induction as it occurred when it was needed rather than conforming to 
bureaucratic programmed requirements. It could happen as often as weekly, daily 
or even hourly if required.  Informal socialisation was also performed through 
small acts of kindness, such as an established group member seeing that a new 
group member was looking lost or confused, and actively engaging them in 
conversation and helping them.   
Other ways in which a new group member might be socialised into their new 
group included buying the new group member a drink at the coffee shop, or 
making them a drink at the kitchen area and introducing them to the tea club 
(Shaw, 2007-2010).  
Actions such as giving eye contact as described by Argyle and Dean (1965), and 
also Kleinke (1986) to a new group member were also observed to be inclusive 
socialisation activities that indicated whether a new group member was being 
welcomed or shunned by the new group.  If these responses were lacking then a 
new group member could feel unwanted, as is shown the experience of an RAF 
Squadron Leader:   
‘…so Commercial sit in the same place and they talk to themselves and 
it’s very difficult to even get a ‘good morning’ sometimes, which I find 
incredible having come from a sort of military unit where if you walk past 
somebody in the street you say ‘good morning’ on camp and here it’s very 
different, you don’t...there’s no eye contact..’ (Shaw, 2011w). 
Their experience illustrates the combined factors of geographical identity and the 
closing ranks of one group against another which in this case occurred within 
Operating Centre C.  The existence of this type of incident, and the regularity with 
which it appeared to happen in DE&S indicated that induction as a practice should 
encompass the team into which a new group member was moving, as well as the 
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new team member, thus ensuring that the team made physical and psychological 
space for the new member.   
The Squadron Leader’s response also points to the difference in culture and 
behaviour between the RAF and the Civil Service, thus illustrating one of the 
unseen barriers between the military and Civil Service, which could lead to 
tension between military and civilian staff.   
In addition, if the group member was joining a new Operating Centre or a Project 
Team, they might be given a lanyard that identified them as being of that team or 
a wider group that was related to their team (see section 4.3.5).  These artefacts, 
and the information that they received at this time formed an element of the new 
group member’s integration into both the functional and the social cultures of the 
group.   
Finding: Informal socialisation into teams was not purely technical or 
social, but was often a combination of both. 
In DE&S there were other integrative practices that were not purely functional or 
purely social.  One of these was called ‘sitting with Nelly’.  This was where the 
new group member would be assigned a person to sit with and who would teach 
the new member the ropes:    
‘And that’s it, they’re [the new group member] inducted into the 
organisation according to the organisation and they’re still swimming 
around.  And then what happens was that an informal induction takes over 
where you [the new group member] sit by Nelly and you learn stuff, or you 
ask Nelly a question and she’ll give her view of how you do it, which was 
not necessarily the way that the organisation wants you to do it.….so you 
immediately end up with a divergence and a latency, almost, in behaviour 
and in some places it can be very obvious and very dangerous to do that.’ 
(Shaw, 2011q). 
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‘Sitting with Nelly’ appeared to fulfil both a functional induction, by teaching the 
newcomer how to carry out specific tasks, and also social integration through the 
newcomer learning how to function within both the group’s socio-technical rules 
and socio-cultural norms.   
That socio-cultural learning appeared to occur primarily because the new group’s 
social culture and the details of the new group member’s working relationship 
with their peers appeared not to be passed on to the new group member through 
the formal induction.  ‘Sitting with Nelly’ could also produce a conflict between the 
socio-technical corporate rules and the socio-cultural ‘way we do things round 
here’, thus showing the tension between the enforcement of the socio-technical 
and the pragmatic and the occasionally subversive nature of the socio-cultural.   
This contradiction within ‘sitting with Nelly’ may have appeared to be because the 
information that was conveyed during the peer to peer transaction might not 
necessarily be the information that DE&S, or the Role Team, wanted to be 
communicated.  As a consequence, the new group member might behave in 
ways that were contradictory to the new group’s ways of working until they had 
learned better.    
As the new group member learned the new group norms they gained entry to the 
group through exposure to in-jokes or conversations. This entry into the behind 
the scenes area of the group allowed the new group member to see, as described 
by Goffman (1959), the internal performance of the group.  It also allowed the 
new group member to be seen as someone who was ‘one of us’ via the 
acceptance of the person that they were working with. They would then be 
integrated into the group informally via trust.   
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5.3.3 Food and integration – a Consistent Theme 
Finding: informal socialisation often occurred in conjunction with food. 
Another element in the practice of socialisation within DE&S was the conjunction 
of socialisation with food.  The following examples firstly show socialisation in 
relation to the phenomenon of ‘Fat Boys Friday’s’ breakfasts.  These events are 
where a group of team members would go as a defined group to the restaurant 
and have a group breakfast on Friday mornings between 8 am and 10 am.  Friday 
breakfasts differed from normal breakfasts in that there were more items on the 
menu.  These events were a cultural element of working at Abbeywood and were 
used with a more casual dress code was in place on Fridays, to mark the 
transition between the working week and the weekend.  
The participating groups were observed to walk along the floor-plate on the way 
to the restaurant, gathering people up as they moved along by signalling to 
specific people who were either part of the group, or who were accepted by the 
in-group.   
The following would be a typical call to breakfast between 8.30 and 10 am on 
Friday mornings on floor-plates in Abbeywood: 
‘Person A. “Who’s coming to breakfast then?” 
Person B “Not me too busy, sorry”,  
Person A “what about you?” 
Person C  “Yep, I’ll join you let me lock this PC and I’ll follow you”’ (Shaw, 
2007c) 
Breakfasts were available every day of the week in Abbeywood, but on Fridays 
the breakfast took on a significantly different meaning and it became more of a 
team social event.  DE&S legitimised Friday breakfasts by providing a full 
breakfast in the Abbeywood restaurants on a Friday.  The socialisation practices 
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that occurred in conjunction with food appeared to reinforce small group and team 
identities and in DE&S they appeared to be predominantly, although not 
exclusively, socio-cultural in nature.   
An example of combined socio-cultural and socio-technical coherence in this way 
is provided here.  Operating Centre C had a monthly ‘Big Breakfast’ that had 
formal elements, such as regular awards for exemplary business practice or 
behaviour, or successes, but which also acted as a social occasion. (Shaw, 
2009e)   
‘Fat Boys Friday’ breakfasts appeared to have several effects: they acted to 
socialise new members of the group into the group’s culture, to socio-culturally 
re-socialise existing members into the group and reinforce group identity, and 
they also appeared to promote group coherence.   
The sizes of the groups that took part in these ‘Fat Boys Fridays’ as discrete 
groups were observed to range predominantly between 3 and 12 people (Shaw, 
2008c). An exception was The ‘Big Breakfast’ group in Operating Centre C which 
was larger, numbering several hundred in total, but within that number the teams 
and social groups could be seen as smaller groupings. .   
‘Fat boys Friday’ breakfasts were the Friday morning activity for many of the 
Abbeywood teams.75  Teams tended to breakfast together, sometimes involving 
other people from different role teams on their local floor-plate, and at other times 
friends from farther afield.  The conversations at Friday breakfasts followed the 
same pattern as described previously in relation to meetings, moving from social 
topics to functional topics and back again seamlessly.  This pattern is described 
by an experienced Team Leader, a Commodore, in Operating Centre G:   
‘   Conversation at these breakfasts was varied, it can be as mundane as 
what people were doing at the weekend, or it can be conversations about 
role based activity that were easier to conduct in that informal environment, 
                                            
75 And on other MOD sites. 
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letting off steam about something that had  happened….  the conversation 
moves between work and leisure’ (Shaw, 2011q). 
The discussion was of socio-technical role and related work subjects, and the 
making sense of the pressures of work combined with gossip, such as ‘what are 
you doing at the weekend?  How are the kids?’   It appears that Friday breakfasts 
were part of the embedded culture in Abbeywood and had acquired a sense of 
importance in marking the transition from work place to weekend family place.  
There appears to be a link between the formal and informal, socio-technical and 
socio-cultural DE&S, and the technical and social language that was used, in the 
form of gossip as a group coherence mechanism, thereby linking the socio-
technical to the socio-cultural. 
In a socio-technical, organisational rules based sense, people who went to 
breakfast should have clocked out76 because DE&S, in one sense, did not 
officially sanction the occurrence of Friday breakfasts during work time.  However, 
few people clocked out and back in again and the breakfast was often justified as 
being an ‘informal team meeting’ (Shaw, 2007-2010). 
The fact that ‘Fat Boys Friday’s’ breakfasts were tolerated implies that the DE&S  
leadership considered that there was a benefit to be gained by teams in DE&S 
from the activity, and that in turn DE&S as a whole would benefit from it.   
However, Friday breakfasts were by no means a whole team activity, and the 
groups that did take part could be self-selecting:   
‘There was an element of socialisation, but it tends to revolve around a 
subset of the team, but it was a broadly based subset.  It’s largely a few 
individuals from each area and it’s sort of age related, it’s family 
circumstance related, it tends to be the single people, younger people’ 
(Shaw, 2011q). 
                                            
76 Used the Flexible working recording system to indicate that they were not working but taking a break 
from work. 
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And by being self-selecting it could lead to the formation of in-groups and out-
groups.   
In addition to Friday breakfasts occurring at Abbeywood, they also occurred at 
DE&S Corsham, where at that time there was no formal restaurant, only the 
Mess.  For example: 
‘…Fat Boy breakfasts, I mean that’s a really interesting one because I 
know parts of my team here would go to the Sergeant’s Mess for breakfast 
or for lunch and so on, so I’m looking forward to seeing what happens 
when we get into the new build,77 because going down to the restaurant 
for breakfast as a group is something that becomes a lot easier’ (Shaw, 
2011d). 
It appears that in DE&S food was a consistent factor that helped to integrate staff 
into teams and also to maintain group coherence.   
Finding: Personal cultural adjustments had their own label within the DE&S 
vernacular.  This was the Abbeywood Coffee Culture.   
Within the context of socialisation that was accompanied by food or drink, there 
was also a more frequent activity than breakfasts that was at that time peculiar to 
Abbeywood and which was recognized in the wider MOD.  This practice 
informally socialised people into smaller groups in DE&S, and also improved 
group coherence and group identity.  It was called the Abbeywood coffee culture.  
Meeting for coffee for a chat with peers was a subtle element of food based 
socialisation that appeared to be linked with gossip and group coherence.  Coffee 
cart78 socialisation could occur when a new member joined a team.   
For example, one of the first things that would happen when someone joined a 
group they would be bought a cup of coffee, or some other beverage.  The new 
                                            
77 A new HQ building was being constructed at the time. 
78 The areas that provided coffee were in the restaurants and were called Coffee Carts. 
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group member would then spend some time either with their new line manager 
or with a peer who had been assigned to buddy them to help them navigate their 
first hours and days in the new group.   
They would engage in the pattern of conversation that would enable the 
established group member to find out more about the new member, and also the 
new member about their new team.   
Coffee cart socialisation initiated a pattern of activity that appears to align with 
what Feldman and others term re-socialisation, see for example, Feldman (1976), 
Van Maanen (1978), and also Van Maanen and Schein (1979).  This research 
labels the type of re-socialisation that is described here as personal cultural 
adjustments, because they happened when they were needed.  They could be 
personally or team directed, and they were subtle and informal elements of 
passing on and learning predominantly cultural norms, rather than organisational 
rules.   
5.3.4 Learned and Acquired Behaviours During Induction and 
Socialisation  
Personal cultural adjustment activities appeared to be all voluntary, carried out 
by the person in order to integrate themselves into their new group.  They 
occurred in conjunction with formal induction, but they occurred predominantly 
after the temporal boundary of 5–10 working days during which formal induction 
was deemed to occur and during which knowledge was transferred that allowed 
the new group member to integrate their world view with that of the group (Dean, 
1984) (Chao et al., 1994).  Figure 5-1 proposes a graphical interpretation of what  
Furnham (2011pp 116 -118) describes as the acquisition of norms in the context 
of knowledge transfer on joining a new group.   
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Figure 5-1 Learned and Acquired Behaviours 
Source Derek Shaw 
Figure 5-1 shows the trajectory of knowledge integration that a group member 
takes on entry and through groups in DE&S.  It shows the boundaries where 
external culture and behaviour that were learned before the group member joined 
that group exist, and also where those behaviours and cultures may not integrate 
with the new group’s behavioural and cultural map.  It also shows the boundary 
where the new group’s behaviours have been learned and assimilated, prior to 
the individual moving on to another group.   
Within this trajectory personal cultural adjustments also took place on a daily, and 
often more frequent basis in established teams, where group members took a 
break from their desks and had a cup of tea or coffee, or had a coffee and a 
cigarette.  In personal cultural adjustments, group coherence appeared to be 
maintained through interaction in small, informal groups of 2-3 people (Shaw, 
2007-2015). 
The new group member gained from these informal coffee breaks, the ability to 
start navigating the boundaries within the group.  They also developed an 
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understanding of the personalities of peers, and also became exposed to the 
group language, for example to local acronyms (Shaw, 2014l).  Personal cultural 
adjustments could be initiated and made through what might be called gossip, 
but the interaction appeared to actually increase the knowledge of the new group 
member and how they were situated within the group, both socio-technically and 
socio-culturally.   
This view chimes with that of Foster (2004 pp 82-83) in his work on gossip, 
suggesting that gossip was an integral part of group coherence.   
In addition to the gossip that occurred during these coffee breaks, the 
conversation moved backwards and forwards between social and functional 
information exchange, discussing the functional aspects of a group member’s 
role.   
It was also observed when the Corsham New Environment was built, that coffee 
shops were built into it, and that small informal meetings also began to occur in 
those coffee areas (Shaw, 2012g).  This indicates that a subtle change of 
organisational practice, which might be defined as a cultural change, occurred at 
Corsham as a result of this change.   
Finding: Group members reinforced group cohesion by regular contact 
within a group size of 5±2.  This size of group reinforced group cohesion at 
a very intimate level, producing a very highly bonded group that changed 
in relationship from the purely functional professional work based group, 
into a stronger relationship that appeared to be based on friendship.   
It was observed that groups carried out activities in order to remain cohesive.  
These activities often occurred in small groups, rather than large groups: 
‘…but I’d say a group of about five or six.  I mean I do still know the other 
guys well enough to say hello and we have a Christmas party every year 
that kind of thing, but I mean there’s a group of about four or five that I 
probably...we go out for lunch or for a few beers or go for lunch in work 
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something like that, we do keep in touch a lot more regularly really, more 
friends really now than work colleagues’ (Shaw, 2011h).  
The informant was a commercial graduate, a C2 grade civil servant in Operating 
Centre G indicates a group with 5-6, within the 5±2 members that was a longer 
lasting group size that appeared as a consistent factor in both formal and informal 
groups within DE&S.  This group was stable for at least a year as a larger informal 
unit, but the key group that maintained regular contact were a group of 5-6 
members.   
This group size is within the boundary of 5±2 group members that is proposed as 
a small stable group. Where there were friendship groups, as opposed to 
functional groups in operation, a key factor in the formation, strength, and 
longevity of those groups appeared to be the content of the social conversations.  
These were based around the shared interest of group members, and often the 
conversation would revolve around a single subject or interest, such as football 
or rugby.   
Where they were not in a fully open plan office this behaviour may also occur in 
groups who were geographically located together and carried out the same 
general function.  Such groups therefore possessed a highly differentiated 
geographic, functional identity.   
The following examples provide differing views of a highly bonded group within 
Operating Centre B:   
‘…you know when lunch starts because [the four people] all push their 
chairs back and it’ll be football wall to wall for the next half hour.  Just solid 
conversation.  And I described this, making a joke out of it to [….] I was 
sitting next to one of the females who was almost crying with laughter 
because she said you’ve got that absolutely nailed, if you’re not a football 
fan and you’re on that particular set […] they won’t talk to you, because 
it’s football’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
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Also, 
‘…Yes, but that’s...they’ve done that even before they were this team, 
when they were  DLO, every Monday morning it was football talk.  You just 
get used to it now, kind of thing.  You actually know that [  ]  was Blackpool 
and [  ] was Spurs, so was [  ]  ....... and then you get the rest of us that 
don’t do that, but that doesn’t...you know...when we split from one spur 
[building area] into two spurs [building areas]  and everything it’s kind of 
Monday mornings I thought football was annoying, but when you don’t 
have it and there’s no banter and there’s complete silence in the office it’s 
like oh, oh, it’s kind of...can’t explain it, but it’s not quite jolly as much, but 
you just...it’s something they’ve always done, they always will…’ (Shaw, 
2011t). 
The group that is described here had also worked together for many years, and 
had also socialised together outside work.  They therefore had a social identity 
that was based on the twin axes of social interests and knowledge and also 
functional professional interests.  They were a stable group of four members who 
discussed football alongside performing their professional function.   
But on the other side of the floor-plate, within the same team, one other person 
joined in with the football discussion, taking the football to a group size of five.  In 
contrast to the football group there was a group of three people that formed a 
consistent group that discussed archaeology within the same overall grouping.  
They were viewed as the out-group in this team, because they did not talk 
football.   
Finding: Food appeared to play a role in the regular socialisation activities 
through Birthday cakes, Christmas parties and Mess nights.  
The informal socialisation practices of Fat boys Friday breakfasts and coffee cart 
socialisation presented thus far in Chapter 5 have all formed part of the social 
fabric of DE&S.  The cycle of work life in DE&S was also marked by such things 
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as: tasks completed, birthdays, people leaving and joining groups, Christmas 
meals, promotion, moving from one job to another, or retirement.  In this example, 
the respondent is a C2 grade civil servant working in Operating Centre D:   
‘Yes, we still go out for Christmas meals which was I would say informal 
team-building.  And we do have every now and again social evenings, you 
know if somebody leaves, they’ll send out an email going out into Bristol 
or Bath and everybody’s welcome.  But you usually get the same people 
turning up, you know, to the leaving drinks as you do to the Christmas 
meal, it’s very difficult to get those that, I wouldn’t say were not interested, 
but those that probably have further to travel, coming along to these 
events’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
Christmas and similar events appeared to be ad-hoc and self-generated by group 
members.   
Also, as with Friday breakfasts, some of those taking part appeared to be self-
selecting, with the same people attending.  This may have led to the formation of 
in-groups within those activities.  Ad hockery was shown in the following example 
from a serving RAF Officer who was on his first posting into DE&S, but who had 
worked alongside the DLO in previous assignments:   
‘…So we [our team] have a couple of socials, we had a Christmas do and 
I know you might just say that’s a night in the pub and a meal out that we 
organised ourselves…’ (Shaw, 2011g). 
All of these events appeared to play an important role in the informal socialisation 
of staff and of reinforcing group coherence and identity.   
Much effort was put into organising the Christmas meal.  In terms of the 
management and organisation of the Christmas meal, the following presents a 
narrative within Operating Centre A (Shaw, 2007-2010) but is representative of 
what happened throughout DE&S.   
 321 
 
 
A small committee of four would meet early in the year, with an average age of 
around 23, and a team leader to organise the event to take place in a local 
restaurant.  Part of the presentation of the dinner included the supply of seating 
cards with name and menu selection on the reverse.  The role groups all sat 
together at the dinner, showing the strength of work-based social bonds.  The 
commercial teams were seated together, finance were seated together on a ring 
fenced table, the business team were seated together.  Thus the groups all 
maintained their functional group structures in a social context.   
There were two tables dedicated to ‘also-rans’ who were a mix from the other 
areas and who were not included in any of the other social groups, so could be 
viewed as outsiders or, in the vernacular as ‘billy no mates’. (Shaw, 2009d).  The 
noise from these two tables was high and, as was usual at these events, after the 
meal the groups went to a local pub to continue the celebrations.  At the first pub, 
several groups immediately sought out sufficient seating and tables to 
accommodate exactly the mix which had been seen in the restaurant so they all 
without exception remained in their original groups.   
Only those of the higher age groups circulated socially, but they did not venture 
too often or too long out of their comfort zone, as they appeared to consider that 
their visits were seen almost as an invasion of the locally networked groups.  As 
people moved on to the second pub the groups made the transfer as a stable 
social group and still remained unmixed with the other groups.  During the 
following day, back at work, people from different groups were greeted with 
comments like where did you get to and didn’t see you after we moved pubs.   
The typical range of group size for these events was between 15 and 70 people, 
although some would host 90 staff or more at a lunchtime venue (Shaw, 2012f). 
Overall, it appears that in general, Christmas meals were good events socially 
that were well supported, but they were not effective as annual team-building 
events, or as a social events, because teams tended to stay within their work 
place boundaries when they were put into a social context.  The failure appears 
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to be because people were seated in their work groups for social safety and not 
enthused to mix, and the one annual chance to get to know others was lost.   
In addition to the Christmas meal, the birthdays of team members were another 
important marker in the work year.  Birthdays were often marked with cakes, 
which were purchased at the local supermarket, but if the person was a cook, or 
the birthday significant, they might be home made.   
Cakes were also used to signal group boundaries, and whether a person was in 
the group, or out of it.  To achieve this, cakes were brought in and put on the 
Meridian79 in the middle of the group of desks where the cake donor sat.  The 
donor would say what the event was, or others would ask, and the news would 
be released, often as an email invitation sent to the wider team, specific people, 
or other colleagues who were not within the local floor-plate to partake of the 
cakes. 
Relaying the news to specific people appeared to be effective in creating a group 
identity and of signalling who was, and who was not, in the group: 
‘One day there was a cheesecake brought in, it was put on the table on 
the other side of the cupboards, away from where the group sat.  And 
certain individuals were called over and given a piece and told to eat it 
there and not take it back to their desks (which was what normally 
happens).  Three people weren't invited to have it, we [the un-invited], felt 
awful, we knew we weren't in the clique’ (Shaw, 2011x). 
This example of what might be called cake effected social categorisation 
indicates a negative way of signalling who was in a group, and of defining clique 
boundaries.  It also appears to indicate that informal socialisation practice could 
enforce group boundaries, between staff, and between those who could or could 
not take part in that practice at that time.  On the other hand, it appeared that, if 
                                            
79 Low level storage in the middle of some seating areas.   
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carried out as deliberate acts of integration and inclusiveness, these socialisation 
events would enhance group cohesiveness, but not necessarily in a positive way.   
Another form of food based socialisation was cake making and regular 
fundraising80 cake sales:   
‘So I think that promotes a bit of a team identity as well.  So the commercial 
branch often have, every couple of months would have a cake sale for 
Help The Heroes and it’s all announced on the Tannoy and everyone goes 
down there to say ‘Hi, well done’ and have a bit of cake ‘thanks for 
supporting the charity and by the way good to see you all working together’ 
and wander off again.  So a bit of a team I think around there’ (Shaw, 
2011s).   
The example shows home baking as a positive integrative, team-building 
practice, which facilitated the development of a positive group identity. One of the 
effects of these types of socialisation appeared to be that, for group members, 
identification with specific groups was flexible and able to adjust to circumstance 
and personality, and  was not necessarily contradictory, thus chiming with Pate 
et al. (2010) and separately Kirke (2007d), in their discussions of the 
manifestation of nested and multiple identities in organisations.   
The outcome of those practices was that there appeared to be an effect on a new 
group member’s feelings of identity, belonging, group cohesiveness, and also 
their understanding of the group’s norms and customs - its socio-cultural 
character.   
The previous observations, coupled with the associated responses and the 
evidence surrounding Friday breakfasts, all appear to show that there was 
                                            
80 There was a definite Great British Bake Off Effect observed during the research period.  This was 
manifest by cakes being baked, in ‘bake off style’ and being brought in to offices to be shared and 
judged. Field notes May 2014 Bicester, Abbeywood Operating Centre D, February 2015. 
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stability of participation within those who took part, and those that did not.   Also 
this stability could create a boundary between the in-group and the out-group.  
This could be said to indicate that this socialisation acted in two directions, both 
to include and exclude people, and also to mark boundaries and also 
demonstrate a passive form of exclusivity and inclusivity within a group.   
These examples have indicated the effects of some informal socialisation 
practises in a mixed military and civilian environment.  There were also events 
that appeared to be promoted to reinforce predominantly military identities within 
DE&S, such as Battle of Britain Celebrations(Shaw, 2014k) or Trafalgar nights:  
‘  We [the Military] do mess dinners.  We [The Royal Navy] do Trafalgar 
night81.  Which interestingly in [ my group] causes a small conflict because 
geographically we’re over here in Corsham and there’s already the 
Pilkington officer’s mess, well they do their own Trafalgar night function, 
so when I organisationally came into [my group] I suddenly had this bizarre 
situation in that I’m based in Abbeywood, which Trafalgar night dinner do 
I go to?  Am I part of DE&S? Obviously as a Senior Navy guy in [my group] 
it was a no-brainer I went to [my group] Trafalgar night dinner and 
obviously I could have gone to both...but it was that interesting where were 
my loyalties now?  Am I...is it [my group] or is it the broader DE&S Naval 
gathering that dominates’ (Shaw, 2011o). 
The Senior Naval Officer shows the dilemma of possessing multiple identities, as 
he was not sure who he owed greatest loyalty to: the smaller group where he 
worked, or the larger group DE&S?  He reveals here that he chose the smaller 
group; thus, appearing to reinforce a theme that was identified when informants 
were asked how strongly they identified with particular groups in DE&S, and it 
was found that they would predominantly identify more strongly with the smaller 
group, rather than a larger group.  This chimes with findings from section 4.5.1, 
                                            
81 A celebration of Admiral Lord Nelson’s Victory at Trafalgar. 
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where it was shown that there was a difference in how strongly people identified 
with different groups in DE&S.  
This response also shows that military personnel had access to exclusive 
socialisation activities which may have reinforced their military identity and ethos, 
as opposed to reinforcing a joint military/civilian identity or ethos.  The military 
personnel only activities produced a potential for divided loyalties within those 
group members that attended those events.  The Naval Officer’s response 
indicates once again that if there was a conflict of identity felt by military 
personnel, it appeared to be more likely that the military identity, combined with 
the smaller working group identity would win and be reinforced, often at the 
expense of the larger group identity of the Operating Centre or DE&S.   
5.3.5 Outcomes and Effects of Informal Socialisation 
Finding: Formal DE&S induction specified benefits to DE&S and to 
participants, informal socialisation did not.  Outcomes were therefore only 
specified and agreed by peers and group members.   
These outcomes were predominantly related to relationship building within the 
group.  This was because, as described by an established SCS 1* civil servant, 
with wide experience in MOD, not just in DE&S, they saw the value of informal 
socialisation as being ‘seeing the social side of people’:   
‘There might well be times where because it’s a less formal situation 
people have been perhaps slightly unguarded in comments that they’ve 
made expressing personal views.  So yes, sometimes you find out things 
about people you rather wish you didn’t know and it is entirely possible to 
end up with a less good opinion of someone than you had before so they’re 
certainly not without risk and I think that’s particularly true for leaders as 
well.  I think there probably have been a couple of occasions where people 
who are more senior in the team will have expressed views and that’s 
caused me or somebody else to think, oh right OK.  That’s what you really 
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think is it?  Well, in that case, I just need to be a bit more careful. So there’s 
certainly those consequences, yes.  It’s just that now you’ve seen another 
dimension of them and you know more about them and they’re highly likely 
to have just continued as their ‘that’s who I am that’s fine’ without thinking 
it’s a particular problem.  But it’s just another thing you know about the 
person and it might be therefore...yes I think it does stay with you 
permanently’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
There appeared to be a degree of consistency with regard to the outcomes of 
informal practice that were expected and observed. It appears then that the social 
side of people was seen as being more important at times than the formal 
technical elements.  This response chimes with the view of, for example, Anthony 
and Janet (2002) and also Salas et al. (1999), who indicate that a major element 
of maintaining group coherence occurs through the transfer of social information.   
There might however, be negative aspects of this behaviour.  These might be 
interpreted in this context as people who were presenting one face to the group, 
while really thinking something else:  
‘…It puts it [the team building activity] on an informal basis so you can see 
the social side of people as well as the work side.  It gives you a chance 
to assess personalities if nothing else, so it’s just the general human 
exchanges that you’d be looking for….Getting to know the people in the 
team, finding out who...  what they are, what they’re like, any weird 
pastimes that they may have.  And I’ve always said and I always feel that 
it’s that informal contact.  If I know people better you can deal with them 
better, you can understand them a bit better, you can do better business 
with them.  Because I don’t suppose they do it just to let us go and have 
some fun.  There must be a benefit associated with it’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
This response from a B1 grade civil servant in Operating Centre A provides 
another typical representation of these themes relating to where group members 
wanted to get to know people better, in order to build on social interaction as a 
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precursor to formal business interaction.  Thus, it appears that for many people 
the informal took precedence over the formal.  This social interaction was useful 
to both the new group member and also to established group members.   
It was also observed that informal socialisation activity was not formally 
measured, either as process or through effect.  However, it was subjectively 
measured by those who experienced it, as, Does it feel good? Do I know this 
person any better?  This subjective peer assessment of the value and 
meaningfulness of informal socialisation accords with the observation that 
informal socio–cultural socialisation and integration appeared to be more useful, 
and better received by group members than the formal process in this way.   
The informal socialisation of group members appeared to support the formal 
business practices.  This was observed by the following SCS 1* respondent: 
‘I don’t know that we organised many things that were deliberate 
familiarisation things, so we just tried to make sure that the core things that 
were the fabric of a team’s life if you like, so team meeting and bits and 
pieces, were done in such a way as to bring people together and not play 
up to the fact that there were two groups…’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
And also, from Operating Centre A: 
‘…we just want to break down some barriers and just get people together 
and enjoy themselves and get the socialising going on a bit better. 
Improving the sort of informal communication across the team…’ (Shaw, 
2011h). 
They suggest that bringing groups of people together, and ‘not playing up the fact 
that there were two groups’ (Shaw, 2011h) was an aim of informal socialisation.  
The bringing together of the groups was an attempt to change the way that groups 
worked together, and to make the separate groups function as one, making the 
two smaller teams into a larger and perhaps more inclusive one.  This might be 
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called team-building, but if it was labelled as such informally, it was not an official 
DE&S label that was applied to the practice.  
A conclusion then follows from the consistency of the responses on informal 
socialisation that the major outcome of informal socialisation was the 
improvement of informal communications within teams.   
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5.4 Strand 3: Team-building  
5.4.1 Introduction 
Section 5.4 will report the findings and present analysis on the concept of team-
building that was observed in DE&S.  Team-building was used as an accepted 
organisational practice in DE&S to induct and integrate new group members, but 
primarily to maintain group coherence, to promote an in-group identity, and also 
to socialise groups into changed organisational states (Shaw, 2013h).  Team-
building activities were carried in group of up to 160 members.  
5.4.2 Team-building; integration and coherence or disintegration? 
Finding:  There were two types of team-building, the formal and the 
informal.  
Two types of team-building were identified in DE&S.  These could be 
characterised as formal and informal, or socio-technical and socio-cultural.   
5.4.3 Formal Team-building 
Formal team-building occurred as a series of formal, directed, and measured 
activities, called break-through events, see Littlefield (2000), in which team 
leaders and group members had certain expectations.  These activities are also 
discussed in section 5.2.2 .  Team-building via break-through activities was 
shown by a B1 grade member of the management team in Operating Centre A:   
‘But classically though the break-through ones were interesting because I 
went on those and you were energised and you get lots of good  ideas 
coming up from the ground, and one of the frustrating things was people 
talk about actions and then you don’t see them happening’ (Shaw, 2011h).  
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Also: 
‘…And they’ve been good I’ve had various of those over the years, the 
formal ones where there were outcomes, formal ones where the outcomes 
haven’t been quite specific and it’s been getting together to try and break 
down communications, get to know each other better, …it depends I think 
on the specific circumstances and requirements of the team as seen by 
the team leader and the senior management team about what they’re 
trying to achieve with that and I’ve seen a whole range [from] ‘we’ve got a 
serious problem here how were we going to do it and overcome it’, to ‘we 
just want to break down some barriers and just get people together and 
enjoy themselves and get the socialising going on a bit better’.  Improving 
the sort of informal communication across the team’’ (Shaw, 2011p). 
Formal team-building events, therefore, appeared to be viewed as erratic in 
performance and infrequent in their practice by staff members.  However, some 
informants recognized the importance of the informal, as opposed to the formal 
elements of the team-building.  The type of break-through events that are 
described here were associated with organisational change, for example when 
teams merged.  The events were designed to create a common understanding in 
the team of what the new team was there to achieve, to develop a team charter 
or common set of rules and behaviours that the team could agree and then work 
to:   
‘…Formal or informal...I suppose you could say that they were all formal 
in that we had a day with the agenda, part inside–outside, part 
presentation, part small group work, part walking around the static 
displays, talking to the soldiers and looking and asking about the kit’ 
(Shaw, 2011h). 
Photograph 5-1 was taken at the event that is described above and shows two of 
the group looking at equipment at a static display during the event that was 
described in the previous response (Shaw, 2009a).  
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Photograph 5-1 Example of Static Display at the Team-Building Event 
Source Derek Shaw  
Attendees, however, would often be frustrated with the event and its lack of 
effectiveness   
‘The great danger is, of course, you go away on a teambuilding and you 
write several flipcharts worth of things to be done and then two years later 
you dust them off and regenerate them’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
It thus appears that in order to be effective, formal team-building must be 
appropriately designed and followed up.   
It also appears that the formal team-building events must include informal 
activities as well, in order that the social as well as the functional needs of the 
team and its members are met.   
Finding: For a period after the creation of DE&S team-building was not 
funded. 
In the DPA and also in DE&S, In order to initiate a formal team-building exercise, 
the management team for the event were given resources which were used to, 
for example, book a hotel or to hire an external facilitator (Shaw, 2007-2010).  
This legitimised the practice organisationally.  But as a result of funding 
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constraints, there was a period after the creation of DE&S when both formal and 
informal team-building appeared to be frowned upon, as a B2 grade member of 
the Commercial Function said:  
‘…When we had money typically it’s the away day or couple of away days 
at a hotel facilitated either indoor or outdoor or both exercises, I mean the 
last formal one I took was when I was in DLO, so it’s going back probably 
2005 or something now I suspect…’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
Also, 
‘It depends on the budget.  It would be nice to go away and do it outside 
of work.as we did before’ (Shaw, 2011h).  
This lack of funding appeared to coincide with the period when DE&S was 
initiated and had started to develop its own identity.  But the reduction in formal 
team-building appeared to reinforce employee cynicism, in that it was believed 
that: ‘they [DE&S] don’t value teams anymore’ (Shaw, 2011h).  
These statements imply that DE&S put finances and budgetary control ahead of 
workforce satisfaction and coherence.   
The following informant, a Senior Naval Officer, who as a Team Leader, had 
recently re-instigated more formal team-building which appeared to have a high 
level of engagement from his team:   
‘Well obviously the team-building event that we had, because we’re not 
allowed to call it team-building, was in July and so what we’re seeing at 
the moment is in a sense the fallout from that is people’s willingness to 
attend the focus groups, to attend my sort of all rank discussions to put 
suggestions into the suggestion box and that’s happening and we’re 
getting quite a good response from that.  So that has endured across the 
summer period and into...well it’s been a very busy start to the autumn 
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season……  I can’t look back and say we did something like this two years 
ago and are we still reaping the benefits from that’ (Shaw, 2011q). 
The Officer’s remarking that ‘we aren’t allowed to call it team-building’, appears 
to support that DE&S did not promote or fund team-building.  It also indicates the 
ways that teams circumvented this ban, by, for example, calling it  ‘focus groups’, 
‘team-development’ if in stable teams, or ‘break-through’ if it was carried out in 
the context of organisational change.  Success of the event was, in this case, 
measured by the levels of continuing engagement by group members in the focus 
groups.   
But even for the Commodore, the practice of formal team-building appeared to 
be subversive because he felt that he was going against DE&S by funding and 
carrying out the activity.   
Therefore while he felt that team-building was valuable, he also confirmed 
previous responses when he felt that DE&S did not value teams and also that 
there was a divide between DE&S and the Project Teams.  Therefore, it might be 
suggested that the type of team-building employed was seen as being important, 
implying that DE&S could spend money more effectively by promoting informal, 
social team-building, rather than the technical traditional team-building that was 
favoured by DE&S and which included competitive activities, and as Sherif (1956) 
described, and as will be shown subsequently in this thesis, did not build teams 
but broke them apart.  
It appears that the subversion of the corporate ban on team-building was 
achieved by the ‘team’ as a construct indicating that they needed to improve the 
way that the team works together and carrying out informal team-building.  This 
in turn appears to indicate that the stance that DE&S took at that time, which was 
one of not allowing team-building to occur because of ‘funding constraints’, may 
have been a false saving.   
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A valid question that could be asked here is: Was the stopping of team-building 
events an effective way of saving money?  Should money have been invested in 
enabling people to work together more effectively, and develop better informal 
communication mechanisms, especially as this was something that was 
described by the respondents as having been effective at removing some of the 
barriers between groups and reducing their group’s distinctiveness?   
As a result, teams carried out team-building, either informally, or formally, and the 
aims of these events were the aims of the teams, rather than promoting the 
corporate aims of DE&S.   
One of the effects of this may have been that the concept of that team identity 
was privileged and reinforced over and above the concept of that team being part 
of DE&S and linking to a stronger, more corporate identity.  
It also seems that team members would appear to support the idea of carrying 
out team coherence activities, and would prefer them to be informal rather than 
formal.   
This might imply that DE&S was considered by its leadership to be a temporary, 
as opposed to an enduring organisation, because it did not appear to consciously 
want to build teams up and create coherence.  This appeared to lead to a 
perception within teams in DE&S that the concept of ‘team’ was not valued in a 
social sense, and was only valued in a functional sense of producing outputs.   
The existence of this perception in turn implies a link to the levels of emotional 
intelligence that were observed within members of the leadership groups, and 
indicates an inability or unwillingness to address the socio-cultural benefits of 
team-building as opposed to focussing on the perceived socio-technical benefits.   
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Finding: Team building occurred within a particular group size boundary. 
In terms of group size,  a B1 grade Team Leader in Operating Centre D indicated 
that team-building only occurred below the 2* Operating Centre level: 
‘…team-building tends to be considered at a lower tactical level, I think the 
largest team-building I was ever technically on was when I was in […] we 
had 160 people …’ (Shaw, 2015e). 
This indicates that there was a physical size boundary below which a group was 
considered to be a team and it indicates a hierarchical level at which team 
building occurred.   
Group cohesion appeared to be enhanced in these smaller teams, and 
boundaries were created, broken and re-created within and between these 
groups.  The group size that appeared to be defined as a maximum for a team 
was below 160 members.  This matches significantly with Dunbar’s cognitive 
group size maximum of 150 members (Dunbar, 1993a p 685 ).  It also matches 
the data provided in section 4.6, of a maximum team size of 150±30 or 135±15 
members as being organisationally legitimised team sizes in DE&S.   
Finding: Formal Team-building in DE&S was designed to promote a sense 
of identity. 
Identity was discussed in section 4.3-4.5, but it is legitimate to place identity within 
the context of team-building.  This was because team-building also reinforced 
group identity in terms of a brand.   
The manifestation and reinforcement of group identity appeared to be, as is 
described by a C1 grade internal consultant working in Operating Centre B, a 
consistent and persistent element of team-building:   
‘…and I’ve been part of a team-building exercise with my new old team, if 
that makes sense, where we rebranded ourselves, got to know each other 
under our new brand’ (Shaw, 2011j). 
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This same effect was reported by a B1 grade civil servant in Operating Centre A:   
‘...if you like it was promoting this team identity and understanding who the 
team are.  Getting to know the people in the team, finding out who...  what 
they are, what they’re like, any weird pastimes that they may have....’ 
(Shaw, 2011h). 
 So it appears that getting to know people was an outcome of these events.  That 
theme is also confirmed by the following respondent, a B2 grade civil servant who 
reiterates the hierarchy of identity between the role team and DE&S, and the 
fragmenting effect that this had on group behaviour:   
‘… And the developing a team identity, was the one that where I 
sit…concerns me the most because I do a lot of work with the three levels 
of management, the 2*, the 1* and at what we call now, Delivery Teams, 
Project Teams, the old IPTs.   And there was very little identity.  People 
identify with their immediate team, but they don’t identify with being part of 
an organisation and therefore what you have was an awful lot of people 
that are pulling in different directions.   And as an ex-business manager, I 
look at business objectives and building better teams and getting the 
understanding and then I look at the team identity and I think in some ways 
within where we are now those are actually polar opposites, because we 
are trying to, with very little success, create a new team identity, but these 
team-buildings (sic) happen at a lower level.  So it enforces the behaviours 
at the lower level and not that these teams are part of a bigger whole’ 
(Shaw, 2011t) 
Once again the respondent indicates that in terms of identity and brand, teams 
are small, not large and that small group behaviours could work against larger 
group’s behaviour, thus pitting the project team against the corporate group.  This 
chimes with previous responses where the strength of group membership is 
perceived to be, and expressed as, stronger at smaller group sizes than at larger 
ones.  This factor then reinforces the small team identity:   
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‘Invariably yes, it improves the team identity.  I don’t think it necessarily 
goes much wider than the team.  With changes and post-mapping and all 
the rest of it, with team identity changes, some people are affected 
positively and some folk are affected negatively in their future role and then 
the communication that goes out’’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
This response from a C1 grade civil servant in Operating centre A appears to 
suggest that team-building within DE&S over time may also have been creating 
boundaries between teams and team-members.  The creation of those 
boundaries may have occurred because the act of team-building developed a 
sense of identity within the group, which automatically created the other of those 
that were not within that group.  It appears therefore, that while team-building was 
designed by DE&S to create a sense of identity within teams, DE&S did not feel 
like a team because it made less effort to build teams and to formally develop 
team cohesiveness.  It also appears to indicate a group size factor, previously 
described, that DE&S was too large a group to be a team, and to be meaningful 
to many of its members in the way that the concept of a team was.   
Finding: Socio-technical and socio-cultural activities and effects were also 
often conjoined within team-building events.   
Formal team-building events were choreographed by management.  They 
appeared to consist of two elements: during the day the event was primarily 
socio-technical, and aimed at improving how the team functioned in a formal 
sense; the informal evening sections of the formal events were primarily socio-
cultural in both nature and effect:  
‘...I went on a team-building exercise over two days, there were 
gymnastics at eleven, twelve o’clock at night.  However, the next day the 
camaraderie of the whole team had just got closer.  It’s funny someone 
said to me you go to team-building events because of the evening, 
because that’s when you start to build the team, it’s not the little activities 
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you do to bring the team closer together during the day, it’s actually the 
night time activities’ (Shaw, 2011j). 
No doubt the events of the evening could sometimes also be classed by 
participants as being risqué, and the DE&S press office was acutely aware of the 
adage: what would the Daily Mail say if they found out (Shaw, 2008a).  However, 
these informal activities were thought by participants to be the most important, 
and also the most effective elements of team-building.  The evening events 
appeared to be consistently carried out in conjunction with food and alcohol which 
both provided a very strong social glue that aided group cohesiveness.  There 
could also be singing, in the form of Karaoke, involved,(Shaw, 2008d) reflecting 
Kirke’s (2014) study and others such as Collins (2002), and separately Bensimon 
(2009) on the use of song in creating group boundaries.   
It therefore appears that while formal team-building was expected to improve 
socio-technical group coherence, it was the informal team-building events in the 
evening that were more meaningful to participants than formal-team-building.  
The fact that informal team-building appeared to be more successful than formal 
team-building echoes the findings of sections 5.2 and 5.3 which found that 
informal socialisation appeared to be more successful than formal induction.   
Finding: Team building was a divisive activity if carried out wrongly. 
It also appeared that if not well organised, team-building could be divisive, rather 
than inclusive, as described by firstly, a B2 grade civil servant in Operating Centre 
C:  
‘…I think most recently one of the dangers was it can actually highlight the 
differences and exacerbate them more than actually bring them together.   
Throughout my career the worst, by far, team-building ones I’ve been on 
were the ones which were not inclusive which can actually exclude people.  
So the classic example of that would be doing something which was very 
physical, so all the nice young fit people and the soldiers love it and get 
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stuck in and people with, like myself, with dodgy old backs and everything 
sitting at the side feeling like a tool basically.  That just had the completely 
opposite effect of what you intended of trying to bring people together, 
you’re just making some people feel left out.  And I have to say my long 
experience had told me never allow the military to organise a team-building 
event because it’ll always be some outward bound type activity which was 
by definition not inclusive to a civilian workforce because there would 
always be people who can’t join in to that.  So you have to be really careful 
what you do and how you design these things.  I think there’s potentially a 
lot of damage done by poorly designed team-building events where they 
haven’t thought through what they want from it, they haven’t thought 
through the design of it and it’s poorly implemented’. (Shaw, 2011h). 
This view was confirmed by a C1 civil servant in Operating Centre D: 
‘…but I think you need to pay attention to your team before you decide 
what would help the team to build.  Instead of saying ‘well it’s OK chaps I 
like sailing, so you’re all going to come along for a week on a yacht with 
me’, that’s great, suits me, but it doesn’t necessarily suit everybody else’ 
(Shaw, 2011h). 
It appears that mixed formal team-building, where civil servants and military 
personnel were within the same team, or even where there was an age or ability 
boundary between groups, appeared to be predominantly received negatively by 
participants.  This may lead to boundaries appearing within teams between those 
who could carry out the activities, or who ‘liked’ them, and those who could, or 
did not. 
Boundaries became evident between those who could, those who could not, 
those that would not, and those that would only grudgingly take part in those 
activities, for whatever reason.  Excluded groups might for example, be 
characterised by age, military, or civilian service, physical ability and willingness 
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or ability to take part.  In those instances, formal team-building appeared to be 
disintegrative rather than integrative.   
Military team-building appeared to be perceived as being primarily based around 
physical activity, such as expeditions and physical activities,(Shaw, 2013c). while 
civil servants appeared to prefer more inclusive and intellectual pursuits such as 
the building of machines to launch eggs without breaking them (Shaw, 2009d). 
Many people would take part in the physical activity, not simply to take part, but 
also to enjoy the team-building that it engendered.  While that might be culturally 
and contextually acceptable in a military, fitness, or age appropriate group, 
physical activity as team-building in DE&S was more likely to be disintegrative, 
rather than integrative within a mixed gender and ability group.   
Team-building that was carried out in this way naturally created boundaries or 
made existing ones more obvious, which generated teams that fractured along 
negative lines, creating negative in-group identities.  Those boundaries were 
likely to be characterised by cynicism, leading to out-group members identifying 
negatively with the rest of their team.   
As a result, this behaviour produced exclusive groups and group boundaries 
within the larger group which produced negative, rather than positive sub-groups.   
The effect of disintegration was reported consistently by respondents and 
confirmed by observation.   
It appears, therefore, that great care must be taken in the design of formal team-
building events.  It appears also that formal team-building had greater risks and 
fewer benefits for DE&S in terms of developing team coherence and 
collaboration.  This was because competition, which appeared to be an integral 
element of formal team-building in DE&S, actually served to create in-groups and 
out-groups (Sherif, 1956), rather than build a unified team.   
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Finding: The good intentions of the team-building activity were often lost 
when people returned to their desks to carry out their day job 
With any practice there are intended and unintended effects.  In DE&S where 
there was latency of effect that produced a finding that was consistent, but which 
had also been observed anecdotally by the researcher(Shaw, 2007-2010) which 
was that the effect of the event disappeared quickly on return to the floorplate:   
‘… it’s a bit like the guy who goes onto the training course on behavioural 
stuff and as he goes back they all say ‘we can tell you’ve been on a course’ 
and within weeks they revert back.  It’s the best intent and then go back 
into the work place and remember we started the conversation about how 
busy people are, it’s, you go back into the work place and then you get 
absolutely swamped with the day to day work so all the good intent, there 
isn’t follow through, ….  So guess what happened?  You start doing the 
emails......I suspect that’s not uncommon, not just for the group that I look 
after, I suspect that’s quite common for the rest of the groups…’ (Shaw, 
2011t). 
The respondent, a B2 grade civil servant in Operating Centre G, suggests that 
the tension that was seen between what was learned and promoted at  the event 
and  what might be called ‘doing the day-job’ occurs because socio-technical and 
socio-cultural cultures hold back the changes that are being sought in these 
events, so culture could be described as being sticky.  Team-building activities 
only appeared to have a lasting effect if they were reinforced on a regular basis, 
but formal, socio-technical team-building only happened annually or biennially.   
For example, a C2 civil servant, who worked in a project delivery team in 
Operating Centre D: 
‘With funds the way they were, the expectation of the team was to do what 
teams historically have done, which was go and stay in a hotel, work the 
afternoon, have fun in the evening, work the majority of the next day, come 
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back to work.  I understand from the feedback that people enjoyed 
themselves, they were quite shocked that they enjoyed themselves.  The 
food in the mess of course was excellent when they do an evening dinner, 
so they really enjoyed that.  They had a quiz night, they really enjoyed that, 
but then when they came back to work it was almost like it had never 
happened’ (Shaw, 2011m).  
And also the following from a C1 civil servant in Operating Centre G:  
‘Because for me yes, two to three weeks.  If I got to know a few people 
better at that conference then yes probably two or three weeks afterwards 
it’s back to normal.  The status quo had been returned to or maintained’ 
(Shaw, 2011ad). 
In some cases the effects were more subtle and the ones that lasted longest were 
the inter-personal relationships, in which case the negative aspects of team-
building may have been forgotten: 
‘Hmm, it’s hard to say, I mean parts of it lingers for quite some time I think.  
I think there’s always a deep benefit to the better understanding, ‘oh, 
you’re not such a bad git after all’ type of feeling…..  There’s a little bit 
about expectation management, you’ve set this objective, we’re going to 
achieve this and this and this and you never achieve that 100% so there’s 
a rapid tail off from the perfect outcome of what you think you’d achieved 
in terms of the business plan and the change in approach, but the deeper 
benefits last, I think the actual interpersonal relationship benefits last.  If 
the negative ones, when it goes really horribly wrong, those can last as 
well and probably last longest of all’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
This nuanced response is from a B1 grade Team Leader in Operating Centre A.  
It shows how the informal, relationship building aspects of team-building may last 
longer.  This indicates that informal aspects may therefore be more meaningful 
to participants than are the formal aspects.  But people will remember the really 
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bad team-building events for a long time; thus, indicating that negative events 
may have a longer effect in DE&S than do positive events.  An alternative 
explanation may be that group members had forgotten that any socio-technical 
action had taken place or they did not recognize that where there had been a 
problem prior to the team-building exercise, it was actually not a problem 
anymore.  A B1 grade civil servant from Operating Centre A describes this, again 
from the point of view of management: 
‘…Well certainly if you come back from most team-building events there’s 
a bit of a buzz on the floor-plate that lasts for a week or two’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
In addition, the following response from a B2 grade civil servant in Operating 
Centre C is consistent with the previous response: ‘In special projects world [the 
effect lasts] as long as the hangover’  (Shaw, 2011h). 
It appears then that any positive effects of formal team-building were consistently 
described as only lasting between three days to three weeks after that.  When 
people had returned to the floor-plate, group members were seen to revert to their 
old ways of working.   
The reasons for this may be linked to a form of process drag, where the day job 
took primacy over the new processes and social behaviours and identities that 
had been developed during the team-building activities.   
This form of drag appeared to be initiated when teams returned to the 
geographical and cultural context of their workplace, as opposed to being in the 
separated context of the formal team-building activity.   
This difference in attendees’ expectations in the longevity of the effects also 
appeared to lead to a difference in group member’s feelings on the utility of the 
event.  These expectations varied both from a personal perspective, and also 
from the perspective of where a person was situated within the DE&S 
organisational structure.  Even the informal talking over coffee and food during 
breaks at formal events and during the evening events appeared to be viewed 
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differently to the formal day-time events, being viewed as ‘down-time’, or not 
really working.   
These informal activities apparently fulfilled the social requirements of general 
team-building which were described by respondents as team cohesion and they 
also reinforced social team identity; they were therefore positive outcomes, as 
opposed to the formal team-building outcomes which appeared to be accidentally 
predominantly dis-integrative and were therefore in terms of organisational 
management, negative outcomes.  
Thus far, team-building has been described as being formal, with the informal 
being intertwined within the formal practice. In DE&S there was a separate form 
of team-building activity identified which did not appear to be called team building, 
but that was the effect that it had on group members, and teams.   
5.4.4 Informal team-building independent of formal team-building 
Finding: Team-building could characterised as being either formal or 
informal in effect.  These informal activities were frequently peer organised, 
and predominantly included food and drink.   
The first respondent was ex-British Army, and at the time of the interview, a C2 
civil servant in Operating Centre D, he talks of team-building being fragmented:  
‘We [the team] used to have a beer and a bite at least once a month, we 
used to go out as a little team, but we do still have runs ashore, which was 
what the Navy like to call it or dine outs and we do still do those, but they 
tend to be a bit more fragmented, but we have had in the past two 
teambuilding events and we also still maintain our little identities, our little 
groups’ (Shaw, 2011g). 
And a Senior Officer within the Royal Navy, but based in DE&S, in Operating 
Centre B indicated that: 
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‘…in terms of ethos, values, divisional runs ashore, going ashore to the 
pub or whatever you go as a group, you look after your mate if he...you 
don’t allow him to be left behind, you look after each other’ (Shaw, 2011q).  
The examples appear to show how the language and dialect from one group 
could be appropriated and used by another group, even though there was what 
would be termed healthy competition between those groups for much of the time.  
Also, there appeared to be the recognition of looking after your mate, from a 
military social and technical culture implies socio-cultural bonding within DE&S 
teams.  The response implies a degree of positive cultural influence from military 
cultures, where group members come together to look after each other both 
physically and emotionally.   
The first respondent also indicates that informal team-building occurred less 
frequently after the creation of DE&S.  This lack of informal team-building 
appeared to be perceived to be due to the pressures of work, a differing and older 
demographic within the workforce of DE&S, coupled with parental and other 
responsibilities, as well as the group members not wanting to socialise outside of 
work time.  There was also as shown earlier, a reduction in financial resource and 
approval for both formal and informal team-building, implying that DE&S was not 
prepared to pay to build teams.   
As with informal socialisation, the conjunction of formal and informal socialisation 
with food during socialisation was reported by 82 respondents in total.  This 
appears to chime with an observed pattern, which was that socialisation was 
carried out in conjunction with either food or drink of some sort, often alcohol, and 
this appeared to make the practice more meaningful to participants.  In addition 
to the context being informal, the information content of informal socialisation 
practice was not technical, but was predominantly social information.  It appeared 
to be this informal practice that enabled the integration of group members into 
the social culture of the group, as opposed to the technical culture.   
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A question can be asked here, what are the differences between informal 
socialisation as described in section 5.3 and informal team-building that are 
described here?    
A central difference is that informal socialisation was almost unseen within DE&S, 
it happened every day at the coffee cart and at breakfasts as what this research 
calls personal cultural adjustments.  Informal team-building was different, it was 
organised by peers and could happen in specific environments, often away from 
the workplace and was often labelled and also characterised as team-building, 
whether it was a trip to the pub, a meal out or a cinema evening.  The outcomes 
were the same, improved team social coherence leading hopefully to increased 
formal team coherence.    
5.4.5 Summary of Induction, Socialisation and Team-building 
This research has discovered that there were two types of socialisation in DE&S, 
characterised as being formal, socio-technical induction and informal socio-
cultural socialisation.  
DE&S had organisational policy on induction and expected people to be inducted 
into role teams and their jobs. This indicated that DE&S as an organisation 
appeared to place value on the functional, socio-technical induction of people.  
This value appeared to be in getting people to be able to perform their functional 
role quickly.  It was also discovered that there were different levels of induction 
that coincided with the hierarchical position of the group. However, the practice 
of these inductions, and group members’ experiences of them, indicate that even 
though formal induction was promoted by DE&S, supported by policy and 
implemented within teams, it appeared to be at the least inconsistent, making it 
appear ineffective.   
It was observed that graduate and apprentice entry schemes were also viewed 
as being inconsistent in their approach to induction into DE&S. Engendering 
expectations’ mis-match.  Part of this expectations’ mis-match appears to arise 
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from the fact that the schemes are MOD schemes, not DE&S schemes and so a 
MOD induction was included within the scheme, but when the new entrant on that 
scheme arrived in DE&S, there appeared to be no formal induction into DE&S. 
This meant that graduates and apprentices appeared to be disappointed with 
DE&S, leading to high attrition rates within some cohorts of entrants, up to a 
reported 50% in one commercial scheme.   
This attrition and expectations mis-match was very expensive for DE&S, as it 
involved the recruitment cost of the graduate, their initial training costs and 
capitation rates82, having to re-employ someone to fill their position, and also the 
cost of the time that team-members may have spent in bringing them into teams.  
There may also have been a reputational cost, as DE&S may appear to be a not 
very good employer, as it perhaps did not seem to care about its new graduates.   
It was also discovered that the entry of military personnel in DE&S differed from 
the entry of civilians.  Military personnel expected a formal induction into their 
teams and they often experienced a two or three day hand-over from a peer, but 
they apparently received no other formal induction into DE&S.  They may have 
received an induction into the Abbeywood site, but that did not integrate them into 
the organisational culture of DE&S.   
Military personnel did receive a military specific welcome, which appeared to 
have the effect of maintaining their military privileges and welfare networks while 
they were at Abbeywood.  The outcome of this and the observation that 
expectations development and mis-match was present in military personnel who 
joined DE&S were indicators that military personnel might not integrate 
completely into the organisational and social culture of Abbeywood and DE&S, 
reinforcing the observation of Yardley and Neal (2007) that the military posting 
into ‘acquisition’ was a transitory post.   
                                            
82 The total cost of employment. 
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This research was carried in the aftermath of the merger of the DPA and the DLO 
into DE&S.  It was observed that when DE&S was created, insufficient effort was 
put into establishing the new DE&S organisational culture through the 
socialisation and induction of staff into the new organisational construct of DE&S.   
The apparent outcome of this lack of socialisation was that it appears that the 
new culture did not break away from the old cultures to become different from the 
DLO and DPA organisational cultures. This meant that the organisational change 
may not have been as successful in terms of changing the perceived old 
organisational cultures as had been hoped by DE&S management.    
The second type of socialisation that the research discovered was informal 
socialisation.  This appeared to socialise group members into the informal, socio-
cultural norms of groups and teams as opposed to them being inducted into the 
technical, functional rules of DE&S. Socio-cultural integration was observed to 
occur as and when it was needed and could be intertwined with formal induction.   
There were many types of informal socialisation, such as coffee meetings, or 
‘sitting with Nelly’.  These practices often combined elements of induction, 
socialisation and group coherence.  This means that informal, socio-cultural 
integration was likely to be experienced more frequently, and was more 
meaningful than formal socio-technical.  It allowed the new group member to 
make personal cultural adjustments to enable them to learn and integrate into the 
unwritten norms of the group.   
A key characteristic of informal socialisation in DE&S was its conjunction with 
food.  This might be very informal coffee meetings in a Neighbourhood café, or 
the slightly more formal ‘Fat Boys Fridays’, or the very formal Mess dinner.  While 
all of these events were open to all members of an area, self-selection occurred.  
This might happen because everyone in a team took part, or it might have been 
where predominantly military personnel or associates took part in specific service 
related occasions such as Trafalgar Night celebrations.   
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These predominantly military events appeared to privilege the reinforcement of a 
military identity as opposed to a more DE&S corporate, mixed civilian and military 
one.   
The result of that appeared to be that all of the socialisation activities could, in 
fact, produce in-groups and out-groups and therefore not act as whole group 
activities.  It therefore appears that the formation of group boundaries occurred 
naturally in DE&S, among predominantly social groups in addition to being 
manufactured by the formal, functional structural breakdown of DE&S.   
It was also discovered that there was a temporal boundary between the point at 
which formal induction was deemed to be completed by new group members and 
also DE&S policy.  This was also the point at which the informal, socio-cultural 
became the primary method of integrative practice.  The formally sanctioned  
period of one week did not appear to be sufficient to give new group members 
the confidence that the induction was either long enough, or good enough.  It may 
then appear that DE&S is not providing enough resource to induct new group 
members into DE&S, leaving people to feel that induction is not as valuable to 
DE&S as the existence of the DE&S Induction policy DE&S (2009d), (2011a) 
suggests. 
The research discovered that in the practice of formal team-building appeared to 
be primarily socio-technical in nature, and informal team-building appeared to be 
primarily socio-cultural.  While these two types of team-building might be 
practised separately, they were often found in conjunction with each other.  They 
might then be expected to reinforce each other, but while that reinforcement 
happened, it appeared that, as with socialisation, it was the informal that was 
more meaningful to team-members, and which reinforced the formal and not the 
other way round.  One of the reasons for this direction of reinforcement may have 
been that formal team-building appeared to be divisive, with obvious differences 
between different ability groups that may have coincided with cultural differences 
between military personnel and civil servants.  A further reason may be that 
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formal team-building appeared to have reputation for bringing the same issues to 
the meeting, year after year, such as communication between management and 
staff, which never seemed to be good enough.  Another reason may have been 
that the team-building management team often had expectations of the event that 
differed from those of the employees.  The management team of the B2 grades 
and above had functional outcomes in mind, whereas everyone else wanted to 
get to know each other better, thus indicating a split between the functional, de-
emotionalised world-view of the B2 grades and above, and the para-familial, 
social view of the employees.   
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5.5 Cultural Tension in DE&S 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Section 5.5 reports the findings on tension between the DPA and the DLO 
organisational cultures that occurred after DE&S was created.  It also indicates 
that DE&S was very slow in both implementing changes that were required to 
develop a single, recognisable DE&S organisational culture and also that staff 
were slow to embrace DE&S.  
5.5.2 Tension between the Old and the New, and ‘Them’ and ‘Us’. 
 
Cartoon 5-1 Tension Between the Old and the New in Vernacular Humour 
Source: MOD, Crown Copyright 
Finding: Cultural tension was recognized in various ways in DE&S 
Within the data there were 64 references given by 47 respondents to the 
existence of tension between the DPA and the DLO organisational cultures and 
the DE&S organisational culture.  This indicates that cultural tensions appeared 
to be widely recognized within DE&S by its staff.  The following response was 
given by a C2 civil servant from Operating Centre B; which was in two sites 
instead of the previous three: 
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‘I sit within an Operating Centre that was one of the first to merge, we still 
have a deeply embedded DPA and a DLO culture which is different to a 
DE&S culture.  So it’s actually all three because there are some scenarios 
where you can sit and listen to somebody and think you’re still in a DLO 
frame of mind and because I’ve worked in the DLO I can see that.  My 
boss has only ever worked in the DE&S in the DPA and she sometimes 
finds it a little odd when things are said, and I can then fill the back history 
in’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
Members of the groups, or the groups themselves appeared to not have 
completely changed their behaviour or group culture since the formation of DE&S: 
‘I actually find really difficult that they they’re actually DPA people and I’m 
finding that DPA people are actually blaming DLO people for all the issues, 
but dealing with what I’m dealing at the moment it’s actually DPA and it the 
behaviours of DPA people that is causing a lot of the issues’ (Shaw, 
2011h). 
Also:   
‘There is still a DPA tribe in evidence and a DLO tribe in evidence.  And 
particularly in the Operating Centre, there are two or three people who still 
hark back to ‘oh well we wouldn’t have done it that way in DPA’ and ‘you’ve 
got rid of all the good things we did in DPA’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
Many of the DE&S groups existed in a very similar forms before the formation of 
DE&S.  Once again, the vernacular use of the word tribe to describe the groups 
in a negative manner indicate s that the term is associated with negative, rather 
than positive behaviours.  Functionally these groups consisted of the same 
members, the same customers and suppliers, and also performed the same 
functions as they had in the precursor organisations.   
The two groups that were described in the first example formed a new group 
within Operating Centre B.  One group was located at the DLO Headquarters, 
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and thus close to the centre of power, one group was previously at Corsham, 
while the third was a predominantly technology focused group within the DPA.  
These geographical cultures had been reduced from three to two, through the 
physical collocation of groups as part of the post-merger colocation of teams from 
other, DE&S sites into the acquisition hub that was based at Abbeywood.   
But the old organisational cultures and groups were still visible in this group: both 
physically, where people sat together; attitudinally in the way that the new group 
viewed the rest of DE&S; and also in the way that the other Operating Centres 
viewed the group and the way that the group performed its role.  This tension and 
ability to identify where a group had originated was repeated across DE&S.   
But in that previous existence, those group cultures were part of the DPA or the 
DLO.  Their history was lost on new-comers, being only accessible as corporate 
memory that could guide the newcomer through the multi-cultural maze of DPA 
and DLO sub-cultures, for example: the first informant said that:  ‘if you go into 
some of our teams you’ll still get the ‘that’s a DPA team, I’m DLO’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
A second informant indicated that:  
‘I think that the process of assimilation into a DE&S single viewpoint had 
not yet quite reached its conclusion.  One tends to find that the Abbey 
Wood contingent, especially those who were DPA and who therefore lived, 
worked, breathed and died in Abbey Wood still have difficulty 
understanding the fact that there was life outside the moat [the lake that 
surrounds Abbeywood site]’ (Shaw, 2011h).   
The two previous responses from civil servants, who were, at the time of the 
interviews working in the same group in Operating Centre B.  This was a 
predominantly policy and bureaucracy based cross cutting Operating Centre.  
Both were C1 grade civil servants, one had recently joined that group from 
Operating Centre C, the other had been in the group for some time.  Their 
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responses were highly congruent, even though the respondents were historically 
from functionally contrasting Operating Centres.   
Tensions between the social and the technical cultures in DE&S were observed 
during the research period, five years after the DPA and the DLO were merged, 
thus showing its strength and longevity.  The reasons for this DE&S appeared to 
be complex. One of the reasons for the existence of this tension between the old 
and the new in all of its forms may, as was shown in section 5.2.2, be the lack of 
induction into DE&S at the time of its creation.  In essence, when a person arrived 
in DE&S, or a group within DE&S, or when DE&S was created from the DPA and 
the DLO, group members brought with them their prior experiences, perceptions, 
and external cultural influences.   
The importation of acquired behaviours was called in the vernacular language of 
DE&S baggage, as is described by a B1 grade civil servant from Operating 
Centre A: 
‘They successfully brought the [team] in, and integrated it into the 
organisational structure.  However, if you chose to have baggage you 
would still see it.  The old [team].  If people chose to see it, they could see 
it’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
That team were brought into DE&S as a joint team composed of DPA and DLO 
staff.  Because, in this instance, the DPA and the DLO had previously tried to 
implement what that team did, each group had their own ideas of how it should 
work in DE&S, and these ideas were not necessarily compatible.  It was because 
of this factor that the team did not appear to work well as a team, and therefore 
the project at that time was not a success.   
The word baggage was also noted in a conversation referring to the respondent’s 
time in pre-DE&S organisations: ‘I probably carry some baggage as a result’ 
(Shaw, 2012l).  This is confirmed by a B2 grade civil servant in relation to a 
change of Team Leader that occurred subsequent to the merger: ‘Doesn’t have 
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30 years baggage of [team x]’ (Shaw, 2011h).   This may indicate that some 
individuals recognized that they could be personally responsible for the tension, 
which was a result of their previous experiences and knowledge.  This prior 
experience and knowledge could, of course, be positive or negative, depending 
on the situation and how the knowledge and experience were deployed.   
Tensions between the old and new process and technical cultures, or “ways of 
working” also appeared to exist in addition to the tensions between the social 
cultures.  This tension appeared to be caused through organisational systems 
and processes not changing, such as where old work processes and practices 
were carried into DE&S.  This is described by a B1 grade civil servant Team 
Leader in Operating Centre D:  
‘If they give me another DPA centric spreadsheet and get grumpy when I 
go back and say,  ‘I don’t like how this was structured because I’m trying 
to break the team structure down’, and all you’re doing was giving me 
readiness checklists that perpetuate the team structure.  Now I know the 
IT guys were here in DPA times, but they haven’t moved on, so there’s 
actually the underbelly of the organisation hasn’t gone away and for as 
long as the infrastructure and the life support systems perpetuate that…’ 
(Shaw, 2011h). 
This exhibition of this tension between the processes, and also the thinking of the 
DPA and that of DE&S appeared to reflect on the credibility of the group that 
promoted the old processes, as the group did not appear to change their 
functional culture to be congruent with the new organisational culture.  It appears 
therefore, that this unwillingness to change may not be solely perpetrated by 
personal agency, but that organisational processes might also have played a part.  
If processes and supporting systems, such as technology do not change, 
especially within an organisational merger, then this could have acted as a 
contributory factor that allowed this tension between the old and the new 
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organisational cultures to occur in DE&S.  This tension was likely to act as a 
braking factor on organisational change programmes.   
These social and technical tensions also appeared to manifest themselves 
through group members, or indeed whole groups, using processes, or forms from 
precursor organisations, instead of using DE&S process structures.  This was 
seen in for example, forms that were used by some staff in one Operating Centre 
to report annual leave.  These were from the RNSTS, (Royal Naval Stores and 
Transport Service), which had been part of the DLO which was subsumed into 
The Warship Support Agency (Shaw, 2010g).  The form that should have been 
used was a DE&S form or the DE&S electronic system.83  
The use of these forms implies that psychologically, the group members 
appeared to be still, in a day to day sense, working in the old organisation, 
because not only had their job not changed, but their phone number and desk 
remained the same and the artefacts and people that they were surrounded by 
remained the same as well (Shaw, 2013e).  But also this tension might have been 
partially legitimised by the group member’s management, who did not want to 
use new forms, for example, or by DE&S itself, by issuing the instructions to use 
up all of the old forms before new ones were produced in order to save money 
(Shaw, 2011ab).   
Geographical identity also appeared to play a part in creating tensions between 
group cultures.  The following response from a C1 civil servant from Operating 
Centre C, describes what happened in the area that he worked in, when a group 
moved en masse into his area: ‘They all huddle together, they use their own 
processes, eat together and go to lunch together, it’s as if they don’t really want 
to be part of the team’ (Shaw, 2010m). That new group had moved from Andover 
to Abbeywood, and appeared to have kept their desks together.  They had also 
                                            
83 HRMS – Human Resources Management System. 
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retained their own technical processes and social groups, rather than integrating 
into Abbeywood technically and socially.   
The tensions between geographical cultures DE&S could also be symbolised by 
the appearance of gate guardians (Shaw, 2010n) as local territory marking 
mechanisms, these have been described in section 4.4  These were often local 
instantiations of either precursor, or other cultures, such as in the collocation of 
groups from outlying stations such as Wyton, Foxhill, Andover, and Ensleigh, 
where a group was transplanted into Abbeywood as a whole, bringing with them 
all of their local culture and their previous group and geographical identity, without 
being socialised into the new culture.  These groups, their gate guardians and 
also other territory marking symbols appeared on floor-plates in Abbeywood as a 
result of the work to collocate groups into Abbeywood (Shaw, 2010b). 
These tensions between the old and new organisational cultures appeared to be 
long lasting.  A C1 grade civil servant who was an internal consultant in late 2010 
indicates this:  ‘I mean they came together about five years ago, something like 
that, and for a good two to three years people were still ‘oh that’s the old DPA 
lot’, it happens a lot less now’’ (Shaw, 2011j).  This view chimes with that 
expressed by a B1 grade Team Leader from Operating Centre D: ‘Instead of the 
big barrier we’ve got lots of little barriers between Operating Centres and groups’ 
(Shaw, 2011h).  This echoes the response given by respondent Abw 32 (Shaw, 
2011h) of there being fences around groups within DE&S where, instead of the 
real and perceived gap that had existed between the DPA and the DLO.   
This tension appeared to be persistent within DE&S, and its existence may have 
acted to reinforce negative group behaviours.  A C1 grade civil servant in 
Operating Centre B describes this through his view of the insularity and 
distinctiveness of a group that was apparent for some time post-merger.  Their 
interview was conducted in 2011, four years after the merger: ‘for a long time 
there was still an invisible sort of insular Chinese wall between the ex-DPA types 
and the ex-DLO types’ (Shaw, 2011h).    
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Cultural tensions did not appear to be limited to any particular staff grade or 
functional group.  The leadership group could also be responsible for hindering 
the organisational changes in DE&S.  This was most clearly visible through the 
power struggle over which process culture should become the dominant one: 
‘some of the 1*s and B1s appear to be rebuilding the IPT [Defence Procurement 
Agency Integrated Project Team] structures’ (Shaw, 2011h).  This response from 
a B1 grade Team Leader, describes how, in Operating Centre D, some ex DPA 
(Defence Procurement Agency), IPT (Integrated Project Team) leaders were 
trying to re-build DPA organisational structures in DE&S, where the IPT structure 
had been intellectually, but not physically dismantled through the creation of 
Operating Centres in DE&S.   
This appears to be one indication that where these tensions existed, 
organisational change might not occur in the way that it was intended.  In this 
instance, instead of getting ‘One DE&S’, it appears that the DPA was being rebuilt 
within an area of DE&S.   
Cultural tension also appeared at the boundary between either civilian groups or 
military/ civilian groups.  This was then manifest as a lack of understanding when 
a group member was moving, for example, from a military environment, to a 
civilian one.  Cultural tensions could also result in some inappropriate behaviour 
between military, ex-military personnel and civilian staff.  The following response 
is from a C1 civil servant:   
‘Talking about tribalism, something yesterday that I have never heard of 
before, never seen before and it must be totally an Army thing.  I went over 
to the main site with the Colonel and the Colonel was walking through the 
buildings and stuff like that and as he was walking through the buildings, 
all the soldiers were standing up and saluting him.  And I have never seen 
that before.  Never.  I was shocked because I couldn’t believe that just as 
he was walking through they were standing and saluting him, sitting down, 
standing and saluting.  Where does that come from?  Where does that 
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come from on an MOD site?  That does not happen.  You know?  And it’s 
because he’s got his flashes on and that’s what I said to you earlier on.  
That’s his behaviour and that’s his expectation’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
This tension between military and civil service cultures in this way may have 
occurred because military personnel did not consistently receive an induction into 
DE&S.  As a result they may not have known how to behave in DE&S, as a 
primarily civilian workplace as opposed to a military workplace.  So it appears 
that one of the consequences of military personnel not experiencing any induction 
into DE&S.  This could lead to military personnel to be culturally inept rather than 
adept in relation to the culture of DE&S.   
This tension and inappropriate behaviour appears to be a low-level form of 
cultural drag, as described by Kirke as a ‘slowing down of change through lack of 
cooperation by the work force who tend to look back to how things were and drag 
their feet in transition to the new state of affairs desired by their management’ 
(Kirke, 2010 p 98).   
5.5.1 Summary of Cultural Drag 
The research identified the existence of multiple levels of cultural drag which was 
in agreement with the work of Kirke (2010) and also of Ogburn (1964). Cultural 
drag was observed as being linked to multiple other cultures, including those of 
the DPA and the DLO.  Those cultures and sub-cultures were long lasting, 
because they had a history, and as Hofstede indicates, any organisation that has 
a history is constrained in its future behaviours (1980 p 27 ).  Two types of cultural 
drag were identified within DE&S, both types conformed to the socio-technical 
and the socio-cultural cultural axes that have been used throughout this research.  
Cultural drag was found to exist within a hierarchy of cultures in DE&S that 
included a series of institutional cultures.  
It appears that the tensions between groups in DE&S resulted from socio-cultural 
processes such as new group members not being effectively integrated into the 
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social culture of the group, but also by socio-technical pressures.  This is where 
underpinning organisational processes do not change and are maintained 
inappropriately in the new organisation or after the organisational change.  One 
element appears to link the examples of cultural drag that have been presented 
thus far in section 5.5.2, that is induction and specifically induction as an element 
of organisational change.  The reason for this assertion is as follows.  When an 
organisation changes it may seek to change its organisational processes at the 
same time as it changes its organisational structures, but If either it takes some 
time for those process changes to be agreed and then communicated to the 
process mangers and users, then they are likely to communicate and use the old 
processes during a longer than expected or understood transition.  In using the 
‘old’ processes users will also be using ‘old’ ways of working and interacting with 
those processes while in the ‘new’ organisation, perhaps for a considerable 
period of time.  This was in the case in DE&S when ‘old’ processes were still in 
use 6 years after the creation of the ‘new’ organisation.   
Where this occurs it is likely to slow the pace of organisational change from the 
‘old’ to the ‘new’, so being one factor that both affects an organisational culture 
and creates socio-technical cultural drag.  This instance of drag links the socio-
technical interactions of people and processes with the socio-cultural, as people 
still use their ‘old’ ways of working and do not change to the new ways.  
The appearance of cultural drag in DE&S appeared to be aided through the lack 
of understanding of senior managers of the importance and effect of 
organisational culture on the success of the merger of the DPA and the DLO.  
A further example that shows how elements of the DE&S organisational culture 
appear to have aided cultural drag  centre around the manifestation of  identity in 
groups.  As shown in section 4.3 identity in the context of organisational change 
possesses a socio-technical element in that one organisational identity is 
removed and another one is imposed on group members, both organisationally 
and symbolically.  It is also a socio-cultural drag because some members may 
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not want to identify with the new organisation.  This socio-cultural drag appears 
to have a link to the law of unintended consequences as this behaviour means 
that some people do not behave as managers expect them to in that situation.   
So in order to counter cultural drag or cultural tensions between the ‘old’ and the 
‘new’ and to make the management of change more effective, any manager who 
is responsible for managing organisational change should identify and 
understand the factors that affect the organisational culture that they are working 
within.  This will then enable them to identify and devise effective interventions 
that induct and socialise staff into the socio-technical culture and socio-cultural 
norms of the new organisation, otherwise organisational change will not occur.  
The lack of identification and understanding of these factors may be one of the 
reasons that as Barton (2011) identifies organisational change has a habit of 
failure in Defence Acquisition.   
This can then be represented graphically and figure 5-2 presents a conceptual 
model of cultural drag, its antecedents and effects in DE&S.   
Moving from left to right across the figure, people, the socio, may react against 
the organisation, the technical, the action of the drag is provided by the people. 
This then might be called socio-cultural drag, because it is the people slowing the 
organisation down, perhaps being unwilling participants to the change.  Also if as 
shown, organisational processes do not change sufficiently quickly, this may 
provide the reason for socio-technical drag, causing people to be unable to 
change and fulfil any new organisational cultural or behavioural requirements.   
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Action Effect Outcome
Socio-cultural –
people unwilling to 
change
Socio-technical  -
processes and people 
unable to change
Lack of 
cooperation
Process and 
Practice lag 
behind 
organisational 
change
Socio-cultural drag
Socio-technical 
drag
• Lack of change 
due to 
unintended 
consequences
• Lack of change
• Sticky cultures
• Organisational 
cultural change 
happens more 
slowly than 
management 
expect
Socio-cultural and Socio-technical cultural drag and their consequences
 
Figure 5-2 Model of Cultural Drag and Its Consequences  
Source Derek Shaw 
Chapter 6 now provides a conceptualisation and characterisation of the 
organisational cultures and ethos of DE&S.   
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6 DE&S Organisational Culture and Ethos: in Harmony, 
or Conflict 
6.1  Introduction 
This research set out to describe and explain factors that affected the 
organisational culture of DE&S between 2007 and 2015. Chapters 4 and 5 have 
described and explained some of those factors, Chapter 6  reports on how the 
DE&S organisational culture and how this was represented by informants and 
was affected by the attributes that were described throughout chapters 4 and 5.   
6.1.1 DE&S Organisational Culture 
Chapters 4 and 5 have presented a series of attributes that groups possessed, 
such as identity, size and membership, which combined with factors such as 
induction socialisation and team building have implied that DE&S did not possess 
one single organisational culture but was a multi-cultural organisation. It also 
shows that there was a value, or ethos that breached the bureaucratic culture of 
DE&S.  Section 6.1.1 shows how this multiplicity of cultures manifested itself.   
Finding: DE&S did not have single, identifiable organisational culture.   
‘DE&S doesn’t have an organisational culture, you have to grow a culture, 
and DE&S isn’t allowed to grow one, it just reacts’ (Shaw, 2015a). 
That comment, from a C1 grade civil servant in Operating Centre D was indicative 
of a groundswell of opinion in DE&S.  It came as part of a conversation after the 
researcher and the informant were making sense of a change readiness 
workshop that they had both attended as part of the preparation for the new 
Bespoke Trading Entity (BTE) in 2015.  The fact that there was such a feeling 
within employees indicates that in DE&S employees were aware that there was 
no single organisational culture that could be identified as being DE&S, but DE&S 
reacted to whatever it was asked to do by government.  That reaction may have 
been part of the organisational culture.  It was not the organisational culture.  It 
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was more likely to be a value or an attribute of being aligned to the super-ordinate 
goal, of supporting the front-line.   
Figure 6-1 shows at a meta-level the cultures that were extant in DE&S and also 
those that existed prior to the existence of DE&S.  It also shows how these 
cultures persisted within DE&S through the imposition of DE&S via the merger of 
the DPA and the DLO.  
Family Ad hoc groups
Ad hoc 
groupsy
Bureaucracy
Front Line 
Command/ 
Armed 
Services/ DE&S 
Support of 
Equipment PTs
DE&S/MOD
DE&S OC and PT 
Acquisition,  
Support and 
Industry facing 
teams
DLO 
DPA Panel 1
Panel 2
Panel 3
Tribe
Tribe
Family
Support Area
Acquisition Area
 
Figure 6-1 A Conceptual View of the Organisational Culture of DE&S 
Source: Derek Shaw  2012-2015 
Legend: Panel 1 shows a conceptualisation of some of the group labels that were 
found in DE&S.  These conceptual labels, such as tribe and ad hoc groups were 
taken from the vernacular language that was used in DE&S. Cameron and Quinn 
(1999 p 54) also use those terms in other organisations, thus providing a degree 
of coincidence to the findings of this research in DE&S.  The position of this panel 
indicates the proximity of these groups to the concept of acquisition and industry.  
They are thus indicative of being ex-DPA groups and of being further away from 
the supporting elements of defence, and thus ‘the front line’. 
Legend: Panel 2 shows a conceptualisation of some of the other groups that 
were found in DE&S.  These conceptual labels, such as tribe were also taken 
from the vernacular language that was used in DE&S. The position of this panel 
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indicates the proximity of these groups to the concept of support, and ‘the front 
line’, they are thus indicative of being ex-DLO groups. 
Legend: Panel 3 provides the formal organisational labels for these groups. 
Legend: Bureaucracy, this bar indicates the concept of the bureaucracy that 
was imposed onto the DPA and the DLO when they were merged.   
The group cultures and types shown in figure 6-1 cultures were characterised 
through vernacular language, organisational function, and group purpose.  Figure 
6-1 conceptualises the reality of the multiple organisational cultural types that 
were extant in DE&S as seen by DE&S staff.  Each of these groups possessed 
their own identities which were visible to other groups.  
For example, a B1 grade Military Officer in Operating Centre J describes the DPA 
and the DLO in a manner that matches the model, in speaking of the difference 
between outputs and the centre that he had encountered during several tours in 
acquisition:   
‘.. the cultures within those groups have been very diverse, given that 
they’ve come from different backgrounds, DLO and DPA, which had 
different cultures and those which were output driven and those which 
were centre driven’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
The reasons for the socio-technical and also the socio-cultural differences 
between the DPA and the DLO can be explained by the differences between their 
outputs and their relative closeness to either the operational military or to industry.  
The following respondent was a military officer in Operating Centre E: 
‘So the need to combine the two organisations made sense.  There was 
never any sense in having one (the DPA) that bought stuff and threw it 
over a wall, (for DLO to support) so it made sense to combine it, I think 
that was a good move’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
 366 
 
 
These organisations also had fundamentally different reasons for their existence.  
The DPA was the Defence Procurement Agency: it specified and worked with 
industry to procure defence equipment.  In terms of types of cultural 
characteristics and definitions, Figure 6-1 conceptualises DE&S as a hamburger 
shaped organisation.  This representation shows the extant cultures of previous 
organisational incarnations, the DPA and the DLO with an added layer of 
bureaucracy separating the two that was imposed as joint organisational 
processes.  These were the corporate elements, through the imposition of the 
DE&S.  This bridged the gap between the DPA and the DLO, instead of actually 
merging them.  
The following B2 grade civil servant describes the corporate joining of the two 
organisations and his feelings as one of the team that was responsible for the 
merger:   
‘I knew damn well that we were having duplicate resources and I think 
battles with the DLO side were quite absolutely unnecessary.  To join us 
together at that corporate level made an awful lot of sense for me’ (Shaw, 
2011p). 
A C1 grade civil servant in Operating Centre A confirmed this: 
‘It was bringing together both the DPA and the DLO into one organization 
to deliver an efficient and effective service to the front line’ (Shaw, 2011h).  
Some members were therefore comfortable with the thought of working in a new 
joint organisation, DE&S, because they thought that would help to improve the 
equipment and support that was provided to the front line.   
This would suggest that there would be no cultural drag, but it actually introduces 
a paradox, because cultural drag was indeed exhibited, even though people knew 
the merger was a good idea.  It took a long time to get the two organisations 
working together, suggesting that the precursor cultures were not sufficiently 
understood by senior management and change leaders in order to socialise 
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people, either socio-technically or socio-culturally into the new organisational 
construct of DE&S.  The effects of this were shown in section 5.2.2.    
A Naval Captain in Operating Centre J characterises the differences between the 
DPA and the DLO, and also the paradox:   
‘…I think the DPA [Defence Procurement Agency] had been very much 
formed in cultural terms by the IPT [integrated Project Team] concept, the 
IPT concept had a lot to commend it particularly in a self-contained project.  
Project managers were given a performance cost and time boundary, and 
that led to teams which were very focussed and inward looking.  Inward 
looking can be a negative, but probably a stronger ethic was the focussed 
bit.  They were focussed on delivering their outputs, sometimes to the 
detriment to the greater good but having been part of that organisation that 
wasn’t visible to people within those projects.  The DLO was a much more 
amorphous organisation, and partly because of what it had come from, 
providing support and support was a very varied commodity, support to a 
platform, support to an equipment were very different’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
The informant characterises the cultures of the DPA and the DLO that normalised 
historical group behaviours.  The response also indicates how organisational 
behaviour could be a contributory factor in personal behaviour and may have led 
to cultural drag as there were different processes that were used to achieve the 
same outcome in different parts of acquisition, the DPA, and support, the DLO.   
One of the key differentiators that were observed within the DPA and DLO 
organisational cultures were the characterisation of the functions of the groups 
and also the group structures.   
Both of these factors contributed to how groups behaved in their respective 
organisations.  It appears then, that the creation of DE&S did not immediately 
achieve a single organisation, either socio-culturally or socio-technically.  This 
may be as a consequence of how the new organisation was imposed onto people 
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as the merger was frequently received cynically by employees, or because of the 
difference in the cultures of the DPA and the DLO.   
The effect of this chimes with the findings of Wanous (2000), on factors that affect 
employees’ cynicism to organisational change.  As a result, there were, and 
remain, boundaries and fracture lines in-between the old DPA and DLO 
It appears that there was a consistent theme that was observed across five 
Operating Centres and four geographical locations.  This was that the cultures of 
the DPA and the DLO were still in existence as process, physical and 
psychological cultural entities, they were sub-cultures in DE&S.  The cultures and 
the cultural boundaries were subtle and pervasive.  The historical major 
differences between the DPA and the DLO became differences between Chief of 
Materiel areas and between Operating Centres.   
There were some differences that remained as tensions as the ex-DLO teams 
were also thought by some staff to be closer to the front line than were the ex-
DPA teams. 
‘I am here to support the front line.  I may not be doing it directly, although 
a couple of years ago I got an invite to go to Camp Bastion, it reminded 
me forcibly how far I’ve been moved away from front line since I started 
my work [in DLO].  But that’s my function (in DE&S), I support the front 
line’ (Shaw, 2011h). 
The respondent, a C1 grade civil servant who had previously been a member of 
the DPA and also of the DLO indicates that he felt divorced from the front line on 
moving to DE&S.  His view indicates that the strength of identity with the ‘front-
line’, as indicated in section 4.5.1 may be linked to something that Schein (1992) 
describes as an internal element of organisational culture, that of a value.  
‘But I was always aware when I was working in what was the DLO, of the 
split with DPA and it was always a source of frustration that you had a 
separate organisation running things like acquisition programmes that, in 
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my view at the time they didn’t understand in service support.  As far as I 
was concerned DLO understood in-service support, DPA knew about 
acquisition, but didn’t know how to buy things for an existing platform’ 
(Shaw, 2011h). 
The feeling of being distanced physically and psychologically from the front line 
was echoed in many ex-DLO teams, who perceived DPA teams to be distanced 
from what the lads and lasses on the front line needed.  In addition to military and 
civil service cultures, groups in DE&S could also possess professional cultures 
based around their function.  The following example from a C2 civil servant 
encapsulates the complexity and the multi-cultural nature of DE&S through the 
use of metaphors that were found within the DE&S lexicon:   
‘Certainly amongst the three services, there’s intense tribalism.  They were 
very parochial.  There’s also to a...what’s the word?...I would say lesser 
extent, various specialisms within the civilian’s side, contracts people stick 
together because of the commercial nature of their job, all people tend to 
be a very close group.  I worked in Quality Assurance for a while which 
was also very friendly family focused group, went across IPT (Integrated 
Project Team) boundaries because we were functionally reporting to the 
head of Quality.  So there’s definitely tribalism in groups’ (Shaw, 2011i). 
This view then reinforces the conceptual model of Figure 5-1, where there were 
multiple social and technical cultures in DE&S, not simply the military and civilian 
cultures.  Because of this differentiation, each domain and Operating Centre 
possessed a technical and social culture that differed from any other Operating 
Centre.  These cultures were supported by factors such as group distinctiveness.  
These have been described throughout this research, and were supported by the 
vernacular language which described these groups and cultures as tribes, or 
families, and enabled the creation of boundaries between groups, their 
differences and heightening the feeling of cultural difference between the groups. 
These groups could also be characterised culturally as described by DE&S 
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members through their socio-technical characteristics and also through the sub-
groups of which they were composed, as either Project Teams, or corporate 
teams, bureaucratic resources and that they do different stuff.    
Because of this functional differentiation, each domain and Operating Centre 
possessed a different socio-technical culture in addition to being different socio-
culturally.   
6.2 Ethos: The Power of Commitment and the Shadow of 
Bureaucracy. 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Section 6.1 has shown that DE&S is a multi-organisational cultural organisation.  
Section 6.2 describes the single unifying and also the most important factor in 
DE&S, its ethos.  It does this by presenting narrative and conceptual 
representations that were developed from the data.   
6.2.2 Culture or Ethos 
“Greek, Sociology, the fundamental character or spirit of a culture; the 
underlying sentiment that informs the beliefs, customs, or practices of a 
group or society; dominant assumptions of a people or period” (Dictionary, 
2014). 
Ethos is not the same as culture.  Tylor suggested that culture (is)  “that complex 
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Tylor, 1871 p 
1).  Ethos may also be confused with culture, in that ‘the way that we do things 
around here’, can be represented as an ethos, when in fact it is a statement of 
cultural rules or norms.  Ethos may therefore be interpreted as being an artefact 
of culture, and as Schein indicates an internal factor of a culture, as opposed to 
being an external factor (Schein, 1990).  
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While this research has identified that there was no single DE&S organisational 
culture, there did appear to be a single ethos, or core value that appeared to be 
present throughout all grades, Operating Centres and Teams.  That ethos could 
be characterised as one of putting the ‘front-line first’.  
The construction of a bi-directional cultural model of DE&S, Figure 6-2, which 
was based on function and output was demonstrated by the following observation 
in a lessons learned84 meeting in April 2012.  An attendee from the bureaucratic 
commercial function put his hands up in a cross shape and described each 
element as pictured below, independently of the researcher’s work.  
The Front Line
Project Effort
Bureaucracy and Policy effect
 
Figure 6-2 Differences: Project Effort and Bureaucratic Culture and Effect.  
Source: Derek Shaw 2012-2015 
Legend: The horizontal stripe represents the bureaucratic effort, or culture, that 
was viewed by informants as being DE&S and MOD driven.  This is a 
predominantly Civil Service culture, as it is the functional element of the 
bureaucracy.   
                                            
84 Lessons Learned was a defined DE&S process that identifies and extracts positive and negative project 
management practice. 
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The vertical stripe bars represent the effort made by the project teams to keep 
the armed services, their customers, supplied with the right equipment.  The 
bureaucratic axis cuts across the project axis. 
The contrast between the two directions was further illustrated by a quotation 
from a fireside chat given by a 2* Civil Servant in Operating Centre D, where the 
concept of ‘both core deliveries and the bureaucracy’85 was described.  This 
indicates that this model of project versus bureaucracy was widely recognized in 
DE&S.  It appears that DE&S acted as a layer between the acquisition teams and 
the support teams, slowing down project delivery and using project resource to 
report to management, rather than to deliver project outputs.  This bureaucracy 
was associated with the civil service, not with the military, or with the project. 
This view chimes with the conceptual view of DE&S that was proposed in Figure 
6-1, section 6.1.1 where DE&S was the bureaucracy that bridged the DPA and 
the DLO, without creating a real merger of the two organisations.   
This model was recognized by both bureaucratic staffs and project staff as a 
useful and valid model through which the organisational culture and ethos of 
DE&S could be discussed.  While the bureaucracy of DE&S supported and 
enabled the delivery of equipment, projects appeared to perceive that the 
bureaucracy ‘got in the way’ of them doing ‘the day job’, and thus as cutting 
across their project effort.   
The ethos and cultural elements of DE&S that were shown in Figure 6-2 can be 
easily imposed on the model in Figure 6-1 without contradiction.  The vertical bar 
of Figure 6-2  appeared to coincide with the primarily DLO manufactured ethos 
of ‘from factory to foxhole’, which was reified by DPA staff, who very strongly 
supported ‘the lads and lasses on the front line’.  
Figure 6-1, Figure 6-2, and Figure 6-4 have presented single concept views of 
the organisational cultures and the ethos of DE&S. This leads to a representation 
                                            
85 The Big Picture for the (OC D) Change Programme 15 May 2013. 
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of the multiple organisational cultures, the relationship of the ‘front-line first’ ethos 
and the effect of the DE&S bureaucracy which is shown in Figure 6-3   
The Front Line
Project Effort
Bureaucracy and Policy effect
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Support
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Figure 6-3 Model of the Organisational Culture and Ethos of DE&S 
Source: Derek Shaw 2012-2015 
Legend:  Bureaucracy, this bar indicates the concept of the bureaucracy that 
was imposed onto the DPA and the DLO when they were merged and it 
represents what DE&S was for many people at that time, and it represents the 
bureaucratic effort that was viewed by informants as being DE&S and MOD 
driven.  The vertical bars represent the effort made by the project teams to keep 
the armed services, their customers, supplied with the right equipment.  
Legend: Panel 1 shows a conceptualisation of some of the group types that were 
found in DE&S.  These conceptual labels such as tribe and adhocracy, were 
taken from the vernacular language that was used in DE&S. The position of this 
panel indicates the proximity of these groups to the concept of acquisition and 
industry, they are thus indicative of being ex-DPA groups and of being further 
away from the supporting elements of defence, and thus ‘the front line’. 
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Legend: Panel 2 shows a conceptualisation of some of the group types that were 
found in DE&S.  These conceptual labels such as tribe, were taken from the 
vernacular language that was used in DE&S. The position of this panel indicates 
the proximity of these groups to the concept of support, and ‘the front line’, they 
are thus indicative of being ex-DLO groups. 
Legend: Panels 3 and 4 provides the formal organisational labels for these 
groups, where they reside in the DE&S ethos in terms of ‘acquisition’, or ‘support’. 
The horizontal element was the controllerate86 or bureaucratic effort and culture.   
Both of these views were expressed as contradicting the bureaucracy, which was 
expressed as being an overhead, and stopping people from doing their jobs.87  
The DPA and DLO multiple Project Team cultures bridged the bureaucracy of 
DE&S in order to deliver equipment to the front-line, despite, rather than because 
of DE&S.  
Across the data it appeared to be recognized that within any military domain, civil 
servants could be brought into the broader grouping of that domain:   
‘I see the civil service as serving all.  And you align with whoever you’re 
working with for at that time.  So if you’re in a D-Ships team at that stage 
you’re aligned to the Navy and great numbers of people change jobs and 
go off and work for Land.  At which stage they become a Land civil servant.  
Just as if I were an Air engineer working on Storm Shadow and the Storm 
Shadow team leader, I don’t know who he is at the moment, but for a 
number of years it was a Naval Captain, I think probably aligned himself 
with the Royal Air Force.  So I might be wrong, but if you are output team 
based then I think civil servants align with whichever service they’re 
outputting to.  Of course there’s the semi-amorphous mass in the middle 
of the supporting groups, the airline tour they’re not aligned to Land, Sea 
                                            
86 Language from the Pre DPA, Procurement executive. 
87 This model and the discussion on linguistic frameworks within DE&S were presented in section 4.7.   
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or Air they’re aligned to the general greater good so in a sense my answer 
is very output team focussed’ (Shaw, 2011q). 
This positive view of civil servants appeared to be because, it was stated, if you 
work with us in any way you become one of us, i.e., the military, not a civil servant, 
and therefore not different to us.  This view appeared to be common across 
services.   
This factor of identification and cultural assimilation was also identified by Kirke 
(2012) in the wider MOD in relation to the RAF and civil servants who worked in 
the RAF domain.  Therefore, it appears that civil servants were thought, because 
they were the bureaucracy, to be adaptable to work with any service.  This 
appears also to imply a degree of cultural agnosticism.  It also indicates that 
groups and individuals were able to create the other in DE&S in terms of who did 
the work, and who was a corporate overhead, a paper pusher.  This finding also 
agrees with the concept of a bi-directional culture/ethos model of DE&S, using 
project effort and bureaucratic effort as the bi-directional elements in Figure 6-2.  
This model then implies that as an organisation, DE&S was the bureaucracy, as 
opposed to the projects that directly supported the front line and that the ethos 
that group members espoused was to support the frontline.  Further reinforcing 
the multiplicity of organisational cultures within DE&S, with a characterisation of 
a bureaucratic culture and a project culture as being different from each other.   
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88 
Figure 6-4 Discretionary Effort as Unpaid Overtime in Operating Centre L.89 
Source: DE&S Time Recording And Charging Data. (TRAC). 
Figure 6-4 was derived directly from DE&S corporate data from Operating Centre 
L during the first quarter of 2014.   
It shows that in this Operating Centre all grades of employee worked more hours 
than they were conditioned to work, conditioned hours being 37 hours per week.  
Lower grades worked fewer hours of unpaid overtime, or discretionary effort, than 
did middle grades, or senior managers in this Operating Centre.  The data were 
gathered from the Time Recording tool that was deployed in preparation for hard-
charging90 of employees’ time to projects.  Figure 6-4, while a true representation 
of the effort provided by staff, does not explain the reasons behind the amount of 
unpaid overtime being worked in that Operating Centre.  It may be that in this 
Operating Centre staff need to work overtime because there was a genuine need 
in terms of project outputs, or it may be that staff are struggling to produce outputs 
because of the amount of bureaucracy that is imposed on them by DE&S.   
                                            
88 DE&S Corporate Data from Time Recording Pilot switch on meeting September 2014. 
89 OF 6/7 = SCS, OF 4/5 =B1 grade/7, OF 2/3 = C1/C2, E1 = AA/AO grades, ref table 3 – 3. 
90 Hard Charging was being introduced to DE&S as a way of assigning true costs to project effort. 
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This is the power of commitment to getting the job done despite the bureaucratic 
requirements or ‘culture’ of DE&S and supporting the front line, and is the 
overwhelming ethos within DE&S.  That ethos functions despite the multiplicity of 
organisational and group cultures and their tensions.   
6.2.3 Summary  
Chapter 6 has linked chapters 4 and 5 to each other showing how the research 
question:  ‘What were the factors that affected the organisational culture of 
DE&S?’  has been answered.  It shows how those factors included: identity, group 
size, metaphors, socialisation and cultural tension or as Kirke (2010) describes 
it,  cultural drag.  It has also shown that there was no single organisational culture 
that existed in DE&S, but that there appears to have been a single ethos, that of 
‘front-line-first’.  
These cultures consisted of technical cultures where the ‘old’ DPA and DLAO 
processes were still used in DE&S, or where functional cultures such as 
‘commercial’ processes, where a set of functional rules existed, creating a distinct 
group.  Organisational cultures were also visible in Operating centres and as 
shown in sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.7 each was linguistically, geographically and 
functionally different from other Operating Centres.  
DE&S also possessed two other major cultural types, the Civil Service and the 
military and these groups could be characterised through language.  They were 
made more distinctive through differences in their functional rules, MOD (2004), 
MOD (2007), MOD (1998), (2006).  There were also differences in dress codes 
between military and civilian personnel MOD (2004), Bain (2008) and a 
combination of functional and cultural differences that caused tension and the 
development of stereotypes, as was shown in section 4.3.8.  
The existence of the vernacular group labels as described in section 4.7 was 
represented graphically in Figure 6-1 to indicate where in the overall conception 
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of Defence Acquisition and support on the continuum between the ‘factory and 
the foxhole’  these groups and their cultures lay  
It was clear from the data in section 4.5 that group members identified very 
strongly with the ‘front-line’.  The language that was used expressed an ethos of 
‘front-line first’ and was balanced by the expression of DE&S as being the 
bureaucratic culture.  This was shown in section 4.7.  This dichotomy is 
represented in Figure 6-2 as a bi-directional model of project effort versus 
bureaucratic effort. This means that a unified cultural model of DE&S can be 
created by overlaying those individual models on each other, as is shown in 
Figure 6-3.  This model indicates how the merger of the DPA and the DLO added 
DE&S as the bureaucratic zipper that joined the two organisations together, and 
that the merger was not a true merger but an imposition of a set of functional 
rules on the DPA and the DLO in an attempt to make them work together as one 
coherent organisation to acquire equipment and support the UK armed forces. 
Underlying the organisational cultures of DE&S Figures 6-2 and 6-3 show a 
conceptualisation of the ethos of the staff in project teams as a project and 
delivery behaviour and how that behaviour breaches the bureaucratic culture of 
DE&S, which is a reporting and controlling activity.   
The effect of the tension between the ethos and the culture within DE&S is then 
seen in the TRAC91 shown in Figure 6-4.  This figure indicates how staff were 
affected by the tension between delivery and bureaucracy by the amount of time 
that is recorded as unpaid overtime.  This suggests that the power of commitment 
is stronger than the shadow of bureaucracy, but staff have to work longer hours, 
not because of the amount of delivery work, but because of the amount of 
bureaucratic tasks that get in the way of them doing their day jobs. This is the 
power of commitment to getting the job done despite the bureaucratic 
requirements or culture of DE&S and supporting the front line and is the 
                                            
91 Time Recording And Charging – a system of recording the amount of time that staff spend on their 
activities.  
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overwhelming ethos within DE&S.  That ethos functions despite the multiplicity of 
organisational and group cultures and their inherent tensions.   
Chapter 7 will now test those findings.  
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7 Testing the Findings 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapters 4 to 6 have reported the findings of the research that answered the 
question, ‘What factors affected the organisational culture of DE&S? between 
2008 and 2014’. 
Chapter 7 now tests those findings.  The findings are firstly presented in a table, 
with a note of the section in which they were presented.  Accompanying this is a 
note of the perceived importance of that finding to the research as measured by 
the number of times the concept was mentioned by informants or identified 
though observations.  Each section in chapter 7 starts with a description of 
findings and the concept that those findings relate to.  The concept and the 
subsequent findings are then discussed firstly in relation to prior literature, and 
then in relation to the results of the testing that was carried out in DE&S and other 
organisations.   
7.1.1 Testing the Findings  
The findings that emerged from the data that were subsequently gathered using 
that methodology were tested along three axes: by reference to prior literature, 
by reference to current military/civilian organisations and internally through 
presentation to members of DE&S.  This style of testing chimes with triangulation 
as described by, for example Jick (1979), and also Olsen (2004).   
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Finding Chapter and Section Perceived importance to Research  
 Identity as manifest through social, 
personal, group, symbolic and 
geographic identity affected the 
organisational cultures of DE&S 
was observed in DE&S through the 
following series of findings:  
 At the merger a new corporate 
identity was conceived that 
resulted in tension between the old 
identities of the DPA and the DLO 
when they were removed. 
 There was a trajectory to the 
manifestation of identities in DE&S 
that started prior to the creation of 
DE&S on the 1st of April  2007 
when the DPA and the DLO 
merged (MOD, 2006).   
 Corporate branding and identity 
extended to labels that indicated 
the function and location of teams. 
 Lanyards and badges were used 
as symbols of identity and these 
 Chapter 4, 
Sections 4.3-4.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 All 124 informants mentioned one or more 
types of identity.  The imposition of identity 
could be a positive factor in group 
behaviour, but appeared to be viewed 
more negatively in DE&S.   
 Throughout field observations of personal 
and corporate behaviour identity appeared 
to be a consistent theme.  
 
 The concept of identity appeared to be 
very important to this research as the 
external manifestation of an internal value. 
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Finding Chapter and Section Perceived importance to Research  
symbols could also be divisive 
among groups. 
 Dress and uniform was used as a 
proxy to express discontent about 
changes in terms and conditions in 
the British Army, with the blame for 
those changes being put onto civil 
servants.  
 The existence of different dress 
codes led to tension between 
groups. 
 
 Chapter 4, 
Sections 4.3-4.5 
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Finding Chapter and Section Perceived importance to Research  
 Groups in DE&S possessed their 
own language.  These dialects 
could act as a barrier between the 
group and the outsider.  They 
could also reinforce in-groups.  
Metaphor was used as a series of 
vernacular labels to describe 
groups and their perceived and 
imagined behaviours. 
 Language changed depending on 
hierarchical place within DE&S. 
The language of the Management 
Boards and the senior grades 
differed from the language of 
employees.  
 Language described an emotion 
state at particular points within the 
hierarchy of DE&S. 
 There was a pattern of language 
and a trajectory of linguistic 
change that was apparent in 
meetings. 
 Informal language as gossip was 
observed to exist within informal 
 Chapter 4, 
section 4.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 respondents directly mentioned 
language as a factor within the culture of 
DE&S.  ~Language appeared to be used 
to reinforce groups, act as a boundary 
between a group and the corporate DE&S 
and vice versa, where it was used to 
reinforce the corporate world-view.  
 Metaphors were used throughout DE&S.  
The metaphor of the ‘tribe’ was directly 
used by 72 respondents.  The metaphor of 
the family was used directly by 11 
respondents.  These metaphors appeared 
to be used consistently in association with 
defined group sizes. 
 The constant use of these metaphors 
indicates that they were important to 
members of DE&S at this time.  
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and formal group coherence 
activities. 
 Groupings and people’s 
relationships with them were 
described using shared 
metaphors. 
 The words tribe and tribal were 
used to describe groups and group 
behaviours.  While group members 
used the word family to describe 
their teams as a positive attribute, 
tribe and tribal had a more 
negative connotation.  These were 
usages pre-dated the formation of 
DE&S. 
 The creation of DE&S did not 
change the way the people used 
the metaphor of tribe to describe 
their group. 
 
 Chapter 4, 
section 4.7 
  
 387 
 
 
Finding Chapter and Section Perceived importance to Research  
 The consistent sizes of teams and 
groups within the hierarchy of 
DE&S affected the Organisational 
Culture of DE&S 
 Team members were able to 
recognize the size at which a team 
stopped being a team and became 
a group. 
 2* organisationally designed stable 
group sizes (Operating Centres) 
were consistent within the 
hierarchy of DE&S, being between 
500 and 2500 members. 
 1* organisationally designed group 
sizes were consistent within the 
hierarchy of DE&S. 
 B1 grade organisationally 
designed group sizes were 
consistent within the hierarchy of 
Operating Centre D in DE&S and 
also Other Operating Centres.  
 B2 grade organisationally 
designed group sizes were 
 Chapter 4 
section 4.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Team sizes were consistent throughout a 
sample of the DE&S hierarchy.  This 
consistency indicates that group size 
played some part in affecting the 
organisational culture of DE&S. 
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consistent within the hierarchy of 
Operating Centre D in DE&S. 
 C1 grade organisationally 
designed group sizes were 
consistent within the hierarchy of 
Operating Centre D in DE&S.   
 
 Chapter 4 
section 4.6 
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Finding Chapter and Section Perceived importance to Research  
 Induction and socialisation in 
DE&S were observed through the 
following findings: 
 Socio-cultural integration could 
occur in a group setting in 
conjunction with formal business.  
 Informal socialisation into teams 
was not purely technical or social, 
but was often a combination of 
both. 
 Informal socialisation often 
occurred in conjunction with food. 
 Personal cultural adjustments 
occurred after the temporal 
boundary between formal and 
informal socialisation 
 Formal DE&S induction specified 
benefits, informal socialisation did 
not.  Outcomes were therefore 
only specified and agreed by peers 
and group members.   
 Group size, gossip and group 
coherence appeared to be linked 
by practice and context. 
 Chapter 5, 
sections 5.2 to 
5.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Induction, socialisation and team-building 
were viewed as necessary, important and 
inconsistently practised and experienced 
within DE&S by 102 respondents.  This is 
confirmed by the four long term 
observations of team-building events, the 
observations at informal socialisation and 
other events and also the induction LFE 
study that was carried out for Operating 
Centre D (Shaw, 2011ad).  
 Inconsistent induction, while not directly 
affecting the organisational culture of 
DE&S had some effect on people who 
became cynical of formal programmes and 
therefore put more reliance on the informal 
methods of integrating people into teams 
and maintaining team-coherence. 
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 As was discovered with induction 
and socialisation, there were two 
types of team-building, the formal 
and the informal.  
 For a period after the creation of 
DE&S team-building was not 
funded. 
 Team building occurred within a 
particular group size boundary. 
 Team building was designed to 
promote a sense of identity. 
 Socio-technical and socio-cultural 
activities and effects were also 
often conjoined within team-
building events (Shaw, 2008-
2011).  
 Team building was a divisive 
activity if carried out wrongly. 
 
 Chapter 5, 
sections 5.2 to 
5.5. 
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Finding Chapter and Section Perceived importance to Research  
 Organisational culture, cultural 
drag and also an organisational 
ethos were observed in DE&S. 
 Cultural drag was recognized in 
various ways in DE&S 
 Each of the teams and groups 
within DE&S formed an individual 
element of the DE&S 
organisational system, and each 
possessed a culture that was a 
sub-set of, and subsidiary to the 
DE&S organisational culture.  The 
existence of these cultures caused 
tensions, because each of these 
different cultures was supported by 
a subtly different ideology.   
 There was a single ethos in DE&S, 
that of ‘front-line-first’. 
 
 Chapter 6  The concept of tension between cultures, 
which was exhibited between both extant 
and old and new cultures was articulated in 
some way by 47 respondents.  This 
indicates that ‘cultural drag’ was 
embedded within the organisational culture 
of DE&S. 
 The conflict between the ethos of front-line 
first and the bureaucracy was recognised 
by DE&S in its mission statement. It was 
also described in organisational literature, 
mentioned directly by 35 respondents and 
recognised by observation.  This indicates 
that the ethos and bureaucracy are both 
implicit within the DE&S organisational 
culture and vital components of the culture. 
 
Table 7-1 Table of Findings 
 392 
 
 
 
 393 
 
 
7.2 Testing in Prior Literature 
The conclusions of the existence of, and the effect of, each contributory factor 
were tested against relevant prior literature.  These contributory factors of identity, 
language, group size and induction and socialisation were presented in Chapters 
4, 5 and 6.  
7.2.1 Identity 
Identity as manifest through social, personal, group, symbolic and 
geographic identity affected the organisational cultures of DE&S.  
The existence and applicability of identity as a mechanism in social categorisation 
is discussed in a wide body of literature, Ashforth and Mael (1989), see for 
example d'Andrade (1984), Ellemers (2005), Fearon (1999), Haslam (2003b), 
(2001 ), Hogg (2003), (1987) Branscombe et al. (1999).  Identity as a concept 
was discussed in section 2.10.  It is therefore no surprise that identity in its many 
manifestations was observed in DE&S, as it is an organisation that is composed 
of groups with different characteristics and roles, and literature, and also 
Cunningham (2007), Ellemers (2005), see for example Paulsen (2003) confirms 
that groups and group members in organisations each possess multiple attributes 
of the concept of identity.   
The attributes of identity in DE&S were not unique to DE&S, for example, 
Thornborrow (2001), Pratt (2003), Humphreys (2002) amongst others have 
shown that symbols such as lanyards, badges and brooches exist as 
representation of personal and social identity, both in military and non-military 
environments.   
There was a trajectory of identities in DE&S that started with the imposition of the 
DE&S identity and the removal of the DPA and the DLO identities and which was 
also marked hierarchically by Operating Centres and Project Teams.  This was a 
forced change, and the effects of the imposition of the new identity, such as high 
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levels of cynicism amongst staff, chimes with Brown and Cregan (2008), Stanley 
et al. (2005), Wanous et al. (2004), Van Knippenberg and Van Leeuwen (2001), 
Van Leeuwen et al. (2000), Van Leeuwen et al. (2003), Knippenberg et al. (2002). 
This supports the validity of the finding that identity may form one of the 
underlying factors that appeared to affect the organisational culture of DE&S 
through the staff’s identification with the old DPA and the DLO, rather than with 
the new DE&S at that time, thereby creating tension between the old and the new 
organisations.   
One further area of tension was identified through the finding that the uniforms 
and symbols that were organisationally legitimised within and by DE&S produced 
and reinforced both pragmatic identities and also social categorisation.   
This finding chimes with the work of Pratt and Rafaeli (1997 pp 865-866), and 
also of Trice and J. (1993), (1984), in non-military organisations, and by Lurie 
(1981 p 18) who discusses military uniform as a symbol of social control.  This 
element of social control as described by Lurie (1981 p 18) and also in a medical 
setting by Pratt and Rafaeli (1997 p 865) helps to validate the finding of the 
asymmetric implementation of dress codes that was found in DE&S.  See Chapter 
4, section 4.3.8. 
Because of the proximity of the military to civilians in DE&S, uniforms were an 
integral part of the DE&S landscape.  It is, therefore, quite plausible that where 
there were differences in dress codes in DE&S then these differences might 
engender feelings that Military personnel were superior professionally to civil 
servants because they, the military, wore a uniform.   
The breadth of prior literature on identity indicates that the conclusion that these 
types of symbols can reinforce in-groups and create out groups in DE&S, thus 
creating inter-group tensions, is a valid and logical one.   
The identification of a concept of geographic, or territorial identity in DE&S chimes 
with the work of Abel (2010), King (2004), Seiler (1984), Vellinga (2007), 
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Wegerhoff (2008) on architecture and is effects on identity, and also the work of 
Kulik et al. (1987) on marking of team space and the creation of team identity 
through territory marking, and also Van Marrewijk and Yanow (2010) on the use 
of corporate and organisational space to create identity and also how socio-
technical factors, such as desk-booking could promote non-corporate behaviour.  
See also Weir et al. (2010) on the concept of the Diwan to mark a boundary 
between formal executive space and a more informal space.   
At the corporate level, the marking of space through the use of architecture 
chimes with the methods and concepts that were identified by, for example, and 
also Abel (2010), King (2004), Seiler (1984), Vellinga (2007), Wegerhoff (2008).   
There are similarities between the finding of legitimised and naturally occurring 
marking of territory in DE&S and the work of Kulik et al. (1987) and their findings 
on the positive aspects of marking of team space and the creation of team identity 
through territory marking.   
At a personal and desk level the marking and protection of territorial identity was 
also observed by Van Marrewijk and Yanow (2010) in a Dutch Telco where it also 
appears that the same factor that was identified in DE&S, that of the desk-booking 
system, produced very similar effects of competing for space.  This makes that 
particular finding in DE&S highly valid, as does the observation by Weir et al. 
(2010), of the existence of a difference between types of executive space, with 
soft seats and protected and private areas.   
The existence of these very similar practices in other organisations documented 
in literature shows that it is entirely plausible that the same factors would be 
observed and possibly amplified in a highly symbolic and stratified organisation 
such as DE&S.   
In DE&S the finding that people could identify with different groups coincides with 
the work of Ellemers (2005), Foreman and Whetten (2002), and also Pate et al. 
(2010), Pratt and Foreman (2000), Riketta and Nienaber (2007), Van Dick et al. 
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(2004), Kirke (2007d).  In DE&S it was found that group members were able to 
possess multiple, non-contradictory work-group identities, thus chiming with 
Ellemers (2005).  These different identities also appeared to be linked not just to 
the organisational cultures of DE&S, in that staff appeared to identify negatively 
with DE&S as the bureaucracy, and positively with ‘the front-line’ and also with 
their role teams.   
Staff thus appeared to show a high degree of social categorisation, and that 
categorisation appeared to be based on the perceived value of the group, i.e., 
DE&S = bad, front-line = good.  This last factor, may also as Evans and Carson 
(2005) describe, be linked to the sizes of the groups that people were identifying 
with, as the groups that were highly identified with were predominantly smaller 
than the ones that were less strongly identified with.   
The existence of these variations in identity in other places, and also the ability 
of group members to maintain multiple identities in organisations in prior literature 
supports the finding that the factors of identity manifestation that were identified 
in DE&S may have had an effect on the organisational culture of DE&S.  It also 
adds to the plausibility of there being an ethos in DE&S that may differ from the 
bureaucratic culture of the Civil Service.   
7.2.2 Language and Metaphor 
Groups in DE&S possessed their own language.  These dialects could act 
as a barrier between the group and the outsider, and they could also 
reinforce in groups.  Metaphor was used as a series of vernacular labels to 
describe groups and their perceived and imagined behaviours.   
The concept of language and metaphor was manifest in DE&S through the 
following series of findings.  
There were four elements within the concept of language in organisations that 
appeared to be relevant to this research.   
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The first was that of the characteristic of language to reinforce intergroup 
distinctiveness, as discussed by for example, Atun (2003), Bourhis and Giles 
(1977), Calman and Royston (1997), Evered (1983), Maass et al. (1989), Martin 
(2007), Piekkari et al. (2005), Rubini and Semin (1994), Tong et al. (1999), 
Whitman (2006) and also Wenger (1998).   
The second was that of language as metaphor within organisations as discussed 
by Deetz (1985), Johnson (1980), Morgan and Lowry (1999), Morgan et al. 
(1997).   
The third has two elements: first, gossip as an organisational or social sense-
making mechanism, discussed by for example, Coates (1989), Bergmann (1993), 
Besnier (1989), Fine and Rosnow (1978), Fortunati (2008), Foster (2004), Foster 
and Rosnow (2006), Fuchs (1995), Jaeger (2004), Levin and Arluke (1987), Luna 
et al. (2013), March and Sevon (1984), Michelson and Mouly (2000), Michelson 
and Mouly (2004), Noon and Delbridge (1993), Paine (1967), Stirling (1956), Wert 
and Salovey (2004b), Wert and Salovey (2004a), Brown et al. (2004); and 
second, gossip as an evolutionary mechanism to promote social coherence as 
described by Dunbar (2007), Dunbar (1998), Dunbar (2003), Dunbar (2004), 
Dunbar et al. (1997), and also Mesoudi et al. (2006).  Finally, the concept of 
language predicating emotional responses, or emotional intelligence within 
specific groups in organisations, is discussed by, for example, Down et al. (2006), 
Ferres and Connell (2004), Goleman et al. (2013), Boyatzis (2014), Boyatzis et 
al. (2014), and also McClelland and Boyatzis (1982).   
The concept of language was observed in be one element of group 
distinctiveness in DE&S.  This distinctiveness was exhibited through groups using 
jargon or different functional dialects.  This use of jargon as a signifier of group 
difference was identified by Wenger (1998), and also by Atun (2003), Calman 
and Royston (1997), Evered (1983), Tong et al. (1999), and also Whitman (2006), 
who all appear to agree that language can help to create the in-group at the 
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expense of the out-group, thereby language became a tool of power within social 
categorisation.   
The finding that the language that group members used appeared to be linked to 
group sizes chimes with the work of Dunbar and Zhou et al. (2005 p 440), Dunbar 
(1993a), where Dunbar uses the concept of the Tribe as a linguistically discrete 
unit ranged between 1500-2000 individuals.  This boundary, for instance, 
coincides with the size of an Operating Centre in DE&S.  Each Operating Centre 
has a significantly different function from another, and so it is entirely reasonable 
that there would be some form of linguistic difference between Operating Centres, 
but this difference appeared to be exacerbated because of the link between each 
Operating Centre and its customer, a particular Front Line Command.  It follows 
that language was different at Operating Centre level, and that this difference had 
the potential to create boundaries and also tension between the groups.   
The finding that language appeared to describe an emotion state that changed at  
particular points within the hierarchy of DE&S chimes with the work of Ferres and 
Connell (2004), and also Goleman et al. (2013).  This different emotion state 
appeared in two broad areas of the DE&S hierarchy, where family and emotional 
language was used by below B grade staff, whereas language with a low 
emotional content was used by staff at B grade and above.  This is described in 
sections 4.7.3 and 4.7.4 and leads to a conclusion that there may have been low 
levels of emotional intelligence within certain staff areas of DE&S.  
The B Grade stakeholders used bureaucratic, functional language that privileged 
and de-emotionalised a functionally related relationship with their work, and their 
peers.  This grade group were described as being ‘like an emotional desert’.  This 
lack of emotional intelligence is as described by  Goleman et al. (2013) and it may 
have two causes, one of which is functional, in that group members at this level 
may have been given tasks to specifically learn the management language.  They 
may have been socialised into that language and also to that emotion state.  
Boyatzis et al. (2014) indicates that there are two human brain systems that affect 
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decision making.  These are the Task Positive Network (TPN) and the Default 
Mode Network (DMN), and that these are antagonistic to each other.  This means 
that according to Boyatzis, that the TPN drives logical function thinking, and cuts 
out the emotional network and more social thinking that is predicated through the 
DMN.  It may therefore be easy for B2 grade and above members of DE&S to 
become functional and task directed, and it may be more difficult for them to 
switch out of that mode and to become more emotionally intelligent.   
This then makes the emotional desert and the change of language at the B2 
grade point from pragmatic language to abstract bureaucratese all the more 
plausible.   
This change also appeared to lead to a difference in relationship between the 
group member and the group. In the first place, where a B2 and above group 
member who entered a relationship with a group that was more functional than 
social, they entered what appeared to be a para-social relationship.  Such a 
relationship was in the style of a social relationship, but the relationship was not 
truly social, rather it was functionally based.  Secondly, if the group member was 
below B2 level, then the relationship with their peers may have been couched in 
terms of family or social language, but as the relationship was not a true family 
relationship, it can be framed as a para-familial relationship.   
There is a second way of discussing the language difference that occurred at the 
B2 grade level.  It may be that people who did not get through the A&DC, or who 
were not successful B2 grade stakeholders, were less able to access what 
Boyatzis calls the TPN, or who were able to balance their emotional needs and 
therefore remained emotionally intelligent.  They may have been able to balance 
the two relationships and become emotionally intelligent on a more consistent 
basis. 
This concept of a group member having a different relationship with groups at 
different levels of the DE&S hierarchy was called by this research, para-sociality, 
to describe a bureaucratic relationship with the organisation, rather than a 
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humanistic relationship with group members, which this research termed a para-
familial relationship.  Both of these types of relatedness were exhibited through 
the language that described the strength of identity by a group member with the 
group, and by the member privileging that group over another.   
This again is plausible because of the concept of language predicating emotional 
responses, or emotional intelligence within specific groups in organisations 
(Down et al., 2006), Ferres and Connell (2004), Goleman et al. (2013), Boyatzis 
(2014), Boyatzis et al. (2014), and also McClelland and Boyatzis (1982).   
These findings, and their existence in this specific literature indicate that the 
TPN/DMN contradiction provides a further evolutionary reason for that particular 
group behaving in that way and the existence of the metaphor of the emotional 
desert.  It therefore appears that evolutionary anthropology and psychology may 
help to explain some behaviours that appear to be ‘hard-wired’ into people, and 
which have an effect on the organisational culture of DE&S.   
Language also helped to provide formal and informal group coherence.  The 
finding that there was a particular pattern of language that was observed in 
relation to socialisation and group coherence activities chimes with Dunbar 
(1998), Dunbar (2004), and also Mesoudi et al. (2006) in that they identified what 
they call social linguistic grooming as a group coherence mechanism.   
The use of language as organisationally directed gossip chimes with, for 
example, Fuchs (1995), Michelson and Mouly (2000), Michelson and Mouly 
(2004), and also Noon and Delbridge (1993), who indicate that while primarily 
perceived as a negative trait, the concept of gossip in organisations can be 
valuable in maintaining the position of members in groups.  It also helps in 
maintaining wider group coherence and can also help where group members are 
attempting to rationalise organisational events.   
It is therefore plausible that the pattern of information interchange that this 
research calls functional linguistic grooming, and which is defined as gossip 
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linked with functional information that takes place in a work-based as opposed to 
a social context is an appropriate label through which group coherence is enabled 
in DE&S.  Functional linguistic grooming is a logical and appropriate extension of 
Dunbar’s  concept of social linguistic grooming (Dunbar, 2004, Dunbar et al., 
1997, Dunbar and Shultz, 2010) within the specific context of maintaining group 
coherence in organisations because it is functional language and action that 
promotes group coherence in a functional, rather than social context.  In addition, 
the existence of  a particular language form, in the finding that informal group 
coherence and socialisation activities appeared to be more meaningful to those 
who experienced them is also entirely plausible, because, as Mesoudi et al. 
(2006) indicate, humans are biased towards the receipt and understanding of 
informal information.   
The finding that metaphors were used within the vernacular language of DE&S 
to describe groups and their perceived and actual behaviour is supported by the 
work of Deetz (1985), Johnson (1980), Morgan and Lowry (1999), and also 
Morgan et al. (1997).  There were three particular metaphors that were used 
within DE&S, and that were of particular interest to this research, that of the 
family, team and tribe.   
These appeared to be associated with two characteristics of groups in DE&S.  
The first being group sizes, in that the metaphor of the group as a family appeared 
to be applied to small groups, whereas the concept label of ‘team’ applied to 
groups that were larger than family sized groups, but that were smaller than 
Operating Centres or tribes.  The use of these metaphors appears to link to the 
hierarchy of group sizes as proposed by Dunbar where a family, or support clique 
group, has 5 members (Hill and Dunbar, 2003 p 56 Table 1), Zhou et al. (2005 p 
440)), a mega-band possesses 500 members and a tribe possesses 1500-2000 
(Dunbar, 1993a p 6).   
If this is correct, then the fact that Dunbar uses the same labels to categorize the 
concept of the family or the support clique may be no more than coincidence.  But 
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this research tentatively suggests that it is plausible that the factor that links the 
three concepts is the fact that through time, humans have lived in group sizes 
that Dunbar  proposes as a consistent hierarchy, see (Hill and Dunbar, 2003 p 56 
Table 1), Zhou et al. (2005 p 440).   
Therefore, as a result of this, when these group sizes arise in organisations such 
as DE&S, people may naturally use a metaphor to describe their lived reality, and 
that metaphor, unknown to them, may truthfully describe that reality.  The second 
factor is that the labels of family and tribe appeared to be used in the vernacular 
to describe a series of behaviours that were predominantly negative, such as 
fighting for resources.   
This feeling is consistent with the findings of, for example, Becher and Trowler 
(2001), Cooke (2008), Etter Sr (1998), Ferguson (1996), Campbell (2006), 
Deloria (1971), Neuhauser (1988), Price and Cybulski (2007), Wilby (1997), 
Hilder (2004), and also Cameron and Quinn (1999).  On group labelling within 
organisations Cameron and Quinn also used the word tribe along with clan and 
fiefdom to describe what appear to be the same behaviours that were discovered 
in DE&S, but in other organisations (Cameron and Quinn, 1999).  Hilder (2004) 
and separately, Price and Cybulski (2007) also use Maffesoli’s concept of the 
neo-tribe (Maffesoli, 1998) as a conceptual label to describe negative group 
behaviours that they observed in technology organisations, which may be similar 
in function and form to DE&S as it may be called a technology organisation.   
In addition to the factors of group size and language, the existence of the 
metaphor the tribe appeared to be legitimised in DE&S through the existence of 
the formally named tribal networks which were originally designed to preserve the 
identity of the single service military tribes in the joint civil service acquisition 
environment.   
This research tentatively suggests that it is plausible that this legitimisation of the 
tribe as a label acted to reinforce the negative behaviours that were perceived to 
be enacted under the aegis of that label.  This then may have given members of 
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these groups permission to create and maintain otherness and cultural 
boundaries between the military and civilian staff.   
In DE&S, the metaphor of the tribe and of the family helped to maintain group 
distinctiveness which was also observed through identity, language, and symbols 
as group or tribal attributes.   
To further test the validity of these findings, the existence of these factors were 
also compared to the characteristics of archaic and neo-tribes as described for 
example by Bennett (1999), Boas and Farrand (1898), Cooke (2008), Ferguson 
(1996), Fox (2005), Fried (1975), Godin (2008), Isaacs (1975), Maffesoli (1998), 
Morris (1981), Pennings and Pascoe (2012), Rink (1891), Zhou et al. (2005), 
Baldus (2003), Campbell (2006), Cova and Cova (2002), Dawod (2001), Deloria 
(1971), Emelyanov-Lukyanchikov (2004), Goulding and Shankar (2011), Gulati 
(2007), Ramakrishna (1994), Sowell (1997), Taute and Sierra (2014), Walzer 
(1992) 
These factors are presented in Table 7-2  which builds on the work of Price and 
Cybulski (2007), Hilder (2004) and also Britan (1980) and others to provide an 
indication of the characteristics of neo- and archaic tribes.   
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Attribute Archaic Tribe  Neo Tribe DE&S para tribe 
L
e
a
d
e
r Common leader 
Price and Cybulski 
(2007p 797) 
Common leader 
(Godin, 2008, Hilder, 
2004) 
Chief Executive, Team Leader/Director.   
Id
e
n
ti
ty
 Common shared 
identity (Rink, 
1891, Boas and 
Farrand, 1898) 
Common shared 
identities (Fried, 1975, 
Isaacs, 1975) 
Common organisational identity.  Fractured sub- 
group identities that become tribal affiliations. 
S
y
m
b
o
ls
 
Common symbols 
and understanding 
of them, can be 
interpreted for the 
group (Boas and 
Farrand, 1898, 
Rink, 1891) 
Common symbols 
presented as brands, 
or genres (Bennett, 
1999, Balmer, 2008a, 
Taute and Sierra, 
2014, Cova and Cova, 
2002, Dionísio et al., 
2008, Moutinho et al., 
2007).  
Hierarchy of symbols that range from Corporate to 
sub-team, legitimised and non-legitimised 
symbols.  Meaning may be given as positive or 
subversive and may be contextually congruent or 
contested.   
G
e
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
 
d
is
ti
n
c
ti
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
Geographically 
bound Price and 
Cybulski (2007p 
797) 
May be geographically 
bound, but also 
intermediated by 
technology and 
therefore distributed.   
Geographically bound by organisational 
requirements.  Territory legitimised, marked, and 
protected with a hierarchy of symbols that indicate 
proximity to centres of power and/or differing 
functional contexts/ sub groups. 
L
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
 
d
is
ti
n
c
ti
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
Common language 
Dunbar (1993a) 
Price and Cybulski 
(2007p 797) 
Common language 
that may be exclusive 
in nature 
Common language composed of sub-set of 
organisational dialects that the group(s) interact 
with, or are culturally aligned to. 
G
ro
u
p
 s
iz
e
 
Family groups 
range at 12-15, 
Clans 35, and 
tribes range from 
mega-bands at 
500 members to 
tribes between 
1500-2000  (Hill 
and Dunbar, 2003, 
Zhou et al., 2005) 
Insufficient evidence 
to describe meaningful 
group sizes of Neo-
tribes 
Para-family groups range from 5- 15 members, 
para-tribes range from 500-2000 members of a 
pillar, business unit or an Operating Centre.  
Boundaries are distinguished by language, 
symbolic and geographic markers.   
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M
e
m
b
e
rs
h
ip
 
Exclusive, only 
able to exercise 
membership of one 
group at any one 
time (Boas and 
Farrand, 1898, 
Rink, 1891) 
May be exclusive, only 
able to exercise 
membership of one 
group at any one time 
as in the case of 
Mods/Rockers/Street 
gangs.  May also be 
multiple and nested, 
e.g., musical/literary 
genres.  (Cova and 
Cova, 2002, Etter Sr, 
1998) 
May be exclusive, but more likely to be mediated 
by context and nested, with multiple group 
memberships and identities being accessible to 
the group member depending on context and 
need, i.e., the socio-technical or the socio-cultural.  
S
h
a
re
d
 S
o
c
ia
l 
S
tr
u
c
tu
re
 
Family, Clan and 
tribal loyalty. 
(Wallerstein, 1960, 
McFate, 2005, 
Gillett, 1973)  
Social structure of that 
group at that time 
(Ferguson, 1996, 
Gibbs, 1994, Godin, 
2008, Maffesoli, 1998, 
Watters, 2003), Price 
and Cybulski (2007p 
797) 
Corporate structure that exists as a primarily socio-
technical wrapper around multiple nested and 
potentially contradictory socio-cultural sub-
cultures.   
S
h
a
re
d
 h
e
ri
ta
g
e
 w
it
h
 
R
e
m
e
m
b
ra
n
c
e
rs
 
Common heritage, 
shamanic and 
bardic 
remembrancing 
(Boas and 
Farrand, 1898, 
Rink, 1891) 
Common memories, 
nostalgia 
events/fanzines/tribute 
bands (Bennett, 1999) 
Corporate memory, records and archives.  
Greybeards access socio-technical heritage, 
referential identities access socio-cultural 
heritage.   
G
ro
u
p
 C
o
h
e
re
n
c
e
 
Events when group 
members convene 
at special places to 
carry out particular 
rituals/festivals 
Events when group 
members convene at 
special places to carry 
out particular 
rituals/festivals 
Team-building events, team briefings which may 
have a formal para-ritualised structure.  E.g., 
Friday breakfasts, Christmas parties, retirement 
events. 
Table 7-2 Characteristics of Archaic, Neo-Tribes and teams in DE&S 
Sources: After Price and Cybulski (2007), Compiled by Derek Shaw  2015 
Attribute Archaic Tribe  Neo Tribe DE&S para tribe 
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Table 7-2  indicates that the attributes of identity, language, symbols, and place 
which exist in archaic, and neo-tribes, and also exist in groups in DE&S which 
are the subject of this research.  This thesis hesitates to call them tribes, but 
suggests that these groups can be called para-tribes, because they appear to be, 
and act as though they are tribes. 
The existence of those characteristics in such a consistent manner in the 
literature makes it entirely plausible that the finding that DE&S was called a tribal 
organisation in the vernacular, and, in more academic language a para-tribal 
organisation, is valid.   
7.2.3 Team Size 
The consistent sizes of teams and groups within the hierarchy of DE&S 
affected the Organisational Culture of DE&S.   
Chapter 2 identified two approaches to team and group size in organisations.  
The first is functional and task based design, see for example, Amason and 
Sapienza (1997), Cohen and Bailey (1997), Curral et al. (2001), Fried (1991), 
Hackman (1987), Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993), Hoegl (2005), (2004), Ilgen 
et al. (2005), Katzenbach and Smith (1992), Neuman et al. (1999), and also 
Pendharkar and Rodger (2009).  The second is an evolutionary approach, see 
for example, Allen (2004), Dunbar et al. (1995), Pulliam and Caraco (1984), Zhou 
et al. (2005), and also Nicholson (2000).   
Table 7-3 shows the series of organisational team sizes from literature and also 
DE&S and shows their proximity to evolutionary stable group sizes as proposed 
by Dunbar 
Table 7-3 is laid out thus:  
Column 1 – Author or source of data. 
Column 2 – Type of Team if known 
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Column 3 – Range of team sizes as number of members 
Column 4 – Average number of team or group members 
Column 5 – Proximity to Dunbar group size 
Column 6 – Dunbar Hierarchy point 
 
Author  Team Type Size Range, 
Number of 
Members 
Average 
Number of 
Members 
Proximity to 
Dunbar 
group sizes 
± 
Dunbar 
Boundary 
that is 
closest to 
data 
Hoegl 
(2005) 
Software 
development 
High performing 
3-6 
Low performing 
7-9 
4.4 
7.8 
Within ± 2 
Within -2, +4 
Group 
size of 5 
members 
(Campion et 
al., 1996)  
Work teams 6-30 15 Within ± 3 
(Average)  
Group 
size of 5 
members 
(Haleblian 
and 
Finkelstein, 
1993) 
Management None given 3.39 (S.d 
1.46) 
Within ± 2 
 
Group 
size of 5 
members 
(Kirkman 
and Rosen, 
1999) 
Work teams 11.12-13.8392 
11.4-15.3293 
13 Within ± 3 
 
Group 
size of 15 
members 
(Curral et al., 
2001) 
Work 2-18 5 Within ± 3 
 
Group 
size of 15 
members 
DE&S 
Operating 
Centres 
B&D  
Role Teams 5-9 5 Within ± 4 
 
Group 
size of 5 
members 
  
                                            
92 Team member data 
93 Team leader data 
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Author  Team Type Size Range, 
Number of 
Members 
Average 
Number of 
Members 
Proximity to 
Dunbar 
group sizes 
± 
Dunbar 
Boundary 
that is 
closest to 
data 
DE&S 
Operating 
Centre E 
Role teams  5-16 N/A Within ± 2. Group 
size of 5 
and 15 
members 
Operating 
Centre D 
Pillar B 
Designed 
Group size 
17894.  
Actual group 
size 139 
1* Pillar 139-178 N/A -15 and + 28 
at designed 
size, stable 
size -11 at 
Dunbar 
maximum 
cognitive 
group size 
Proximity to Dunbar 
group sizes 
135 ± 15 or 150 ± 30 
Operating 
Centre E 
Designed 
Group size 
11795 .  
Actual group 
size 111 
1* Pillar 111-117 N/A Designed 
size -33 at 
Dunbar 
maximum 
cognitive 
group size, 
Proximity to Dunbar 
group sizes 
135 ± 15 
or 150 ± 
30 
DE&S  Top Teams 5-7 6 ±2 Group 
sizes of 5 
members 
DE&S  Operating 
Centres  
500-2500 N/A 500-2500 Megaband 
and or 
tribe of 
500 to 
2000 
members 
Table 7-3 Team Size Comparison Between Literature, DE&S and Dunbar 
Source: Derek Shaw 
Table 7-3 shows the proximity of group sizes that were identified in DE&S to a 
sample of those that were found in literature, Campion et al. (1996), Amason and 
Sapienza (1997), Bradner et al. (2005), Curral et al. (2001), see for example Fried 
(1991), Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993), and also Pendharkar and Rodger 
                                            
94 Total team size 178 including 41 vacancies and Top Team, stable group size 137. 
95 Total team size 117 including 6 vacancies and Top Team, stable group size 111. 
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(2009), (2006), Hoegl (2005).  These group sizes were also close to the hierarchy 
of group sizes that  Hill and Dunbar (2003), and also in Zhou et al. (2005).  In this 
author’s opinion this proximity indicates that there may be evolutionary factors at 
play within the group sizes that exist in organisations.   
The team sizes that appear regularly across DE&S also appear to be consistent 
with those found in the literature, indicating a positive degree of validity of the 
findings in DE&S.  Team and group sizes in DE&S were presented in section 4.6.     
In looking for other reasons to explain the consistency within team sizes and other 
groups in DE&S the search leads to evolutionary anthropology and psychology.  
This is where the work of Hill and Dunbar (2003 p 63) suggests that, as a result 
of evolution, groups and human networks scale consistently at a factor of 
between 3 and 4, and are layered, hierarchical and geometrically sized 2, 3, 5, 
15, 45-50, up to maximum cognitive boundary of 150.   
Dunbar shows that this hierarchy of group sizes is consistent across a wide range 
of groups, for example, archaic groups, hunter gatherer groups, religious 
communities, and also armies (2003 Figure 1), Hill et al. (2008).  Groups sized 
between 500 members and up to 2500 members become in Dunbar’s terms, 
‘mega-bands’ and tribes Hill and Dunbar (2003 p 67) and at this size possess the 
attribute of linguistic distinctiveness.  
In terms of evolutionary group size, Dunbar tested his group size theory against 
groups in armies from ancient Persian armies to the present (Dunbar, 2003).  The 
group sizes that were found within this research of mixed military and civilian 
groups were congruent with Dunbar’s findings on group sizes in other military 
organisations (2003 Figure 1), Hill et al. (2008).   
The proximity of the military to both DE&S and also to Dunbar’s work is of interest 
to this research because of the closeness with which group sizes in both the 
military and DE&S match each other and also Dunbar’s group size criteria.   
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This research has then extended the explanation of Dunbar’s work to show that 
there appears to an underlying bias towards these size groups, as teams and 
larger groups in organisations through the critical and comparative literature 
review and field data, the results of which are presented in Table 7-3.   
In addition, the use of Dunbar’s scaling factor of between 3 and 4 as a boundary 
and also to scale up the group sizes, to provide 5±2, 15±3, 45±9 and 135±15 or 
150±30 has provided a consistent frame within which group sizes in DE&S can 
be viewed.  This was presented in 4.6.  These groups in DE&S fall within a 
consistent margin either side of Dunbar’s internal group size boundaries.  The 
consistency of group sizes again may be attributed to the result of evolutionary 
factors, rather than intellectual organisational design, and organisational design 
in DE&S may therefore be cognitively biased.  This research has made Dunbar’s 
work more pragmatic and applicable to organisational design theory by showing 
the consistency of Dunbar’s scaling criteria in one organisation, which might be 
used to bound group size patterns within other organisations.   
Therefore, there appears to be a very close match between formal team and 
group sizes as well as social group size in DE&S, prior literature on organisations 
and Dunbar’s group sizes and scaling factors.  Also, that the label of team  is a 
concept label for a group with a common purpose, that ranges in size from 5 to 
160 members, but can be used as a metaphor for groups with more than 160 
members who have the same common purpose.  
This research suggests that this closeness is not coincidental, but arises as a 
result of evolutionary factors, because as shown in Table 7-3.  Dunbar’s group 
sizes are seen clearly in organisations in prior literature.   It may therefore be the 
case that the group sizes that were observed in those other organisations are not 
due to function and task based organisational design, but are evolutionarily 
predicated.   
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7.2.4 Induction and Socialisation. 
Induction and socialisation in DE&S was manifest throughout DE&S 
Testing of the findings on induction and socialisation takes the following form:  
induction and socialisation into DE&S at the point of its creation will be discussed.  
This will be followed by induction and socialisation of members into DE&S, 
especially cohorts and graduates; and then induction and socialisation of 
members from group to group.  This in turn is followed by induction and 
socialisation of military personnel into DE&S.  The final section tests the findings 
on team-building.   
The finding that induction into DE&S on its creation was inconsistent, and also 
that it engendered high levels of cynicism that employees felt towards DE&S at 
that time, chimes with the work of Wanous et al. (2004) and others both in regard 
to induction but also to organisational change, see for example Andersson 
(1996), Brown and Cregan (2008), Dean et al. (1998), Stanley et al. (2005).   
It is then quite realistic that, as a result of the levels of cynicism that this research 
discovered, it was possible to identify both DLO and DPA behaviours and 
organisational cultures in DE&S, because staff had not been inducted into the 
required DE&S behaviours.  As a result it appeared that there was no single 
DE&S.   
This secondary effect chimes with the work of  Kirke who discusses cultural drag 
in Defence Acquisition (Kirke, 2010 p 98 ). This finding also makes it quite 
plausible that the reasons that the organisational cultural changes that were 
intended for DE&S, did not happen as they should have, because staff were not 
fully inducted or socialised into the new concept of DE&S.  They therefore could 
exhibit their ‘old’ behaviours instead of ‘new’ ones.  
The finding that induction of graduates was inconsistent chimes partially with the 
work of Garavan and Morley (1997), and also Scholarios et al. (2003), who 
indicate that graduate entry schemes are generally effective.  This was 
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discovered in DE&S: the MOD level elements of induction were well organised 
but the DE&S elements were not. This then adds to the plausibility that induction 
in DE&S was inconsistent.  This inconstancy was also found in the inductions that 
new group members received when they moved from group to group.   
There was also a temporal boundary that existed between the completion of 
formal induction, and the predominance of informal integration.  No references in 
literature to this type of boundary could be found.   When testing was carried out 
in other organisations, three of the organisations, two similar to DE&S, being 
parts of the Civil Service, and one an industrial organisation, indicated that there 
was a similar boundary, but that the boundary occurred at a different time in each 
organisation.  DE&S appears to be idiosyncratic in respect of this timing and how 
it was viewed by the organisation and by staff.  
The finding that the induction of military personnel into DE&S was different from 
the induction that civil servants received, and that they also received a military 
specific arrivals process, the JSAU (DE&S, 2010a) led to several outcomes: the 
expectations that military personnel held with regards to DE&S may not have 
been met, thus chiming with, amongst others, Chen and Klimoski (2003), 
Garavan and Morley (1997), Korte and Sylvester (1982), Wanous et al. (1992), 
and also Dean (1984), who also discuss the effects that expectations’ mis-match 
can have on new entrants to organisations.   
This then add to the credibility that some of the behaviours that were observed in 
military staff, such as cultural ineptness, were valid within the context of this 
research.  The existence of the military specific arrivals process created a 
boundary between civil servants and the military that supported the feeling that 
they, the military, were somehow different, and more valuable, thus increasing 
the plausibility that socialisation in this instance reinforced social categorisation.   
Team building in DE&S was found to consist of the same formal, socio-technical 
and the informal, socio-cultural types as induction and socialisation.   
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The identification of these two types of team-building chimes with the work of 
Anthony and Janet (2002), and also Salas et al. (1999).  It is therefore entirely 
plausible to label these two types, socio-technical and socio-cultural team-
building, because of the differing context, content and outcomes that were 
required of each type.   
The finding that formal team-building appeared to be divisive chimes with the 
work of Sherif (1956) and makes it plausible that the finding in which formal, 
competitive team-building was seen to create in-groups and could be divisive was 
also valid.   
The finding that social-cultural integrative practice was better than formal socio-
technical practice at building teams was supported by internal responses from 
DE&S and other staffs.  This chimes with the work of Mesoudi et al. (2006), who 
stated that informal information exchange, which was associated with social 
rather than functional practice is biased by people over the exchange of formal 
information.  This finding and its validation indicates that staff were correct in their 
view that informal socialisation practice was more meaningful and useful to them 
than was formal induction.  This level of confirmation again increases the validity 
and plausibility of the finding that informal socialisation and team-building were 
more effective at building collaborative teams in DE&S than formal team-building 
was.   
Throughout DE&S induction and socialisation were inconsistently practised and 
experienced, and informal socialisation appeared to be more meaningful to those 
that experienced it.  Several underlying findings were discovered.  These findings 
will now be presented and tested against appropriate literature, if any exists.   
The finding that informal socialisation in DE&S was neither purely technical nor 
purely social appears to chime with the work of Feldman (1976), and his 
description of contingent socialisation, where socialisation into a group occurs 
where and when it is needed and is therefore contextually appropriate.  It also 
chimes with Van Maanen (1978), Van Maanen and Schein (1979), Nicolini et al. 
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(2003) Rohde and Sprogøe (2007), and alsoSprogøe and Rohde (2007) who all 
take a more integrated view of socialisation.   
The finding that formal team-building had a series of outcomes that were 
specified by ‘management’, and that informal socialisation did not chimes with the 
findings of Klein (2000), Semmer and Schallberger (1996).  The difference in 
outcomes between the two types was striking.   
Formal team-building required functional outcomes and therefore might be 
thought of as being predominantly socio-technical in nature, whereas the 
outcomes of informal socialisation were more social, such as getting to know 
people better, and therefore apparently more socio-cultural in nature.  This 
research has found no literature  that directly describes these findings, but there 
are similarities to be found in the work of Van Maanen (1978), Van Maanen and 
Schein (1979) and also Feldman (1976) who indicate that there is a spectrum of 
needs between managers and staff in socialisation.   
This appears to add to the feeling that this finding is valid, and also when 
expressed in this way is singularly applicable to DE&S.  It is also reasonable to 
see that there is a link between this finding and the finding of the para-social and 
para-familial relationship that existed through the expression of language and of 
what Boyatzis (2014), Boyatzis et al. (2014), and McClelland and Boyatzis (1982) 
have indicated is a function of neural processing.   
This once again provides validation of the vernacular view that the behaviours 
noted within this group were ‘hard-wired’ into people and were therefore 
evolutionary in nature.    
The finding that DE&S did not fund or legitimise team-building in the period after 
the merger, or any similar practice could not be found reflected in literature.   
There was also no literature that directly linked team-building with group sizes, 
but group sizes in DE&S appeared to match a series of bounded group sizes 
chimes both with the management literature on functional team sizes, for 
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example, Bergmann (1993), Foster and Rosnow (2006), Fuchs (1995), Haviland 
(1977), Jaeger (2004), Luna et al. (2013), March and Sevon (1984), Mesoudi et 
al. (2006), Michelson and Mouly (2000), Michelson and Mouly (2004), Noon and 
Delbridge (1993), and also Wert and Salovey (2004b). 
The co-existence of these group sizes in both management literature, as 
described by for example Bradner et al. (2005), (Fried, 1991, Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1993, Hoegl, 2005, Cohen and Bailey, 1997), and the coherence 
activities that accompany them, indicate that is realistic to make a further link to 
evolutionary factors that influence the organisational culture of DE&S through the 
combination of the interaction of gossip, group sizes and group coherence 
activities.   
The finding that team-building in DE&S was explicitly used to create a sense of 
identity chimes with the work of Anthony and Janet (2002), Salas et al. (1999).  It 
also chimes with the work of Brown Brown (1999), Rupert et al. (2007) Ellemers 
(2005), Galen (2009), Hennessy and West (1999), Hogg (2003), Paulsen (2003), 
Tajfel and Turner (1986), in that all groups possess an identity and that they will 
try to reinforce that identity in relation to themselves and to other groups.  This 
finding makes it even more plausible that the conclusion that a) DE&S 
accidentally reinforced innate group behaviour, and b) that informal team-building 
was more meaningful than formal team-building activity, and that both the finding 
and the conclusion are valid.   
The finding that, as with induction and socialisation, formal and informal team-
building activity could be conjoined, points to what Feldman (1976) calls 
contingent socialisation, and what this research prefers to call contextually 
appropriate socialisation activity.  This finding appears to lend weight to the view 
that the socio-technical and the socio-cultural were inextricably linked in DE&S, 
through the socio, the people.   
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7.2.5 Organisation Culture, Ethos and Cultural Drag in DE&S 
There was no organisational culture in DE&S, but there was an 
organisational ethos.  Also Cultural drag existed that affected the speed of 
organisational change. 
The discovery that there was no single organisational culture in DE&S chimes 
with the work of Van Knippenberg and Van Leeuwen (2001 p 249) who indicate 
that multiple organisational cultures after a merger may be beneficial to the 
merged organisation.  This makes it entirely plausible that the existence of the 
multiple organisational cultures in DE&S at that time, although appearing to be 
an accident, had a more positive effect than group members may have realised.   
A conceptual model of those multiple organisational cultures was developed 
Figure 6-1. The usefulness of this model was validated by responses from DE&S 
staff, who recognized the language that was used to describe the groups and 
also the behaviours that were attributed to the groups.  Therefore, it is entirely 
plausible, because of the validation with literature and also within DE&S staff, that 
the finding of the multi-organisational cultural nature of DE&S is both valid and 
furthermore confirms the fact that there was no single DE&S organisational 
culture.   
The finding that what this research refers to as cultural drag in DE&S, which 
occurred after the merger of the DPA and the DLO, chimes with the work of Kirke 
(2010 p 98), and also (Ogburn, 1964).  This research further suggests that what 
Kirke calls cultural drag is socio-cultural drag.  This research developed Kirke’s 
concept of cultural drag and has identified a further facet of cultural drag, that of 
socio-technical drag.  This appears where organisational process and practice do 
not change fast enough, causing the drag that occurs when organisational 
changes do not occur as expected, as the people, the socio, use old processes, 
because they have to, not because they want to.  Hofstede also indicates that an 
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organisation’s history constrains future organisational behaviour (Hofstede, 1980 
p 27).   
Some further reasons for the existence of cultural drag may be linked to a lack of 
induction and preparedness for the merger, which chimes with the work of Smith 
(2005)  This factor of cultural drag may also be a factor that affects the success 
in organisational change programmes.  This chimes with the work of Bovey and 
Hede (2001), externally to MOD, and with the findings of Barton (2011), who 
remarked on the lack of success of organisational change programmes in MOD.   
The finding that the ethos of ‘front-line-first’ appeared to be the single unifying 
factor in DE&S appeared to be supported by Bem, who said that “values are ends, 
not means, and their desirability is either non-consciously taken for granted (a 
zero order belief) or seen as a direct derivation from experience or from some 
external authority (a first order belief)” Bem (1970 p 16).  This view also chimes 
with Hofstede who says that culture is a system of collectively held values (1980 
p 24).  Hofstede also says that culture can be affected by non-members (1980 p 
30).  The organisational cultures in DE&S, and the values that support those 
cultures would logically be influenced by for example, Front Line Command 
Cultures and the Political culture of the United Kingdom, especially as members 
of those groups worked in DE&S.    
It is therefore quite credible and entirely valid that the ethos of front-line-first is 
the single consistent factor within the multiple organisational and professional 
cultures and it is this that unites DE&S, and which is confused as ‘the culture of 
DE&S’ but it is in reality, a value that is personally and professionally held within 
DE&S.   
  
 418 
 
 
7.2.6 Summary 
Section 7.2 has shown that either the finding, or the effect of each of the findings 
can be validated in prior literature.  This broad and intense validation gives 
credence to the academic validity of both the findings and also of the conclusions 
that are drawn from those findings.   
 
7.3 Testing the Findings in DE&S and Other Organisations 
7.3.1 Introduction 
Section 7.3 presents the results of the Internal and external testing of the 
research findings.  It is structured as follows: Table 7-4 presents a table of 
personnel who tested the findings and indicates their industry affiliation and 
response, then follows the results of internal testing within DE&S, lastly the 
results of the testing that was carried out externally to DE&S are presented.  
7.3.2  Testing the Findings 
7.3.2.1 Internal Testing 
As discussed in Chapter 3 the research findings were tested in DE&S and also in 
comparable organisations.  These were a UK Government Trading Agency, a 
major UK Defence contracting organisation and also a regiment of the British 
Army.  Those findings were: identity, and identification with groups and the axes 
of identification, group sizes as found in formal and informal groups, and the 
concept of the lack of organisational culture, and also the directional model of 
project effort versus bureaucratic policy.   
When tested internally with informants, the data met Sanger’s criteria whereby: 
“Analyses of the relationship between events and people achieve greater 
validity if participants who have been observed in the research, recognize 
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themselves, their motives, their actions and their rationale in the 
researcher’s recordings and reconstructions” (Sanger, 1996 p 40).  
Table 7-4 Testing  provides the details of the testing and also an indication of the 
responses.  The results were recognized by test subjects as being truthful to 
DE&S, both as observed by DE&S employees, and also by those respondents 
who looked into DE&S from other partner organisations.  This therefore gave the 
researcher greater confidence that the results were both valid and reliable.   
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 Grade No. 
Respondents 
Method Response notes   
SCS/ Military 
Star Grades 
5 PowerPoint™  
Presentation of 
results and 
discussion 
Recognised main themes, added 
examples in from their experience of 
group behaviours affecting outputs.  One 
person challenged the results and then 
admitted that they recognized all the 
themes and often acted in that way. 
(Shaw, 2010-2012) 
Broader Banded 
B  
6 PowerPoint™  
Presentation of 
results and/or 
discussion 
Generally recognized themes, but might 
disagree that they, or their teams, were 
tribal, or acted in that way, But they 
admitted that they recognized the 
behaviour in other teams. (Shaw, 2011-
2014) 
Contractor 1 Discussion of 
results 
Recognised themes in DE&S and home 
company. (Shaw, 2014d) 
Broader Banded 
C  
5 Discussion of 
results 
Recognised themes, and who was to 
blame for them.  Often adding in that 
these stopped them from getting on with 
the job. (Shaw, 2011-2014) 
External  4 PowerPoint™  
Presentation of 
results and 
discussion 
Recognised themes in DE&S and home 
company. (Shaw, 2014h) 
Commercial 
workshop 
30 PowerPoint™  
Presentation of 
results and 
discussion 
Recognised themes, added in about 
group size becoming unmanageable 
above 120.  Wanted to improve induction 
to get a better, less fractious team. 
(Shaw, 2012d). 
External Military  1 Two 
discussions of 
the results and 
comparison to 
their experience 
in the British 
Army 
Recognised the findings, and added in 
specific examples within their experience 
in the British Army. 
Table 7-4 Testing Personnel and Industry Affiliation 
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A sample of five civilian SCS and military equivalent grade informants were 
approached formally by the researcher and a meeting was arranged with each 
informant that was intended to last at least one hour to enable a detailed 
discussion of the concepts.   
The meeting consisted of the researcher giving each informant a presentation of 
the key findings.  This initiated a detailed discussion of each finding with the 
respondent. This method changed when presenting findings to B grade civil 
servants and their military equivalents, where with some informants who were 
familiar with the research, a discussion was held that was more informal than 
using a presentation to describe the findings.   
Validation of key findings with contractors and C grade and below staff was 
completed through a series of face to face discussions with individuals, often as 
informal coffee meetings.  
Validation of the key findings with the external organisations was achieved by 
formally contacting the respondents at the organisation, when a meeting was 
arranged to discuss the findings.  The meeting consisted of the researcher giving 
the informant a presentation of the key and contentious findings, which included 
a detailed discussion of each finding with the respondents. 
Testing of the findings started in DE&S in January 2011 on completion of the 
interviews, when the researcher completed an initial themes briefing to an SCS 
2*.  The themes that were identified at this early stage were that of the extent of 
the tribe metaphor and the existence of the apparent identity and cultural split in 
DE&S.   
The researcher later took this finding to one of their trusted informants to obtain 
a greater degree of face validity, if appropriate.  As a result of this discussion, a 
preliminary version of the model at figure 6.1 was developed.  
Further confirmation of the validity of the full findings by SCS and star grade staff 
was provided in 2012 by the 1* lead within Operating Centre A:  
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‘Having moved swiftly from denial to acceptance regarding the 1* 
behaviours, I really enjoyed reading your thought provoking notes’ (Shaw, 
2011a). 
A subsequent meeting with a 2* civil servant(Shaw, 2012a) separately validated 
the results of the protection and competition for resources between groups and 
also the change of language from direct language to more  bureaucratic language 
at B grade level and above.   
The change of language was further confirmed in a meeting with an assessor of 
the Assessment and Development Centre (A&DC).  They indicated that the 
assessors had voiced concerns over the levels of what Goleman et al. (2013) call 
emotional intelligence that they as assessors had observed in candidates at the 
A&DC (Shaw, 2014o).  This informant was also able to confirm that the 
behaviours that were characterised as a lack of emotional intelligence appeared 
to be hard-wired into some people, and that as Boyatzis et al. (2014) suggest, 
some people, who were highly emotionally intelligent appeared to be able to 
balance both states, in DE&S as 1* and 2* levels.   
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7.3.2.2 Group Testing  
Wider testing of the findings in DE&S was gained through participation in a 
commercial function workshop where the Team Leader had requested a 
presentation of the research findings, concentrating on the findings on induction 
and socialisation.  This agenda was suggested because it was recognised within 
this group, as the group was growing quickly, and had reached 35 members, that 
a more effective approach to induction members into the group was needed at 
this time.   
This workshop provided the following response: ‘I worked in a UOR [Urgent 
Operational Requirements] IPT (Integrated Project Team), it was about 120 
people, when it got over that number, it kind of broke up and became 
unmanageable’ (Shaw, 2012i).   
This response, which was given before the researcher had presented any 
information on the group sizes that had been found in DE&S, adds to the 
validation of the findings in that they were recognised and added to by members 
of DE&S.  It also increases the plausibility of the conclusions and further fulfils 
Sanger’s validity criteria quoted above (Sanger, 1996 p 40).   
7.3.3 External Testing 
The findings were also tested outside DE&S where their validity was also 
supported through the following comments such as that following, which was 
received when the researcher was presenting the research results at an internal 
MOD and academic conference when the respondent indicated what he saw as 
the ‘rightness’ of the conclusions:  
‘I can relate to all of what you said, I don’t know all the language, but I can 
see it in evidence all around me.  People do go and socialise over a coffee 
and my team, I had a small team within a team, ...I had a fifteen man team, 
right sort of figure for Dunbar, and we were very focussed, we had a very 
clear set of support contracts, it was the best experience in my time in the 
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Army apart from commanding a squadron of tanks which is 100 people and 
again these are all within the group sizes that you are saying’’ (Shaw, 
2013m). 
When tested in a defence contractor and an external agency, the findings 
produced strikingly similar results.  In the defence contractor, the hierarchy of the 
organisation, because it was a project team based organisation was recognised 
as being similar to that identified in DE&S, with team sizes provided by testing 
informants as anecdotally falling within those same size boundaries, although 
larger corporate groups appeared to fall outside those boundaries.96   
The finding that there was a language divide between the corporate organisation 
and the project teams was recognised in both of the organisations.  In the defence 
contractor this difference was anecdotally ascribed to the way that the 
organisation had developed in an organic way as it had taken over and merged 
with other defence contractors, and the fact that not all of these organisations had 
been fully integrated into the parent company.  This chimed with the effect of the 
lack of integration of the DPA and the DLO that occurred at the creation of DE&S.   
Thus it appears that within both the defence contractor and the external agency 
all of the concepts and the findings were recognised, some in such great detail, 
such as induction, and also the use of a desk booking system, which was 
coincidentally at that time being implemented in the external agency.  This 
indicates that the legitimacy of the research findings was greatly increased and 
also led to the identification of new potential research areas.  
The findings, when tested in a regiment of the British Army,(Shaw, 2014c) were 
both recognised as being seen in the parts of the Civil Service that this informant 
had experienced, but also in the British Army.  This informant also validated the 
finding of a hierarchy of group sizes in DE&S by relating that hierarchy of group 
sizes to the hierarchy of group sizes that were in their regiment, and also to the 
                                            
96  See section 8.1.3 for suggestions for further research.   
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wider Army.  That hierarchy of group sizes was also highly consistent with the 
findings of Dunbar (Dunbar, 1993a, Zhou et al., 2005).   
They also recognised the concept of tribalism, as defined in Table 7-2 and also 
section 2.7.  They were able to relate that to their experience of what they called 
‘cap-badge tribalism’, where different regiments would work to out-manoeuvre 
another, in order to look better, get better jobs, not to do ‘worse jobs’ or at an 
individual level, would fight each other, either symbolically at inter-regiment 
sports or boxing matches, or physically, after individuals had been drinking.  The 
finding that there was a change in behaviour at what corresponded to the B2 level 
in the Civil Service, which was equivalent to the Lt Col., level in the Army was 
also validated, as this was the level at which a person became more corporate in 
the Civil Service, or regimentally or army focussed, rather than company or 
platoon focussed.  The validation from all of these informants and their different 
organisations increases the validity of the findings and also the plausibility of the 
conclusions that have been drawn from the findings.   
 
7.3.4 Conclusion 
The results of the research have been systematically validated through reference 
to prior literature, by referral back to DE&S and to external organisations.  This 
research is therefore able to confidently suggest that the conclusion that identity, 
linguistic frameworks, evolutionarily predicated group sizes and also the ways 
that induction and socialisation were carried out worked together as system of 
factors to affect the organisational culture of DE&S.   
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8 Conclusions And Recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter 8 presents some reasons that this research is unique, conclusions that 
can be drawn from the findings, a putative future research agenda and finally 
some implications of this research for other organisations.  Chapter 8 concludes 
with a series of implications and recommendations for DE&S and other 
organisations that arise from this study.   
8.1.1 Presenting the Reasons Why This Study is Unique  
This research is considered to be unique because no research of this nature, or 
at this level, has been carried out in DE&S, the DPA and the DLO.  Also, no 
studies have investigated the organisational culture of DE&S, apart from Kirke’s 
small pilot study  (2007a) which contributed to his paper on the importance of 
understanding the importance of understanding organisational culture in the 
context of defence acquisition (2010).  In addition, this research has been carried 
out in an environment where it is difficult for outside academics to gain access to 
study, and none have at this level. As a result the researcher was in a privileged 
position as an employee and trusted insider to the organisation and able to 
observe and gather data without, for most of the time being questioned as to why 
they were doing the research.  This research is therefore unique when considered 
on those factors alone.  
A further factor in the uniqueness of this research is that DE&S only existed in 
the form that was investigated from 1st April 2007 to 31st March 2015, when it 
underwent an organisational change to become a Bespoke Government Trading 
Entity (BTE).  Therefore, the research cannot be directly repeated as the 
underlying organisational structures that were the object of the initial research are 
no longer in place, even though the people, processes and organisational outputs 
remains generally the same.   
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In academic terms, this research is further considered to be unique because of 
the theoretical framework that combined a broad social sciences approach with 
evolutionary anthropology and psychology.  These have been used to investigate 
and understand factors that affected the organisational culture of DE&S.  This 
specific, multi-factorial framework has not been used before within any 
organisation, let alone part of the UK government, such as DE&S.   
8.1.2 Conclusions 
Chapter 7 presented and tested the findings of this research, Section 8.1.2 now 
takes those findings and draws some conclusions from them, the foremost 
conclusion being: 
There was no single Organisational Culture in DE&S but there was a single 
ethos that brought the multiple Organisational cultures together, that ethos 
was ‘front-line-first’.  
There were multiple factors within DE&S that allowed this multiplicity of 
organisational cultures to exist.   
Identity, its legitimisation and management was a significant factor in the creation 
of group distinctiveness in DE&S.  It was legitimised by DE&S through the use of, 
for example, lanyards and uniforms, territory marking and also asymmetrical 
implementation of dress codes between military personnel and civil servants.  
This difference in dress codes often led to tension between military personnel 
and civilians, with military personnel indicating that civilians were somehow not 
as professional as the military.   
In terms of affiliation with different groups, group members were able to identify 
with more than one group at a time but group members predominantly identified 
not with DE&S but with the lads and lasses on the frontline.  This was manifest in 
different ways depending on where a person was in the DE&S hierarchy, for 
example, staff at below administrative grade levels and military rank equivalents, 
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were more likely to identify strongly with their Role Team and the frontline. 
Management grade staff were more ambivalent in their strength of identification 
with DE&S, tending to, but not exclusively, identify more strongly with their role 
team and the Front line, but almost being the squeezed middle.  Leadership and 
senior staff grades group members and were more likely to be ambivalent about 
their identification with both role front line, role teams and DE&S.   
Established Senior Civil Service and Star grade military staff were seen to identify 
equally strongly with the Role Team, Front Line and DE&S.  But identification 
with, differed from commitment to, as all staff were committed to supporting the 
lads and lasses on the front line, thus showing a paradox which might be 
explained through the use of ethos as one facet of culture, as opposed to it being 
the culture itself.  
DE&S was a project and team based organisation.  Formal teams and groups in 
DE&S were consistently sized at 5 ± 2, 15 ± 3, 45 ± 9, 135 ±15, 150 ± 30, and 
500 to above 2500.  This pattern  significantly matched the evolutionary stable 
group size criteria proposed by Dunbar (Zhou et al., 2005, Hill and Dunbar, 2003), 
and also those of Bernard and Kilworth (Bernard et al., 1987, McCarty et al., 
2001).   
The existence of this group size factor appears to indicate that organisational 
design of group sizes in DE&S was informed by cognitive bias, rather than by 
intellectual insight, because these group sizes have been shown to be 
evolutionarily comfortable to manage within the human brain (Hill and Dunbar, 
2003, Zhou et al., 2005).  The ability to manage groups at those size maxima was 
shown through the fact that when these group sizes were breached, the groups 
in DE&S became less manageable, less effective, and fractured to smaller group 
sizes.   
A second conclusion is that the congruence of the group sizes with evolutionary 
stable group sizes provides legitimacy for groups in DE&S to be visible as clans 
and tribes by virtue of their size.  
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The combination of legitimised social categorisation, identification with groups 
and the sizes of the groups allowed group members to self-identify as tribes.  This 
research describes these groups as para-tribes, and the groups behaving in a 
tribal manner.   
These tribal behaviours of competition and protection of resources appeared to 
be caused by the contributory factors of group distinctiveness, comprising 
organisational dialect, group identity, social identity, geographic identity and 
socialisation and organisationally designed group size.   
Those factors interacted with the organisationally designed group size which fell 
at, or not insignificantly close to evolutionary stable group sizes.  Staff in DE&S 
were not truly a tribe, but the combination of the linguistic frameworks, structures, 
rituals, symbols and group sizes that were supported by the DE&S ethos, all 
served to create a social framework that caused people to act and think tribally.   
The finding that group members identified with different groups in DE&S and that 
difference was grade related leads to a conclusion that there was a was grade 
related divide within DE&S which may have affected working relationships.  Staff 
predominantly identified most strongly with ‘the lads and lasses on the front line’, 
not with DE&S.  This leads to a conclusion that when senior leaders encouraged 
people to identify with DE&S and tried to create ‘one DE&S’, then this created 
dissonance in those staff who did not identify with DE&S, but who identified with 
the ‘front-line’.  It may actually be more productive for senior leaders to not 
attempt to create a monolithic view of ‘one DE&S’ but to leave staff to identify with 
the most important group, their customers, the ‘front-line.  This then removes 
tension from the functional/delivery axis of the DE&S organisational culture and 
ethos, leaving the ethos to remain pre-eminent. 
Uniforms also provided a visible reminder of both the front line and also the 
difference between the military and civilians.  This boundary was in general 
positive, but on occasion it could lead to tension between the two groups.  One 
conclusion of this, while contentious would be to introduce either a dress code 
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within DE&S, or even create a DE&S uniform that all staff, whether military or 
civilian while in DE&S would wear, thus removing all external symbols of 
difference. 
Geographic identity through the use of organisational symbols and personal 
territory marking produced physical boundaries between groups and staffs.  This 
leads to the conclusion that the groups in DE&S were able to be identified by 
location and possessed and protected territory in a similar way that is recognised 
within clans and tribes by anthropologists, thus adding a further factor to the 
legitimisation of the description of the tribal nature of the organisation. This 
territorial tension was heightened at a personal and team leader level by the 
implementation of ‘flexi-desking’, where people had to book their desks, leading 
led to what the research calls ‘super-competitive behaviours’ between staff 
members who were protecting their territory, their desk. One conclusion of the 
use of flexi-desking is that before any system such as this is implemented then 
the socio-emotional needs of staff with regards to territory, desks and their work 
based and social groups needs to be understood by the implementing 
organisation.    
The language that was used in DE&S showed how group members saw the 
group, and how they related to their groups and to their peers.  Language also 
provided, through organisational dialect, a further element of group 
distinctiveness, such as where language was used to mark physical, symbolic 
and psychological boundaries.   
A common metaphor to describe groups was that of the tribe which was used to 
describe group members lived reality in their work and social groups.  Vernacular 
language described groups as tribes which matched a series of evolutionary 
stable group size boundaries, such as where a team was too small to be a team, 
being more like a family, or where the team behaved like a tribe, by, for example, 
protecting its resources.  Language thus described a sub-cognitive reality linking 
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a group member’s intellectual self to the evolutionary concepts that were latent, 
but hard-wired into humans.   
Language also changed in relation to hierarchy.  Emotional, pragmatic language 
was predominantly used below junior leadership level, or military equivalent rank.  
Above that level, a more objective, non-emotional language predicated a change 
in relationship between individual group members, and also between group 
members and DE&S.  This appeared to be linked to emotional intelligence and 
the ‘emotional desert’ that was observed at this level of the organisational 
hierarchy, (see for example Goleman et al., 2013). 
The finding that language affected the organisational culture of DE&S through the 
existence of organisational dialects leads to the conclusion that the group 
language may not have been fully understood by outsiders, thus creating a 
communications and understanding boundary and glossaries and ‘acronym 
busters’ are not enough to breach this boundary.  This was known in DE&S, but 
it was not known how to overcome this boundary.  The finding that there were 
metaphors to describe groups through, size, behaviour and relatedness leads to 
the conclusion that the linguistic differences occurred at the boundaries of the 
Operating Centres and Business Units.  These groups were all comparable in 
size to evolutionary group sizes where language became significantly different 
from other groups.  Therefore the tribes could be further distinguished by their 
linguistic footprint in DE&S.  This was a further feature that reinforced the view 
that DE&S was a tribal organisation.  
In terms of integrating staff into teams, there were two types of socialisation in 
DE&S.  
 Formal induction which enabled new group members to understand the 
rules of the group and also the new group member’s technical role within 
the group.   
 Informal integration of new group members into the norms of the group.   
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Induction within DE&S, and also into DE&S on its creation, was inconsistently 
practised and experienced.  This led to high levels of cynicism amongst group 
members who experienced it and contributed to them identifying negatively 
towards DE&S.   
Where induction was positively experienced, the group member was more likely 
to identify positively with their role team and with DE&S.  Formal induction was 
completed within 4-6 weeks of a new member joining their team.  This produced 
a boundary at which point DE&S deemed the group member to be fully inducted 
and able to perform their role duties, even though the new group member may 
not have felt totally competent.   
Military personnel received a specific welcome into DE&S Abbeywood that was 
not an induction and  which was designed to maintain their military privileges.  
The JSAU arrivals process was a geographically specific practice for military 
personnel who were posted to DE&S, and specifically into Abbeywood.  It was a 
purely life support function for military personnel.  Military personnel received 
information about military specific training and the medical centre.  These were 
facilities that were available to military personnel only, showing a further degree 
of differentiation between military and civilian staff, which added to the tensions 
between those two groups.   
The legitimised and required experience of the JSAU arrivals process reinforced 
the military identity as opposed to developing or reinforcing a pan-DE&S identity 
or culture, thus indicating once again the multi-cultural nature of DE&S.  One 
consequence of the lack of consistent integration of staff into groups was the lack 
on integration of mental models, as shown in Figure 2.  The led to both tension 
between the old group and the new member and also cultural drag. 
Induction into DE&S at its creation and afterwards into teams was inconsistent.  
Therefore ‘old’ DPA and DLO groups and their behaviours could still be seen in 
DE&S and these groups and their behaviours acted to slow down the 
organisational, cultural and behavioural changes in DE&S through cultural drag.  
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The logical conclusion that follows from this is that if DE&S leadership are seeking 
to create a cohesive organisation and also within organisational transformation, 
then a hierarchy of technical induction and inclusive socialisation in the DE&S, 
domain, Operating Centre, Business Unit and teams must be developed.  If this 
is not implemented DE&S will remain a divided organisation and subject to 
cultural drag, thus slowing down the pace of organisational change. Also new 
members of staff, and also those that go through organisational changes will 
remain psychologically in the ‘old’ organisation, exhibiting behaviours that are not 
congruent with new ways of working.  This also applies to technical organisational 
changes, where for example, processes or IT systems do not change quickly to 
match new organisational requirements then this will slow both the pace and likely 
success of organisational change.  
Formal, team-building was found to be inconsistently practised and was therefore 
inconsistently experienced by those taking part in it. Formal team-building was 
also found to be generally divisive as described by Sherif (1956) in that 
competitive team-building built boundaries, whereas collaborative exercises 
enabled group members to work together.   
Formal induction and team-building might therefore be considered to be a waste 
of DE&S time and money, because of its inconsistency, the manner in which it 
was practised and the effect that it had on participants.  Conversely, informal 
team-building, where relationships between people were explored was generally 
seen to be more effective at building better teams.  This inconsistency of 
induction, socialisation and team-building practice also contributed to cultural 
drag.   
Cultural drag occurred because team cultures, such as the DPA (Defence 
Procurement Agency), the DLO (Defence Logistics Organisation), or the WSA 
(Warships Support Agency), were more meaningful and also the ‘new’ DE&S 
behaviours were not modelled and inculcated into staff via induction into the new 
DE&S.   
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In terms of ways of working, or cultural norms in DE&S there were two formal 
cultural axes that were consistently evident.  These applied throughout the 
research, these axes were the socio-technical and the socio-cultural.   
The existence of the socio-technical and the socio-cultural organisation in DE&S 
was a symptom of the divide between the bureaucracy, and the project teams.  
The Project Teams saw themselves as being different from the bureaucracy.  The 
divide was also one of the indicators that DE&S was a multi-organisational 
cultural organisation.  This is shown in Figure 6-1 A Conceptual View of the 
Organisational Culture of DE&S which uses the vernacular labels of the groups 
to show how the pre-DE&S groups remained in predominantly the same location 
in DE&S as they had in the DPA and the DLO and that DE&S was the 
bureaucracy that was imposed on top of the DPA and DLO.   
The difference between the Organisational cultures and the Ethos of DE&S are 
shown in Figure 6-2 Differences: Project Effort and Bureaucratic Culture and 
Effect. where the horizontal axis represents the bureaucratic, functional culture 
of DE&S and the vertical axis shows the ethos of ‘front-line-first’, or delivery.  
The single ethos of front-line-first may actually be used as a metaphor to 
represent the organisational cultures of DE&S as a single statement of an 
organisational value, and also as a metaphor through which the concept of a 
single organisational culture may be represented.   
That ethos of front-line-first is the power of commitment of the staff in DE&S, and 
the shadow of bureaucracy was the bureaucratic organisational culture, which 
intermingled with the multiple organisational cultures in DE&S to hinder the work 
of DE&S in supplying the armed services with the right equipment, at the right 
time and at the right cost.   
This model is also seen in the ‘delivery v functional’ model that is described as 
part of the Bespoke Trading Entity of the new DE&S.  
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The results were exhaustively validated through reference to prior literature and 
also by referral back to DE&S.  This research is therefore able to confidently 
suggest that not only is it highly plausible, but that it is completely logical to reach 
the conclusion that identity, linguistic frameworks, evolutionarily predicated group 
sizes and also the ways that induction and socialisation were carried out worked 
together as system of factors to affect the organisational culture of DE&S.   
None of the factors worked in isolation from each other, but they may have 
worked together as a flexible hierarchy of effects depending on the context in 
which they were experienced, both in time, in relation to internal DE&S, or 
external factors.   
These naturally occurring factors were reinforced by the way that they are 
organisationally legitimised, thus making DE&S a fractured organisation with no 
single organisational culture, being thus a multi-organisational cultural 
organisation, but with a single ethos, that of front-line-first.   
They were further reinforced by the way that they are organisationally legitimised, 
thus making DE&S an organisation with no single organisational culture, but 
instead being a multi-organisational cultural organisation, with a single ethos, that 
of  front-line first.   
By viewing all of these factors through the lens of social and evolutionary 
anthropology and combining that with the use of the metaphors of tribe and family 
in DE&S it enabled this research to describe DE&S as a para-tribal organisation 
with no single organisational culture, but with a single ethos, that of Front line first 
and delivery.   
I suggest that these factors acted together to create a fractured organisation with 
multiple organisational and social cultures, but within the multiplicity of cultures 
there was one single ethos that brought all staff together, that of ‘front-line-first’.  
This was the power of commitment and the delivery ethos that supported the front 
line, but this ethos was overshadowed by the bureaucracy that attempted to stifle 
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people’s efforts to support the front line and which was most visible to politicians 
and media critics. 
Implications of this Research 
The study of knowledge-based organisations gives space to identify the 
interaction of people with the groups that exist in organisations, their identities, 
cultures and sub-cultures, and how those cultures interact with the technical and 
functional organisation and also how group size from a right size point of view 
should be considered.   
This research suggests that the combination of socio-technical and socio-cultural 
analysis of organisations should become an accepted analytical stance within 
management theory because many organisations are now post-industrial and are 
knowledge-based, as described by, for example, Alvesson (1993), (2001).  Also 
that the use of evolutionary anthropology and psychology are useful lenses 
through which underlying reasons for group behaviours may be identified and 
understood.   
The implications for future research fall into three broad camps: one, within 
Government and large bureaucracies, secondly within other large organisations 
and thirdly, within the areas of organisational thinking, management theory, 
organisational design and development.   
Within government organisations and large bureaucracies the theoretical 
framework that was used by this research may be of use in investigating and 
potentially improving the way that those organisations function.  That is because 
DE&S is part of the same government machinery, and therefore the research may 
be able to be replicated with the same degree of veracity in other government 
departments as was obtained in DE&S.  That implication may also be valid for 
large organisations that support bureaucracies, especially in relation to 
developing the most effective size teams and working groups.   
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This research has also developed a new way of looking at organisations that is 
multi  modal.  It is therefore potentially able to not simply describe and analyse 
organisations using this framework, but also to recommend valid, academically 
and experientially supported recommendations to aid organisations and 
organisational change projects.  This research also has implications for 
management theory, as it has added a further layer of reasoning underneath the 
existing organisational theory literature, where for example Amason and 
Sapienza (1997), Curral et al. (2001), Fried (1991), Haleblian and Finkelstein 
(1993), Pearce and Herbik (2004), Tohidi and Tarokh (2006),  and also Cohen 
and Bailey (1997) indicate that team size is functionally driven.  This research 
suggests that there is an underlying cognitive bias within those team sizes that 
are evolutionarily predicated and that bias can be seen throughout that literature.   
Despite these factors producing what appear to be predominantly negative 
behaviours, which were described in the vernacular and also externally, as tribes 
and tribalism, the teams and people in DE&S, through the ethos of ‘front-line-
first’, were still committed to the ‘front line’ and delivering military equipment, often 
in spite of the efforts of corporate DE&S and the bureaucratic culture.   
One final conclusion is that the single ethos of front-line-first may actually be used 
as a metaphor to represent the organisational cultures of DE&S as a single 
statement of an organisational value, and also as a metaphor through which the 
concept of a single organisational culture may be represented.   
That ethos of front-line-first is the power of commitment, and the shadow of 
bureaucracy was the bureaucratic culture, which intermingled with the multiple 
organisational cultures in DE&S to hinder the work of DE&S in supplying the 
armed services with the right equipment, at the right time and at the right cost.   
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8.1.3 Recommendations.  
The implications of this research for organisations are wide ranging and cover 
areas such as identity and commitment to the frontline, organisational culture and 
ethos, organisational change techniques and also organisational design and 
creating ‘right-size’ teams and other groups.  This can be achieved by using the 
framework that has been used within this research to show how identity is linked 
to commitment, and also how care must be taken when imposing a new 
organisational identity on an organisation.   
 
 Recommendation: ascertain which groups people identify with, how 
strongly they identify with them and also how strongly they identify with 
elements of their organisation and identify exactly what it is that they 
identify with.  This can then be used to develop the new organisational 
narrative for the new organisation.   
This research also helps by showing the importance of induction and 
socialisation, both in times of organisational change and also when bringing new 
members into teams.  Through the explanation and understanding of the socio-
technical and the socio-cultural approaches to socialisation and induction this 
research has shown how each type of integration is important. 
 
 Recommendation: make induction and socialisation in organisations in all 
its forms, including team-building consistent and meaningful to team-
members.   
This research has shown DE&S why the team sizes and also the hierarchy of 
group sizes are appropriate for DE&S; that they have an evolutionary basis and 
also that organisational design in DE&S has a cognitive bias.   
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 Recommendation: organisations must understand that these group sizes 
are vital to organisational effectiveness, and it must learn to manage and 
maintain these groupings.  It must therefore become consciously 
competent in recognising the evolutionary effects on organisational 
design.   
This research informs organisational research by showing clearly that there is no 
single organisational culture in DE&S, but there is a single ethos, that of ‘front-
line first’ that takes primacy over the cultural differences.  The work that is being 
undertaken by consultants to change DE&S, includes changing the 
organisational culture, this research provides evidence to inform those changes.  
 
 Organisations must firstly understand and then manage the cultural 
boundaries that exist within them and also those that affect it.  It must 
also understand how culture and ethos interact and ensure that the 
interaction remains positive, and that as this research suggests, the 
power of commitment is not swamped by the shadow of bureaucracy.   
A further area where this research informs organisational research is that of the 
implication of the existence of a linguistic change, from employee to stakeholder.  
This change informs the communication problems that are described in the 
vernacular between the leadership and the workers.  The ‘problem’ is that there 
is a difference in language between the two groups, and that difference is not 
understood by the leadership group, not that there are not enough 
communications.  
 Organisations must understand and then manage the linguistic 
boundaries that exist within it.  It must also understand how language 
and identity interact and ensure that the interaction remains positive, and 
that as this research suggests, emotional intelligence levels are raised 
within the leadership group. 
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The recommendations of this thesis for DE&S and other organisations are wide 
ranging and cover areas such as identity and commitment to the front-line, 
however that is defined, organisational culture and ethos, organisational change 
techniques and also organisational design and creating ‘right-size’ teams and 
other groups.  DE&S is in 2015 undergoing further change, so this thesis can 
inform those changes.  This can be achieved by using this thesis to show how 
identity is linked to commitment, and also how care must be taken when imposing 
a new organisational identity on an organisation.   
 
 Recommendation: ascertain which groups’ people identify with, how 
strongly they identify with them and also how strongly they identify with 
the new organisational narrative for the BTE.  Create a new narrative that 
staff can identify with without being coerced.  
 For other organisations going though organisational change such as 
mergers, ascertain which groups’ people identify with, how strongly they 
identify with them and also how strongly they identify with the new 
organisational narrative.   
This thesis also helps by showing the importance of induction and socialisation, 
both in times of organisational change and also when bringing new members into 
teams.  Induction takes more than a week, and socialisation in to the 
organisational culture a lot longer than that (Shaw, 2004).  Through the 
explanation and understanding of the socio-technical and the socio-cultural 
approaches to socialisation and induction this thesis has shown how each type 
of integration is important. 
 Recommendation: make induction and socialisation in DE&S in all its 
forms, including team-building, consistent and more meaningful to team-
members.   
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 All organisations should make induction and socialisation in all its forms, 
including team-building, consistent and more meaningful to team-
members.   
This thesis has shown why the team sizes and also the hierarchy of group sizes 
are appropriate for DE&S and that they have an evolutionary basis It has also 
shown that organisational design in DE&S was affected by a cognitive bias.   
 
 Recommendation: DE&S must understand that these group sizes are 
vital to organisational effectiveness, and it must learn to manage and 
maintain these groupings.  It must therefore become consciously 
competent in recognising the evolutionary effects on organisational 
design.   
 All large organisations should make efforts to become consciously 
competent in understanding that these group sizes are vital to 
organisational effectiveness, and they must learn to manage and 
maintain these groupings.  They must therefore become consciously 
competent in recognising the evolutionary effects on organisational 
design.   
This thesis informs DE&S by showing clearly that there is no single organisational 
culture in DE&S, but there is a single ethos, that of ‘front-line first’ that takes 
primacy over the cultural differences.  The work that is being undertaken by 
consultants to change DE&S includes changing the organisational culture.  This 
thesis provides evidence to inform those changes and warns against 
compromising the ‘front-line-first’ ethos.  
 
 DE&S must firstly understand and then manage the cultural boundaries 
that exist within it and also those that affect it, such as the front line 
commands and also of consultants and manpower support, i.e., MSPs  
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(Managed Service Providers). (The Stationery Office, 2013c) It must also 
understand how culture and ethos interact and ensure that the interaction 
remains positive, and that as this thesis suggests, the power of 
commitment is not swamped by the shadow of bureaucracy.   
 Other organisations must make efforts to understand the cultural 
boundaries and values within their organisations.  This will then enable 
them to understand the tensions between delivery to the customer and 
the enabling and supporting and to balance the needs of the customer 
with those of managing the organisation.   
A further area where this thesis informs DE&S is that of the implication of the 
existence of a linguistic change at B2 level, from employee to stakeholder.  This 
change informs the communication problems that are described in the vernacular 
between the leadership and the workers.  The ‘problem’ is that there is a 
difference in language between the two groups, and that difference is not 
understood by the leadership group.  
 
 DE&S must understand and then manage the linguistic boundaries that 
exist within it.  It must also understand how language and identity interact 
and ensure that the interaction remains positive, and that as this thesis 
suggests, emotional intelligence levels are raised within the leadership 
group.   
 Large organisations must make efforts to understand the linguistic 
boundaries that exist within them and make efforts to break those 
barriers down in order to be more cohesive organisations.  
 
This thesis has shown that personal and geographical identity, both at the group 
and personal level affects organisation and personal behaviour and culture.  
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 Recommendation:  DE&S must understand and manage personal and 
geographical identity such as the use of uniforms as a symbol of division 
between groups.  It must also recognise that the marking and protection 
of territory is an evolved human need.  Thus when implementing flexible 
desking it must understand and address these deep needs in order to 
make this type of organisational change smooth and successful. 
 Organisations must recognise, understand and manage personal and 
geographical identity as they can become symbols of division between 
groups.  They must also recognise that the marking and protection of 
territory is an evolved human need and be cognisant of these needs 
when implementing organisational changes that impinge on group or 
personal territory.   
 
This thesis also has implications for organisations that interact with DE&S, or are 
within MOD, such as DSTL, Army HQ, Navy Command and Air Command.  They 
are all large mixed military and civilian organisations, and so have many parallels 
with DE&S.  But also they are in some respects closer to the front-line than is 
DE&S, and so, if the factors that affect the organisational culture of DE&S are 
present in those commands, as is likely, the effect on the Command HQ may be 
that there is also a pattern of cultural fracturing, with multiple organisational 
cultures, and that there may even be a different ethos.  It will be of interest within 
any future research agenda, if allowed, to shed light on the complexities of those 
organisational cultures.   
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8.2 A Future Organisational Research Agenda in DE&S and 
Government Organisations  
In terms of future research agenda, it will be of interest to carry out a comparative 
study within the Bespoke Trading Entity as part of the DE&S transformation using 
the theoretical framework from this research in the next phase of organisational 
changes in DE&S.  Also, in relation to the Transformation of D&S into a ‘match 
fit’ organisation by 2015 (Shaw, 2015c) a further are that will provide a rich seam 
of data is that of the changes to the DE&S organisational culture that are being 
dictated via the organisational change teams and the Manged Service Providers 
(MSPs) who are attempting to impose new cultural traits onto DE&S, such as 
personal safety culture (Shaw, 2015c).  
In terms of a wider research agenda outside of DE&S, and in UK Government 
departments it will also be of value to explore the suitability of the framework in 
the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) as, in 2015, it is going 
through an organisational change that is similar to the one that DE&S went 
through between 2007 until 2015.  A further field of similar research would be the 
UK government Cabinet Office, which is currently undergoing substantial 
organisational change, including for example, the introduction of flexible desking 
which caused such difficulties in DE&S.  The themes that were identified in this 
research were recognised and expanded on, potentially providing a further field 
for further research (Shaw, 2015b).  
It will also be of interest to replicate this research in the front line headquarters 
with UK defence, such as Army HQ, Andover, as it is preparing for the Future 
Force 2020 changes (The Stationery Office, 2015) and at the same time 
investigating the command culture within the British Army.  In a wider practical 
research sense it will be of further interest to replicate this research in UK defence 
contractors because of their proximity to DE&S, and also the similarities within 
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their staffing, secondment and size of the groups within their hierarchy as 
describe when testing this research. 
It will be of further interest to replicate the investigation of group and team sizes 
within both the wider MOD and also other government departments, defence 
contractors, non UK military/civilian organisations, non UK government 
departments and also non-governmental organisations (NGOs).   
In terms of wider military and civilian organisations, material from this study is 
already being used as a case study within a NATO report97 that is investigating 
tensions between military personnel and civilian staff across NATO as a multi-
national, military and civilian organisation.   
This research therefore appears to have worldwide applicability at this early 
stage, even though it was carried out within a single UK organisation.   
8.2.1 Implications of This Research – A Wider Organisational 
Research Agenda 
In addition to taking the research framework that was used in this research into 
other organisations there are specific areas of enquiry that this research may help 
to illuminate.  Some of those are presented here. 
During the course of this research it has become apparent that the unique, multi-
factorial theoretical and pragmatic approach that was taken by this thesis was of 
interest to other organisational researchers.  Therefore, the implications for future 
research fall into three broad camps: one, within Government and large 
bureaucracies; secondly, within other large organisations; and thirdly, within the 
areas of organisational thinking, management theory, organisational design and 
development.   
Within government organisations and large bureaucracies the theoretical 
framework that was used by this thesis may be of use in investigating and 
                                            
97 Technical Activity Proposal (TAP) HFM-226. 
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potentially improving the way that those organisations function.  That is because 
DE&S is part of the same government machinery, and therefore the research may 
be able to be replicated with the same degree of veracity in other government 
departments as was obtained in DE&S.  This thesis may have direct application 
within Defence acquisition organisations internationally such as for example 
Canada and Australia.   
This research may be especially useful within NATO, the United Nations (UN) 
and the European Union as more joint and multi-national military, aid and peace-
keeping operations are implemented, with the concomitant need for different 
military and civilian organisational and national cultures to work together 
effectively, at short notice and under extreme pressure.  
That implication may also be valid for large organisations that support 
bureaucracies, especially in relation to developing the most effective sized teams 
and working groups.   
This thesis suggests that the combination of socio-technical and socio-cultural 
analysis of organisations that is outlined in this thesis and which was used within 
this research should become an accepted analytical stance within management 
theory to give space to identify the interaction of people with the groups that exist 
in organisations, their identities, cultures and sub-cultures.  It also enables the 
investigation of how those cultures interact with the technical and functional 
organisation and also how the planning of group size should be done.  Those 
factors, combined with the use of evolutionary anthropology and psychology are 
useful lenses through which underlying reasons for group behaviours may be 
identified and understood.   
This thesis also has implications for management theory, as it has added a further 
layer of reasoning underneath the existing organisational theory literature, where 
for example Amason and Sapienza (1997), Curral et al. (2001), Fried (1991), 
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993), Pearce and Herbik (2004), Tohidi and Tarokh 
(2006), and also Cohen and Bailey (1997) indicate that team size is functionally 
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driven.  This thesis suggests that there is an underlying cognitive bias within those 
team sizes that are evolutionarily predicated and that bias can be seen 
throughout that literature.   
A further area that warrants investigation is the relationship between team size 
and high and low performing teams, thus expanding and developing the work of, 
for example  (Anthony and Janet, 2002, Katzenbach and Smith, 1992, Yeatts and 
Hyten, 1998).  
This thesis has also indicated that as Nicholson (Nicholson, 2000, Nicholson, 
2008) describes organisations are both unnatural and also that evolutionary 
factors affect organisational management and outputs.  Therefore this thesis and 
its supporting theoretical and investigatory frameworks can usefully be used to 
further investigate and explain the effects of some evolutionary factors, such as 
group size and language within organisations.   
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Epilogue 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis has documented aspects of DE&S culture from its inception in 2007.  
This epilogue is being written in April 2014, in the first weeks of the new Bespoke 
Government Trading Entity (BTE).  
1.2 Vesting Day April 2, 2014 
In 2012 it was decided to implement major changes in DE&S, and in 2014 the 
Defence Reform Bill was passed by Her Majesty’s Government (The Stationery 
Office, 2013a).  The plan was initially to change DE&S from a Civil Service 
organisation into a Government Owned Contractor Operated entity (GOCO), with 
external partners providing particular areas of expertise.   
The change programme had been led by the Materiel Strategy Team, with 
external support.  However, the transition to GOCO was not universally well 
received, generating high levels of cynicism, both within DE&S and outside (The 
Stationery Office, 2013b)  In the event, due to commercial considerations, a 
GOCO was not created.  Instead a new version of DE&S was created within three 
months of the GOCO proposal being rejected after £7.4m (Unknown, 2014) had 
been spent on the plans.   
To document the process, practice and behaviours and effects of the GOCO 
changes on the DE&S workforce would require a study in its own right.   
Therefore, this epilogue will take some of the themes that were identified within 
this thesis and discuss the transition from DE&S to the Bespoke Trading Entity 
(BTE) within those frames of reference.   
This approach seeks to identify any initial differences and similarities between the 
organisational changes that occurred to merge the DPA and the DLO to form 
DE&S, and those that led to the creation of the BTE.   
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The original concept of the Government Owned Contractor Operated entity for 
DE&S was proposed by Bernard Gray98 in his report Review of Defence 
Acquisition for the Secretary of State For Defence, called the Gray Report (The 
National Archive, 2012)  In DE&S, the move towards a (GOCO) was signified by 
the creation of a small separate team to manage the materiel strategy.   
This created an in-group that were different from the rest of DE&S, because the 
group was mostly populated by external consultants.  The members of this group 
were psychologically in the new organisation, because they were designing it, as 
opposed to everyone else in DE&S, who, in the vernacular, were still getting kit 
out of the door to support the lads and lasses on the frontline.   
The group driving these changes only expanded in late 2013 when it became 
increasingly clear that the commercial bidders for the GOCO were pulling out of 
the commercial process (Unknown, 2013)  The fact that the bidders pulled out 
reinforced and appeared to vindicate the cynicism that was felt and articulated by 
many members of DE&S.  That was because while changes were necessary, it 
was believed that the GOCO option did not appear to be the right one, because 
the majority of people in DE&S were civil servants and they felt that they were 
there to serve the front line, and not to make profits (Shaw, 2013f).  
The competition rules under which the GOCO was being run meant that an 
internal comparator had to be developed.  This internal comparator was in 
essence DE&S being run as a Civil Service organisation as opposed to being 
part, or wholly privatised. This was accompanied by even more cynicism as this 
internal comparator, which was called DE&S+, and which was initiated after the 
GOCO programme, had to build up staff and experience.  This group held a series 
of workshops at which selected employees were asked what was good or bad 
about DE&S, in order to inform the comparator.  In December 2013, it became 
clear that the GOCO could not go ahead at that time because all the bidders, 
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apart from one, had pulled out.  This event triggered an intense period of work to 
develop a solution that was called DE&S ++, which became the Bespoke Trading 
Entity (BTE) that vested on 1 April 2014.   
Work to provide information for the GOCO work engendered huge amounts of 
antipathy from all grades towards the Materiel Strategy Team, not only because 
of the bureaucratic demands for information to inform the materiel strategy, but 
also because of the feeling that a GOCO was not going to work because of the 
nature of DE&S’s work, how people felt about it and the nature of the changes.   
Expectations prior to, and on, vesting day from DE&S to BTE were managed 
differently from when DE&S was created.  It was made clear by senior staff that 
not much was going to change,(Shaw, 2014a) and that employees would not see 
much change until managed service partners were brought in (Smith, 2014).  
These managed service partners were to bring in extra skills and experience that 
DE&S supposedly did not possess.  
 So the only changes that were seen were that the neighbourhoods were 
decorated, flooring and toilets repaired, and planning applications for more car 
parking spaces were made.  It was announced that there would be changes to 
the annual performance review system, which had received a negative reaction 
from a large number of civilian staff (Shaw, 2014a).   
But one of the most discussed changes were the freedoms to pay higher salaries 
and to operate differently as the BTE moved away from a central MOD 
organisation, to become an organisation that had hard boundaries between the 
Ministry of Defence and the frontline commands.  But in relation to this, staff were 
told that the extra money was not for them, it was only for new people who had 
the skills that they, the old staff in DE&S, did not have, thus having the effect of 
making many staff even more cynical about the changes.  Some of this cynicism 
was blunted by DE&S carrying out a piece of work to take suggestions that were 
made by staff on day one, and then put in place ‘hygiene changes’ such as repairs 
to buildings and improvements to the bane of Abbeywood staffs’ lives, car-parking 
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(Shaw, 2014f).  This was a difference from the DPA and DLO merger, where the 
only changes that were seen on day one were symbolic.  
In terms of identity, the name of the organisation remained the same, but it was 
a different, new type of organisation.  The Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM) 
became its Chief Executive.  The flag outside the front of Abbeywood remained 
the same, but the strapline ‘The Future is ours to Deliver’, was emblazoned on all 
of flags that greeted new staff on day one, as shown in Photograph 1-1.   
 
 
Photograph 1-1 DE&S Bespoke Trading Entity Symbols April 1 2014 
Source: Andrew Linnet Crown Copyright 
Another difference between the creation of the BTE and DE&S was that there 
were no new lanyards for staff who remained in DE&S.  The staff, however, of 
the organisation that left DE&S: the Information Systems and Support (ISS) 
organisation, which became part of Joint Forces Command (JFC) April 2014, 
received a new lanyard to signify their new symbolic and pragmatic identity.  The 
lanyard, shown in Photograph 1-2 was therefore used to signify a new identity, 
not a continuing identity.  There is no reference to DE&S on the lanyard. The 
reference is to Joint Forces Command (JFC), representing a total divesting of the 
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old, DE&S identity.  Many of those people then remained at Abbeywood, carrying 
on as before in their teams and work-groups and also on the same floor-plates.  
Therefore their geographical identity had not changed although their 
organisational identity had.   
 
 
Photograph 1-2 ISS JFC Lanyard  
Source: Derek Shaw 
But the imposition of lanyards and identity on the staff of ISS appeared to have 
the same effect in 2014, as did the imposition of the DE&S identity on the staff of 
the DPA and the DLO in 2007, i.e., they were treated negatively:  
‘You noticed and asked about my new lanyard.  Yes, I got 3-line-whipped 
to replace my Help For Heroes lanyard with a Joint Force Command/ISS 
lanyard as part of the rebranding and, I suppose, initial psychological 
separation, exercise.  I'll wait a bit until the rebranding enthusiasm has 
died down and swap back to HfH [Help for Heroes].......the reason I'm here 
is to support Front Line at whatever remove, not to embroil myself in the 
constant organisational churn as internal empires rise and fall’ (Shaw, 
2014b). 
  
 454 
 
 
 
Photograph 1-3 Chief Defence Materiel With the Vesting Day Cake 
Source: Andrew Linnet. Crown Copyright 
There was also a food element to induction into the BTE, as there was cake and 
a barbecue available in the central plaza.  The changes on Day One were 
overwhelmingly symbolic, not substantial, pragmatic, and consisted of flags, 
cakes, as shown in Photograph 1-3, of Bernard Gray, DE&S Chief of Defence 
Materiel, standing next to the DE&S cake.   
There was an implied socio-cultural element to the day’s events, because in 
addition to being away from one’s desk and listening to the briefings and being 
able to socialise with others.  Photograph 1-4 shows Bernard Gay unveiling the 
new DE&S plaque.   
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Photograph 1-4 Unveiling the Plaque on Vesting Day  
Source: Andrew Linnet. Crown Copyright 
The unveiling of a plaque is a further indication that space can be used in a 
symbolic way to construct, or re-construct identities as is described by Van 
Marrewijk and Yanow (2010).    
Photograph 1-5 shows Bernard Gray addressing staff on vesting day.  These 
events were held in then Neighbourhoods across DE&S Abbeywood.  A small 
stage was created to raise the speaker up and amplification was provided so that 
everyone could hear what the speaker was saying.  In this Neighbourhood the 
audience can be seen on the balconies and walkways as being at floor level.  This 
indicates the popularity of the events.   
There are two things that are of immediate noteworthiness within this 
Neighbourhood.  Firstly the Ensign that has been draped over the balcony was a 
tribal symbol, of the Royal Navy, and that an Operating Centre, not a DE&S 
symbol.  This indicates that there was large naval contingent in this 
Neighbourhood.  In fact this is where the Maritime Domain within DE&S is 
centred.  The visibility of the ensign ensures that anyone who sees that 
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photograph knows which group predominates in that Neighbourhood, it is a 
symbol of presence and power and its use indicated that this group may have 
wanted to be recognized as being different within the new organisational 
construct, or perhaps as a challenge to the new corporate identity.  
Secondly, the restaurant areas, which is visible in the photograph as the sunken 
area immediately behind the stage, were cleared of tables for that day and a 
reduced food service was made available to staff.  This clearance was made to 
enable more staff to be able to listen to the corporate message.  As is shown in 
the photograph, attendance at this event was very high because not only were 
people interested in the messages and what was happening to them and their 
jobs on vesting day, but some of the senior staff were not usually seen by many 
staff, so this was an opportunity to meet with and talk to the senior leaders.   
 
Photograph 1-5 Vesting Day Briefing by the new Chief Executive. 
Source: Andrew Linnet. Crown Copyright 
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1.3 Conclusion 
Even if people attended the briefings on day one, and there were many that did, 
their jobs did not change on the 1st of April.  Socialisation into the changed 
organisation was attempted, but not achieved through ‘town hall’ meetings where 
the Chief of Defence Materiel or materiel strategy director briefed up to 400 
people, normally 200 in number (Shaw, 2014n).  This was formal communication 
with questions and answers.   
The concept of the structure of the Bespoke Trading Entity was briefed to 1* and 
2* leaders (Shaw, 2014g) and they were asked to hold cascade briefs to further 
brief their staff.  There were differing levels of engagement and cynicism from 
these leaders.  This could be interpreted as honesty, over the magnitude of the 
intended changes, or cynicism in the way that it was managed (Shaw, 2014g).   
There may be a more formal induction to the Bespoke Trading Entity as time 
progresses, and the researcher may still, at that time, be part of DE&S, and will 
make notes and will analyse the induction practice and judge its effectiveness.  
Let us hope, that at a cultural level the difficulties inherent in DE&S’ will not be 
re-invented and that the new DE&S will at last learn from its own experiences of 
organisational change.   
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Appendixes 
Appendices 
Appendix A  
Questions That Informed the Research 
“Does the tribal nature of the groups of people within these organisations 
influence knowledge transfer between the groups, if there is an effect, what is 
it?”.  
“How is it the effect caused?  Why does it happen and how can organisations use 
any influence to their advantage?”.  
“Does the ritual and symbolism that is used to inculcate loyalty and identity to an 
organisation, make it more difficult for people in these organisations to trust 
others who are not in their organisation?”. 
“How does the ritualism and symbolism that exists within each service affect a 
service member’s ability to trust other staff who are not of their service group?”.  
“Do the induction methods used and promoted by groups within the organisation 
influence knowledge transfer between groups and individuals within those 
groups?”. 
 “How are people in the groups affected by the induction and identity development 
and maintenance processes; can this effect be reliably measured?”. 
  “What are the unseen frameworks, linguistic, behavioural, personal and 
organisational that cause people to behave in this way?”. 
“How does the change in membership of these groups affect the core group 
identity”. 
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 “Does a person still maintain an identity in their core group and what type of 
identity does it become when they have left the core group?”.99 
 ”What identity is retained when members of the armed forces leave the active 
service by their joining the Royal British Legion,  for example or retiring and 
joining the civil service retirees groups?”.  
“What identity is retained when members of a single service move to a joint 
service posting?”. 
“Does the fact that in the services as in any large organisation, many people find 
their life partner, spouse, lover or significant other and form relationships with 
them that become permanent both within and outside of any organisational 
context cause people to develop a stronger identity?”.  
 “What effect is there in belonging to one of these groups in respect to knowledge 
transfer?  If you are a member of one of these groups and another member has 
some privileged information do you get that information first?”, “under the 
counter”, before the people who are supposed to get that information?”  
 “If you are not a member of one of those in-groups are you ignored or 
downgraded in terms of trust for receiving information”? 
 
  
                                            
99 One example is where the number of smokers has declined, but the reformed smokers group may have 
expanded or these people may not belong or identify themselves with a group at all once they have left 
the ‘smokers’ group. 
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Appendix B  
Academic Papers Derived From This Thesis 
Liverpool Management School and Keele University Ethnography Conference, 
held at Cardiff Business School: The Power of Commitment v. the Shadow of 
Bureaucracy: Socialisation, Identity and Group Behaviour in the Ministry of 
Defence in Defence Equipment and Support.  
http://www.liv.ac.uk/managementschool/ethnography_conference/papers2011/S
haw.pdf 
The Power of Commitment v. the Shadow of Bureaucracy: Socialisation, Identity 
and Group Behaviour in the Ministry of Defence in Defence Equipment and 
Support, Presented at Emerging Ethnographic Friendships Conference 20-21 
June 2012, University Campus Suffolk, Ipswich, UK  
The Power of Commitment v. the Shadow of Bureaucracy: Socialisation, Identity 
and Group Behaviour in the Ministry of Defence in Defence Equipment and 
Support.  Presented at Shrivenham Student Symposium 2012. 
Culture and Transformation in Defence: Recent Research Findings in DE&S. 
presented at Beckett House Network Series: with Dr Kirke. 
Architectures and Physical boundaries as signifiers of inter-group conflict: 
Presented at ULMS Ethnography Conference, UCS, Ipswich August 2014. 
PhD Poster: ULMS Ethnography Conference, UCS, Ipswich August 2014. 
In preparation: Case study, Tensions between military and civilian employees, 
NATO task: Technical Activity Proposal (TAP) HFM-226. 
In preparation: Book chapter: Identity Transtions in Ethnographic Research, in  
Encuntering Ethnographies, (provisonal title), Palgrave Macmillan.  
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